In re Stoneroad

BACKGROUND

In 1987, a jury found petitioner guilty of the second degree murder of Michael Kane, the 17-year-old son of petitioner‘s long-time girlfriend, Mildred Irwin, and of the attempted murder of Irwin. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 664/187.) He was sentenced to a term of 15 years to life for the murder of Kane and an additional 11-year consecutive term for the attempted murder of Irwin and weapons enhancements. Petitioner entered state prison on July 1, 1987. He became eligible for parole on March 9, 2002, and is currently serving his 26th year in state prison.2 In 2006, the Board conducted a subsequent parole suitability hearing and denied petitioner parole. In 2010, the Board again denied petitioner parole and scheduled his next parole hearing to occur in three years. The Board‘s 2010 rulings are the subject of this petition. Petitioner’s Background Prior to his imprisonment, petitioner had a long-standing problem with alcohol that is inseparable from any account of his life and the commitment offenses. According to a 1987 probation department report, petitioner began drinking when he was 12 or 13 years old, and was drinking regularly by the time he was 16. Petitioner was a ―binge…

James Charles Stoneroad, a life-term inmate of state prison convicted of second degree murder, petitions for a writ of habeas corpus from the decision of the Board of Parole Hearings (the Board) denying him parole. Petitioner argues that the decision denying parole is arbitrary and unsupported by some evidence of his current dangerousness. He additionally urges that the gravity of his commitment offense can no longer be used to find him unsuitable for parole because he has already served more prison time than the maximum base term prescribed by the Board’s regulations for that offense.

We reject the latter argument but accept the former. As we explain, the Board’s decision does not reflect due consideration of numerous statutory and regulatory factors bearing upon suitability for parole and the evidence the Board relied upon does not rationally indicate petitioner is currently dangerous. Because the decision violates due process, we shall grant the petition and remand the matter to the Board for further proceedings pursuant to In re Prather (2010) 50 Cal.4th 238 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 291 , 234 P.3d 541 ] (Prather).

BACKGROUND

In 1987, a jury found petitioner guilty of…

I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority’s opinion that agrees with appellant’s contention that the Board of Parole Hearings (the Board) decision was “arbitrary and unsupported by some evidence of his current dangerousness.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 601.) I do so for several reasons: (1) although my colleagues cite most of the relevant authority regarding the standard of review we are required to use in cases such as this, a standard made very clear by our Supreme Court in In re Shaputis (2011) 53 Cal.4th 192 [ 134 Cal.Rptr.3d 86 , 265 P.3d 253 ] (Shaputis II), they fail to apply the core “modicum of evidence” test articulated in that case to the record before us; (2) they effectively ignore the ample evidence in the record supporting the Board’s decision and, instead, set forth why, in their view, the Board should have decided this case differently; and (3) finally, they overlook some of the specific legal points made by the Shaputis II court and other facts present in the record of this case. (Id. at p. 208.)

A. The Governing Law

In concluding its unanimous decision in Shaputis II, our Supreme Court listed five factors governing review by the judicial branch of…