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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10 11 JEREMY STAN RICE, Case No. 5:24-cv-02604-DDP-JC

12 Plaintiff, 13 ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT v. WITH LEAVE TO AMEND AND 14 DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO

RESPOND TO ORDER

15 SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY

SHERIFF’S BUREAU OF

16 DETENTION AND

CORRECTIONS,

17 18 Defendant. 19

I. SUMMARY

20 On December 4, 2024, Jeremy Stan Rice (“Plaintiff”), a California inmate 21 confined at West Valley Detention Center (“WVDC”) in Rancho Cucamonga, who 22 is proceeding pro se and has been granted leave to proceed without prepayment of 23 filing fees (“IFP”), formally filed a Civil Rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 24 § 1983 (“Section 1983”) against the “San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Bureau of 25 Detention and Corrections.” (Docket No. 1). Plaintiff claims Defendant has 26 violated his constitutional rights, including his right to “equality of civil rights,” by 27 depriving him of “the opportunity to education in law [sic]” due to allegedly 28 1 inadequate resources in WVDC’s law library. (Comp. at 5).1 He seeks “significant 2 relief and punitive damages.” (Comp. at 6). 3 The Court has screened the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 4 §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A. As the Complaint is deficient in multiple respects, 5 including those detailed below, it is dismissed with leave to amend. 6 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 7 A. The Screening Requirement 8 As Plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding IFP on a civil rights complaint against 9 governmental defendants, the Court must screen the Complaint, and is required to 10 dismiss the case at any time it concludes the action is frivolous or malicious, fails 11 to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a 12 defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 13 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); Byrd v. Phoenix Police Dep’t, 885 F.3d 639, 641 14 (9th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted). 15 When screening a complaint to determine whether it states any claim that is 16 viable, the Court applies the same standard as it would when evaluating a motion to 17 dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 18 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). Rule 12(b)(6), in turn, is 19 read in conjunction with Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 20 Zixiang Li v. Kerry, 710 F.3d 995, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2013). Under Rule 8, each 21 complaint filed in federal court must contain a “short and plain statement of the 22 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While 23 Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, at a minimum a complaint must 24 allege enough specific facts to provide both “fair notice” of the particular claim 25 26 1In the copy of the Complaint that is filed on the Court’s electronic docket, each 27 individual page is followed by a duplicate page. Citations to the Complaint in this Order refer to 28 the page numbers located on the bottom-right of each page of the form Complaint – i.e., “Page 1 or 6,” “Page 2 of 6,” etc. 2 1 || being asserted and “the grounds upon which [that claim] rests.” Bell Atlantic 2 || Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 & n.3 (2007) (citation and quotation marks 3 || omitted); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (Rule 8 pleading 4 || standard “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 5 || accusation” (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)). 6 To avoid dismissal on screening, a complaint must “contain sufficient factual 7 || matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 8 | Byrd, 885 F.3d at 642 (citations omitted); see also Johnson v. City of Shelby, 9 || Mississippi, 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014) (per curiam) (Twombly and Iqbal instruct that 10 | plaintiff “must plead facts sufficient to show that [plaintiffs] claim has substantive 11 } plausibility”). A claim is “plausible” when the facts alleged in the complaint would 12 || support a reasonable inference that the plaintiff is entitled to relief from a specific 13 || defendant for specific misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted); see 14 || also Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1242 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[A] [Section 1983] 15 || plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s 16 || own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 17 || 676)); Gauvin v. Trombatore, 682 F. Supp. 1067, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (complaint 18 || “must allege the basis of [plaintiff's] claim against each defendant” to satisfy Rule 19 || 8 requirements (emphasis added)). Allegations that are “merely consistent with” a 20 || defendant’s liability, or reflect only “the mere possibility of misconduct” do not 21 || “show[] that the pleader is entitled to relief” (as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 22 || 8(a)(2)), and thus are insufficient to state a claim that is “plausible on its face.” 23 || Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (citations and quotation marks omitted). 24 At this preliminary stage, “well-pleaded factual allegations” in a complaint 25 || are assumed true, while “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action” 26 || and “legal conclusion[s] couched as a factual allegation” are not. Id. (citation and 27 || quotation marks omitted); Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 763 (9th Cir. 2014) 28 || (“mere legal conclusions ‘are not entitled to the assumption of truth’” (quoting

1 || Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79)), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 1077 (2015). In addition, the 2 || Court is “not required to accept as true conclusory allegations which are 3 || contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint,” Steckman v. Hart 4 || Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1295-96 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted), and 5 || “need not [] accept as true allegations that contradict matters properly subject to 6 || judicial notice or by exhibit,” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 7 || 988 (9th Cir.), amended on denial of reh’g, 275 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation 8 | omitted). 9 In general, civil rights complaints are interpreted liberally in order to give 10 || pro se plaintiffs “the benefit of any doubt.” Byrd, 885 F.3d at 642 (citations and 11 || internal quotation marks omitted). Nonetheless, a pro se plaintiff must still follow 12 || the rules of procedure that govern all litigants in federal court, including the 13 || Rule 8 requirement that a complaint minimally state a short and plain statement of 14 || aclaim that is plausible on its face. See Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 15 || 1995) (per curiam) (“Although we construe pleadings liberally in their favor, pro se 16 || litigants are bound by the rules of procedure.” (citation omitted)), cert. denied, 516 17 || U.S. 838 (1995); see also Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 954 18 | (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“[A] liberal interpretation ofa... civil rights complaint 19 || may not supply essential elements of [a] claim that were not initially pled.” 20 || (quoting Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992)) (quotation marks 21 || omitted; ellipses in original)). 22 If a pro se complaint is dismissed because it does not state a viable claim, the 23 || court must freely grant “leave to amend” if it is “at all possible” that the plaintiff 24 || could fix the identified pleading errors by alleging different or new facts. Cafasso, 25 | U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th Cir. 2011) 26 || (citation omitted); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-30 (9th Cir. 2000) (en 27 || banc) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 28 | ///

1 B. Section 1983 Claims 2 To state a Section 1983 claim, a complaint must allege that a defendant, 3 || while acting under color of state law, caused a deprivation of the plaintiff's federal 4 || rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations 5 || omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). 6 || There is no vicarious liability in Section 1983 lawsuits. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. 7 || (citing, inter alia, Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 8 | U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). Hence, a government official may not be held liable under 9 || Section 1983 unless the particular official’s own actions caused the alleged 10 || constitutional deprivation, OSU Student Alliance v. Ray, 699 F.3d 1053, 1069 (9th 11 || Cir. 2012) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 819 (2013), anda 12 || municipal entity (such as a city or county, or its agencies and departments) may be 13 || held liable only for constitutional violations occurring pursuant to an official 14 | government policy or custom, Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 15 } 115, 121 (1992); Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. The municipal entity “cannot be held 16 || liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor — or, in other words, a municipality 17 || cannot be held liable under [Section] 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” 18 | Monell, 436 U.S. at 692; Bd. of the Cnty. Comm of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v. 19 || Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). Thus, “[iJn order to hold the County liable 20 || under [Section] 1983, [Plaintiff] must show (1) that he possessed a constitutional 21 || right of which he was deprived; (2) that the [County] had a policy; (3) that the 22 || policy amounts to deliberate indifference to [Plaintiffs] constitutional right; and 23 || (4) that the policy is the ‘moving force behind the constitutional violation.’” 24 || Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations and internal 25 || quotation marks omitted); Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 26 || 2011), cert. denied, 569 U.S. 904 (2013). 27 | /// 28 | ///

1 | IH. DISCUSSION 2 As indicated above, Plaintiff claims that his constitutional rights have been 3 || violated due to WVDC’s allegedly deficient law library. (See Comp. at 5). As 4 || explained below, the Complaint is dismissed with leave to amend because it fails to 5 || state a viable claim for relief.’ 6 The Constitution does not guarantee prisoners “an abstract, freestanding 7 || right to a law library or legal assistance.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 8 | (1996). However, prisoners do retain a constitutional right to “meaningful access 9 || to the courts,” which generally requires prison officials to ensure that prisoners 10 || have the “capability of bringing contemplated challenges to sentences or conditions 11 || of confinement before the courts,” including by providing prisoners with access to 12 || adequate law libraries. Id. at 351, 356; see also Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 13 | 828 (1977) (holding “that the fundamental constitutional right of access to the 14 || courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of 15 || meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or 16 || adequate assistance from persons trained in the law” (footnote omitted)), overruled 17 || in part on other grounds, Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354. To state a claim for violation of 18 || this right, a prisoner must plausibly show that the inadequate legal resources or 19 || assistance caused “actual injury” — that is, that the conditions frustrated or are 20 || impeding the inmate’s attempt to bring a nonfrivolous legal claim. Lewis, 518 U.S. 21 || at 348-49; Nev. Dep’t of Corr. v. Greene, 648 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2011) 22 || (citation omitted), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 911 (2012). As the Supreme Court 23 || explained: 24 /// 25 26) 00° □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ *The Complaint does not specify which rights were allegedly violated. Below, the Court 27 expressly analyzes the Complaint under the constitutional rights of access to the courts and to 28 || equal protection. The Court has reviewed the Complaint as a whole and cannot discern any other potentially viable federal grounds for relief based on Plaintiffs allegations, liberally construed.

1 [A]n inmate cannot establish relevant actual injury simply by 2 establishing that his prison’s law library or legal assistance program 3 is subpar in some theoretical sense. . . . “[M]eaningful access to the 4 courts is the touchstone,” and the inmate therefore must go one step 5 further and demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings in the library or 6 legal assistance program hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim. 7 He might show, for example, that a complaint he prepared was 8 dismissed for failure to satisfy some technical requirement which, 9 because of deficiencies in the prison’s legal assistance facilities, he 10 could not have known. Or that he had suffered arguably actionable 11 harm that he wished to bring before the courts, but was so stymied by 12 inadequacies of the law library that he was unable even to file a 13 complaint. 14 Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351 (quoting Bounds, 430 U.S. at 823). Here, Plaintiff alleges 15 that WVDC’s law library consists solely of books that “are damaged (missing 16 pages) or extremely outdated” (Comp. at 5), but he does not allege that these 17 conditions caused him to suffer any “actual injury” in litigating a nonfrivolous 18 legal claim. He therefore fails to state a claim on this basis. 19 Dismissal is also warranted to the extent that Plaintiff intends to assert a 20 claim for violation of his constitutional right to “equality,” or equal protection. 21 (See Comp. at 5). A claim for violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 22 Fourteenth Amendment requires showing that Defendant intentionally 23 discriminated against Plaintiff based upon Plaintiff’s membership in a protected (or 24 “suspect”) class, such as race, see, e.g., Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 25 686 (9th Cir. 2001), or that Defendant intentionally treated Plaintiff differently 26 from similarly situated individuals without a rational relationship to a legitimate 27 state purpose, Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). 28 /// 7 1 Here, Plaintiff vaguely asserts that Defendant has “denied every pro per 2 || individual equality of opportunity in education of law” at WVDC, due to the 3 || allegedly “damaged” or “outdated” law books. (Comp. at 5 (emphases added)). 4 || Pro per individuals — i.e., litigants who are not represented by counsel — are not a 5 || suspect class. See Leskinen v. Perdue, 837 F. App’x 447, 450 (9th Cir. 2020) 6 || (equal protection claim failed in part because plaintiff did not “identifly] any 7 || authority to suggest that pro se plaintiff's are a suspect class’’); Tran v. Nationstar 8 | Mortg. LLC, 2015 WL 6955015, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2015) (“Pro se litigants 9 || are not a suspect class meriting strict scrutiny.” (citing Wolfe v. George, 486 F.3d 10 | 1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007))). Neither are prisoners. See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 11 | F.3d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff therefore does not allege that he is a 12 || member of any suspect class. Moreover, he does not specify in what ways he, as a 13 || pro per inmate, has been treated differently from other, “similarly situated” 14 || inmates, including inmates with counsel. He does not allege, for example, that 15 || some inmates have direct access to a better law library at WVDC. Otherwise, to 16 || the extent that Plaintiff is complaining simply that pro per inmates at WVDC have 17 || less access to legal expertise or assistance than inmates with counsel, he cannot 18 || show that such difference is irrational in any respect. Cf. Moore v. Bd. of Trs. of 19 || Yakima Cty. Library, 268 F. App’x 669, 671 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming denial of 20 || equal protection claim because plaintiff “failed to meet his burden to negate ‘every 21 || conceivable basis which might support’ rule allowing attorneys to access to county 22 || law library while denying access to pro se litigants” (citations omitted)). Indeed, it 23 || would be irrational to insist that unrepresented inmates at a jail facility be given the 24 || same “opportunity in education of law” (Comp. at 5) as trained lawyers. Inferring 25 || such a requirement under the Constitution would also seem to conflict with the 26 || holdings addressed above, which establish that an inmate’s constitutional “right to 27 || litigation assistance . . . is limited to the tools prisoners need ‘in order to attack 28 || their sentences, [either] directly or collaterally, and in order to challenge the

1 conditions of their confinement.’” Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th 2 Cir. 2011) (quoting Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355), abrogated on other grounds as stated 3 in Richey v. Dahne, 807 F.3d 1202, 1209 n.6 (9th Cir. 2015). Plaintiff therefore 4 fails to establish a violation of his constitutional rights based on the alleged 5 conditions at WVDC. 6 IV. ORDERS3 7 In light of the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Complaint is 8 dismissed with leave to amend. 9 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within twenty-one (21) days of the date of 10 this Order, Plaintiff must do one of the following: 11 1. File a First Amended Complaint which cures the pleading defects set 12 forth herein;4 or 13 /// 14 15 3The Court’s order herein constitutes a non-dispositive ruling on a pretrial matter. To the extent a party disagrees with such non-dispositive ruling, such party may file a motion for review 16 by the assigned District Judge within fourteen (14) days. See Local Rule 72-2.1. To the extent a 17 party believes the rulings to be dispositive, rather than non-dispositive, such party has the right to object to this Court’s determination that the rulings are non-dispositive within fourteen (14) days. 18 A party will be foreclosed from challenging the rulings herein if such party does not seek review 19 thereof, or object thereto. 20 4The Clerk is directed to provide Plaintiff with a Central District of California Civil Rights Complaint Form, CV-66, to facilitate Plaintiff’s filing of a First Amended Complaint if he 21 elects to proceed in that fashion. Any First Amended Complaint must: (a) be labeled “First 22 Amended Complaint”; (b) be complete in and of itself and not refer in any manner to the original Complaint – i.e., it must include all claims on which Plaintiff seeks to proceed (Local Rule 15-2); 23 (c) contain a “short and plain” statement of each of the claim(s) for relief (Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)); (d) make each allegation “simple, concise and direct” (Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1)); (e) set forth 24 clearly the sequence of events giving rise to the claim(s) for relief; (f) allege specifically what 25 each Defendant did and how that individual’s conduct specifically violated Plaintiff’s civil rights; (g) for each claim asserted, specifically identify which Defendants are being sued and in what 26 capacity; (h) not add Defendants or claims that are not reasonably related to the claims asserted 27 in the Complaint; (i) include a title naming all the parties (Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a)); and (j) set forth “each claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence . . . in a separate count[.]” Fed. R. 28 Civ. P. 10(b). 9 1 2. Sign and file the attached Notice of Dismissal which will result in 2 the voluntary dismissal of this action without prejudice; or 3 3. File a Notice of Intent to Stand on the Complaint, indicating Plaintiff’s 4 intent to stand on the Complaint despite the pleading defects set forth herein, which 5 may result in the dismissal of this action based upon such defects. 6 Plaintiff is cautioned that his failure timely to file a First Amended 7 Complaint, a Notice of Dismissal, or a Notice of Intent to Stand on the 8 Complaint may be deemed Plaintiff’s admission that amendment is futile, and 9 may result in the dismissal of this action with or without prejudice on the 10 grounds set forth above, on the ground that amendment is futile, for failure 11 diligently to prosecute and/or for failure to comply with this Order. 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 DATED: April 7, 2025 14 ______________/s/_____________________ Honorable Jacqueline Chooljian 15

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

16 17 Attachments 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10