I. BACKGROUND

22 This is a wage-and-hour employment action filed by Plaintiff against 23 Defendant Lakin Tire West, LLC and Does 1 to 100, bringing one cause of action 24 under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (“PAGA”) on behalf of herself and 25 other aggrieved employees.1 (Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff filed her complaint in Los 26 27 1 The underlying Labor Code violations of Plaintiff’s PAGA claims are for failure 28 1 Angeles Superior Court on August 13, 2024. On November 21, 2024, Lakin filed 2 an answer. On December 9, 2024, Defendant removed the case to this Court on the 3 grounds that Plaintiff’s claim is preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management 4 Relations Act (“LMRA”) because Plaintiff brings her PAGA claim on behalf of 5 aggrieved employees who were party to certain collective bargaining agreements 6 (“CBAs”) with Lakin. (Id.) On January 17, 2025, Defendant filed a motion for 7 judgment on the pleadings. (Dkt. No. 13.) On February 19, 2025, Plaintiff filed a 8 motion to remand. (Dkt. No. 23.) Both parties have filed oppositions and replies 9 in connection with the two motions. 10 II. DISCUSSION 11 “Only state-court actions that originally could have been filed in federal court 12 may be removed to federal court by the defendant.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 13 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, district courts have 14 original jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or 15 treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “The general rule, referred to as 16 the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ is that a civil action arises under federal law for 17 purposes of § 1331 when a federal question appears on the face of the complaint.” 18 City of Oakland v. BP PLC, 969 F.3d 895, 903 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Caterpillar, 19 482 U.S. at 392). However, complete preemption is “an exception to the well- 20 pleaded complaint rule.” Saldana v. Glenhaven Healthcare LLC, 27 F.4th 679, 686 21 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing City of Oakland, 969 F.3d at 905). Moreover, an exception 22 to the well-pleaded complaint rule exists for a small category of state law claims 23 which “necessarily raise a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, 24 which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally 25 approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.” Grable & Sons 26

27 rest periods, failure to timely pay wages, secret payment of lower wages, failure to provide complete and accurate wage statements, and failure to pay all wages due 28 1 Metal Prod., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005); see also City 2 of Oakland, 969 F.3d at 904. There is a “strong presumption against removal 3 jurisdiction,” and “the court resolves all ambiguity in favor of remand to state 4 court.” Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation 5 omitted). “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks 6 subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 7 The Ninth Circuit follows a two-step test articulated in Burnside v. Kiewit 8 Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2007) to determine whether a cause of action 9 is preempted by section 301 of the LMRA. In the first step, “we ask whether the 10 asserted cause of action involves a right that exists solely as a result of the CBA.” 11 Curtis v. Irwin Indus., Inc., 913 F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2019) (internal quotations 12 and brackets omitted). “The essential inquiry is this: Does the claim seek purely to 13 vindicate a right or duty created by the CBA itself?” Id. (internal quotations and 14 brackets omitted). If the claim is not preempted at step one, courts move to step 15 two and ask “whether a plaintiff’s state law right is substantially dependent on 16 analysis of the CBA, which turns on whether the claim cannot be resolved by simply 17 ‘looking to’ versus ‘interpreting’ the CBA.” Id. at 1153 (internal quotations and 18 brackets omitted). 19 Plaintiff argues that the case should be remanded because LMRA preemption 20 does not apply to her PAGA claim, as she herself was “never subject to any 21 collective bargaining agreement.” (Dkt. No. 23 at 11.) Defendant argues that this 22 Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the PAGA claim even if Plaintiff herself 23 is not a union member or covered under a CBA. (Dkt. No. 25 at 4–5.) “Federal 24 district courts are split on whether federal subject matter jurisdiction exists when a 25 plaintiff's individual PAGA claim is not preempted, but the non-individual PAGA 26 claims on behalf of other aggrieved employees are preempted.” Shwiyhat v. Martin 27 Marietta Materials, Inc., 2023 WL 6626129, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2023). In 28 Braswell v. AHMC San Gabriel Valley Med. Ctr. LP, the plaintiff was a licensed 1 vocational nurse who brought a suit for one cause of action under PAGA for 2 violations of the Labor Code. 2022 WL 707206, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2022). As 3 with all PAGA suits, plaintiff brought her claim “on behalf of herself, the Labor 4 Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”), and Aggrieved Employees.” Id. 5 (internal quotations omitted). The defendants removed the action from state court 6 to this district on the grounds that plaintiff’s overtime and sick pay claims were 7 preempted under the LMRA. The court ruled that because the plaintiff filed suit 8 “on behalf of employees covered by a qualifying CBA, her own lack of CBA 9 coverage is not a defense to preemption under Curtis.” Id. at *4. Other courts have 10 followed the reasoning in Braswell. See Huerta v. Doubletree Emp. LLC, 2024 WL 11 890548, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2024); Shwiyhat, 2023 WL 6626129 at *4; 12 Rodriguez v. USF Reddaway Inc., 2022 WL 18012518, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 13 2022). 14 In contrast, the court in Rivera v AHMC Healthcare, Inc. reached the opposite 15 conclusion. There, the plaintiff also brought one claim under PAGA for Labor Code 16 violations. The court first found that because plaintiff was not covered by the CBA 17 that the defendants contended met the requirements of section 514, her “own 18 overtime claim [was] therefore not displaced by [the qualifying CBA].” 2022 WL 19 716094, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2022). The court then noted that defendants’ 20 argument that the PAGA claim was “nevertheless preempted because [plaintiff] 21 asserts her claim on behalf of [other] employees, and some of their claims are 22 displaced by [the qualifying CBA]” was unsupported by case law. Id. at *3 23 (“Defendants point to no case providing for section 301 preemption where the 24 plaintiff was not actually covered by the CBA in question”). Ultimately, because 25 defendants had “not persuasively shown that [their] conception of PAGA is the 26 correct one,” and “[w]here there is doubt as to removability, it is resolved against 27 removal,” the court found the PAGA claim was not preempted and remanded the 28 case to state court. Id. The court also reasoned that defendants’ “conception of 1 PAGA would lead to anomalous results,” and that because “complete preemption 2 under section 301 is intended to promote uniformity and consistency in the 3 interpretation of [CBAs],” the “policy underlying preemption would not be served 4 by exercising jurisdiction in this case” since Plaintiff’s own claim would not require 5 the court to interpret a CBA.2 Id. Other courts have agreed with Rivera instead of 6 Braswell. See Stoddart v. Heavy Metal Iron, Inc., 2023 WL 2524313, at *4 (E.D. 7 Cal. Mar. 15, 2023) (finding Rivera persuasive and declining to follow Braswell 8 and Rodriguez because “their logic is at odds with the nature of the PAGA statute,” 9 which “does not create any substantive rights nor does it impose any legal 10 obligations” and therefore, subject matter jurisdiction depends on whether the court 11 has jurisdiction over the underlying predicate Labor Code violations); Dominguez 12 v. Leprino Foods Co., 2023 WL 7104801, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2023) 13 (concluding same); Cranton v. Grossmont Hosp. Corp., 2022 WL 16572028, at *6 14 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2022) (noting that Braswell may have “misconstrued and 15 misapplied the relevant law” and finding it unpersuasive). 16 The Court finds the Rivera line of cases persuasive. Here, Plaintiff does not 17 appear to be covered by any CBA, and Defendant does not dispute this. PAGA 18 does not create any substantive rights—therefore, subject matter jurisdiction over 19 Plaintiff’s PAGA claim depends on the underlying predicate Labor Code violations. 20 Because Plaintiff is not covered by a CBA, her rights exist in state law independent 21 of any CBA—therefore, her claim is not preempted at step one of the Burnside 22 analysis. Resolving Plaintiff’s claim would not involve interpretation of a CBA— 23 therefore, her claim is not preempted at step two of the Burnside analysis. 24

25 2 The Rivera court also noted that “[a]lthough the California Supreme Court has described a PAGA suit as one ‘on behalf of all affected employees,’ in the same 26 order the Court described a PAGA action as one ‘designed primarily to benefit the 27 general public’”—therefore, the Rivera court found defendants’ conception of PAGA as “the aggregation of employees’ individual claims” unpersuasive. Id. at 28 1 | Moreover, any ambiguity over subject matter jurisdiction must be resolved “in favor 2 | of remand to state court.” Philip Morris, 582 F.3d at 1042. Defendant cites no 3 | binding authority holding that PAGA claims brought by plaintiffs who were not 4 || covered by a CBA are preempted by the LMRA on the account of other aggrieved 5 | employees’ union member status. 6 IH. CONCLUSION 7 Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion to Remand is GRANTED. Because the 8 | Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claim, Defendant’s Motion 9 | for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED as moot. 10 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 13 | DATED: April 9, 2025 ei tt rs 14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28