Robledo

facts or otherwise present circumstances that would warrant treating it as a motion

to reopen rather than a motion to reconsider the BIA’s earlier denial of his request

to accept his untimely appeal. See Singh v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir.

2004) (“[W]here the facts surrounding allegedly ineffective representation by

counsel were unavailable to the petitioner at an earlier stage of the administrative

process, motions before the BIA based on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel

are properly deemed motions to reopen.” (quoting Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889,

891 (9th Cir. 2003))). Robledo does not dispute that he filed the instant motion after

the thirty-day deadline for a motion to reconsider had expired. See 8 U.S.C. §

1229a(c)(6)(B).

Robledo also contends that the BIA improperly declined to consider the

materials supporting his motion in violation of his due process rights. Robledo’s

2 24-479 due process claim is effectively a repackaging of his general claim that the BIA erred

by not reopening his case and accepting his untimely appeal by certification.

Because we lack jurisdiction to consider the BIA’s…