Wendell Reinking v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.

Good Law
539 F. App'x 780
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitAugust 29, 201311-35363, 11-35397California1,017 words

Opinion

Opinion

FILED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION AUG 29 2013

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WENDELL W. REINKING, No. 11-35363

Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 3:07-cv-00212-JWS

v.

MEMORANDUM*

ALYESKA PIPELINE SERVICE CO.;

ALYESKA PIPELINE SERVICE CO.

PENSION FOR OPERATING

COMPANY EMPLOYEES, initially effective July 1, 1976; ALYESKA

PIPELINE SERVICE CO.

SEPARATION BENEFITS PLAN NO.

516; ALYESKA PIPELINE SERVICE

CO. PENSION PLAN RETIREMENT

AND TRUST COMMITTEE;

ALYESKA PIPELINE SERVICE CO.

HUMAN RESOURCES

DEPARTMENT AS PLAN

ADMINISTRATOR FOR ALYESKA

SEPARATION BENEFITS PLAN NO.

516,

Defendants - Appellants.

WENDELL W. REINKING, No. 11-35397

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. page 2

Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:07-cv-00212-JWS

v.

ALYESKA PIPELINE SERVICE CO.;

ALYESKA PIPELINE SERVICE CO.

PENSION FOR OPERATING

COMPANY EMPLOYEES, initially effective July 1, 1976; ALYESKA

PIPELINE SERVICE…

lead Opinion

MEMORANDUM *

1.The structural conflict of interest present in this case is entitled to little weight because there’s no evidence of malice, self-dealing, a suspect claims-granting history, inadequate investigation of a claim or failure to credit a claimant’s reliable evidence. See Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955, 968-69 (9th Cir.2006) (en banc).

2. The Pension Plan administrator didn’t abuse its discretion in denying Reinking’s application for benefits. See Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506 , 130 S.Ct. 1640, 1646 , 176 L.Ed.2d 469 (2010); Gatti v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 415 F.3d 978, 981 (9th Cir.2005). The Pension Plan’s definition of “Employee” as “any person engaged in rendering personal services to the Employer for earnings considered wages under Section 3121(a) of the [Internal Revenue] Code” can reasonably be read to refer only to those employees on Alyeska’s payroll. The plan administrator’s decision to adopt such an interpretation doesn’t violate ERISA’s anti-cutback provision, see 29 U.S.C. § 1054 (g), as the later amendments to the plan can reasonably be read as clarifications of the earlier language.

3. The Separation Plan…

035concurrenceinpart Opinion

Berzon, J.

concurring and dissenting:

I respectfully dissent as to the pension plan benefits but concur with regard to the separation benefits.

*782 For the reasons explained by the district court, the plan administrator’s interpretation of the phrase “any person engaged in rendering personal services to the Employer for earnings considered wages under Section 3121(a) of the [Internal Revenue] Code” was an abuse of discretion. In addition, the plan’s separate reference to leased employees would be superfluous were Alyeska’s interpretation of the 1989 definition of “Employee” correct. See, e.g., Brown v. S. Cal. IBEW-NECA Trust Funds, 588 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.2009) (“[E]ach provision in an agreement should be construed consistently with the entire document such that no provision is rendered nugatory.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). I would therefore affirm the district court as to the pension benefits.

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