DISCUSSION

Collins argues the shifting of the burden of proof for release to the SVP contained

in the amended SVPA violates equal protection. In McKee I, the Supreme Court held the

SVPA is subject to equal protection analysis because it "treats SVP's significantly less

favorably than those similarly situated individuals civilly committed under other statutes"

including MDO's and NGI's. (McKee I, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 1196, 1203, 1207.)

Since individuals within each of these categories "have the same interest at stake—the

loss of liberty through involuntary civil commitment—it must be the case that when

society varies the standard and burden of proof for SVP's . . . , it does so because of the

belief that the risks involved with erroneously freeing SVP's from their commitment are

3 The Supreme Court remanded in McKee I for an evidentiary hearing on whether disparate treatment for SVP's is justified. The court transferred "grant and hold" cases under McKee I to the Courts of Appeal with directions to vacate their prior opinions and reconsider in light of McKee I. The order expressed a desire to avoid unnecessary multiplicity of proceedings and directed this court to suspend further proceedings pending finality of the proceedings in McKee I. 3 significantly greater than the risks involved with freeing" other civil committees. (Id. at

p. 1204.)

The Supreme Court remanded the case for a hearing on whether the People could

justify disparate treatment for SVP's. The court instructed: "It must be shown that,

notwithstanding the similarities between SVP's and [other civil committees], the former

as a class bear a substantially greater risk to society, and that therefore imposing on them

a greater burden before they can be released from commitment is needed to protect

society. This can be shown in a variety of ways. For example, it may be demonstrated

that the inherent nature of the SVP's mental disorder makes recidivism as a class

significantly more likely. Or it may be that SVP's pose a greater risk to a particularly

vulnerable class of victims, such as children. . . . Or the People may produce some other

justification." (McKee I, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1208, fn. omitted.)

After remand, the superior court conducted a 21-day evidentiary hearing on the

justification of disparate treatment for SVP's and concluded the People had met their

burden. On appeal, we reviewed the matter de novo. (McKee II, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th

at p. 1338.) "When a constitutional right, such as the right to liberty from involuntary

confinement, is at stake, the usual judicial deference to legislative findings gives way to

an exercise of independent judgment of the facts to ascertain whether the legislative body

' "has drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence." ' " (McKee I, supra,

47 Cal.4th at p. 1206, italics added.) In McKee II, we concluded "[t]he People have

shown 'that the inherent nature of the SVP's mental disorder makes recidivism as a class

significantly more likely[;] . . . that SVP's pose a greater risk [and unique dangers] to a

4 particularly vulnerable class of victims, such as children'; and that SVP's have diagnostic

and treatment differences from MDO's and NGI's, thereby supporting a reasonable

perception by the electorate . . . that the disparate treatment of SVP's under the amended

[SVPA] is necessary to further the state's compelling interests in public safety and

`humanely treating the mentally disordered." (McKee II, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at

p. 1347.) The Supreme Court denied a petition for review, rendering McKee II final.

(McKee II, review den. Oct. 10, 2012, S204503).

This court has, of course, followed McKee II, and other Courts of Appeal have as

well. (See, e.g., People v. McDonald (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1376-1382; People

v. Landau (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1, 47-48; People v. McCloud (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th

1076, 1085-1086; People v. McKnight (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 860, 863-864.) While it is

clear Collins believes the evidence relied on in McKee II is insufficient to justify

disparate treatment of SVP's, we have carefully evaluated it and conclude otherwise.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

MCCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

HALLER, J.

O'ROURKE, J.

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