NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 30 2025

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DANIEL DAVID DYDZAK, Nos. 23-15784 23-16193 Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. v. 2:22-cv-01008-APG-VCF

TANI CANTIL-SAKAUYE; et al.,

MEMORANDUM*

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Andrew P. Gordon, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 22, 2025**

Before: GRABER, H.A. THOMAS, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

Daniel David Dydzak appeals pro se from the district court’s judgments

dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging claims related to prior lawsuits

challenging his disbarment as a California attorney. We have jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo both a dismissal for lack of personal

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes these cases are suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). jurisdiction, Lazar v. Kroncke, 862 F.3d 1186, 1193 (9th Cir. 2017), and for failure

to state a claim, Stoner v. Santa Clara County Office of Educ., 502 F.3d 1116, 1120

(9th Cir. 2007). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction

Dydzak’s claims against all moving defendants except Judge Rawlinson because

Dydzak did not allege facts sufficient to establish that these defendants had

sufficient contacts with Nevada to provide the court with either general or specific

jurisdiction. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915,

924 (2011) (“For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general

jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile . . . .”); Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin

Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2004) (specific personal jurisdiction

requires, among other things, that “the claim must . . . arise[] out of or relate[] to

the defendant’s forum-related activities”).

The district court properly dismissed Dydzak’s claim against Judge

Rawlinson on the basis of judicial immunity. See Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260

F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001) (describing factors relevant to whether an act is

judicial in nature and subject to absolute judicial immunity).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the complaint

without leave to amend. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656

F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining

2 23-15784 23-16193 that dismissal without leave to amend is proper when amendment would be futile).

AFFIRMED.

3 23-15784 23-16193