Ronald Weaver v. Ken Clark
Opinion
Opinion
MEMORANDUM
Petitioner Ronald Arthur Weaver appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus, brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 . He raises four arguments that the district court erroneously applied a procedural bar to his claims of trial-level ineffective assistance of counsel (“LAC”), and asks us to expand his certificate of appealability (“COA”) to include two additional arguments. We address each argument and request in turn.
Because Weaver has offered no compelling rebuttal of Ylst’s “look-through” presumption, we agree with the district court that the California Supreme Court denied his trial-counsel IAC claims on the independent and adequate state-law ground of untimeliness. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 , 111 S.Ct. 2590 , 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991).
Considering Weaver’s three and one half year delay between his conviction and his habeas petition, his is not an “exceptional” case involving an “exorbitant application” of California’s timeliness rule. See Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 376 , 122 S.Ct. 877 , 151 L.Ed.2d 820 (2002). Weaver cannot overcome his procedural default.