MEMORANDUM

Sean S. Shallow appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his employment action alleging violations under Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), as well as state law. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Wood v. City of San Diego, 678 F.3d 1075, 1080 (9th Cir.2012). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Shallow’s action because Shallow failed to allege a cognizable claim for relief in his first amended complaint. See Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121-22 (9th Cir.2008) (“A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may be based on either a ‘lack of a cognizable legal theory’ or ‘the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.’ ” (citation omitted)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”); Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 12-541 (one-year statute of limitations for slander or libel claims); Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 988 (9th Cir.2007) (en banc) (elements of a discrimination claim under the ADA); Dube v. Likins, 216 Ariz. 406 , 167 P.3d 93, 104 (Ct.App.2007) (elements of a defamation claim under Arizona law).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Shallow additional leave to amend. See Abagninin v. AM-VAC Chem. Corp., 545 F.3d 733, 742 (9th Cir.2008) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that leave to amend may be denied if amendment would be futile or if previous amendments failed to cure deficiencies).

Because we affirm on the basis that Shallow failed to state a claim, we do not consider Shallow’s contentions concerning his service attempts and alleged barriers to completing service.

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.