NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 12 2025

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KENNETH JEREMY LAIRD, No. 18-16634

Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:17-cv-00482-JAT

v.

MEMORANDUM*

RYAN THORNELL; ATTORNEY

GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF

ARIZONA,

Respondents-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona James A. Teilborg, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted December 11, 2024 Pasadena, California

Before: GRABER, DESAI, and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges.

Petitioner Kenneth Jeremy Laird appeals the district court’s order denying

his petition for writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(a). We review de novo a district court’s order denying a petition for writ of

habeas corpus, Catlin v. Broomfield, 124 F.4th 702, 721 (9th Cir. 2024), and

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. affirm.

Laird contends that the Arizona Court of Appeals erred in holding that

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012)—which generally prohibits mandatory,

life-without-parole sentences for juvenile offenders—does not apply to

consecutive, term-of-years sentences that exceed the juvenile’s life expectancy.

See State v. Laird, No. 1 CA-CR 14-0568 PRPC, 2016 WL 5746220 (Ariz. Ct.

App. Oct. 4, 2016). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), we “defer to the state court’s decision on any claim adjudicated

on the merits unless the decision was ‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application’ of ‘clearly established Federal law’ or was ‘based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented.’” Avena v. Chappell,

932 F.3d 1237, 1247 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). If “the state

court adjudication on the merits does not withstand deferential scrutiny under

§ 2254(d),” we then “decide the habeas petition by considering de novo the

constitutional issues raised.” Amado v. Gonzalez, 758 F.3d 1119, 1131 (9th Cir.

2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, even assuming that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision was

contrary to clearly established law, Laird’s Eighth Amendment claim fails. See

Helm v. Thornell, 112 F.4th 674, 676 (9th Cir. 2024) (“Where, as here, a petitioner

must clear two hurdles in order to obtain affirmative habeas relief on the merits, we

2 may uphold a denial of relief on either ground.”) Miller requires only that a state

court, before sentencing a juvenile homicide offender to life without the possibility

of parole, utilize a “discretionary sentencing procedure” that permits a sentencing

judge “to impose a lesser punishment in light of [the defendant’s] youth.” Jones v

Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98, 120 (2021). When the sentencing judge originally

sentenced Laird for his crimes, Arizona law permitted the judge to impose each of

Laird’s sentences concurrently, and to consider Laird’s youth before deciding

whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences. See State v. Thurlow,

712 P.2d 929, 932 (Ariz. 1986) (explaining that age is one of the “mitigating

circumstances a court shall consider in determining [a] sentence”); State v.

Fillmore, 927 P.2d 1303, 1313 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (explaining that “a trial court

must choose, among concurrent and consecutive sentences, whichever mix best fits

a defendant’s crimes”). When the judge vacated Laird’s death sentence on the

murder conviction and resentenced Laird to life with the possibility of parole after

twenty-five years, the judge again had discretion to consider Laird’s youth and to

impose the sentence concurrently to Laird’s other sentences. Thus, the judge “had

discretion to run all of [Laird’s] sentences concurrently, such that [he] might be

incarcerated for only 25 years and would have some of [his] lifetime out of

prison.” Helm, 112 F.4th at 686 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Miller

requires no more.” Id. at 687.

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AFFIRMED.

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