1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Jane Roe JN 15, Case No.: 3:24-cv-2316-L-BLM

12 Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

13 v. MOTION TO REMAND

14 THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, et al., [ECF No. 12] 15 Defendants. 16

17 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Jane Doe JN 15’s (“Plaintiff”) motion to 18 remand the action to State court. (ECF No. 12.) Defendant The Church of Jesus Christ 19 of Latter-day Saints (the “Church”)1 filed an opposition and Plaintiff replied. (ECF Nos. 20 18, 21.) The Court finds that the matter is appropriate for decision without oral argument 21 pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES 22 the motion. 23 // 24

25 26 27 1 Counsel for the Church also represents Defendant Temple Corporation of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, an integrated auxiliary of the Church. However, opposition was filed only 28 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff filed a complaint in State court against the Church, Temple Corporation of 3 The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (the “Temple Corporation”), and the 4 Escondido California Stake of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (the 5 “Escondido Stake”) alleging that she was sexually abused by four different perpetrators 6 from 1961 to 1978. (ECF No. 1-3 (“Compl.”).) Defendants were initially sued as Does 7 pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 340.1, however, the Court granted their 8 unopposed ex parte application to name Doe Defendants 1, 2, and 3. (ECF No. 37.) 9 The Church removed the action to this Court with the consent of the Temple 10 Corporation. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 27 (“NOR”).) Removal was based on diversity pursuant to 11 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The Church did not receive consent of the Escondido Stake who 12 had yet to be served. (Id. ¶ 12.) Disputing diversity, Plaintiff now moves to remand this 13 case back to State court. (ECF No. 12-1 (“Mot.”).) 14 II. LEGAL STANDARD 15 A suit may be removed from State court only if the federal court would have 16 subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); see also Caterpillar Inc. v. 17 Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)2 (“Only state-court actions that originally could have 18 been filed in federal court may be removed to federal court by the defendant.”). “If at 19 any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter 20 jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The party seeking 21 removal bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. See Provincial Gov’t of 22 Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2009). 23 Diversity jurisdiction under § 1332(a) requires complete diversity of citizenship 24 and an amount in controversy greater than $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The 25 complete diversity requirement is met when “the citizenship of each plaintiff is diverse 26 27 28 1 from the citizenship of each defendant.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 2 (1996). “When an action is removed on the basis of diversity, the requisite diversity must 3 exist at the time the action is removed to federal court.” Miller v. Grgurich, 763 F.2d 4 372, 373 (9th Cir. 1985). The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff is a citizen of 5 California. (Compl. ¶ 3; NOR ¶ 7; Mot. at 6.) Therefore, complete diversity exists if 6 none of the Defendants is a citizen of California. 7 III. DISCUSSION 8 A. Citizenship of the Escondido Stake 9 Plaintiff argues that complete diversity is lacking because one of the Defendants is 10 domiciled in California. The parties do not dispute that the Church is incorporated and 11 has its principal place of business in Salt Lake City, Utah. (Compl. ¶ 5; NOR ¶ 8.) The 12 parties also do not dispute that the Temple Corporation is incorporated and has its 13 principal place of business in Salt Lake City, Utah. (Compl. ¶ 6; NOR ¶ 9.) The parties 14 dispute only the Escondido Stake’s citizenship. Plaintiff claims that the Escondido Stake 15 is a non-diverse California citizen, while the Church argues it is an unincorporated 16 division of the Church that does not independently have citizenship. 17 Plaintiff initially argues that removal is based on the theory that the Escondido 18 Stake is fraudulently joined. If so, the Church must show that “there is absolutely no 19 possibility Plaintiff will be able to establish a cause of action against” the Escondido 20 Stake. (Mot. at 12 (citing the standard for fraudulent joinder as stated in Mercado v. 21 Allstate Ins. Co., 340 F.3d 824, 826 (9th Cir. 2003)).) This is not the Church’s stated 22 basis for removal, however. Instead, the Church contends the Escondido Stake is not an 23 independent entity but a unit of the Church. If the Church is correct, the Escondido 24 Stake’s citizenship is the same as the citizenship of the Church and there is complete 25 diversity between Plaintiff and all Defendants. Accordingly, the relevant issue is not 26 fraudulent joinder but citizenship. 27 While an “incorporated subsidiary” of a corporation may “possess citizenship 28 independent of its parent corporation,” an “unincorporated division” shares the 1 citizenship of its parent corporation. Breitman v. May Co. California, 37 F.3d 562, 564 2 (9th Cir. 1994). Unincorporated divisions are not “formal[ly] separate[ ]” from their 3 parents, and therefore are not “independent entit[ies] for jurisdictional purposes.” Id. 4 (quoting Schwartz v. Electronic Data Systems, Inc., 913 F.2d 279, 284 (6th Cir.1990)); 5 see also Sanfilippo v. Match Grp. LLC, 2021 WL 4440337, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 28, 2021) 6 (noting that following merger between Tinder and Match Group, “the district court did 7 not err by considering only Match Group, LLC’s citizenship for purposes of assessing its 8 jurisdiction”). 9 Plaintiff alleges that the Escondido Stake is “a religious entity and subsidiary of” 10 the Church. (Compl. ¶ 7.) She further alleges that the Escondido Stake “is an entity of 11 unknown form, and operating pursuant to the laws of, the State of California.” (Id.) 12 Plaintiff also alleges that the Escondido Stake has a principal place of business in 13 California and “is registered to do business in California.” (Id.) 14 The Church claims that the Escondido Stake “is a division of the Church, which is 15 incorporated at its highest level, meaning its constituent parts—local wards and stakes— 16 are part of the incorporation and not separate legal entities.” (Opp., ECF No. 18, at 12 17 (emphasis in original).) Contrary to Plaintiff’s allegation, a search of California 18 Secretary of State records for the Escondido Stake returns no results, thus supporting a 19 reasonable inference that the Escondido Stake is not registered to do business in the State 20 of California. (See ECF No. 18-3 ¶ 1.)3 Moreover, Plaintiff’s own allegations undermine 21 her argument—Plaintiff alleges that the Escondido Stake is a subsidiary of the Church, 22 that the Escondido Stake operates “at the direction of and under the control of” the 23 Church, and “reports directly to” the Church. (Compl. ¶ 7.) The complaint alleges that 24 “the First Presidency [of the Church] and the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles declare and 25 26 27 3 The Church’s request to take judicial notice of the search results is GRANTED. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (“A court may take judicial notice of matters of public 28 1 establish policy, and oversee the entire Church, including every Stake and Ward in 2 California.” (See Compl. ¶ 23 (emphasis added).) Furthermore, it is the Church—and 3 not the Escondido Stake—which owns, operates, and maintains the building that is used 4 by the Escondido Stake. (NOR ¶ 11.) The Escondido Stake receives its funding from the 5 Church and has no registered agents in California, has no assets, does not have insurance, 6 and cannot pay judgments. (Id. ¶ 12.) Indeed, as laid out in the Articles of Incorporation, 7 the Church assumes all claims arising from the activities of the Church or its agents, 8 including the stakes. (Decl. of Branden Wilson, ECF. No. 20-1, ¶ 13.) 9 Accordingly, the Escondido Stake is an “unincorporated division” of the Church 10 and not an “incorporated subsidiary” of a corporation that “possess[es] citizenship 11 independent of its parent corporation.” See Breitman, 37 F.3d at 564. Because the Court 12 finds that the Escondido Stake is a division of the Church for jurisdictional purposes, the 13 Escondido Stake is a citizen of Utah, thus establishing complete diversity.4 14 B. Fictious Name Designations 15 Plaintiff argues for the first time in her reply that complete diversity is lacking 16 because the citizenship of all Doe Defendants must be ignored pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 17 1441(b)(1). (ECF No. 21 at 12-14.) Initially, all Defendants were named as Does 18 pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 340.1. (See generally Compl.) “In 19 determining whether a civil action is removable on the basis of the jurisdiction under 20 section 1332(a) ..., the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names shall be 21 disregarded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(1). If the Court were to disregard the citizenship of 22 all Defendants, then diversity jurisdiction would be lacking as diversity “does not exist 23 where one party possesses citizenship, and all opposing parties possess no citizenship.” 24 See Geppert v. Doe 1, No. 23-CV-03257-SVK, 2023 WL 5804156, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25 7, 2023). 26

27 4 For the same reasons the Escondido Stake is not a forum defendant under 28 U.S.C. 28 1 However, an exception applies when the identity of Doe Defendants is readily 2 known. See, e.g., Roe CS 88 v. Doe 1, No. CV 24-11154-JFW(SSCX), 2025 WL 485121 3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2025). Here, in its notice of removal, the Church identified Does 1, 2, 4 and 3 and waived the anonymity protections afforded by California Code of Civil 5 Procedure § 340.1. (See NOR.) Furthermore, Plaintiff readily identified Defendants in 6 court documents, including in the initial Complaint. (See Compl. ¶¶ 5-7 (identifying Doe 7 Defendants by a description and business address of each Defendant.) Because 8 Defendants’ identities were apparent on the face of the Complaint, Plaintiff’s fictitious 9 defendant argument is rejected as to Does 1–3. 10 C. Diversity Jurisdiction 11 A state-court action can be removed on diversity grounds only where there is 12 complete diversity between the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 13 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), 1441(a). The Church has met its burden of showing that the 14 parties are diverse. Specifically, Plaintiff is a citizen of California. The Church, the 15 Temple Corporation, and the Escondido Stake are all citizens of Utah. In its notice of 16 removal, the Church alleged that, given the severity of the sexual abuse allegations, the 17 amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. “[A] removal notice need only plausibly allege, 18 not detail proof of, the amount in controversy.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., 19 LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 83 (2014); see also id. at 89 (“In sum, as specified in § 20 1446(a), a defendant’s notice of removal need include only a plausible allegation that the 21 amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold. Evidence establishing the 22 amount is required by § 1446(c)(2)(B) only when the plaintiff contests, or the court 23 questions, the defendant’s allegation.”). Plaintiff does not dispute that the amount in 24 controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold. 25 // 26 27 28 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 Because the Church has met its burden of establishing federal jurisdiction, the 3 Court DENIES the motion to remand. 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5 6 || Dated: May 19, 2025 : 1 fee fp 8 H . James Lorenz, 9 United States District Judge

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