People v. Prado CA2/6

DISCUSSION

Appellant contends, and the Attorney General concedes, he is entitled to section 1170(d)(1)(A) recall and resentencing because Heard expanded the statute’s reach to include juvenile offenders serving de facto LWOP regardless of their eligibility for section 3051 youth offender parole. As the pertinent facts of appellant’s case are undisputed, we review his claim de novo. (See People v. Davis (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 429, 438.) Given the Attorney General’s concession, we assume without deciding that section 3051 did not eliminate de facto LWOP and that juvenile offenders sentenced to de facto LWOP are entitled to section 1170(d)(1)(A) relief. Accordingly, we need only consider whether appellant’s 60 year to life sentence is de facto LWOP. We conclude it is not. California’s approach to sentencing juvenile offenders has changed dramatically in the 26 years since appellant’s sentencing. Motivated in part by two decisions of the United States Supreme Court, Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551 [161 L.Ed.2d 1], and Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48 [176 L.Ed.2d 825], the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 9 (2011- 2012 Reg. Sess.), adding section 1170(d)(1)(A) to provide…