DISCUSSION

A. The scope of this appeal does not include a review of the merits of the CHRO entered in this or any other case.

In addition to determining the amount of attorney’s fees Michael could recover during the January 2023 hearing, the court entertained two requests by Joseph. The first was his motion filed in October 2022 to reconsider the CHRO entered against him in July 2022. The court denied this motion as untimely under section 1008, which requires such a motion to be filed within

2 During oral argument, Joseph claimed for the first time that he objected to specific line items in Michael’s attorneys’ billing entries. These alleged objections refer to one line item in each of six billing entries. Michael was billed $2,070 for these entries—each of which also contained at least one other line item that Joseph took no issue with. 3 Although mislabeled a “judgment,” the order granting Michael’s motion for attorney’s fees is properly appealable as a postjudgment order. (See § 904.1, subd. (a)(2).) 3 ten days of the entry of the challenged order. (§ 1008, subds. (a) & (e).) The second was his unsuccessful request for a CHRO against Michael, which Joseph filed in a separate action. Joseph appears to believe we can review both of these additional adverse results as well as the court’s award of attorney’s fees. He is mistaken. To the extent he seeks our review of the denial of his unsuccessful request for a CHRO, jurisdiction is lacking because he brought that request

in a case separate and apart from the one now before us.4 Neither can we address Joseph’s arguments concerning the CHRO entered against him in this case in July 2022. A CHRO is appealable because it is an order granting an injunction. (§ 904.1, subd. (a)(6); R.D. v. P.M. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 181, 187.) The latest possible deadline for Joseph to have filed his notice of appeal from the CHRO was 180 days after the order was entered. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1) [stating deadlines of 60 and 180 days for appealing judgments], (e) [applying to appealable orders the deadlines for appealing judgments].) That deadline passed in January 2023, two months before Joseph filed his notice of appeal in this case. Thus, even if we were to construe Joseph’s notice as also seeking appellate review of the CHRO,

it would be untimely.5 (See Van Beurden Ins. Services, Inc. v. Customized Worldwide Ins. Agency, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 51, 56 [“The time for appealing

4 Accordingly, we deny Michael’s request for judicial notice of the docket in [Joseph S. v. Michael D.], which he identifies as the case initiated by Joseph to obtain a CHRO. (Super. Ct. San Diego County, 2022, No. 37-2022- 00050247-CU-HR-CTL.) 5 To the extent a motion for reconsideration can sometimes extend the time for filing a notice of appeal (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.108(e)), it must be a timely motion (Branner v. Regents of University of California (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1043, 1047) and, in any event, it cannot extend the deadline more than 180 days after entry of the appealable order. 4 [an appealable order] is jurisdictional; once the deadline expires, the appellate court has no power to entertain the appeal.”]; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(e).)

B. Attorney’s Fees

Having established what this appeal is not about, we now turn to the arguments that are properly before us—the propriety of the award of attorney’s fees to Michael. Subdivision (s) of section 527.6 states that “[t]he prevailing party in an action brought pursuant to this section may be awarded costs and attorney’s fees, if any.” Because an award of attorney’s fees is not mandatory under this statute, we review for abuse of discretion both (1) the court’s decision that Michael is entitled to recover these fees (Krug v. Maschmeier (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 796, 802–803 (Krug)), and (2) the award amount (People ex. Rel. Becerra v. Shine (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 288, 293 (Shine)). Trial judges have “broad authority to determine the amount of a reasonable fee[]” because they are best positioned to evaluate the professional services performed in their courtrooms. (Ibid., internal quotation marks omitted.) Their judgment, although subject to review, “will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.” (Ibid., internal quotation marks omitted.) Against this backdrop, we can resolve both of Joseph’s challenges to the award of attorney’s fees in short order. He first contends that the court’s decision to award fees to Michael was “procedurally and substantively flawed” because the court “deviate[d] significantly from established legal standards.” Joseph, however, also recognizes that the only requirement

5 for a party to seek attorney’s fees under section 527.6, subdivision (s) is that

he or she prevailed, as Michael did.6 Joseph next takes issue with the amount of the award, claiming the court failed to recognize that Michael’s attorneys inflated their bills by “excessive charges and procedural manipulations” meant to “escalat[e his] legal and financial burden.” But Joseph does not identify any specific charges that he believes were excessive, which leaves us with his generic complaints about perceived overbilling. And even were we to assume that the line item charges Smith identified to the trial court were unreasonable (ante, at fn. 2), its independent scrutiny of Michael’s fee request resulted in a significantly larger reduction than striking those items could have achieved. Particularly when considered in light of the deference we accord to a trial court in fashioning an award of attorney’s fees, Joseph’s complaints do not persuade us to second guess the court’s judgment as to how much Michael may recover.

6 In his opening brief, Joseph contended that Michael was not eligible to receive attorney’s fees under section 527.6, subdivision (s) because the court did not make a finding of either frivolousness or bad faith on his part. In errata filed before oral argument, however, Joseph amended his brief to reflect the correct standard for eligibility to receive an award of attorney’s fees under this statute. 6

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. Michael is awarded his costs on appeal.

DATO, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

BUCHANAN, J.

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