1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 GUSTAVO BAHENA, an individual, Case No. 8:25-cv-00471-JWH-DFMx

12 Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

13 v. MOTION TO REMAND [ECF No. 12] 14 CITY OF LA HABRA,

ANTHONY LUSTER,

15 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

HOMELAND SECURITY,

16 HOMELAND SECURITY

INVESTIGATIONS,

17 COUNTY OF ORANGE, and DOES 1-20, inclusive, 18 Defendants. 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 1 Before the Court is the motion of Plaintiff Gustavo Bahena to remand this 2 action to Orange County Superior Court.1 The Court concludes that this matter 3 is appropriate for resolution without a hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7-15. 4 After considering the papers filed in support and in opposition,2 the Court 5 DENIES the Motion, for the reasons set forth herein. 6 I. BACKGROUND 7 A. Facts 8 In his Complaint, Bahena recounts the facts of this case as follows: 9 In January 2024, a United States Magistrate Judge signed a search 10 warrant for Bahena’s residence in Seal Beach, California.3 The following 11 month, officers from the City of La Habra, the Department of Homeland 12 Security, and the Orange County Probation Department executed that search 13 warrant.4 When the officers arrived at Bahena’s residence, they announced 14 their presence twice in rapid succession before forcibly breaking down Bahena’s 15 door to gain entry.5 16 When the officers entered the residence, Bahena stood at a second-floor 17 window to the right of the front door and shouted, “Stop! Stop! What are you 18 19

20 1 See Pl.’s Mot. to Remand (the “Motion”) [ECF No. 12]. 21 2 The Court considered the documents of record in this action, including the following papers: (1) Notice of Removal [ECF No. 1]; (2) Complaint [ECF 22 No. 1-1]; (3) Motion; (4) Pl.’s Supp’l to the Motion (the “Supplement”) [ECF 23 No. 14]; (5) Def. County of Orange’s Opp’n to the Motion (the “County Opposition”) [ECF No. 21]; (6) Def. City of La Habra’s Opp’n to the Motion 24 (the “City Opposition”) [ECF No. 22]; and (7) Pl.’s Reply in Supp. of the 25 Motion (the “Reply”) [ECF No. 23]. 26 3 See Complaint ¶ 18. 27 4 See id. at ¶ 19. 1|| doing?!”® The officers yelled at Bahena to put his hands up.’ Before Bahena complied, Defendant Anthony Luster yelled that Bahena had a firearm, then Luster fired his own weapon twice at Bahena.*® 4 Several officers then approached Bahena, who was bleeding profusely, 5|| and ordered him to put his hands on his head.? When Bahena raised his arms to || comply, he cried out in pain."© Bahena was placed in handcuffs and led outside, || then instructed to sit a few houses down from his own.” An officer asked 8 || Bahena where he was shot, and Bahena told her that he had been shot in his left 9|| arm, which was gushing with blood. Approximately 20 minutes later, an || ambulance arrived and transported Bahena to the hospital. 11|| B. __ Procedural History 12 In December 2024, Bahena commenced this action in Orange County || Superior Court against Defendants City of La Habra, Anthony Luster, United 14|| States Department of Homeland Security and Homeland Security Investigations 15|| (jointly, “DHS” and Orange County.'* Through his Complaint, Bahena || asserts eight claims for relief: 17 e unreasonable search and seizure—detention and arrest, in violation of 42 18 U.S.C. § 1983; 19 5 Tawa, 7 Id. at 424. 8 See id. at J 25. 9 See id. at FF 28 & 29. 24] 0 Id. at 429. 25) 1 Id. at J 30. 26) ? Ia. 27|| 8 See id. at J 32. “ — See generally id.

1 e unreasonable search and seizure—excessive force, in violation of 42 2 U.S.C. § 1983; 3 e unreasonable search and seizure—denial of medical care, in violation of 4 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 3 e unreasonable search and seizure—search exceeding scope of warrant, in 6 violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 7 e municipal liability—failure to train, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 8 e battery; 9 e negligence; and 10 e negligent infliction of emotional distress.” 11 In March 2025, DHS removed the action to this Court pursuant to 28 12|| U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), which authorizes the removal of civil lawsuits against the 13 || United States or any agency thereof.’° That same month, DHS moved to 14|| dismiss all of the claims against it,’ and Bahena voluntarily dismissed DHS." 15|| Bahena then filed the instant Motion.” 16 Il. LEGAL STANDARD 17 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Accordingly, “[t]hey 18 || possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. 19|| Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). In every federal case, the || basis for federal jurisdiction must appear affirmatively from the record. See 21|| DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 n.3 (2006). “The right of removal is entirely a creature of statute and a suit commenced in a state court 23 5 See generally id. © See Notice of Removal. 26|| 1 See Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss [ECF No. 7]. * See Notice of Dismissal [ECF No. 9]. ° Motion.

1 must remain there until cause is shown for its transfer under some act of 2 Congress.” Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002) (internal 3 quotation marks omitted). When Congress has acted to create a right of 4 removal, those statutes, unless otherwise stated, are strictly construed against 5 removal jurisdiction. See id. 6 To remove an action to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, the 7 removing defendant “must demonstrate that original subject-matter jurisdiction 8 lies in the federal courts.” Syngenta, 537 U.S. at 33. As such, a defendant may 9 remove civil actions in which either (1) a federal question exists; or (2) complete 10 diversity of citizenship between the parties exists and the amount in controversy 11 exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1332. “Complete diversity” means 12 that “each defendant must be a citizen of a different state from each plaintiff.” 13 In re Digimarc Corp. Derivative Litigation, 549 F.3d 1223, 1234 (9th Cir. 2008). 14 When the litigants are entities, diversity jurisdiction depends on the form of the 15 entity. See, e.g., Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 195–96 (1990) (finding 16 that an unincorporated association such as a partnership has “the citizenships of 17 all of its members”). 18 The right to remove is not absolute, even when original jurisdiction exists. 19 In other words, the removing defendant bears the burden of establishing that 20 removal is proper. See Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th 21 Cir. 2006) (noting the “longstanding, near-canonical rule that the burden on 22 removal rests with the removing defendant”); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 23 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The strong presumption against removal jurisdiction 24 means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is 25 proper.” (quotation marks omitted)). Any doubts regarding the existence of 26 subject matter jurisdiction must be resolved in favor of remand. See id. 27 (“Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of 1 III. ANALYSIS 2 Bahena concedes that this Court has jurisdiction over this matter, but he 3 argues that the Court should nevertheless remand this action to Orange County 4 Superior Court for two reasons.20 First, this action was removed by DHS, and 5 DHS has since been dismissed from the lawsuit.21 Second, there is a criminal 6 action pending against Luster, so Bahena contends that remand as permissible 7 under abstention doctrines.22 8 Neither of those reasons supports remand. It is undisputed that DHS 9 properly removed this action, and there is no question that the Court has 10 jurisdiction over the action because Bahena asserts claims under federal law. A 11 federal court normally has a “virtually unflagging obligation” to exercise the 12 jurisdiction vested in it by Congress. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. 13 United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). And Bahena provides no support for his 14 argument that an action over which the Court has jurisdiction, once properly 15 removed, should be remanded because the removing defendant has been 16 dismissed. To the contrary, other courts have held that the dismissal of a federal 17 government agency does not necessitate remand. See, e.g., Morris v. Bd. of 18 Trustees of Cal. State Univ., 2024 WL 1421281, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2024). 19 Similarly, although Bahena asserts that “[c]ourts have consistently 20 recognized that remand may be warranted for reasons external to the removal 21 process, such as [Younger and Burford] abstention,”23 he provides no example of 22 any court that has remanded based upon the application of an abstention 23 doctrine. And even if abstention could serve as a basis for remanding an action, 24

25 20 See generally Motion; Reply. 26 21 See Motion 4:18-5:14. 27 22 See Reply 3:12-5:23. 1 Bahena has not offered any basis on which the Court could abstain from deciding 2 this matter. Specifically, Bahena argues that abstention is permitted under two 3 different doctrines, but neither doctrine is inapplicable to this action. 4 First, Bahena argues that abstention is permitted under Younger v. Harris, 5 401 U.S. 37 (1971), because there is a pending state court criminal action against 6 Luster. But Younger abstention is only appropriate when (1) there is “an 7 ongoing state judicial proceeding”; (2) those “proceedings implicate important 8 state interests”; and (3) there is “an adequate opportunity in the state 9 proceedings to raise constitutional challenges.” ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. v. 10 State Comp. Ins. Fund, 754 F.3d 754, 758 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Middlesex 11 Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). 12 Proceeding to litigate this action would not in any way “enjoin, or have the 13 practical effect of enjoining,” the state court case against Luster. See 14 AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Roden, 495 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2007); see also 15 Moreno v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 2023 WL 8165517, at *6 n.3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 16 2023) (noting that Younger abstention did not apply to a parallel state-court 17 criminal proceeding). Thus, Younger abstention is inappropriate. 18 Second, Bahena argues that abstention is appropriate under Burford v. Sun 19 Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). But under Burford, a district court must dismiss an 20 action when such dismissal is necessary “to avoid federal intrusion into matters 21 which are largely of local concern and which are within the special competence 22 of local courts.” Tucker v. First Md. Sav. & Loan, Inc.¸942 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th 23 Cir. 1991). That necessity arises only when “(1) the state has concentrated suits 24 involving the local issue in a particular court; (2) the federal issues are not easily 25 separable from complicated state law issues with which the state courts may 26 have special competence; and (3) federal review might disrupt state efforts to 27 establish a coherent policy.” Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., 379 F.3d 654, 671 1|| state court criminal proceeding against Luster implicates the kind of “complex 2|| state administrative process[]|” with which the Court must avoid interfering. 3|| Seezd. And even if those interests were implicated, the Court is confident that 4|| the issues in this litigation are easily separable from those of the criminal 5|| proceeding. 6 Accordingly, Bahena’s Motion is DENIED. 7 IV. DISPOSITION 8 For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby ORDERS that Bahena’s 9|| instant Motion [ECF No. 12] is DENIED. 10 IT ISSO ORDERED.

Dated: May 28, 2025 ® 13 SNIT STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28