NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 4 2025

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

VICTOR MANUEL AMARO-SALTILLO, No. 23-29 Agency No. Petitioner, A205-274-390 v.

MEMORANDUM*

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted June 2, 2025** Seattle, Washington

Before: RAWLINSON, BRESS, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.

Victor Manuel Amaro-Saltillo, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for

review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision dismissing his appeal

from an Immigration Judge (IJ) order denying cancellation of removal. Amaro-

Saltillo also challenges the BIA’s denial of his request for administrative closure of

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). his removal proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny

the petition.

1. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying administrative closure. See

Marquez-Reyes v. Garland, 36 F.4th 1195, 1208–09 (9th Cir. 2022) (standard of

review). “Administrative closure is a procedural tool created for the convenience of

the Immigration Courts and the Board,” by which the IJ or BIA temporarily removes

a case from its active docket. Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec. 688, 690 (BIA

2012); see also Gonzalez-Caraveo v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 885, 889–90 (9th Cir. 2018).

Administrative closure is appropriate “when the parties are ‘await[ing] an action or

event that is relevant to immigration proceedings but is outside the control of the

parties or the court and may not occur for a significant or undetermined period of

time.’” Gonzalez-Caraveo, 882 F.3d at 889 (quoting Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I. &

N. Dec. at 692).

In this case, Amaro-Saltillo failed to point to any action or event or any other

circumstance that would have provided a proper basis for administrative closure

under the Matter of Avetisyan factors. See Marquez-Reyes, 36 F.4th at 1209. Rather,

Amaro-Saltillo argues that administrative closure was warranted for “humanitarian”

reasons, which largely restate the merits of his application for cancellation of

removal. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that this was an

insufficient basis for administrative closure.

2 23-29 2. Amaro-Saltillo next challenges the agency’s denial of cancellation of

removal. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b), the Attorney General “may cancel removal,”

and adjust to the status of lawful permanent resident, aliens who are otherwise

removable but who satisfy four statutory eligibility criteria. As relevant here, 8

U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) requires the alien to show “that removal would result in

exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child,

who is a citizen” or a lawful permanent resident. Although we lack jurisdiction to

review the agency’s ultimate discretionary decision whether to grant cancellation of

removal or any underlying findings of fact, we have jurisdiction to review the

agency’s hardship determination as a mixed question of law and fact under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(2)(D). See Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 212, 225 & n.4 (2024);

Gonzalez-Juarez v. Bondi, ---F.4th---, 2025 WL 1440220, at *3 & n.2 (9th Cir. May

20, 2025).

To show the required hardship, Amaro-Saltillo must demonstrate hardship

that is “substantially beyond the ordinary hardship that would be expected when a

close family member leaves the country.” Gonzalez-Juarez, ---F.4th---, 2025 WL

1440220, at *8 (quoting In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 62 (BIA

2001)); see also Wilkinson, 601 U.S. at 222. We review the agency’s hardship

determination for substantial evidence. Gonzalez-Juarez, ---F.4th---, 2025 WL

1440220, at *5. “Under this standard, we must uphold the agency determination

3 23-29 unless the evidence compels a contrary conclusion.” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918

F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019).

In this case, the record does not compel the conclusion that Amaro-Saltillo’s

son, A.A.M., would experience exceptional and extremely unusual hardship if

Amaro-Saltillo is removed to Mexico. The BIA acknowledged that there would be

some financial hardship to A.A.M.’s mother if Amaro-Saltillo stopped contributing

to the child’s care, but it noted that A.A.M.’s mother largely supported A.A.M. The

BIA also noted that while Amaro-Saltillo’s health insurance covered some of

A.A.M.’s health expenses, most of those expenses were covered by his mother’s

employer-provided health insurance, and A.A.M. would not lose medical insurance

if Amaro-Saltillo is removed to Mexico. The agency could reasonably conclude that

A.A.M.’s mother would be able to provide for A.A.M. on her own and that the

financial effects of Amaro-Saltillo’s removal would not amount to an exceptional

and extremely unusual hardship.

The BIA also gave due consideration to the emotional effects on A.A.M. But

the BIA noted that Amaro-Saltillo and A.A.M. were already well-versed in

communicating by phone and video, which could still continue. The BIA also

pointed to the fact that A.A.M.’s mother stated her intent to travel to Mexico

annually with A.A.M. In these circumstances, the record does not compel the

conclusion that A.A.M. would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship if

4 23-29 Amaro-Saltillo were removed. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D); see also Gonzalez-

Juarez, ---F.4th---, 2025 WL 1440220, at *9 (“[T]he hardship determination requires

hardship that deviates, in the extreme, from the hardship that ordinarily occurs in

removal cases.”).

PETITION DENIED.

5 23-29