DISCUSSION

A party seeking a civil harassment restraining order must petition for relief under section 527.6. The responding party “may file a response that explains, excuses, justifies, or denies the alleged harassment, or may file a cross-petition under this section.” (§ 527.6, subd. (h).) The court may issue the order if it finds clear and convincing evidence of “unlawful violence, a

2 It is not clear if the trial court held a hearing on

respondent’s section 527.6 petition. Appellant’s appendix contains no order or reporter’s transcript from the scheduled hearing date, i.e., April 26, 2024. The procedural summary contained in the court’s August 23 ruling states: “4/25/24 – Miscellaneous minute order issued by the Court in 24CV-0224 that mutual restraining orders were previously granted in 24CV- 0158 [i.e., this case], so the Court would take no action.”

3 credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose.” (Id., subds. (a)(1), (b)(3) & (i); Schraer v. Berkeley Property Owners’ Assn. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 719, 730.) A party may appeal the court’s ruling as an “order granting or dissolving an injunction, or refusing to grant or dissolve an injunction.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(6).) Appellant contends the court lacked authority to issue mutual restraining orders at the March 22, 2024 trial because respondent had not yet petitioned for an order against appellant. She also contends this violated her due process rights by depriving her of notice and an opportunity to be heard. We review these questions of law de novo. (See Harris v. Stampolis (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 484, 497 [whether a restraining order “passes constitutional muster” is a question of law reviewed de novo].) We review the trial court’s findings in support of the restraining order’s entry for substantial evidence. (Ibid.) Two cases anchor appellant’s arguments: Kobey v. Morton (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1055 (Kobey) and Nora v. Kaddo (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1026 (Nora). In both, the trial court issued mutual restraining orders even though respondents had not cross-petitioned for relief. The Courts of Appeal reversed. Nora quoted Kobey as follows: “‘[S]ection 527.6 calls for the formality of a cross-complaint before the court imposes on the plaintiff “what approximates a permanent injunction.” The court’s inherent power does not extend so far as to encompass an order without a petition to serve as a vehicle for that order.’” (Nora, at p. 1029, quoting Kobey, at p. 1060.) We agree with this premise but will not apply it here for two reasons.

4 First, the petitioners in Nora and Kobey immediately objected to the trial court issuing mutual orders. Here, appellant concedes she agreed to them at the March 22 hearing. The record does not include a reporter’s transcript or minute order from this date. The August 23 motion to vacate ruling, however, states the court “held a full trial [on March 22] with testimony from both [parties] and found clear and convincing evidence to issue a restraining order against both parties.” The court then “inquired of the parties if they would consider mutual restraining orders due to the ongoing issues and allegations between them, and both sides agreed.” Second, Nora and Kobey did not involve a respondent who promptly filed a prophylactic section 527.6 petition. Respondent did so here on April 12—only three weeks after the court entered the mutual orders. Appellant opposed this petition, sought judicial notice of the March 22 orders, and filed a notice of related cases. Both petitions were before the court when it heard the motion to vacate on July 31. The August 23 ruling states the court considered the evidence supporting the “various petitions” and found it duplicative of that introduced at the first hearing. Appellant thus received ample notice of the allegations against her and at least two evidentiary hearings at which she was fully aware of respondent’s allegations against her. The petitioner in Nora, in contrast, received no evidentiary hearing at all. (Nora, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1028-1029.) The procedural infirmities that prompted Nora and Kobey to reverse and vacate mutual restraining orders are not present here. We agree with the trial court that appellant was “aware of the content and allegations of [r]espondent’s petition” and that “a further evidentiary hearing would generate the same evidence

5 and allegations the Court has previously considered.” While the parties’ testimony at hearing is not contained in the record, their declarations and exhibits are sufficient to support a finding that each party engaged in “a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at [the other party] that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).)

DISPOSITION

The mutual restraining orders are affirmed. Respondent did not appear and shall not recover costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

CODY, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

BALTODANO, J.

6 Tana L. Coates, Judge Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo ______________________________

Sanger Law Firm, Sarah S. Sanger and Miguel A. Avila, for Petitioner and Appellant. No appearance for Respondent.

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