1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 P.C., et al., Case No. 24-cv-02597-AMO

8 Plaintiffs,

ORDER RE MOTIONS TO DISMISS

9 v. FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

10 COUNTY OF SONOMA, et al., Re: Dkt. Nos. 78, 81 Defendants. 11

12 13 Before the Court are the motions to dismiss of Defendants Sonoma County and individual 14 Sonoma County social workers (ECF 78) and Defendant Amy Lafferty (ECF 81). The motions 15 are fully briefed, and because they were suitable for decision without oral argument, the Court 16 vacated the hearing set for May 20, 2025. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Civ. L.R. 7-6. This Order 17 assumes familiarity with the facts and procedural history of this case. Having carefully considered 18 the parties’ papers and the arguments made therein, as well as the relevant legal authority, the 19 Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART both motions for the following reasons. 20 I. DISCUSSION 21 Plaintiffs P.C. and M.C. filed the operative first amended complaint on October 31, 2024. 22 Amended Complaint (“Am. Compl.”) (ECF 66). The amended complaint asserts causes of action 23 related to the alleged abuse Plaintiffs suffered at the hands of their adoptive parents, Jose and Gina 24 Centeno (“the Centenos”), and names as defendants Sonoma County and ten Sonoma County 25 social workers (“County Social Workers”),1 the Centenos, the City of Rohnert Park, Officer 26

27 1 The County Social Workers named in the amended complaint are McCay, Jones, Sashital, 1 Gonzalez, Officer Groat, TLC Child and Family Services (“TLC”), and Amy Lafferty, the 2 adoption services representative of the State of California in charge of P.C. and M.C.’s adoption. 3 Plaintiffs bring claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (Counts 1 and 2) against all Defendants; a 4 Monell claim (Count 3), breach of mandatory duty claim (Count 4), intentional infliction of 5 emotional distress (“IIED”) claim (Count 6), and assault claim (Count 7) against Sonoma County 6 and TLC; and a negligence claim (Count 5) against TLC. Plaintiffs have settled their claims 7 against TLC, as well as those against Rohnert Park, Officer Gonzalez, Officer Groat, and TLC. 8 See ECF 107. Further, because Plaintiffs voluntarily dismiss Counts 6 and 7 against Sonoma 9 County, ECF 83 at 6, the causes of action that remain are Counts 1 and 2 against all remaining 10 Defendants, and 3 and 4 against Sonoma County. 11 On December 6, 2024, Sonoma County and the County Social Workers (together, “County 12 Defendants”) filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim, ECF 78, 13 as did Lafferty, ECF 81. Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a 14 complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted. Fed. R. 15 Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(6) requires dismissal when a complaint lacks either a “cognizable 16 legal theory” or “sufficient facts alleged” under such a theory. Godecke v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 17 937 F.3d 1201, 1208 (9th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). Whether a complaint contains sufficient 18 factual allegations depends on whether it pleads enough facts to “state a claim to relief that is 19 plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 20 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual 21 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 22 misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. 23 When evaluating a motion to dismiss, the Court “accept[s] factual allegations in the 24 complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 25 party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008) 26 (citation omitted). However, “allegations in a complaint . . . may not simply recite the elements of 27 a cause of action [and] must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice 1 1135 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). Courts may dismiss a claim “where there is either a lack 2 of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal 3 claim.” Hinds Invs., L.P. v. Angioli, 654 F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 2011). Courts should “freely 4 give leave” to amend “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). 5 A. County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 6 County Defendants move to dismiss all of Plaintiffs’ claims against them, as well as 7 Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages against the County Social Workers. See County 8 Defendants’ Motion (“County Mot.”) (ECF 78). The Court addresses each claim and the 9 arguments for dismissal in turn. 10 1. Section 1983 11 Plaintiffs bring two claims against County Defendants under the Fourteenth Amendment 12 for failure to adequately respond to or investigate reports of abuse and for providing false 13 information to a court. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 78-90. “The Fourteenth Amendment substantive due 14 process clause protects a foster child’s liberty interest in social worker supervision and protection 15 from harm inflicted by a foster parent.” Tamas v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 630 F.3d 833, 16 842 (9th Cir. 2010). County Defendants argue the County Social Workers are either absolutely 17 immune from liability or that they are entitled to qualified immunity because Plaintiffs fail to 18 allege deliberate indifference. They further contend Sonoma County cannot be held vicariously 19 liable for the County Social Workers. Each argument is addressed in turn below. 20 a. Absolute Immunity 21 “Defendants in § 1983 suits are generally entitled to only immunities that existed at 22 common law.” Rieman v. Vazquez, 96 F.4th 1085, 1090 (9th Cir. 2024). “[S]ocial workers are 23 not afforded absolute immunity for their investigatory conduct, discretionary decisions or 24 recommendations.” Cox v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 913 F.3d 831, 837 (9th Cir. 2019) 25 (quoting Tamas, 630 F.3d at 842). Nor are they entitled to absolute immunity from claims relating 26 to “investigative or administrative” activity. Hardwick v. Cnty. of Orange, 844 F.3d 1112, 1115 27 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). Courts “grant[] state actors absolute immunity only for those 1 v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 896 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 2 409, 431 (1976)). Social workers may enjoy absolute immunity related to “discretionary, quasi- 3 prosecutorial decisions to institute court dependency proceedings to take custody away from 4 parents.” Rieman, 96 F.4th at 1090 (citation omitted). Such immunity is only available if the 5 social worker’s “activity or function” is “part and parcel of presenting the state’s case as a generic 6 advocate.” Hardwick, 844 F.3d at 1115. 7 County Defendants argue that they are absolutely immune because the alleged conduct – 8 “providing knowingly wrongful and false information to the Court, including, but not limited to, in 9 the Adoption Reports submitted to the Court,” Am. Compl. ¶ 81 – involved testifying in court, 10 which is a “quasi-judicial function” of a social worker’s job. County Mot. at 12. Count 1, 11 however, also alleges County Defendants failed to provide medical, dental, and mental health 12 services, conduct mandated visits, respond to reports of abuse, and ensure the adequacy of 13 placements. Am. Compl. ¶ 80. Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the allegations 14 underlying Count 1 relate to County Defendants’ “investigatory conduct” as they arise from a 15 failure to respond to reports of abuse. See Cox, 913 F.3d at 837. County Defendants are not 16 entitled to absolute immunity for such conduct. See Hardwick, 844 F.3d at 1116 (“[S]ocial 17 workers . . . are not entitled to absolute immunity from claims that they fabricated evidence during 18 an investigation or made false statements in a dependency petition affidavit that they signed under 19 penalty of perjury, because such actions aren’t similar to discretionary decisions about whether to 20 prosecute.”) (quoting Beltran v. Santa Clara Cnty., 514 F.3d 906 (9th Cir. 2008)). Because 21 County Defendants have not met their burden of showing the underlying allegations relate to the 22 County Social Workers’ actions as “part and parcel of presenting the state’s case as a generic 23 advocate” rather than as to their “investigative or administrative” functions, Hardwick, 844 F.3d at 24 1116, the Court finds the County Social Workers are not absolutely immune from Count 1.2 25 b. Qualified Immunity 26 County Defendants next argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity against Count 2. 27 1 To determine whether a defendant is shielded by qualified immunity, courts ask “(1) whether the 2 facts, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, show that the officer’s 3 conduct violated a constitutional right and (2) if so, whether the right was clearly established, such 4 that a reasonable official would understand that his conduct violated that right.” Tamas, 630 F.3d 5 at 842. County Defendants argue Plaintiffs have not alleged a violation of a constitutional right 6 because they have not adequately pleaded deliberate indifference sufficient to support a claim for 7 violation of due process. “To violate due process, state officials must act with such deliberate 8 indifference to the liberty interest that their actions ‘shock the conscience.’ ” Id. at 844. Conduct 9 that “shocks the conscience” is “deliberate indifference to a known . . . [or obvious] danger.” Cox, 10 913 F.3d at 837. Deliberate indifference requires “a showing of an objectively substantial risk of 11 harm and a showing that the officials were subjectively aware of facts from which an inference 12 could be drawn that such a risk existed and that either the official actually drew that inference or 13 that a reasonable official would have been compelled to draw that inference.” Id. (internal 14 quotation marks and citation omitted). 15 County Defendants argue the amended complaint is “factually devoid” of allegations that 16 “each of the individual social worker defendants had knowledge that the Centenos posed a specific 17 threat to P.C. and/or M.C. prior to their placement with the Centenos.” County Mot. at 14. In 18 other words, County Defendants contend Plaintiffs fail to allege each County Social Worker was 19 subjectively aware of facts from which an inference of a substantial risk of serious harm could be 20 drawn. Not so. The amended complaint details how the County Defendants were aware that the 21 Centenos “were having trouble caring for” Kaya, Michelle, and P.K. prior to P.C.’s placement 22 with the Centenos, Am. Compl. ¶ 29, and that shortly after P.C.’s placement – and prior to M.C.’s 23 placement – significant concerns emerged, including that the Centenos had removed Michelle 24 from school and had failed to seek therapy for any of the children, despite being informed therapy 25 would be essential. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 30-31. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that 26 the County Social Workers disregarded facts that would “compel an inference that there existed an 27 objectively substantial risk” that the Centenos would harm the children. See Cox, 913 F.3d at 837- 1 investigation, the evidence of which County Defendants were made aware, and the timing of the 2 investigations and incidents. See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ 34-37, 51-57, 59-63. These allegations are 3 far from conclusory. 4 Thus, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged deliberate indifference and the County Social 5 Workers are not entitled to qualified immunity. County Defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts 1 6 and 2 because they are immune is DENIED. 7 c. Vicarious Liability 8 County Defendants argue Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims must be dismissed as to Sonoma 9 County, as public entities may not be held liable for acts of an employee under Section 1983 on a 10 theory of respondeat superior. County Mot. at 16. Indeed, “a local government cannot be held 11 liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. 12 Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Plaintiffs do not address this argument and thus concede the 13 point. See Namisnak v. Uber Techs., Inc., 444 F. Supp. 3d 1136, 1146 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (quoting 14 Ardente, Inc. v. Shanley, 2010 WL 546485, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2010)) (“Plaintiff fails to 15 respond to this argument and therefore concedes it through silence.”). As a result, the County 16 Defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts 1 and 2 as to Sonoma County is GRANTED without leave 17 to amend. 18 2. Monell Claim 19 Next, County Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ third cause of action for violation of 20 their due process rights. A government entity may be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where a 21 “policy, practice, or custom” was the “moving force” behind a constitutional violation. Dougherty 22 v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011); see Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. To establish 23 government liability for an improper custom, there must be “practices of sufficient duration, 24 frequency and consistency” rather than “isolated or sporadic incidents.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 25 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996); see Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 714 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Proof of 26 random acts or isolated events is insufficient to establish custom.”). “The line between ‘isolated 27 or sporadic incidents’ and ‘persistent widespread conduct’ is not clearly delineated.” Lemus v. 1 Cir. 2017); see Nelson v. City of Los Angeles, 2015 WL 1931714, at *10-11, 18 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 2 28, 2015) (denying motion to dismiss Monell claim where plaintiffs alleged numerous instances of 3 jail guards retaliating against them for reporting misconduct); compare Meehan v. Los Angeles 4 County, 856 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1988) (two incidents not sufficient to establish custom) and 5 Davis v. Ellensburg, 869 F.2d 1230, 1233 (9th Cir. 1989) (manner of one arrest insufficient to 6 establish policy) with Motley v. Smith, 2016 WL 3407658, at *9 (E.D. Cal. June 20, 2016) 7 (multiple incidents of police denying protection to abused women because of their gender were 8 sufficient to allege widespread custom). 9 As discussed above, the Court finds that Plaintiffs sufficiently allege deliberate 10 indifference by the County Social Workers. Plaintiffs allege that the County had the following 11 policies, practices, and customs that gave effect to such deliberate indifference: 12 1. “The policy of placing children with foster/adoptive parents without conducting a thorough and complete investigation of the prospective foster/adoptive parents, 13 their home, and the children living within that home.” 14 2. “The policy of placing multiple children with foster/adoptive parents without 15 interviewing and examining the children already placed with such parents.” 16 3. “The policy of conducting inadequate investigations of reports of abuse and neglect.” 17 4. “The policy of deliberate indifference to children designated as ‘high-risk.’ ” 18 5. “The policy of limiting child abuse investigations to the subject of the report, and 19 deliberate indifference to the status of other children living in the home.” 20 6. “Deliberate indifference toward training, supervision, and discipline.” 21 22 Am. Compl. ¶ 94. County Defendants argue Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged a Monell 23 claim because the amended complaint “alleges merely that certain social workers behaved in 24 certain ways regarding [Plaintiffs]” and lacks “sufficient factual allegations that any of the actions 25 of the Defendant Social Workers were so widespread as to be attributable to the County.” County 26 Mot. at 19. However, Plaintiffs have alleged multiple instances in which the County conducted 27 inadequate investigations of abuse and neglect (the third policy). See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 30, 34, 36- 1 different points over the course of several years, but they were also carried out by different County 2 employees. Moreover, Plaintiffs have alleged at least five instances in which the County limited 3 child abuse investigations to the subject of the report (the fifth policy) – that is, when County 4 Social Workers did not inquire as to the welfare of one set of children in the Centeno home when 5 investigating reports of abuse into the other set of children. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 47, 52, 53, 58, 60. 6 These instances also involved different County Defendants and took place over the course of 7 years. This is sufficient, at the pleading stage, to allege a pattern or practice that caused Plaintiffs’ 8 constitutional injury. See Motley, 2016 WL 3407658, at *9. Thus, the motion to dismiss Count 3 9 based on the third and fifth alleged policies is DENIED. 10 However, Plaintiffs fail to allege more than one or two instances where County Defendants 11 carried out the alleged first, second, and fourth policies sufficient to allege more than isolated 12 incidents. See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ 94 (“[T]he County and TLC twice placed ‘high risk’ children 13 with the Centenos without conducting a thorough and complete investigation . . . .”). Plaintiffs’ 14 allegations regarding the failure to train policy (sixth policy) are also insufficient to establish a 15 Monell claim, as they are conclusory and are not based in factual allegations. See, e.g., Am. 16 Compl. ¶ 47 (“Due to the County’s deficient procedures, practices, training and supervision, these 17 responding social workers were not even aware that Plaintiffs . . . were still living in the Centeno 18 home.”). County Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Monell claim is therefore GRANTED 19 as to the first, second, fourth, and sixth policies, but because Plaintiffs may be able to allege 20 additional facts sufficient to state a claim based on those policies, the Court cannot determine 21 amendment would be futile, and thus grants leave to amend. See Barahona v. Union Pac. R.R. 22 Co., 881 F.3d 1122, 1134 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[L]eave to amend should be denied as futile ‘only if no 23 set of facts can be proved under the amendment to the pleadings that would constitute a valid and 24 sufficient claim or defense.’ ”). 25 3. Breach of Mandatory Duty 26 County Defendants move to dismiss Count 4, Plaintiffs’ breach of mandatory duty claim 27 based on mandatory duties under State Adoption Program Regulations, Child Welfare Services 1 Regulations, the Welfare and Institutions Code, and the California Penal Code. County Mot. at 2 20. 3 County Defendants first argue they are immune from this cause of action. California 4 Government Code § 820.2 immunizes public employees from liability “resulting from [their] act 5 or omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in 6 [them], whether or not such discretion be abused.” Action is only immunized under Section 820.2 7 when the public employee “prove[s] that . . . in deciding to perform (or not perform) the act which 8 led to [the] plaintiff’s injury, [the employee] consciously exercised discretion in the sense of 9 assuming certain risks in order to gain other policy objectives.” Lopez v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit 10 Dist., 40 Cal. 3d 780, 794 (1985) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, 11 government defendants “have the burden of establishing that they are entitled to immunity for an 12 actual policy decision made by an employee who ‘consciously balanc[ed] risks and advantages.’ ” 13 AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 639 (9th Cir. 2012). The County Social 14 Workers have not met their burden, as they fail to present any evidence that they made considered 15 policy decisions and consciously exercised discretion in their actions. 16 As for Sonoma County, it is liable for injury “proximately caused by an act or omission of 17 an employee,” unless that employee is found to be immune. Cal. Gov. Code § 815.2(a)-(b). 18 Because the County Social Workers are not immune, the County is not either. See Sanderlin v. 19 City of San Jose, 2022 WL 913055, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2022) (rejecting San Jose’s 20 argument that it was immune under Section 815.2 where the court found its employees were not 21 statutorily immune). 22 Having determined the County Defendants are not immune from Plaintiffs’ breach of 23 mandatory duty claim, the Court addresses the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ allegations related to each 24 purported breach of duty below. 25 a. Adoption Program Regulations 26 Plaintiffs allege Defendants had mandatory duties under State Adoption Program 27 Regulations §§ 35177, 35181, and 35183, which instruct adoption agencies to conduct face-to-face 1 sections impose mandatory duties, which Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that County 2 Defendants violated by failing to conduct the required interviews. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 102-103. 3 County Defendants argue that because these sections are located within subchapter 5 of Chapter 3 4 in Title 22 of the California Code of Regulations, which is titled “Procedures for Agency 5 Adoptions,” the subchapter constitutes “mere[] guidelines,” not obligations. County Mot. at 22. 6 Although “[a]n employee manual . . . is not an enactment that imposes a mandatory duty on 7 county employees,” Cnty. of Los Angeles v. Superior Ct., 102 Cal. App. 4th 627, 638 (2002), 8 County Defendants have neither explained nor provided authority for their contention that these 9 procedures amount to nothing more than guidelines or an employee manual. As such, the Court 10 DENIES County Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count 4 as to the Adoption Program Regulations. 11 b. Child Welfare Services Regulations 12 Plaintiffs also allege County Defendants breached mandatory duties set forth in Child 13 Welfare Services Regulations §§ 31-405.22 and 31-125. Section 31-405 requires that a social 14 worker “shall . . . [g]ive preferential consideration for placement of the child to an adult who is a 15 grandparent, aunt, uncle or sibling of the child.” Similarly, that section instructs social workers to 16 “[m]onitor the child’s physical and emotional condition, and take necessary actions to safeguard 17 the child’s growth and development while in placement.” However, these regulations do not 18 require social workers to take any “particular action” or provide “implementing guidelines or 19 rules” to facilitate a statutory requirement. Guzman v. Cnty. of Monterey, 46 Cal. 4th 887, 898 20 (2009); see de Villers v. Cnty. of San Diego, 156 Cal. App. 4th 238, 261 (2007) (finding no 21 mandatory duty where the predicate enactment “confers on government officials the discretion to 22 evaluate and decide how best to implement the required security”) (citation omitted). This gives 23 social workers discretion in the execution of their duties and thus does not impose a mandatory 24 duty. See Mueller v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 2018 WL 8130611, at *3 n.5 (C.D. Cal. May 9, 25 2018) (noting that while Section 31-405.22 “appear[s] to impose a duty to complete a process” it 26 “afford[s] significant discretion to social workers”). 27 By contrast, Child Welfare Services Regulation § 31-125 requires a social worker 1 neglected, or exploited, and at least one adult who has information regarding the allegations.” 2 This requirement to have in-person contact provides a clear directive. See Gerrie v. Cnty. of San 3 Bernardino, 2019 WL 8013412, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2019) (finding that “the requirement 4 that the social worker contact the child’s parents as part of the investigation [pursuant to regulation 5 31-125] is mandatory”). The Court thus GRANTS the motion to dismiss Count 4 as to Child 6 Welfare Services Regulation § 31-405.22 but DENIES the motion to dismiss Count 4 as to § 31- 7 125. 8 c. Welfare and Institutions Code 9 Plaintiffs further allege County Defendants breached mandatory duties set forth in the 10 California Welfare and Institutions Code. Several statutory sections on which Plaintiffs rely, 11 however, provide for discretion and thus do not impose a mandatory duty. 12 For example, Welfare and Institutions Code § 16507.5 states that when a minor is 13 separated from their family, the county welfare department or adoption agency social worker 14 “shall make any and all reasonable and necessary provisions for the care, supervision, custody, 15 conduct, maintenance, and support of the minor.” However, the statute does not specify what 16 those “reasonable and necessary provisions” entail, leaving it to the social worker’s discretion. 17 See Haggis v. City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal. 4th 490, 498 (2000) (holding that a public officer must 18 have been required to take a particular action that does not involve the exercise of discretion). 19 Section 16519 likewise does not provide a mandatory duty, as it simply recounts the legislative 20 finding and declaration regarding the importance of foster child safety, and Plaintiffs point to no 21 language that imposes a duty. See Cnty. of Los Angeles, 102 Cal. App. 4th at 638-39. Plaintiffs’ 22 claim for breach of a mandatory duty under Section 16507.5 accordingly fails. Similarly, Section 23 16504 requires social workers to make an “immediate in-person response” where a child is 24 “reported to the county welfare services department to be endangered by abuse, neglect, or 25 exploitation.” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 16504(a), (c). The social worker “shall consider 26 providing appropriate social services to maintain the child safely in his or her own home.” Id. § 27 16504(a). However, an in-person response is not required when the department determines “based 1 referrals”) that an in-person response is not appropriate. Id. This statute does not provide a 2 mandatory duty because it vests discretion in the social worker and department by not requiring an 3 in-person response where the department determines that one is not necessary or proper. See Cnty. 4 of Los Angeles v. Superior Ct., 209 Cal. App. 4th 543, 554 (2012) (holding that “[a]n enactment 5 requiring a public entity to conduct an investigation under certain circumstances does not, without 6 more, impose a mandatory duty to take certain specific action.”). Plaintiffs argue that the County 7 Social Workers did not review previous referrals, but the language of the statute merely states that 8 the evaluation of risk “includes collateral contracts, a review of previous referrals, and other 9 relevant information” – it does not mandate reviewing referrals. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 10 16504(a). Accordingly, this section does not establish a mandatory duty. 11 Plaintiffs next argue that County Defendants had a duty under Section 16501.1 to “utilize 12 the [Child Welfare Services/Case Management System] to access child and family specific 13 information in order to make appropriate and expeditious case decisions,” but failed to use that 14 system to “access the prior contacts between the County and the Centeno family.” Am. Compl. 15 ¶ 115. This allegation is conclusory, and Plaintiffs fail to point to the particular provision in 16 § 16501.1 that they contend gives rise to the duty. The Court finds this section also does not 17 establish a mandatory duty. The Court thus GRANTS the motion to dismiss Count 4 as to the 18 purported breach of mandatory duties under Welfare and Institutions Code §§ 16507.5, 16504, and 19 16501.1. 20 Section 328, however, does impose a mandatory duty. That section states that if a social 21 worker “has cause to believe that there was or is within the county [a child suffering abuse], the 22 social worker shall immediately make any investigation the social worker deems necessary . . . .” 23 County Defendants argue that such investigations are discretionary. However, the Code provides 24 that in conducting an investigation, the social worker “shall interview any child four years of age 25 or older who is a subject of an [abuse] investigation . . . .” Id. The Ninth Circuit has held that 26 under this code, social workers “have a legal obligation to investigate allegations of child abuse.” 27 Capp v. Cnty. of San Diego, 940 F.3d 1046, 1055 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 1 mandatory duty.” Cnty. of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 107 Cal. App. 5th 160, 182 (2024). 2 Thus, at this stage, Plaintiffs have alleged a mandatory duty to investigate a child abuse allegation 3 under Section 328, and the motion to dismiss Count 4 as to that section is DENIED. 4 d. California Penal Code 5 Plaintiffs allege County Defendants breached a mandatory duty set forth in the California 6 Penal Code, which requires that all persons participating in the investigation of suspected child 7 abuse “shall consider the needs of the child victim and do whatever is necessary to prevent 8 psychological harm” to the victim, and that the “intent and purpose of th[e] article is to protect 9 children from abuse and neglect.” Cal. Penal Code § 11164. Plaintiffs argue County Social 10 Workers violated Section 11164 because they failed to consider the needs of the child victims and, 11 in some instances, took no action whatsoever to prevent harm. Opp. at 22. However, this section 12 of the Penal Code provides no indication as to how a person investigating abuse should consider 13 the “needs of the child” or what actions they must take. Indeed, an enactment such as Section 14 11164 does not create a mandatory duty if it “merely recites legislative policies that must be 15 implemented through a public agency’s exercise of discretion.” Cnty. of Los Angeles v. Superior 16 Ct., 102 Cal. App. 4th 627, 639 (2002). Thus, Section 11164 does not establish a mandatory duty, 17 and the motion to dismiss Count 4 as to the California Penal Code is GRANTED. 18 4. Punitive Damages 19 Finally, County Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages. 20 County Mot. at 30. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “punitive damages may be assessed . . . when a 21 defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or if it involves reckless or 22 callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” Fair Housing of Marin v. Combs, 23 285 F.3d 899, 916 (9th Cir. 2002). County Defendants are correct that Plaintiffs have not 24 provided factual allegations suggesting Defendant Social Workers acted with an “evil motive.” 25 County Mot. at 30. It is a closer call as to whether, viewed as a whole, the amended complaint 26 sufficiently alleges that Defendant Social Workers acted with “reckless or callous indifference” 27 toward the children such that punitive damages could be supported. However, Plaintiffs do not 1 See Namisnak, 444 F. Supp. at 1146. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive 2 damages is therefore GRANTED. 3 B. Lafferty’s Motion to Dismiss 4 Amy Lafferty moves to dismiss the claims brought against her in the amended complaint. 5 Amy Lafferty Motion (“Lafferty Mot.”) (ECF 81). Each claim is addressed below. 6 1. Section 1983 7 a. Count 1 8 Plaintiffs’ first claim alleges Defendants deprived Plaintiffs of their Fourteenth 9 Amendment rights to be free from harm while involuntarily in government custody and their right 10 to medical care, treatment, and services. Am. Compl. ¶ 80. Plaintiffs allege Defendants failed to 11 provide medical, dental, and mental health services, conduct legally required visits, adequately 12 respond to reports of abuse, and ensure adequacy of relative caregiver placements. Am. Compl. 13 80. Lafferty argues Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently plead the claim against her because the operative 14 complaint does not allege Lafferty had any duty or obligation to Plaintiffs encompassing any of 15 those types of services or tasks. Lafferty Mot. at 11. However, Plaintiffs allege Lafferty received 16 reports that detailed abusive behavior within the Centeno household, that the Centenos were 17 overwhelmed, that Michelle K., P.K., and Kaya K. were at “high risk” for abuse, that additional 18 children in the household would increase the existing danger, and that Lafferty ignored and failed 19 to follow up on those reports and nonetheless pushed for the Centenos’ adoption of additional 20 children. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 41-43, 45-46. These constitute more than conclusory allegations of 21 deliberate indifference. See Cox, 913 F.3d at 837. At this stage, Plaintiffs have sufficiently 22 alleged there was an objectively substantial risk of serious harm, and that a reasonable official 23 would have been compelled to draw that inference. See Momox-Caselis, 987 F.3d at 845. 24 Lafferty’s motion to dismiss Count 1 as to her failure to investigate and respond to reports of 25 abuse is thus DENIED. 26 However, Plaintiffs’ first cause of action also alleges County Defendants “interfere[d] with 27 the proper placement of Plaintiffs Michelle K. and P.K. by providing knowingly wrongful and 1 the instant action, the amended complaint does not state a claim for interference with Plaintiffs 2 P.C. and M.C.’s proper placement. Even if the correct plaintiffs were named, this cause of action 3 would fail to state a claim for interference with proper placement based on judicial deception. “To 4 support a § 1983 claim that a social worker engaged in judicial deception, a plaintiff must show 5 “(1) a misrepresentation or omission (2) made deliberately or with a reckless disregard for the 6 truth, that was (3) material to the judicial decision.” Rieman v. Vazquez, 96 F.4th 1085, 1093 (9th 7 Cir. 2024) (citing Scanlon v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 92 F.4th 781, 799 (9th Cir. 2024)). Such 8 claims must comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which requires that the claim be 9 stated “with particularity,” i.e., that a claim allege “the who, what, when, where, and how” of the 10 judicial deception. See Benavidez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1145 (9th Cir. 2021). 11 The allegations in the amended complaint regarding the alleged judicial deception lack the 12 required specificity. The Court therefore GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count 1 as to 13 the interference with proper placement claim with leave to amend. 14 b. Count 2 15 Lafferty argues the state-created danger claim in Count 2 fails because Plaintiffs have 16 shown no “affirmative conduct on the part of the state in placing the plaintiff in danger.” Lafferty 17 Mot. at 15 (citing L.W. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119, 121 (9th Cir. 1992)). Plaintiffs argue it is 18 “abundantly clear” that Plaintiffs allege affirmative conduct by Lafferty, Opp. at 6, but the Court 19 cannot discern any such allegations from the Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs’ allegations that 20 Lafferty provided courts with false information or withheld information from courts fall short of 21 the specificity required. Thus, Lafferty’s motion to dismiss Count 2 is GRANTED. Because 22 Plaintiffs may be able to allege affirmative conduct by Lafferty necessary to state a claim, the 23 Court cannot determine that amendment of these claims would be futile and therefore grants leave 24 to amend. 25 2. Section 1985 26 Lafferty also moves to dismiss the Section 1985 claims in Counts 1 and 2 on the basis that 27 Plaintiffs fail to allege any facts showing conspiracy. Lafferty Mot. at 13-14. “To state a cause of 1 of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the 2 laws, (3) an act by one of the conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (4) a personal 3 injury, property damage or a deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.” 4 Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 641 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 5 88, 102-103 (1971)). “A mere allegation of conspiracy without factual specificity is insufficient.” 6 Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988). To satisfy the first 7 element, “the parties to have conspired must have reached a unity of purpose or common design 8 and understanding, or a meeting of the minds in an unlawful arrangement.” Gilbrook v. City of 9 Westminister, 177 F.3d 839, 856 (9th Cir. 1999). In the Ninth Circuit, a claim under Section 1985 10 must plead specific facts supporting the allegation that defendants conspired together. Karim- 11 Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988). 12 Here, Plaintiffs allege, for example, that Defendants “acted, knew and/or agreed, and/or 13 thereby conspired together . . . to deprive and continue to deprive Plaintiffs of their constitutional 14 rights . . . .” Am. Compl. ¶ 82. Viewing the allegations in the FAC in the light most favorable to 15 Plaintiffs, the Court finds it “contains legal conclusions but no specification of any facts to support 16 the claim of conspiracy,” Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 626, and therefore GRANTS Defendants’ 17 motion to dismiss the Section 1985 claims against Lafferty.3 Because Plaintiffs may be able to 18 allege additional facts sufficient to state a claim against Lafferty for judicial deception and 19 conspiracy, dismissal is with leave to amend. 20 II. CONCLUSION 21 In sum, each motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. 22 Specifically, as to the County Defendants’ motion, the motion to dismiss Counts 1 and 2 is 23 DENIED as to the County Social Workers and GRANTED as to Sonoma County. The Court 24 DENIES the motion to dismiss Count 3 as to the third and fifth policies and GRANTS the motion 25 to dismiss Count 3 as to the first, second, and fourth policies with leave to amend. The motion to 26 3 Though the Court need not look beyond the first element to determine dismissal of the Section 27 1985 claims is proper, it notes that the amended complaint is devoid of allegations that Lafferty 1 dismiss Count 4 is DENIED as to the Adoption Program Regulations, Child Welfare Services 2 Regulation § 31-125, Welfare and Institutions Code § 328, and GRANTED as to Child Welfare 3 Services Regulation § 31-405.22, Welfare and Institutions Code §§ 16507.5, 16504, and 16501.1, 4 Cal. Penal Code § 11164 without leave to amend. The motions to dismiss Counts 1 and 2 as to 5 Sonoma County and Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages are GRANTED without leave to 6 amend. 7 As to Lafferty’s motion, the motion to dismiss the Section 1983 claim in Count 1 is 8 DENIED as to the failure to investigate and respond to reports of abuse and GRANTED as to the 9 interference with proper placement. Lafferty’s motion to dismiss the Section 1983 claim in Count 10 2 is DENIED IN PART AND GRANTED IN PART with leave to amend, and her motion to 11 dismiss the Section 1985 claims in Counts 1 and 2 is GRANTED with leave to amend. 12 Any amended complaint is due by July 9, 2025. Leave to amend is granted solely to cure 13 the defects identified in this Order. No parties or claims may be added without leave of Court or 14 stipulation of Defendants. Plaintiffs are cautioned that failure to remedy the defects identified in 15 this Order will very likely result in dismissal of the claims without leave to amend. Moreover, the 16 parties are cautioned that relitigating matters already resolved by the Court, unless explicitly 17 allowed by the Federal Rules or leave of court, will result in sanctions. 18 If Plaintiffs elect not to file an amended complaint, they shall file a notice of intent to stand 19 on their amended complaint no later than July 9, 2025. 20 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 Dated: June 16, 2025 23 24

ARACELI MARTÍNEZ-OLGUÍN

25 United States District Judge 26 27