1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RONALD L. SEAY, No. 1:25-cv-000177-SAB (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT

TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN A DISTRICT

13 v. JUDGE TO THIS ACTION 14 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CORRECTIONS/REHABILITATION, et RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF THE 15 al., ACTION 16 (ECF No. 10) Defendants. 17 18 19 Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this action filed pursuant to 42 20 U.S.C. § 1983. 21 Plaintiff’s complaint in this action was filed on February 11, 2025. (ECF No. 1.) 22 On March 3, 2025, the Court screened the complaint, found that Plaintiff failed to state a 23 cognizable claim for relief, and granted Plaintiff thirty days to file an amended complaint. (ECF 24 No. 9.) 25 Plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint or otherwise respond to the March 3, 2025 26 order. Therefore, on May 13, 2025, the Court issued an order for Plaintiff to show cause why the 27 action should not be dismissed. (ECF No. 10.) Plaintiff has failed to respond to the order to 28 show cause and the time to do so has now passed. Accordingly, dismissal of the action is 1 warranted. 2 I. 3 SCREENING REQUIREMENT 4 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 5 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 6 Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 7 “frivolous or malicious,” that “fail[] to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that 8 “seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 9 1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). 10 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 11 pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 12 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 13 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 14 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate 15 that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. Jones v. 16 Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). 17 Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings 18 liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 19 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be 20 facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer 21 that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss 22 v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant 23 has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s 24 liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d 25 at 969. 26 II. 27 COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS 28 The Court accepts Plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint as true only for the purpose of the 1 screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 2 Plaintiff was consistently and constantly deprived of meals, clothing, personal property, phone, 3 shower, recreation time, medical treatment, social contact, commissary, care packages, radio, 4 reading books, tablet, television, legal property, and every other necessity to serve a natural life 5 sentence. 6 Plaintiff seeks monetary compensation for the denial of his constitutional rights. 7 III. 8 DISCUSSION 9 A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 10 On the form complaint, Plaintiff acknowledges that there is an inmate remedy process at 11 Kern Valley State Prison (KVSP) and he filed an appeal or grievance regarding all the claims in 12 the complaint. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) However, Plaintiff checks the box “no” in response to the 13 question whether the exhaustion process is complete, and states, “The appeal or grievance has not 14 been decided.” (Id.) 15 Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, “[n]o action shall be brought with 16 respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner 17 confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are 18 available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is a condition precedent to filing a 19 civil rights claim. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006); see also McKinney v. Carey, 311 20 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Congress could have written a statute making exhaustion a 21 precondition to judgment, but it did not. The actual statute makes exhaustion a precondition to 22 suit.” (citations omitted)). The exhaustion requirement “applies to all inmate suits about prison 23 life.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Further, the nature of the relief sought by the 24 prisoner or the relief offered by the prison’s administrative process is of no consequence. Booth v. 25 Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). And, because the PLRA’s text and intent requires “proper” 26 exhaustion, a prisoner does not satisfy the PLRA’s administrative grievance process if he files an 27 untimely or procedurally defective grievance or appeal. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 93. A prisoner 28 need not plead or prove exhaustion. Instead, it is an affirmative defense that must be proved by 1 defendant. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007). A prison’s internal grievance process, not 2 the PLRA, determines whether the grievance satisfies the PLRA exhaustion requirement. Id. at 3 218. However, courts may dismiss a claim if failure to exhaust is clear on the face of the 4 complaint. See Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014). 5 The California prison grievance system has two levels of review. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, 6 §§ 3483, 3485. “Completion of the review process by the Institutional or Regional Office of 7 Grievances resulting in a decision of ‘identified as staff misconduct,’ ‘pending legal matter,’ or 8 ‘time expired’ in accordance with subsections (g)(8) through (g)(10) of [ ] section [3483] does 9 constitute exhaustion of all administrative remedies available to a claimant within the 10 department.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3483(l)(2). Additionally, “[c]ompletion of the review 11 process by the Office of Appeals resulting in a decision of ‘denied,’ ‘granted,’ ‘no jurisdiction,’ 12 ‘identified as staff misconduct,’ ‘pending legal matter,’ or ‘time expired’ in accordance with 13 subsections (g)(1) through (g)(3) and (g)(8) through (g)(10) of [ ] section 3485 constitutes 14 exhaustion of all administrative remedies available to a claimant within the department.” Cal. 15 Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3485(l)(1). 16 In general, failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense that the defendant must plead and 17 prove. Jones, 549 U.S. at 204, 216. However, courts may dismiss a claim if failure to exhaust is 18 clear on the face of the complaint. See Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166. Here, it appears clear on the 19 face of his complaint that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit 20 as he admits the process is not complete and the inmate appeal/grievance has not been decided. 21 Here, from the face of the complaint, it appears Plaintiff failed to exhaust the administrative 22 remedies prior to filing suit. Thus, if Plaintiff files an amended complaint, he must indicate 23 whether he has exhausted his administrative remedies. If he has not, he should allege why, if at 24 all, this action should proceed. See Jones, 549 U.S. at 223-24; Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 25 1175-76 (9th Cir. 2005) (If a court concludes that a prisoner failed to exhaust his available 26 administrative remedies before filing a civil rights action, the proper remedy is dismissal without 27 prejudice). 28 /// 1 B. CDCR as Defendant 2 “Suits against state officials in their official capacity ... should be treated as suits against 3 the State.” Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991); Holley v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 599 F.3d 1108, 4 1111 (9th Cir. 2010) (treating prisoner's suit against state officials in their official capacities as a 5 suit against the state of California). An official capacity suit “represent[s] only another way of 6 pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 7 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (citation omitted). Such a suit “is not a suit against the official personally, 8 for the real party in interest is the entity.” Id. at 166 (emphasis in original). 9 “The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages in federal court against a state, 10 its agencies, and state officials acting in their official capacities.” Aholelei v. Dep’t of Public 11 Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007). Indeed, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal 12 courts from hearing a Section 1983 lawsuit in which damages or injunctive relief is sought against 13 a state, its agencies (such as CDCR) or individual prisons, absent “a waiver by the state or a valid 14 congressional override....” Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 1999). “The 15 Eleventh Amendment bars suits which seek either damages or injunctive relief against a state, ‘an 16 arm of the state,’ its instrumentalities, or its agencies.” See Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. City of 17 Lodi, Cal., 302 F.3d 928, 957 n.28 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation and citations omitted). “The 18 State of California has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to claims 19 brought under § 1983 in federal court....” Dittman, 191 F.3d at 1025–26 (citing Atascadero State 20 Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985)); see also Brown v. Cal. Dep’t. of Corrs., 554 F.3d 21 747, 752 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding California Department of Corrections and California Board of 22 Prison Terms entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity). Therefore, Plaintiff cannot pursue 23 claims for damages or injunctive relief against CDCR, the entity, in this action. 24 C. Supervisory Liability 25 A supervisory official is liable under section 1983 if (1) the official is personally involved 26 in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) there is a “sufficient causal connection between the 27 supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 28 1242–43 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011)). “The 1 requisite causal connection can be established … by setting in motion a series of acts by others or 2 by knowingly refus[ing] to terminate a series of acts by others, which [the supervisor] knew or 3 reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury.” Starr, 652 4 F.3d at 1207–08 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (alterations in original). Thus, a 5 supervisor may “be liable in his individual capacity for his own culpable action or inaction in the 6 training, supervision, or control of his subordinates; for his acquiescence in the constitutional 7 deprivation; or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” 8 Keates, 883 F.3d at 1243 (quoting Starr, 652 F.3d at 1208). 9 “Conclusory allegations that various prison officials knew or should have known about 10 constitutional violations occurring against plaintiff simply because of their general supervisory 11 role are insufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Sullivan v. Biter, No. 15-cv-00243, 12 2017 WL 1540256, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2017) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 13 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) and Starr, 652 F.3d at 1207). In other words, to state a claim against any 14 individual defendant based on supervisory liability, Plaintiff “must allege facts showing that the 15 individual defendant participated in or directed the alleged violation, or knew of the violation and 16 failed to act to prevent it.” Richard v. Holtrop, No. 15-cv-5632, 2016 WL 11520620, at *5 (C.D. 17 Cal. May 12, 2016) (emphasis in original) (citing Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th 18 Cir. 1998)) (“A plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an individual 19 was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights.”). 20 With respect to Defendant Warden Pat Horn, supervisory liability is not an independent 21 cause of action under § 1983, and Plaintiff must allege both an underlying constitutional violation 22 and a connection between the supervisor’s actions and the violation. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 23 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (“A defendant may be held liable as a supervisor under § 1983 ‘if 24 there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a 25 sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional 26 violation.’ ”), quoting Hansen v. Black, 855 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989); Leer v. Murphy, 844 27 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (“The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on 28 the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to 1 have caused a constitutional deprivation.”), citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71, 375-77 2 (1976). Plaintiff may not simply attempt to hold a supervisory Defendant liable without any 3 factual allegations regarding their personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation or a 4 causal connection between their wrongful conduct and the violation. Further, simply stating 5 (without factual support) that these supervisor individuals knew or should have known of the 6 alleged misconduct based on prior complaints or written letters is likewise insufficient to state a 7 cognizable claim for relief. See, e.g., Rivera v. Fischer, 655 F.Supp.2d 235, 238 (W.D.N.Y.2009) 8 (“Numerous courts have held that merely writing a letter of complaint does not provide personal 9 involvement necessary to maintain a § 1983 claim.”) (quoting Candelaria v. Higley, No. 04–CV– 10 277, 2008 WL 478408, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2008) (gathering cases)); Sealey v. Giltner, 116 11 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1997) (prison official who received inmate's letter but forwarded it to 12 subordinate for investigation and response was not personally involved in depriving inmate of 13 constitutional right); Jones v. Fischer, No. 9:11–cv–774 (GLS/CFH), 2013 WL 4039377, at *10 14 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2013) (“receipt of a letter or grievance, without personally investigating or 15 acting on the letter or grievance, is insufficient to establish personal involvement”); Smart v. 16 Goord, 441 F.Supp.2d 631, 642–643 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (failure of supervisory prison official to 17 take action in response to letters complaining of unconstitutional conduct is insufficient to 18 demonstrate personal involvement). Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim 19 against Warden Pat Horn. 20 D. Linkage Requirement 21 Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act requires that there be an actual connection or link 22 between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by 23 Plaintiff. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 24 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects another to the deprivation of a 25 constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates 26 in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that 27 causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th 28 Cir. 1978); see also Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (“A plaintiff must 1 allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an individual was personally involved in the 2 deprivation of his civil rights.”). 3 Although Plaintiff names certain individual Defendants in the caption of the complaint, he 4 does not link them to any affirmative act or omission giving rise to his alleged constitutional 5 violations. 6 E. Conditions of Confinement 7 Extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim, and 8 only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are 9 sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 10 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). “Prison officials have a duty to ensure that prisoners are provided adequate 11 shelter, food, clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 12 726, 731-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotations and citations omitted). Conditions of confinement in 13 combination may have a “mutually enforcing effect” that deprives a single identifiable human 14 need such as food, warmth, or exercise, but “[a]morphous overall conditions cannot rise to the 15 level of cruel and unusual punishment when no specific deprivation of a single human need 16 exists.” Brown v. Bueno, No. 1:17-cv-01295-LJO-SKO (PC), 2018 WL 6068513, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 17 Nov. 20, 2018) (citing and quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304-05 (1991) (internal 18 quotation marks omitted)). 19 Here, Plaintiff fails to link any individual Defendant to a specific alleged unconstitutional 20 condition or that such condition was an extreme deprivation (e.g., allegations meals, clothing, 21 personal property, etc.). Nor are there any facts setting forth the duration to which Plaintiff 22 experienced such condition. In addition, Plaintiff fails to allege facts to demonstrate that any 23 individual acted with deliberate indifference. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable 24 claim for relief. 25 IV. 26 FAILURE TO OBEY COURT ORDER AND FAILURE TO PROSECUTE 27 Here, the Court screened Plaintiff’s complaint, and on March 3, 2025, an order issued 28 providing Plaintiff with the legal standards that applied to his claims, advising him of the 1 deficiencies that needed to be corrected, and granting him leave to file an amended complaint within 2 thirty days. (ECF No. 9.) Plaintiff did not file an amended complaint or otherwise respond to the 3 Court’s March 3, 2025 order. Therefore, on May 13, 2025, the Court ordered Plaintiff to show 4 cause within fourteen (14) days why the action should not be dismissed. (ECF No. 10.) Plaintiff 5 failed to respond to the May 13, 2025 order and the time to do so has passed. 6 Local Rule 110 provides that “[f]ailure of counsel or of a party to comply with these Rules 7 or with any order of the Court may be grounds for imposition by the Court of any and all sanctions 8 . . . within the inherent power of the Court.” The Court has the inherent power to control its docket 9 and may, in the exercise of that power, impose sanctions where appropriate, including dismissal of 10 the action. Bautista v. Los Angeles County, 216 F.3d 837, 841 (9th Cir. 2000). 11 A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to prosecute an action, failure to 12 obey a court order, or failure to comply with local rules. See, e.g. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 13 53-54 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissal for noncompliance with local rule); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 14 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissal for failure to comply with an order to file an amended 15 complaint); Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) (dismissal for failure to comply 16 with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. United States 17 Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order); 18 Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986) (dismissal for lack of prosecution and 19 failure to comply with local rules). 20 “In determining whether to dismiss an action for lack of prosecution, the district court is 21 required to consider several factors: ‘(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; 22 (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public 23 policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic 24 sanctions.’ ” Carey, 856 F.2d at 1440 (quoting Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1423). These factors guide 25 a court in deciding what to do, and are not conditions that must be met in order for a court to take 26 action. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th 27 Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). 28 /// 1 In this instance, the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of the litigation and the 2 Court’s need to manage its docket weigh in favor of dismissal. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) 3 Products Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d at 1226. Plaintiff was ordered to file an amended complaint 4 within thirty days of March 3, 2025 and has not done so. Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the 5 order of the Court by filing an amended complaint hinders the Court’s ability to move this action 6 towards disposition. This action can proceed no further without Plaintiff’s compliance with the 7 order and his failure to comply indicates that Plaintiff does not intend to diligently litigate this 8 action. 9 Since it appears that Plaintiff does not intend to litigate this action diligently there arises a 10 rebuttable presumption of prejudice to the defendants in this action. In re Eisen, 31 F.3d 1447, 11 1452-53 (9th Cir. 1994). The risk of prejudice to the defendants also weighs in favor of dismissal. 12 The public policy in favor of deciding cases on their merits is greatly outweighed by the 13 factors in favor of dismissal. It is Plaintiff’s responsibility to move this action forward. In order 14 for this action to proceed, Plaintiff is required to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies 15 in the operative pleading. Despite being ordered to do so, Plaintiff did not file an amended 16 complaint or respond to the order to show cause and this action cannot simply remain idle on the 17 Court’s docket, unprosecuted. In this instance, the fourth factor does not outweigh Plaintiff’s 18 failure to comply with the Court’s orders. 19 Finally, a court’s warning to a party that their failure to obey the court’s order will result 20 in dismissal satisfies the “consideration of alternatives” requirement. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262; 21 Malone, 833 F.2d at 132-33; Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424. The Court’s March 3 , 2025, order 22 requiring Plaintiff to file an amended complaint expressly stated: “If Plaintiff fails to file an 23 amended complaint in compliance with this order, the Court will recommend to a district judge that 24 this action be dismissed consistent with the reasons stated in this order.” (ECF No. 9, at 9.) In 25 addition, the Court’s May 13, 2025, order to show cause specifically stated: “Plaintiff’s failure to 26 comply with this order will result in a recommendation to dismiss the action for the reasons stated 27 above.” (ECF No. 10.) Thus, Plaintiff had adequate warning that dismissal would result from his 28 noncompliance with the Court’s orders. 1 V. 2 ORDER AND RECOMMENDATIONS 3 The Court has screened Plaintiff's complaint and directed Plaintiff to file an amended 4 | complaint within thirty days. Plaintiff has failed to comply with the Court’s order to file an 5 | amended and has not responded to the Court’s order to show why the action should not be 6 | dismissed. In considering the factors to determine if this action should be dismissed, the Court 7 | finds that this action should be dismissed for Plaintiff's failure to obey the March 3, 2025 and May 8 | 13, 2025 orders, failure to prosecute this action, and failure to state a cognizable claim for relief. 9 Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall randomly assign a 10 | District Judge to this action. 11 Further, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed for □□□□□□□□□□□ 12 | failure to comply with a court orders, failure to prosecute, and failure to state a cognizable claim 13 | for relief. 14 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 15 || Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen 16 | (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written 17 | objections with the Court, limited to 15 pages in length, including exhibits. The document should 18 | be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is 19 | advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights 20 | onappeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. 21 | Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). IT IS SO ORDERED. DAM Le 93 | Dated: _ June 23, 2025

STANLEY A. BOONE

24 United States Magistrate Judge 25 26 27 28 11