DISCUSSION

Defendant argues the trial court should have resentenced him in the 2009 case despite conceding he had completely “served his time on that case as of October 14, 2019.” The People argue defendant’s claim is moot because he is not “ ‘currently serving a term’ ” in the 2009 case. We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 461.) “ ‘ “ ‘As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task here is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. [Citation.] We begin by examining the statute’s words, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Gonzalez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1138, 1141.) “ ‘ “[W]e look to ‘the entire substance of the statute . . . in order to determine the scope and purpose of the provision . . . .[Citation.]’ [Citation.] That is, we construe the words in question ‘ “in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the

3 statute. . . . ” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] We must harmonize ‘the various parts of a statutory enactment . . . by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961.) “When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for construction and courts should not indulge in it.” (People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 895.) “Prior to January 1, 2020, section 667.5, subdivision (b) required trial courts to impose a one-year sentence enhancement for each true finding on an allegation the defendant had served a separate prior prison term and had not remained free of custody for at least five years. (Former § 667.5, subd. (b).) Effective January 1, 2020, Senate Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 136) (Stats. 2019, ch. 590) amended section 667.5 by limiting the prior prison term enhancement to only prior terms for sexually violent offenses. [Citations.] Enhancements based on prior prison terms served for other offenses became legally invalid.” (People v. Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 375, 379- 380 (Burgess).) “Later, in 2021, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 483). This bill sought to make the changes implemented by Senate Bill 136 retroactive. [Citation.] It took effect on January 1, 2022, and added former section 1171.1, now section 1172.75, to the Penal Code.” (Burgess, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 380.) Defendant claims the plain language of section 1172.75 entitles defendant to a full resentencing in both the 2009 and 2014 cases. We disagree. “Section 1172.75 states that ‘[a]ny sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of [s]ection 667.5, except for any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense . . . is legally invalid.’ [Citation.] The statute further establishes a mechanism to provide affected defendants a remedy for those legally invalid enhancements. Subdivision (b) of section 1172.75 directs the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation . . . and the correctional administrator of

4 each county to ‘identify those persons in their custody currently serving a term for a judgment that includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a) and . . . provide the name of each person, along with the person’s date of birth and the relevant case number or docket number, to the sentencing court that imposed the enhancement.’ ” (Burgess, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 380, italics added.) As required by statute, the trial court sentenced defendant to consecutive sentences in the 2014 case. (§ 1170.1, subd. (c) [requiring the court to impose consecutive terms for persons convicted of one or more felonies while in prison, and for defendants to serve such terms consecutively commencing from the time the person would otherwise have been released from prison].) The trial court in the 2014 case was the “sentencing court” under section 1172.75, subdivision (b), as it imposed a sentence that contained enhancements that are now legally invalid. Because the term for the in-prison offenses in the 2014 case was consecutive to the sentence in the 2009 case, the 2014 sentence did not become part of the aggregate prison term the trial court imposed for the out-of-prison offenses in the 2009 case. (People v. Reed (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 302, 305; People v. Escobedo (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 440, 451.) Defendant concedes he finished serving the sentence imposed in the 2009 case in 2019. Because defendant was no longer “currently serving” the sentence from the 2009 case when the trial court recalled his sentence in 2023, the plain language of section 1172.75 establishes defendant was not eligible for resentencing in the 2009 case. (People v. Escobedo, supra, 95 Cal.App.at p. 447 [defendants not currently serving sentences with now illegal prior prison term enhancements are not eligible for relief under § 1172.75].)

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DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

/s/

WISEMAN, J.

We concur:

/s/ ROBIE, Acting P. J.

/s/

BOULWARE EURIE, J.

 Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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