DISCUSSION

13 To survive 3D Systems’ motion to dismiss, Intrepid’s “complaint must contain 14 sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 15 face.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation marks omitted). 16 Plausibility requires more than mere “conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation” of elements; 17 it must be based on “factual allegations” that “raise a right to relief above the speculative 18 level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (cleaned up). Even though 19 the devices in patent cases can be complicated, the “pleading obligations are not onerous.” 20 Bot M8 LLC v. Sony Corp. of Am., 4 F.4th 1342, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2021). To “place the 21 alleged infringer on notice of what activity is being accused of infringement,” id. at 1352, 22 “an adequate complaint need only contain some factual allegations that, when taken as true, 23 articulate why it is plausible that the accused product infringes the patent claim,” AlexSam, 24 Inc. v. Aetna, Inc., 119 F.4th 27, 35 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (quotation marks omitted). 25 26

27 1 “Patent ’301” refers to U.S. Patent 11,014,301, and “Patent ’511” refers to 28 1 According to 3D Systems, Intrepid’s complaint is deficient for each category of 2 infringement—direct, willful, induced, and contributory. 3 A. Direct Infringement 4 Direct infringement comes in two flavors: (1) literal infringement—that is, when a 5 “product” “literally infringe[s] upon the express terms of a patent claim,” and 6 (2) infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, which is when “there is equivalence 7 between the elements of the accused product or process and the claimed elements of the 8 patented invention.” Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 9 (1997). Under the doctrine of equivalents, the “scope of a patent is not limited to its literal 10 terms but instead embraces all equivalents to the claims described.” Festo Corp. v. 11 Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 732 (2002). Under either 12 theory, 3D Systems contends that Intrepid’s complaint fails. 13 As to literal infringement, 3D Systems makes three arguments. Perhaps its strongest 14 point is that “the relevant 3D printing technology involves complex processing and 15 software and therefore requires a level of detail that is missing from the Complaint.” (ECF 16 26, at 20.) It’s true that “the complexity of the technology, the materiality of any given 17 element to practicing the asserted claim(s), and the nature of the allegedly infringing 18 device” can heighten “[t]he level of detail required” at the pleading stage. Bot M8, 4 F.4th 19 at 1353. But, even for such cutting-edge devices, Intrepid’s complaint meets that standard. 20 The complaint places 3D Systems on notice of which products infringe the ’301 and ’511 21 Patents: the PSLA 270 and additional products that are “under development,” including a 22 PSLA-270-related “large-format [digital-light-processing] printer” and another 23 “Bioprinter.” (ECF 1, at 19–20, 27–30.) The complaint also describes the allegedly 24 infringing technology within each product: the “image projection system with multiple 25 projectors which project sub-images arranged in an array with overlapping sub-images to 26 form a composite image”; “a display subsystem controlling the image projection system 27 and each of the projectors”; and “digital filters [that] adjust sub-image properties and 28 alignment, including an irradiance mask, gamma adjustment mask, warp correction filter, 1 and a blending bar.” (Id. at 21; see also id. at 5–6.) As for the PSLA 270, the complaint 2 even details that there are “two projectors projecting two side-by-side sub-images 3 downward.” (Id. at 14.) These allegations allow 3D Systems to “know what [Intrepid’s] 4 patents claim” and “what [Intrepid] asserts [the accused] systems do.” See K-Tech 5 Telecomms., Inc. v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 714 F.3d 1277, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2013). So 3D 6 Systems is “on notice of” the “complex[]” “activity [that] is being accused of 7 infringement.” See Bot M8, 4 F.4th at 1353. 8 In a related argument, 3D Systems maintains that there is no “fair notice” because 9 the “complaint lacks factual support that the accused products meet each and every element 10 of claim 1 of the asserted patents.” (ECF 26, at 17 (cleaned up).) “If even one” “is missing,” 11 it insists, “there cannot be a finding of literal infringement.” (Id. at 18.) Not so. “A plaintiff 12 is not required to plead infringement on an element-by-element basis.” Bot M8, 4 F.4th 13 at 1352. At any rate, Intrepid offered fair notice of its literal-infringement claim by 14 attaching the ’301 and ’511 Patents as well as the patent application for 3D Systems’ 15 allegedly infringing Bioprinter (ECF 1-2; ECF 1-3; ECF 1-11); describing 3D Systems’ 16 purportedly infringing products in detail, including photographs of its PSLA 270 17 3D printer and a diagram of its internal architecture (ECF 1, at 13–21; ECF 1-6); and 18 claiming that “the PSLA 270 infringes each limitation of each Asserted Patent,” as do 19 3D Systems’ Bioprinter and its “large-format version of the PSLA 270” (ECF 1, at 19–21). 20 See, e.g., Disc Disease Sols. Inc. v. VGH Sols., Inc., 888 F.3d 1256, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2018) 21 (upholding patent-infringement complaint that attached the “asserted patents”; identified 22 the accused products “by name and by attaching photos of the product packaging”; and 23 alleged that “the accused products meet ‘each and every element of at least one claim [of 24 plaintiffs’ patents], either literally or equivalently’”). 25 Finally, 3D Systems asserts that Intrepid’s claims about the “in development” 26 products are too “vague.” (See ECF 26, at 21.) But, according to the complaint, a 27 3D Systems representative said that the PSLA 270 is only “the first of what will be a family 28 of new projector-over-VAT printing systems.” (ECF 1, at 19.) And, if the PSLA 270 1 infringes, it’s reasonable to infer that the “family” of related products “under development” 2 will as well—especially if, as alleged, that technological progeny “works the same way as 3 the PSLA 270” with an expected “four or more image projectors pointing downward to a 4 larger build platform located in or on a vat of resin.” (See id. at 19–20.) Those allegations 5 might ultimately be wrong, but they are far from vague. At any rate, the missing details 6 about the PSLA 270 and other allegedly under-development products are “not ascertainable 7 without discovery,” and thus “should not bar [Intrepid’s] filing of a complaint.” See K- 8 Tech, 714 F.3d at 1286. So Intrepid’s literal-infringement claims survive. 9 Turning to Intrepid’s doctrine-of-equivalents allegations, 3D Systems insists that 10 they are too “conclusory” to state a claim. (ECF 26, at 24.) But once a complaint adequately 11 states literal-infringement claims, “a general allegation of patent infringement under the 12 doctrine of equivalents is sufficient to place Defendants on notice” of its intent to rely on 13 that theory. See Brice Env’t Servs. Corp. v. Arcadis U.S., Inc., No. 3:21-CV-00141-JMK, 14 2022 WL 1032930, at *8 (D. Alaska Apr. 6, 2022); see also id. at *8 n.101 (collecting 15 cases). After all, plaintiffs may plead direct infringement “alternatively or hypothetically” 16 to allow for the possibility that the post-discovery proof reveals that an accused product 17 does not literally infringe but is still close enough to infringe as an equivalent. See Fed. R. 18 Civ. P. 8(d)(2). With such alternative causes of action, “the pleading is sufficient if any one 19 of them is sufficient.” Id. Because Intrepid already stated a claim for literal infringement, 20 it met its alternative-pleading obligations by claiming that 3D Systems “has infringed one 21 or more claims of” both patents “under the doctrine of equivalents.” (See ECF 1, at 27, 29); 22 see also Brice, 2022 WL 1032930, at *8. 23 As both direct-infringement theories are adequately pleaded, the motion to dismiss 24 them is denied. Also, 3D Systems’ subsidiary arguments that the other infringement claims 25 lack a direct-infringement predicate are rejected. 26 B. Willful Infringement 27 3D Systems next contends that Intrepid’s willful-infringement claim “fails because 28 it is based on . . . speculatory allegations that have nothing to do with an intent to infringe” 1 upon Intrepid’s patents. (ECF 26, at 25.) The complaint’s allegations suggest otherwise. 2 Once “[k]nowledge of the asserted patent and evidence of infringement” are 3 established, Bayer Healthcare LLC v. Baxalta Inc., 989 F.3d 964, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2021), 4 “the concept of ‘willfulness’ requires . . . no more than deliberate or intentional 5 infringement,” Eko Brands, LLC v. Adrian Rivera Maynez Enters., Inc., 946 F.3d 1367, 6 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Intrepid alleges that 3D Systems knew of the patents by nature of 7 “review[ing] each of the patent publications that matured as the Asserted Patents within 8 days of their publication” and then “used the Asserted Patents as a roadmap to develop” its 9 allegedly infringing products. (ECF 1, at 22, 25.) These facts alone likely qualify as 10 “deliberate or intentional infringement” behavior. See Eko Brands, 946 F.3d at 1378; 11 see also BSD Crown, LTD. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 3d 993, 1002, 1004 12 (N.D. Cal. 2023) (ruling that “willful infringement” was “plausibly allege[d]” when, 13 “despite knowledge” of the patent, defendant “continued to use the allegedly infringing 14 technology”); cf. Longhorn Vaccines & Diagnostics, LLC v. Spectrum Sols. LLC, 15 564 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 1148 (D. Utah 2021) (explaining that willful-infringement 16 allegations would fail against “defendants who, in good faith, attempted to design around 17 patents they knew about”). 18 And Intrepid’s allegations regarding willfulness go much further, plausibly 19 suggesting that 3D Systems conducted corporate espionage in aid of patent infringement. 20 That is, while ostensibly interviewing for a position at Intrepid, a 3D Systems employee 21 allegedly “toured Intrepid’s facilities and was shown Intrepid’s highly confidential 22 unreleased products, test beds, samples, and technologies,” including those Intrepid claims 23 “in its patents.” (ECF 1, at 22–23.) That employee purportedly “knew” that these 24 innovations “would be much faster than anything 3DS had in the marketplace or even under 25 development at that time.” (Id. at 23.) And he “continued to request detailed information 26 from Intrepid regarding the” technologies. (Id.) What’s more, the 3D Systems employee 27 allegedly violated the non-disclosure agreement he signed with Intrepid when he later 28 “informed one or more 3DS employees that they should take a careful look at Intrepid’s 1 patents and public patent applications.” (Id.) 3D Systems’ “Director of Material Sales” did 2 so, and he “ascertained that [the] information regarding Intrepid’s . . . technology” would 3 be “a dire threat to 3D Systems’ business.” (Id. at 24.) That director then “requested 4 immediate analysis” of “how Intrepid’s new technology stacked up to existing 3DS 5 equipment . . . to combat the impending threat that this new technology posed.” (Id.) In 6 addition, after the fateful tour of Intrepid’s facilities—but before the claimed 7 infringement—3D Systems workers had several other internal discussions about the 8 patented technology at issue here, according to the complaint. (See id.) 9 These factual details easily meet the standard for plausibly alleging willfulness. The 10 motion to dismiss the willful-infringement claim is denied. 11 C. Induced Infringement 12 As to induced infringement, 3D Systems focuses primarily on the intent requirement. 13 To pass muster, an allegation of induced infringement must plausibly show, among other 14 things, that “the accused infringer specifically intended another party to infringe the patent 15 and knew that the other party’s acts constituted infringement.” AlexSam, 119 F.4th at 46 16 (cleaned up). 3D Systems maintains that the complaint contains only “[c]onclusory 17 allegations” and “no factual basis to infer specific intent to induce.” (ECF 26, at 29.) But 18 “[c]ircumstantial evidence may suffice to prove specific intent,” AlexSam, 119 F.4th at 46, 19 and the complaint sets forth a plausible indirect case for such intent. As discussed above, 20 Intrepid has adequately alleged 3D Systems’ knowledge of the subject patents. And, 21 according to the complaint, 3D Systems “announced via press release” that a customer 22 “intends to add . . . two PSLA 270” 3D printers “to its manufacturing workflow.” (ECF 1, 23 at 19.) It is plausible that 3D Systems specifically intended to induce infringement by this 24 client based on “instructional materials” that 3D Systems provided its customers (id. at 28, 25 30) as well as 3D Systems’ website video, “Get to know the PSLA 270,” which 26 “introduces” the allegedly infringing device alongside “a web button” allowing “users to 27 ‘Get a Quote’” (id. at 14, 18). Indeed, the case for specific intent here is at least as strong 28 as the facts the AlexSam court blessed. See AlexSam, 119 F.4th at 46 (approving induced- 1 infringement pleadings of specific intent because they plausibly alleged, among other 2 things, that defendant induced “infringement by its customers by continuing to sell, 3 support, and instruct its customers on using the” accused products “in an infringing manner, 4 at least through information available on Defendant’s website including information 5 brochures, promotional material, and contact information”). 6 3D Systems’ arguments thus fall short, and the motion to dismiss the 7 induced-infringement claim is denied. 8 D. Contributory Infringement 9 We turn, finally, to contributory infringement, which is a theory of liability for the 10 seller of a part or “component of a patented machine” when that component has little use 11 except in its role within the patented device. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). To state a claim for 12 contributory infringement, plaintiffs must plausibly allege that: (1) “someone other than 13 [the] alleged [contributory] infringer . . . directly infringe[d] a claim of the patent”; (2) the 14 alleged contributory infringer “supplied an important component of the infringing part of 15 the product or method”; (3) the “component is not a common component suitable for 16 non-infringing use”; and (4) the alleged contributory infringer “supplied the component 17 with the knowledge of the patent and knowledge that the component was especially made 18 or adapted for use in an infringing manner.” N.D. Cal. Model Patent Jury Instruction 3.6 19 (brackets omitted). 20 3D Systems advances three main arguments. First, it protests that the complaint 21 offers only conclusory allegations of the “non-staple nature” of 3D Systems’ components. 22 (ECF 26, at 27–28.) For this element, however, at least one district court has found that a 23 general allegation that the accused products “have no substantial non-infringing uses” 24 suffices. See Venkee Commc’ns, LLC v. Belkin Int’l, Inc., No. 2:20-cv-02021-CBM-PVCx, 25 2020 WL 5413039, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2020). Other district courts disagree, rejecting 26 general allegations in this context as “conclusory,” “threadbare recitals” that contravene 27 the plausibility pleading requirements. See Iron Oak Techs., LLC v. Dell, Inc., No. 1:17- 28 CV-999-RP, 2018 WL 1631396, at * 2 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 4, 2018) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. 1 at 678). But there’s good reason to allow a general allegation in this particular instance—a 2 contrary position would essentially require plaintiffs to prove a negative without the benefit 3 of discovery. And that strikes the Court as an “onerous” requirement that would improperly 4 require patentees to “prove their case at the pleading stage.” See Bot M8, 4 F.4th at 1346, 5 1354. 6 Of course, such general allegations may be inadequate if the complaint otherwise 7 “demonstrate[s] that the [accused] products do have substantial non-infringing uses,” but 8 that exception is not implicated here. See In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing 9 Sys. Pat. Litig., 681 F.3d 1323, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Intrepid pleads that the 3D Systems 10 products at issue—the “Accused Instrumentalities”—“were not staple articles of 11 commerce suitable for substantial non-infringing uses.” (ECF 1, at 28, 30.) Nothing in the 12 complaint contradicts that assertion. 13 3D Systems’ next line of attack centers on the complaint’s failure to allege, beyond 14 conclusory statements, that 3D Systems “knew that any products lacked non-infringing 15 uses.” (ECF 26, at 27.) But the “same allegations that adequately plead knowledge of the 16 patent and knowledge of the patent infringement for purposes of induced infringement” 17 can “suffice for purposes of [a] contributory infringement claim.” See AlexSam, 119 F.4th 18 at 47. As discussed earlier, Intrepid’s complaint alleges at least as strong a case for 19 3D Systems’ knowledge as the one that sufficed in AlexSam. 20 Finally, 3D Systems faults the complaint for failing to “identify any specific 21 component that allegedly contributorily infringed the Asserted Patents.” (ECF 26, at 27.) 22 Yet in describing the makeup of 3D Systems’ “Bioprinter,” the complaint lists several such 23 material components, including an “image projection system with multiple projectors 24 which project sub-images arranged in an array with overlapping sub-images to form a 25 composite image”; a “display subsystem controlling the image projection system and each 26 of the projectors”; and “digital filters [that] adjust sub-image properties and alignment, 27 including an irradiance mask, gamma adjustment mask, warp correction filter, and a 28 blending bar.” (ECF 1, at 21; see also id. at 7–8.) These components are precisely what 1 || Intrepid claims in its patents. (See ECF 1-2, at 31, 43; ECF 1-3, at 31, 43.) The same is true 2 ||of the PSLA 270 and its family of devices. (See ECF 1, at 21 (describing “a display 3 subsystem controlling the image projection system and each of the projectors” and “digital 4 ||filters [that] adjust sub-image properties and alignment, including an irradiance mask, 5 || gamma adjustment mask, warp correction filter, and a blending bar’’).) 6 The Court denies the motion to dismiss the contributory-infringement claim. 7 CONCLUSION 8 3D Systems’ dismissal motion is DENIED. 3D Systems’ judicial-notice motion 9 || (ECF 26-1) is denied as moot, as it involved material unnecessary for the Court’s decision. 10 || Dated: July 15, 2025

12 Hon. Andrew G. Schopler 13 United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28