NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 17 2025

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TEODORO MEJIA-GARCIA, No. 23-3855 Agency No. Petitioner, A089-091-369 v.

MEMORANDUM*

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted July 9, 2025** Seattle, Washington

Before: McKEOWN, PAEZ, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.

Petitioner Teodoro Mejia-Garcia (“Mejia-Garcia”) is a native and citizen of

Mexico. He petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) order

dismissing his appeal from an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) order (collectively

“agency”). The agency denied his applications for withholding of removal and

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). “When the BIA

summarily affirms the IJ’s decision, we review the IJ’s decision as the final agency

action.” Pagayon v. Holder, 675 F.3d 1182, 1188 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam)

(citation omitted). “We review factual findings for substantial evidence and legal

questions de novo.” Flores Medina v. Garland, 37 F.4th 626, 632 (9th Cir. 2022)

(citation omitted). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the

petition.

1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Mejia-

Garcia is ineligible for withholding of removal because he failed to establish either

past persecution or a clear probability of future persecution on account of a

protected ground. First, the agency found that Mejia-Garcia did not suffer harm

rising to the level of persecution when he was told by two armed cartel members in

2013 to leave that part of Mexico or they would “disappear” or “kill” him. Mejia-

Garcia was never physically harmed after this threat and never made contact with

the two unidentified individuals again. “[C]ases with threats alone, particularly

anonymous or vague ones, rarely constitute persecution.” Duran-Rodriguez v.

Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). Rather, persecution

is more likely to be found “where threats are repeated, specific and ‘combined with

confrontation or other mistreatment.’” Id. (citation omitted). The evidence

presented by Mejia-Garcia does not compel a finding of past persecution.

2 23-3855 Second, the agency determined that Mejia-Garcia’s fear of being killed by

his ex-father-in-law, Edocio Garcia, does not establish a clear probability of

persecution on account of a protected ground. In the petition for review, Mejia-

Garcia does not argue that Edocio’s desire for vengeance is motivated by family-

based animus. Therefore, we will not disturb the agency’s finding that “Edocio’s

reason to harm [Mejia-Garcia], out of revenge for reporting him to the police when

he sexually abused [Mejia-Garcia’s] daughter, would be the result of personal

animus between Edocio and [Mejia-Garcia], and not on account of a protected

ground.” Purely personal retribution does not establish nexus to a protected

ground. See Molina-Morales v. INS, 237 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding

that “[p]urely personal retribution” is “not persecution on account of” a protected

ground) (citation omitted); Garcia v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1136, 1144–45 (9th Cir.

2021).

While Mejia-Garcia argues that he fears persecution on account of his

membership in a particular social group (“PSG”) of “family members of Edocio

Garcia’s family,”1 he has not identified any evidence compelling the conclusion

that either the two cartel members or Edocio were targeting him on the basis of his

1 We reject the government’s contention that Mejia-Garcia failed to present this proposed PSG before the agency. The IJ expressly acknowledged in its order that “[Mejia-Garcia] contends that he is entitled to relief because of his membership in a particular social group, ‘family members of Edocio Garcia’s family.’”

3 23-3855 family membership.2

2. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that Mejia-Garcia

failed to establish a “chance greater than fifty percent that he will be tortured” if

removed to Mexico. Hamoui v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 2004).

Mejia-Garcia contends that he “was tortured by the two cartel members” who

threatened him. But, as discussed, the single unrealized threat from unidentified

cartel members did not rise to the level of persecution, let alone torture. See

Davila v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1136, 1144 (9th Cir. 2020) (“Torture is ‘more severe than

persecution.’”) (citation omitted).

Mejia-Garcia also claims that “Edocio and his family have connections to

the cartel and can assassinate him,” but this claim is too speculative to meet Mejia-

Garcia’s high burden for CAT protection. While Edocio threatened to shoot

“anybody that could report him to the police,” and Mejia-Garcia reported Edocio to

the police, Mejia-Garcia testified that neither he nor his family in Mexico had

heard from Edocio since Mejia-Garcia made the report. Mejia-Garcia

2 The agency did not err in determining that the Department of Homeland Security’s inadvertent disclosure of personally identifiable information related to Mejia-Garcia’s removal proceedings on the Internet did not have “any bearing on [Mejia-Garcia’s] request for relief, as nothing in [Mejia-Garcia’s Motion to Request Withholding of Removal] shows that the person who [Mejia-Garcia] fears knows about the data breach.” In the petition for review, Mejia-Garcia asserts that the inadvertent disclosure “has placed [him] at high risk to be harmed or killed” but fails to explain or substantiate this claim with any record evidence.

4 23-3855 acknowledged that he does not know where Edocio is, including whether he is still

in Mexico. Moreover, the only basis for Mejia-Garcia’s belief that Edocio is

connected to a cartel is that Edocio told him so. Where a petitioner’s fear of

torture is “speculative and unsupported by the record,” substantial evidence

supports the denial of protection under CAT. Gutierrez-Alm v. Garland, 62 F.4th

1186, 1201 (9th Cir. 2023).

PETITION DENIED.

5 23-3855