facts, we do not recite them here. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291 to review the district court’s denial of qualified immunity “to the extent that

it turns on an issue of law.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985). We

affirm the district court’s order.

“We review a denial of qualified immunity de novo, viewing the facts and

drawing reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing

summary judgment.” Ames v. King County, 846 F.3d 340, 347 (9th Cir. 2017).

We apply a two-part test to determine whether officials are entitled to qualified

immunity: (1) whether the facts as shown “make out a violation of a constitutional

right, and (2) if so, whether that right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of

defendant’s alleged misconduct” such that a reasonable official would be on notice

that their conduct violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Pearson v. Callahan,

2 24-3889 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). A

court may address these questions in any order. Id. at 236.

We have articulated a “discrete constitutional right” that “parents will not be

separated from their children without due process of law except in emergencies.”

Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1235–36 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Mabe v. San

Bernadino Cnty., Dep’t of Pub. Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d 1101, 1109 (9th Cir. 2001)).

Stated more specifically, the state may remove a child from their parents without a

court order if there is “reasonable cause to believe the child is in imminent danger

of serious bodily injury, and the scope, degree, and duration of the intrusion are

reasonably necessary to avert the specific injury at issue.” Id. at 1237–38

(synthesizing cases).

1. The district court held that there was a material dispute of fact about

Appellants’ knowledge of Keahiolalo’s custody rights at the relevant times.

Appellants argue that their knowledge of Keahiolalo’s custody rights is immaterial

because they would have removed B.D. from David’s custody after the November

30, 2019 assault, and pursuant to the December 4 temporary restraining order,

regardless of where they placed her. See Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 904 (9th

Cir. 2001) (holding that the materiality of a disputed issue of fact is a legal

question). But a fact finder could decide that B.D.’s placement with Keahiolalo

violated the right to familial association because it was not “reasonably necessary”

3 24-3889 to protect B.D. from harm and unduly affected the “scope, degree, and duration” of

B.D.’s separation.

For example, a jury could determine that it was unreasonable for social

workers with knowledge of Keahiolalo’s limited custody rights to informally

“transfer” B.D. to her father, rather than take temporary protective custody of B.D.

See Haw. Rev. Stat. § 587A. As a result of the informal transfer, B.D. was

relocated to different island, and David did not receive the procedural protections

she is due under Hawaii law, which presumably would have granted her the

hearing that led to the return of B.D. 11 days earlier. Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 587A-

9(5); 587A-11(7); see also Burke v. County of Alameda, 586 F.3d 725, 733 (9th

Cir. 2009) (noting that “if the parent without physical custody does not reside

nearby . . . , it is probably reasonable for a police officer to place a child in

protective custody without attempting to place the child with the geographically

distant parent”); Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1140 (9th Cir. 2000) (observing

children were “traumatized” by a lengthy separation from their parents with limited

visitation).

2. Appellants further argue that the district court erred by defining the

asserted constitutional right at too high a level of generality. See Anderson v.

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (noting that clearly established inquiry

focuses on whether “contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear” to put officials

4 24-3889 on notice). We disagree. Our precedent clearly instructs social workers that,

without a court order, any intrusion on a parent’s familial association rights must

be limited to what is “reasonably necessary” to protect children from imminent

danger of serious bodily injury. See Wallis, 202 F.3d at 1138–39. Depending on

the facts adduced at trial, a fact finder could conclude that B.D. was not in

imminent danger of serious bodily injury when defendants took B.D. into custody

without a court order. A reasonable jury could also conclude that the “scope,

degree, and duration” of B.D.’s 21-day separation from her mother was not

reasonably necessary to protect her from harm. Thus, resolving factual disputes in

Davids’ favor, as we must at this stage, Appellants’ actions violated the clearly

established core contours of David’s familial association rights. The district court

did not err by denying Appellants qualified immunity.

AFFIRMED.

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