background knowledge of the topic. His report detailed the history of the region

1 We also conclude that the district court’s decision would have been the same absent Dr. Tomljanovich’s testimony, but need not further discuss that issue as our conclusion that the testimony is relevant and reliable is sufficient for our harmless error analysis. See United States v. Jimenez-Chaidez, 96 F.4th 1257, 1269 (9th Cir. 2024).

2 23-3892 dating back to the 1500s with a particular emphasis on the history of ethnic

tensions in the region. He also explained the structure of the Army of the Republic

of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“ABiH”), including its Zulfikar Unit, and based those

explanations on his analysis of documentary evidence. Such context is relevant to

the Trusina massacre. See United States v. Ruvalcaba-Garcia, 923 F.3d 1183, 1188

(9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“Relevancy simply requires that the evidence

logically advance a material aspect of the party’s case.” (internal quotation marks

omitted)). Dr. Tomljanovich also properly testified about the methodology used in

his report. See id. at 1188–89 (noting that reliability “requires that the expert’s

testimony have a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of the relevant

discipline” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2. We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment,

“viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and

drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor.” Schrader Cellars, LLC v. Roach,

129 F.4th 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting Bell v. Wilmott Storage Servs., LLC,

12 F.4th 1065, 1068 (9th Cir. 2021)). In a civil denaturalization proceeding,

summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine issue of material fact as to

whether clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence supports denaturalization.”

United States v. Arango, 670 F.3d 988, 992 (9th Cir. 2012).

We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the United

3 23-3892 States as to Counts 2 and 5.2 A misrepresentation claim has four elements: (1) “the

naturalized citizen must have misrepresented or concealed some fact,” (2) “the

misrepresentation or concealment must have been willful,” (3) “the fact must have

been material,” and (4) “the naturalized citizen must have procured citizenship as a

result of the misrepresentation or concealment.” Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S.

759, 767 (1988). Here, Yetisen failed to disclose that she had served in the Zulfikar

Unit on both her asylum application (Count 2) and her naturalization application

(Count 5). There is no genuine dispute of material fact that Yetisen did so

willfully. “[A]n intent to deceive is not required” and “knowledge of the falsity of

a representation is sufficient.” Forbes v. INS, 48 F.3d 439, 442 (9th Cir. 1995).

Yetisen’s failure to disclose her service was material because it had a “natural

tendency to influence the decisions of” immigration officials. Kungys, 485 U.S. at

772. And Yetisen procured citizenship as a result of this concealment, as the record

demonstrates that she would have been ineligible under the persecutor bar had she

disclosed her service in the Zulfikar Unit. See id. at 767.

3. We review de novo the question whether an equitable defense “is a valid

defense to the particular cause of action.” Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. Nutrition Now,

Inc., 304 F.3d 829, 834 (9th Cir. 2002). We review for abuse of discretion a district

2 Because we affirm on Counts 2 and 5, we need not reach the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the United States as to Counts 1 and 3.

4 23-3892 court’s application of laches. Pinkette Clothing, Inc. v. Cosmetic Warriors Ltd.,

894 F.3d 1015, 1025 (9th Cir. 2018).

Even assuming laches is an available defense in a civil denaturalization

proceeding, the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Yetisen’s

laches defense. “Laches requires proof of (1) lack of diligence by the party against

whom the defense is asserted, and (2) prejudice to the party asserting the defense.”

Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 282 (1961). Yetisen cannot show a lack of

diligence on the government’s part. There is no evidence or testimony

demonstrating that Yetisen ever disclosed her service in the Zulfikar Unit. The

government did not learn of Yetisen’s service in the Zulfikar Unit until March

2009. Yetisen was subsequently extradited to Bosnia in November 2011, sentenced

to five and a half years in prison in April 2012, and returned to the United States

after serving that sentence. The government initiated this action in April 2018, less

than a year after Yetisen’s return to the United States. Considering Yetisen’s

extradition to and prison sentence in Bosnia, a six-month delay after Yetisen

returned to the United States hardly demonstrates a lack of diligence. See United

States v. Dang, 488 F.3d 1135, 1144 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that “most

denaturalization proceedings are instituted beyond [a] five-year period”).

AFFIRMED.

5 23-3892