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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

9 10 DEBORAH J. ROMBAUT, an Case No. 2:25-cv-02802-AB (Ex) individual, on behalf of herself and all ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 11 others similarly situated, MOTION TO REMAND [Dkt. No. 22] 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. 14 15 U.S. CONCEPTS LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company; and DOES 16 1 through 50, 17 Defendants. 18 19 Plaintiff Deborah J. Rombaut (“Plaintiff”), on behalf of herself and all other 20 similarly situated employees within the State of California, filed a Complaint 21 (“Compl.,” Dkt. No. 1-3) in the Los Angeles County Superior Court alleging that 22 Defendant U.S. Concepts, LLC (“Defendant”) violated various California labor laws. 23 See Compl. ¶ 2. Defendant removed the action pursuant to the Class Action Fairness 24 Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to 25 Remand. (“Mot.,” Dkt. No. 11.) Defendant filed an Opposition (“Opp.,” Dkt. No. 15), 26 and Plaintiff filed a Reply (Dkt. No. 17). For the following reasons, the Court 27 DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion. 28 2 From February 6, 2021, to February 28, 2025, Plaintiff was employed by

3 Defendant as a non-exempt Brand Ambassador and seeks to represent a class of

4 individuals who are or were employed by Defendant as non-exempt employees in 5 California during the class period. See Compl. ¶¶ 3, 21. According to Plaintiff, 6 Defendant violated California labor law by failing to pay minimum wage and failing 7 to compensate for all hours worked, including overtime. Id. ¶¶ 24, 32. Plaintiff further 8 alleges that Defendant failed to provide legally required rest or meal breaks. Id. ¶¶ 38, 9 44. In addition, Plaintiff claims Defendant failed to pay wages in a timely manner both 10 during employment (i.e., seven calendar days following the close of payroll) and at 11 separation (i.e., seventy-two hours after resignation). Id. ¶¶ 52, 54. Plaintiff also 12 alleges that Defendant did not fully reimburse Plaintiff for work-related expenses. Id. 13 ¶ 58. Defendant purportedly failed to provide accurate itemized wage statements, 14 which Plaintiff attributes to Defendant’s failure to keep accurate bookkeeping records. 15 Id. ¶¶ 60, 64. Last, Plaintiff alleges Defendant failed to provide adequate seating 16 throughout the course of the job. Id. ¶ 66. 17 Based on these allegations, the Complaint alleges the following ten (10) causes 18 of action: (1) Failure to Pay All Minimum Wages (Cal. Lab. Code §1197); (2) Failure 19 to Pay All Overtime Wages (Cal. Lab. Code. §§ 204, 510, 1194, and 1198); (3) 20 Failure to Provide Rest Periods and Pay Missed Rest Period Premiums (Cal Lab. Code 21 § 226.7 and 512); (4) Failure to Provide Meal Periods and Pay Missed Meal Period 22 Premiums (Cal. Lab. Code § 226.7); (5) Failure to Maintain Employment Records 23 (Cal. Lab. Code § 1174(d)); (6) Failure to Pay Wages Timely during Employment 24 (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 210 and 218.5); (7) Failure to Pay All Wages Earned and Unpaid 25 at Separation (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 201-3); (8) Failure to Indemnify All Necessary 26 Business Expenditures (Cal. Lab. Code § 2802, subds. (b), (c)); (9) Failure to Furnish 27 Accurate Itemized Wage Statements (Cal. Lab. Code § 226 subds. (a)); and (10) 28 Violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law (Cal. Bus. and Pro. Code § 17200- 2 On March 31, 2025, Defendant filed a Notice of Removal (“NOR,” Dkt. No. 1),

3 removing the case to federal court pursuant to CAFA. Plaintiff now moves to remand

4 the case back to state court on the grounds that Defendant has not satisfied the 5 requisite amount in controversy under CAFA, and Defendant failed to timely remove 6 the case. According to Plaintiff, Defendant’s Notice of Removal relies on inflated 7 estimates regarding unpaid working hours, non-compliant meal periods and rest 8 periods, waiting time penalties, failure to timely pay wages, wage statements, and 9 attorneys’ fees. 10 II. LEGAL STANDARD 11 The Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) vests federal district courts with 12 original jurisdiction over class actions in which (1) the parties are minimally diverse, 13 (2) the proposed class has more than 100 members, and (3) the total amount in 14 controversy exceeds $5 million. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d); Serrano v. 180 Connect, Inc., 15 478 F.3d 1018, 1020–21 (9th Cir. 2007). There is no presumption against removal in 16 cases invoking CAFA, “which Congress enacted to facilitate adjudication of certain 17 class actions in federal court.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 18 574 U.S. 81, 88 (2014). “CAFA’s primary objective” is to “ensur[e] ‘Federal court 19 consideration of interstate cases of national importance.’” Id. (citing § 2(b)(2), 119 20 Stat. 5). 21 A removing defendant bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. See 22 Ibarra v. Manheim Investments, Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2015). To meet 23 this burden as to the amount in controversy, “a defendant’s notice of removal need 24 include only a plausible allegation that the amount in controversy exceeds the 25 jurisdictional threshold.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC, 574 U.S. at 88 26 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2)(B)). 27 Only “when the plaintiff contests, or the court questions, the defendant’s 28 allegation” must the defendant submit evidence to establish the amount in controversy 2 Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1195. A defendant may prove the amount in controversy by a

3 declaration or affidavit. See Elizarraz v. United Rentals, Inc., 2019 WL 1553664, at

4 *3 (C.D. Cal. April 9, 2019). The Court should “treat the removal petition as if it had 5 been amended to include the relevant information contained in the later-filed 6 affidavits.” Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 407 n. 3 (1969); see also Cohn v. 7 Petsmart, Inc., 281 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The district court did not err in 8 construing [defendant’s] opposition as an amendment to its notice of removal.”). 9 The plaintiff may submit evidence to the contrary. Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1198 10 (citing Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 89). “The parties may submit evidence outside the 11 complaint, including affidavits or declarations, or other ‘summary-judgment-type 12 evidence relevant to the amount in controversy at the time of removal.’” Id. at 1197 13 (quoting Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1997)). 14 Once “both sides submit proof [] the court then decides where the preponderance 15 lies.” Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1198. “Under this system, a defendant cannot establish 16 removal jurisdiction by mere speculation and conjecture, with unreasonable 17 assumptions.” Id. at 1197. 18 III. DISCUSSION 19 A. Evidentiary Objections 20 In evaluating the existence of diversity jurisdiction on a motion to remand, 21 courts “consider . . . summary-judgment-type evidence relevant to the amount in 22 controversy at the time of removal.” Fritsch v. Swift Transportation Co. of Arizona, 23 LLC, 899 F.3d 785, 793 (9th Cir. 2018). “An affidavit or declaration used to support 24 or oppose a motion [for summary judgment] must . . . set out facts that would be [but 25 not necessarily are] admissible in evidence . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). At 26 summary judgment, a district court may consider hearsay evidence submitted in an 27 inadmissible form, so long as the underlying evidence could be provided in an 28 admissible form at trial. See JL Beverage Co., LLC v. Jim Beam Brands Co., 828 F.3d 2 Plaintiff filed evidentiary objections to Defendants’ evidence, specifically, parts

3 of the Morales Declaration. (Dkt. No. 11-4.) Plaintiff objects that parts of the Morales

4 Declaration lack foundation, are factual conclusions, lack personal knowledge, lack 5 authentication, and call for speculation. Id. The objections of the Morales Declaration 6 are overruled. 7 Defendant provided a supplemental declaration (“Morales Suppl. Decl.,” Dkt. 8 No. 15-3) that addressed Plaintiff’s objections. As to the grounds for the first two 9 material objections, Valerie Morales, as Director of Payroll, was speaking to her 10 personal knowledge and credentials. See Morales Suppl. Decl., ¶¶ 1-10. The Court 11 rejects Plaintiff’s grounds for the third material objection because Morales establishes 12 proper foundation in her supplemental declaration. There, she describes the basis and 13 boundaries of her personal knowledge and personal access to business records 14 maintained in the ordinary course of business operations. Id. The remaining grounds 15 are overruled for the same reasons. For the fourth material objection, Morales’ 16 testimony on her personal knowledge and credentials lays proper foundation. There is 17 no basis for the remaining grounds as Morales has testified that she has access to 18 repositories of business records, obtained them, and downloaded them into ten 19 specifically identified Excel files. Id. ¶¶ 8-9. 20 Accordingly, the Court may consider this evidence. Plaintiff’s evidentiary 21 objections are OVERRULED. 22 B. Timeliness of Removal 23 Removal under CAFA must be initiated “within 30 days after receipt by the 24 defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth 25 the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based.” 28 U.S.C. § 26 1446(b)(1). Then, three jurisdictional requirements must be satisfied: (1) the parties 27 must be diverse, (2) the proposed class must be over 100 members, and (3) the 28 aggregated amount-in-controversy must exceed $5 million dollars. Id. § 1332(d)(2), 2 defendant is able to remove a suit within thirty days “from which it is ascertainable

3 that the case is removable.” Roth v. CHA Hollywood Med. Ctr., L.P., 720 F.3d 1121,

4 1124 (9th Cir. 2013); see 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). 5 Here, though Defendant’s removal of the case came substantially after the 6 initial thirty-day window from when Plaintiff filed her complaint, Plaintiff’s 7 Complaint does not affirmatively reveal removability under CAFA. Because 8 Plaintiff’s expected damages are not explicitly stated in the initial pleading, Defendant 9 was required to independently assess the viability of removal under CAFA. 10 Defendant, through its custodian of records, accessed raw data/business records from 11 multiple repositories of electronic information and provide that data to Defendant’s 12 expert, Zach Lewis. Opp. at 12:19-23. The expert then used the data to apply the 13 violation rates and calculate the amount in controversy. Id. at 12:23-24. This 14 discovery related to the amount in controversy supports the Court’s finding that 15 Defendant properly removed the matter within thirty days of determining that it could 16 do so properly. See Roth v. CHA Hollywood Med. Ctr., L.P., 720 F.3d 1121, 1124 (9th 17 Cir. 2013). As such, Defendant’s removal was timely. 18 C. Amount in Controversy 19 The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff’s class exceeds one hundred members, 20 and that the parties are minimally diverse. The only dispute is whether the amount in 21 controversy is satisfied. Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that “the amount in controversy 22 for Plaintiff’s and the Class Members’ claims, in aggregate, is less than $5 million,” 23 Compl. ¶ 9, while Defendant contends that it exceeds $5 million. In its Notice of 24 Removal, Defendant estimates the amount in controversy to be at least $5,958,868. 25 See NOR ¶ 82. 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 2 Defendant’s 3 Estimated Claim 4 Amount in Controversy 5 Unpaid Wages $1, 276, 673 6 Overtime Wages $309,585 7 Rest Breaks $542,312 8 Meal Periods $351, 359 9 Waiting Time Penalties $1,137,935 10 11 Failure to Maintain Accurate Employment Records $144,500 12 Untimely Pay During Employment $577,300 13 Unreimbursed Business Expenses $138,780 14 Inaccurate Wage Statements $288,650 15 Attorneys’ Fees $1,191,773 16 Total $5,958,868 17 18 First, consistent with the above-referenced authorities, the Court will treat the 19 Defendant’s Notice of Removal to have been amended by, and to include the materials 20 Defendant filed with, its Opposition. The claims contributing to the amount in 21 controversy are Plaintiff’s claims for unpaid wages, overtime wages, rest breaks, meal 22 periods, waiting time penalties, failure to maintain accurate employment records, 23 untimely pay during employment, unreimbursed business expenses, inaccurate wage 24 statements and attorneys’ fees. Because reasonable attorneys’ fees are recoverable 25 pursuant to Cal. Lab. Code § 2802 and Cal. Civ. Code § 1021.5, they must be 26 included in the amount in controversy. See Chavez v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 888 27 F.3d 413, 416 (9th Cir. 2018) (the amount in controversy includes “attorneys’ fees 28 awarded under fee shifting statutes”); Fritsch, 899 F.3d at 794 (when “the law entitles 2 fees are at stake in the litigation, and must be included in the amount in

3 controversy.”).

4 Plaintiff does not challenge Defendant’s estimate for failure to maintain 5 accurate employment records, untimely pay during employment, unreimbursed 6 business expenses, and inaccurate wage statements, but attacks aspects of all other 7 calculations. Specifically, Plaintiff argues Defendant’s amount in controversy 8 calculation is based on unreasonable assumptions and unsupported by evidence. See 9 Mot. 1:9-1:18. Plaintiff challenges Defendant’s calculations as follows: 10  One hour of unpaid time a week, a minimum wage violation = $638,336.59 11  One hour of unpaid overtime a week, an overtime violation = $309,585.39 12  Meal and rest period violation rates of 20% = $893,952.10 13  Reimbursement of business expenses at $20 per month = $138,780.00 14  Waiting time violation rates of 100% = $1,137,935.00 15  Wage statement violation rates of 100% = $288,650.00 16  Attorneys’ fees at a rate of 25% = $1,191,773.73 17 With its Notice of Removal, Defendant filed declarations estimating, based on 18 its records, the number of employees in the classes, the number of work weeks in 19 issue, average hourly rates, and other data necessary to calculate the amounts in 20 controversy. In its Opposition, Defendant explains it relied on assumed violation rates 21 because Plaintiff’s complaint did not provide the frequency of alleged violations. See 22 Opp. 13:16-13:18. Defendant states it relied on the following evidence in support of 23 its assumed violation rates: (1) “electronic data maintained in the ordinary court of 24 Defendant’s business;” (2) “a custodian of records declaration and evidentiary 25 foundation establishing that the data was pulled from reliable business records;” (3) 26 “an economist who specializes in applying his data analytics expertise to wage-and- 27 hour matters;” and (4) a declaration from Defendant’s Director of Payroll. See Opp. at 28 14. In her Reply, Plaintiff reiterates that Defendant has not established the requisite 2 3:19. Having considered the arguments and evidence, the Court finds that Defendant

3 has satisfied its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount

4 in controversy exceeds $5 million. 5 1. Amount in Controversy Estimates Post-Rose Hills 6 If a defendant wants to pursue a federal forum under CAFA, the defendant has 7 the burden to put forward evidence showing the amount in controversy exceeds $5 8 million. Ibarra, 775 F.3d. at 1197. A defendant’s proposed controversy calculations 9 “need some reasonable ground underlying them.” Id. A plaintiff, as here, can 10 challenge a defendant’s assertion of the amount in controversy, but when doing so, 11 must then submit their own proof to the court. Id. 12 Plaintiff argues that Defendant has not met its burden to show that the amount 13 in controversy exceeds CAFA’s $5 million threshold because the assumptions 14 underlying Defendant’s calculations are unreasonable and unsupported by any 15 evidence. Mot. 1:9-1:18. As noted above, a removing CAFA defendant may not 16 establish the amount in controversy “by mere speculation and conjecture, [or] with 17 unreasonable assumptions.” Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1197–98. A defendant must instead 18 rely on “real evidence and the reality of what is at stake in the litigation.” Id. 19 However, the Ninth Circuit recently shed light on how district courts are to 20 assess the reasonableness of a removing defendant's assumptions in a CAFA case:

21 What makes an assumption reasonable may depend on which element 22 of the amount-in-controversy calculation is at issue. For example, in a wage-and-hour case, the number of employees in the class may be most 23 easily determined by examining the defendant's employment records. It 24 therefore may make sense to expect a defendant to introduce evidence of that number. See Dudley v. Eli Lilly & Co., 778 F.3d 909, 917 (11th 25 Cir. 2014) (noting that a CAFA defendant has “access to its own 26 employment records” and can provide information derived from those records “without conceding liability or being unduly burdened”). By 27 contrast, it makes little sense to require a CAFA defendant to introduce 28 evidence of the violation rate—really, the alleged violation rate— that the evidence does not exist. For that reason, a CAFA defendant can 2 most readily ascertain the violation rate by looking at the plaintiff's complaint. 3

4 Perez v. Rose Hills Co., 131 F.4th 804, 808 (9th Cir. 2025) (emphasis in original). The 5 Perez court went on to clarify that the assumptions underlying a removing defendant’s 6 violation rates “do not necessarily need to be supported by evidence” if the 7 assumptions are “founded on the allegations of the complaint.” Id. The district court 8 must determine, then, whether the defendant’s violation-rate assumptions are based on 9 a “reasonable interpretation of the complaint.” Id. at 809. In so doing, district courts 10 should bear in mind that an assumption “is not unreasonable simply because another 11 equally valid assumption” may be drawn from the complaint. Id. at 809. 12 Here, Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s allegations of a policy and practice of 13 violating California labor law justify assuming the following violation rates: one 14 unpaid hour of unpaid time; one hour of unpaid overtime per week; 20% meal period 15 violation rate; 20% rest period violation rate; 100% waiting time penalty violation 16 rate; and 25% benchmark for attorneys’ fees. In response, Plaintiff does not offer any 17 evidence that the amount in controversy is below the necessary $5 million. Plaintiff 18 offers no data, affidavits, nor evidence for the Court to consider in the alternative. See 19 Perez v. Rose Hills Co., 131 F.4th 804, 808 (9th Cir. 2025) (“And if [Plaintiff] 20 believed that some other assumption would have been more reasonable, she was free 21 to propose that rate.”); see also Arias v. Residence Inn by Marriott, 936 F.3d 920, 927 22 (9th Cir. 2019) (“An assertion that the amount in controversy exceeds the 23 jurisdictional threshold is not defeated merely because it is equally possible that 24 damages might be less than the requisite amount.”) (internal quotations omitted). The 25 Court therefore has no other number to turn to except for Defendant’s asserted value. 26 The Court assesses each of Defendant’s proffered calculations in turn to see if they are 27 justified by the allegations made in the Complaint. See Perez, 131 F.4th at 809 28 (violation rates must be justified). 2 by Defendant are reasonably supported by the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint.

3 While Defendant’s numbers are clearly calculated in a way to maximize the amount in

4 controversy, they are, for the most part, consistent with the general language used by 5 Plaintiff in describing the frequency of alleged violations and are thus permissible. See 6 Gist-Reed v. Alpha Analytical Laboratories, Inc., 2025 WL 1572929, at *3. Therefore, 7 as discussed below, Defendant has met its burden to satisfy the amount in controversy. 8 1. Minimum Wage Violations is Reasonable 9 Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s use of a 20% violation rate, equating to one 10 unpaid hour per week, to calculate unpaid wages is based on “mere conjecture and 11 generalizations,” rather than evidence, “about the number or lengths of shifts worked 12 by the putative class members.” Mot. 8:17-8:19 (citing NOR, Morales Decl., Dkt. 13 No.1-8, at 2-3). However, Plaintiff’s Complaint offers no guidance as to the frequency 14 of the alleged violations, relying instead on allegations that Defendants did not 15 compensate “for all hours worked” to assert that Defendants’ assumed 20% violation 16 rate is unreasonable. Compl. ¶ 24. 17 The assumed violation rate of 20% is reasonable, particularly in light of 18 Plaintiff’s failure to offer any alternative limiting principle or rebuttal evidence. See 19 Mariscal, LLC, 2021 WL 1400892, at *3 (holding defendant’s assumed violation rate 20 of 25% reasonable because plaintiff did not offer evidence that restricts or limits the 21 violation rate in the complaint or moving papers); Stanley v. Distribution Alternatives, 22 Inc., No. 17-cv-2173-AG (KKx), 2017 WL 6209822, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2017) 23 (accepting defendant’s assumptions regarding meal period violation rates and 24 observing that plaintiff provided no allegations concerning frequency of the alleged 25 violations and no competing evidence that would suggest lower violate rates). 26 Defendant’s proposed violation rate is considered reasonable if it is justified by the 27 allegations in the complaint. Id. 28 /// 2 Further, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges, “Class Members periodically worked

3 hours that entitled them to overtime compensation,” and “Defendants [] had a policy

4 and practice of denying meal breaks.” Compl. ¶¶ 32, 33 (emphasis added). Plaintiff 5 counters that she does not allege that class members were not compensated for all 6 overtime hours but instead states they “were not fully compensated for those hours.” 7 Reply at 4:25-4:26. Plaintiff similarly argues that the Defendant’s overtime 8 calculation inaccurately relies on the same 20% violation rate, or one hour of unpaid 9 overtime. 10 Here, Defendant bases its estimate on Plaintiff’s allegations in her complaint 11 and are thus reasonable. There is no limiting language attached to “periodically.” 12 Though it is true that other, less generous valuations could be consistent with a 13 “periodic” practice, the Defendant need only show that its interpretation is a 14 reasonable one. Perez, 131 F.4th at 809. The Court cannot say that Plaintiff’s 15 allegations that the violations occurred periodically forecloses the possibility that the 16 violations happened at roughly a twenty percent rate, and thus, Defendant’s 17 calculations are in line with the described violations. See Perez, 131 F.4th at 809. 18 3. Meal and Rest Period Violations 19 Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s calculations of damages for meal and rest 20 periods are inflated because Defendant uses a 20% violation rate. Plaintiff’s 21 Complaint states that Class Members were “often” denied meal and rest periods and 22 Defendants had a “policy and practice” of denying these breaks. See Compl. ¶ ¶ 33, 23 38, 46, and 90. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant often did not provide a meal break 24 before the fifth hour of work or a second meal break before the tenth hour of work. 25 See Compl. ¶ 46. To compute its calculation, Defendant applied one missed meal 26 premium for every shift that had a meal-eligible break (i.e., a shift more than 5 hours). 27 See NOR, Lewis Decl. ¶ 15. Similarly, Defendant estimates its rest period violations 28 by applying one missed rest break premium for every eligible shift (i.e., a shift of at 2 and that Defendant had a “policy and practice” of denying these breaks does not

3 foreclose the possibility that the violation happened at every opportunity that arose,

4 and thus, Defendant’s calculations are in line with the described violations. See Perez, 5 131 F.4th at 809. 6 Consistent with the above-referenced authorities and Plaintiff’s failure to 7 provide any rebuttal evidence, the Court finds the 20% violation reasonable and 8 rejects Plaintiff’s claim. 9 4. Waiting Time Penalties are Sufficiently Supported. 10 Cal. Labor Code § 203 provides that employers who fail to timely pay all 11 earned wages upon termination are subject to a fine equal to the employee’s normal 12 wages for each day the wages are late, up to a maximum of 30 days. Here, Plaintiff 13 asserts that Defendants improperly relied on a 100% violation rate (i.e., all terminated 14 Class Members) and a maximum 30-pay penalty in estimating the waiting time 15 penalties. 16 Plaintiff argues Defendant did not provide sufficient evidence to claim a 100% 17 violation rate. Plaintiff states that the testimony from Defendant’s expert data analyst 18 does not support the violation rate because he does not explain why all 364 putative 19 employees would be entitled to compensation from waiting time penalties. Mot. 16:9- 20 16:10. But Defendant is not “obligated to research, state, and prove the plaintiff’s 21 claims for damages.” Mortley v. Express Pipe & Supply Co., No. 17-cv-1938-JLS- 22 JDE, 2018 WL 708115, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2018). Instead, Defendant can make 23 reasonable assumptions about the violation rates. See Arias, 936 F.3d at 922. Here, 24 Defendant relies on language from the Complaint such as, “the unlawful acts alleged 25 herein have a direct effect on all of Defendants’ employees,” to assume the 100% 26 violation rate. Compl. ¶ 18 (emphasis added). The declarations from both Defendant’s 27 data analyst expert and Director of Payroll then serve as additional evidence to 28 support the reasonable assumptions of the violation rate. Plaintiff alleges systemic 2 reasonably concluded all terminated employees were owed some amount of

3 compensation. See, e.g., Marquez v. Southwire Co., LLC, No. 21-cv-252-JGB (SPx),

4 2021 WL 2042727, at *6 (C.D. Cal. May 21, 2021) (“If Defendant had a ‘pattern and 5 practice’ of refusing to grant meal and rest breaks or pay class members for all hours 6 worked, then it is likely that all or nearly all class members experienced wage 7 statement and delay violations.”). Defendant’s expert identified 364 terminated Class 8 Members in the relevant period and multiplied each employee’s lowest hourly rate by 9 their average daily hours by 30 days to calculate the waiting time penalties. See Opp. 10 17:21-17:27. Defendant reasonably assumes a 100% violation rate and uses 11 conservative figures to calculate the total estimate. 12 Plaintiff also argues that Defendants improperly assumed and provided no 13 evidence in support of its assumption that each class member would be owed the 14 maximum statutory penalty. Mot. 16:13-16:15; see Garibay v. Archstone 15 Communities LLC, 539 F. App’x 763, 764 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Archstone assumes that 16 each employee would be entitled to the maximum statutory penalty but provides no 17 evidence supporting that assertion.”). To the contrary, Defendant relies on 18 assumptions tied to the Complaint, such as, “Defendants have failed to pay 19 [terminated] Class Members whose sums were certain at the time of termination 20 within at least seventy-two hours of their resignation and have failed to pay those 21 sums for thirty days thereafter” (emphasis added). Plaintiff expressly states the thirty- 22 day penalty applies without providing evidence that the penalty only applies to a 23 subgroup of Class Members. The maximum statutory penalty therefore is not 24 “assumed” at all; rather, such damages are evident from the face of the Complaint. 25 “[A] removing defendant may rely on some assumptions to establish the amount in 26 controversy.” Perez, 131 F.4th at 809. Defendant’s numbers, while possibly inflated, 27 have not been shown to be unreasonable in light of the allegations in the operative 28 complaint, especially given the lack of other number or evidence provided by 2 damages based on waiting time penalties.

3 5. Reimbursement of Business Expenses

4 Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that “the Class Members” were denied 5 reimbursement relating to cell phones, personal computer use, and mileage. Compl., ¶ 6 112. Plaintiff does not allege that such expenses were minimal, sporadic, or de 7 minimis. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that all of these categories of expenses were 8 “necessary,” a “requirement of performing their job duties,” and “required to perform 9 their work.” Id. 10 Defendant uses an estimate of $20.00 per month to calculate all unreimbursed 11 expenses owed to Plaintiff and Class Members. Plaintiff challenges this estimate, 12 arguing that the violation rate is unreliable due to Defendant’s failure to provide 13 adequate evidence or justification. Mot. 13:27-14:4. Defendant counters by citing 14 District Court cases where a $20 estimate was considered “reasonable” and 15 “conservative.” See Shachno v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., No. 22-cv-1215 TWR (JLB), 2023 16 WL 316367 at *11-12 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2023); Cavada, supra, 2019 WL 5677846, 17 at *7 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2019). Plaintiff, meanwhile, does not offer an alternative 18 figure. Considering all the arguments presented, the Court finds no basis to reject the 19 $20.00 violation rate. Thus, Defendant has sufficiently supported their calculation of 20 unreimbursed business expenses. 21 6. Wage Statement Violation Rates 22 Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges, on a class-wide basis, that Defendant’s wage 23 statements were both facially inaccurate and derivatively inaccurate as a result of 24 unpaid wages, overtime wages, and unpaid meal and rest period premiums. 25 First, Plaintiff alleges the wage statements were facially inaccurate because 26 “Defendants issued and continues to issue wage statements to its non-exempt 27 employees including Plaintiff and the other Class Members that are inadequate under 28 Labor Code section 226, subdivision (a)”. Compl. ¶ 116. Second, Plaintiff then alleges 2 Plaintiff and other Class Members properly [with respect to unpaid wages, unpaid

3 overtime wages, and unpaid break premiums], Defendants failed to include required

4 information in their wage statements.” Id. Plaintiff then alleges that “Defendants’ 5 failure to comply with Labor Code section 226, subdivision (a), of the Labor Code 6 was knowing and intentional.” Id., at ¶ 117. 7 Defendant used a 100% violation rate, equating to the maximum fine of $50.00, 8 to calculate the wage statement violation penalties. Plaintiff contends that Defendant 9 failed to provide summary judgment-type evidence justifying the application of the 10 maximum penalty, and argues, that the Court should therefore disregard Defendant’s 11 estimate of $288,650.00. Mot. 17:16-17:18. However, in light of Perez, Defendant’s 12 proposed violation rate may be considered reasonable if it is anchored to the 13 allegations in the Complaint. Here, Plaintiff alleges systemic substantive or derivative 14 wage statement violations in its Complaint, thereby, justifying the application of a 15 100% violation rate. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant has properly 16 supported its damages calculation for wage statement violations. 17 7. Attorneys’ Fee Calculation 18 Defendant calculated the amount put in controversy by the claim for attorneys’ 19 fees using the 25% benchmark that applies to common fund class action settlements, 20 which would yield $1,191,773. This is a reasonable estimate of the amount in 21 controversy for the attorneys’ fees claim in this case. 22 Districts courts, including this one, have used the 25% as a “benchmark level” 23 to estimate the amount put in controversy by attorneys’ fee shifting statutes. Garibay, 24 539 Fed Appx. 763, 764. See also, Rwomwijhu v. SMX, LLC, No. CV-16-08105-AB 25 (PJWx), 2017 WL 1243131, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2017), Sanchez v. Russell Sigler, 26 Inc., No. CV-15-01350-AB (PLAx), 2015 WL 12765359, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 27 2015). A benchmark approach is appropriate here because Defendant’s estimate is 28 derived from supported damages calculations, and Plaintiff offers no contrary 1 | evidence, such as lodestar figures. See, e.g., Tijerina v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 24- 2 || CV-02466-BEN-SBC, 2025 WL 1355308, at *4 (S.D. Cal. May 9, 2025). In 3 | California, courts use the lodestar method to calculate attorneys’ fees. Ketchum v. 4 | Moses, 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1132 (2001). The lodestar figure is “calculated by 5 || multiplying the number of hours the prevailing party reasonably expended on the 6 || litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.” See Candle v. Bristow Optical Co. Inc., 224 7 | F.3d 1014, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000). Without proposed figures to apply the lodestar 8 || method, the Court relies on Defendant’s supported 25% benchmark level to calculate 9 || the attorneys’ fees. But see, e.g., Gurzenski v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 10 | 221CVO5959ABJEMX, 2021 WL 5299240 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2021) (applying the 11 | lodestar method with figures provided by Plaintiff in lieu of the 25% benchmark 12 | level). 13 Since the Court finds that the amount in controversy, that is $4,767, 094, is 14 | supported by a preponderance of the evidence, the Court includes the $1,191,773 of 15 || attorneys’ fees in the total amount in controversy. 16 In sum, the Court finds that all of Defendant’s calculations reasonable and 17 | sufficiently supported and concludes that the total amount in controversy exceeds the 18 | $5 million threshold under CAFA. 19 IV. CONCLUSION 20 Defendant has met its burden of establishing by a preponderance of the 21 | evidence that the threshold is satisfied. Accordingly, the Court has subject matter 22 | jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims. The Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Remand. 23 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. 25 | Dated: July 18, 2025 | □□ 27 HON. ANDRE BIROTTE JR. 28 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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