BACKGROUND

I. The conviction and sentence

Valdez was born in April 1981. In 2000, a jury convicted him of first degree

murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) for a killing committed when he was 17 years old. (People v.

Valdez (Feb. 26, 2002, E028843) [nonpub. opn.].) The jury found true a hate-crime

special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(16)) and a firearm enhancement (§ 12022.53,

3 subd. (d)), and the court found true a gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). The

trial court sentenced Valdez to 25 years to life plus LWOP. Valdez appealed, and we

affirmed the judgment in an unpublished opinion. (People v. Valdez, E028843.)

II. Resentencing under section 1170(d)(1)

In 2018, Valdez petitioned for resentencing under former section 1170,

subdivision (d)(2), which was subsequently redesignated as section 1170(d)(1). (Senate

Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.); Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.) The trial court granted

the petition and resentenced Valdez to 50 years to life in state prison.

III. Resentencing under section 1170(d)(10)

In November 2022, Valdez became eligible under section 3051 for youth offender

parole at age 41. Valdez received a youth offender parole hearing in December 2023. He

was denied parole for five years. His next parole suitability hearing was tentatively set

for 2028.

In October 2023, Valdez, representing himself, filed a petition for resentencing

under section 1170(d)(1) and Heard. Heard held that it violates equal protection to deny

resentencing relief under section 1170(d)(1) to juvenile offenders who were originally

sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP. (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at

pp. 633-634.) The trial court initially denied the petition in an ex parte proceeding but

later struck the denial. Defense counsel was subsequently assigned to represent Valdez

and requested time to investigate and to brief the issues relevant to resentencing Valdez.

4 The People then filed written opposition to the petition, arguing that Valdez was not

entitled to be resentenced again under section 1170(d)(1).

Valdez filed a supplemental petition for resentencing under section 1170(d)(1).

He argued that he was entitled to resentencing under section 1170(d)(1) under the

reasoning of Heard because his sentence of 50 years to life is the functional equivalent of

LWOP. The People filed a supplemental opposition to the petition, arguing that Heard is

distinguishable and that Valdez’s sentence of 50 years to life is not the functional

equivalent of LWOP.

The trial court found the petition to be a successive petition filed under section

1170(d)(10) and granted it. The court cited People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349

(Contreras) for the proposition that “[a] sentence of 50 years to life is the functional

equivalent of a life without parole sentence (‘de facto life without parole’).” Because

Valdez had been resentenced to 50 years to life, the court found Valdez’s sentence to be

the functional equivalent of LWOP under Contreras. The trial court further found the

analysis in Heard applicable to resentencing petitions under section 1170(d)(10).

Relying on Heard, the trial court concluded that it would violate “equal protection to

deny an individual sentenced to the functional equivalent of life without parole the

opportunity to petition for resentencing under subdivision (d)(10) of section 1170.”

The trial court granted a three-week stay to allow the People to file a petition for

writ of mandate to seek review of the court’s ruling, which the People did. We stayed

proceedings in the trial court pending our decision on the writ petition.

5

DISCUSSION

The People contend that the trial court erred by granting Valdez’s resentencing

petition because (1) Heard was wrongly decided, and (2) Valdez’s sentence is not the

functional equivalent of LWOP. The People do not challenge the trial court’s decision to

construe Valdez’s petition as a petition under section 1170(d)(10). We accordingly

assume for the sake of argument that the trial court did not err in that regard, and we treat

the operative filing as a petition under section 1170(d)(10).

We need not decide whether we agree with the equal protection analysis in Heard

as it applies to section 1170(d)(1) or whether that analysis applies to resentencing

petitions under section 1170(d)(10) for defendants who, at resentencing pursuant to

section 1170(d)(1), are sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP. Assuming that

Heard was correctly decided and that its analysis applies to resentencing petitions under

section 1170(d)(10) brought by defendants who were resentenced to the functional

equivalent of LWOP pursuant to section 1170(d)(1), we agree with the People that the

50-year-to-life sentence that Valdez received on resentencing in 2018 is not the

functional equivalent of LWOP for purposes of resentencing under section 1170(d)(10).

I. Juvenile sentencing law

Over the last two decades, both the United States Supreme Court and the

California Supreme Court have recognized that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of

cruel and unusual punishment limits “the punishment that may constitutionally be

imposed on juvenile offenders.” (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 615.) In 2010,

6 Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48 (Graham) held that the Eighth Amendment

categorically “prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile

offender who did not commit homicide.” (Graham, at p. 82; id. at p. 74; see also Roper

v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 568, 572, 578 [Eighth Amendment categorically

exempts imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under age 18 when the

crime was committed].) Graham explained that a juvenile offender convicted of a

nonhomicide crime need not be guaranteed eventual release, but if a sentence of life is

imposed on such a juvenile offender, then that offender must be provided “some

meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and

rehabilitation.” (Graham, at p. 75; id. at p. 82.)

Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 (Miller) extended Graham’s reasoning

(but not its categorical ban) to juvenile offenders who commit homicide. (Miller, at

pp. 476-477, 480, 489.) Miller held “that mandatory life without parole for those under

the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on

‘cruel and unusual punishments’” (id. at p. 465) and that a judge or jury sentencing a

juvenile offender for a homicide crime must have the opportunity to consider certain

specified mitigating circumstances related to the offender’s youth before imposing

LWOP (id. at pp. 477-479, 489).

In 2012, the California Supreme Court in People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th

262 (Caballero) held that “a 110-year-to-life sentence imposed on a juvenile convicted of

nonhomicide offenses contravenes Graham’s mandate against cruel and unusual

7 punishment under the Eighth Amendment.” (Id. at p. 265.) Because the juvenile

defendant was not eligible for parole for 100 years, the court reasoned that the

indeterminate sentence “with a parole eligibility date that falls outside the juvenile

offender’s natural life expectancy” amounted to the “functional equivalent” of a sentence

to LWOP, which the Eighth Amendment prohibits for juvenile offenders convicted of

nonhomicide crimes. (Caballero, at p. 268.)

In order to bring juvenile sentencing into conformity with Graham, Miller, and

Caballero, our Legislature added sections 3051, 3046, subdivision (c), and 4801,

subdivision (c), to the Penal Code effective January 1, 2014. (People v. Franklin (2016)

63 Cal.4th 261, 276-277 (Franklin).) Section 3051 requires the Board of Parole Hearings

“to conduct a ‘youth offender parole hearing’ during the 15th, 20th, or 25th year of a

juvenile offender’s incarceration” (§ 3051, subd. (b)), depending on the offender’s

“‘controlling offense’” (id., subd. (a)(2)(B)). (Franklin, at p. 277.) Although section

3051 originally excluded juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP from youth offender

parole eligibility, the Legislature subsequently amended the statute to provide that such

offenders are eligible for youth offender parole hearings in the 25th year of incarceration.

(Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 619, fn. 8; § 3051, subd. (b)(4).)

In 2016, our Supreme Court held in Franklin that the reasoning of Caballero

applies to juvenile homicide offenders and that the Eighth Amendment prohibits

sentencing a juvenile homicide offender to a sentence that is the functional equivalent of

LWOP “without the protections outlined in Miller.” (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at

8 p. 276.) The juvenile homicide offender in Franklin was sentenced to 50 years to life and

argued that the sentence violated the Eighth Amendment because it was the functional

equivalent of LWOP. (Franklin, at p. 268.) Franklin concluded that the defendant’s

challenge to the constitutionality of his sentence was rendered moot by section 3051,

which became effective after the defendant was sentenced. (Franklin, at pp. 276-277.)

Franklin explained that section 3051 “changed the manner in which the juvenile

offender’s original sentence operates by capping the number of years that he or she may

be imprisoned before becoming eligible for release on parole.” (Franklin, at p. 278.)

The court described the defendant’s sentence, as transformed by the retroactive

application of section 3051, as “a life sentence with parole eligibility during his 25th year

of incarceration, when he will be 41 years old.” (Franklin, at p. 279.) Franklin

“conclude[d] that such a sentence is not the functional equivalent of LWOP” (ibid.),

reasoning that the entitlement to a youth offender parole hearing meant that the defendant

was “serving a life sentence that includes a meaningful opportunity for release during his

25th year of incarceration” (id. at pp. 279-280).

Two years later, in Contreras, our Supreme Court concluded that sentences of 50

years to life and 58 years to life for two 16-year-old defendants who were not convicted

of homicide offenses were the functional equivalent of LWOP. (Contreras, supra, 4

Cal.5th at pp. 356, 368-369.) Both defendants were convicted under the one strike law

(§ 667.61), which rendered them ineligible for youth offender parole. (Contreras, at

pp. 357, 359; § 3051, subd. (h).) Given the defendants’ statutory ineligibility for youth

9 offender parole, Contreras noted that the analysis of the juvenile defendant’s 50-year-to-

life sentence in Franklin was inapplicable. (Contreras, at p. 359.) Contreras reasoned

that the defendants’ earliest possible release at age 66 or age 74 “after decades of

incarceration” did not afford the defendants the meaningful incentive to rehabilitate and

opportunity for redemption and reentry into society required by the Eighth Amendment.

(Contreras, at pp. 368-369.)

II. Resentencing under section 1170, subdivision (d)

Section 1170(d)(1) provides: “When a defendant who was under 18 years of age

at the time of the commission of the offense for which the defendant was sentenced to

imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole has been incarcerated for at least

15 years, the defendant may submit to the sentencing court a petition for recall and

resentencing.” (§ 1170(d)(1)(A).) “The petition must include a statement describing the

defendant’s remorse, identifying any work towards rehabilitation, and stating one of four

qualifying circumstances is true.” (People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435, 443

(Sorto); § 1170, subd. (d)(2).) If the court recalls the sentence, then “the court shall have

the discretion to resentence the defendant in the same manner as if the defendant had not

previously been sentenced, provided that the new sentence, if any, is not greater than the

initial sentence.” (§ 1170, subd. (d)(7).)

“If the sentence is not recalled or the defendant is resentenced to imprisonment for

life without the possibility of parole, the defendant may submit another petition for recall

and resentencing” after at least 20 years of incarceration, and another after 24 years.

10 (§ 1170(d)(10).) Relief under section 1170(d)(10) is thus available to defendants who

previously filed petitions for resentencing under section 1170(d)(1) and either (1) were

denied relief under section 1170(d)(1) or (2) were granted relief and resentenced to

LWOP. (§ 1170(d)(10).)

“‘The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law we review de novo.’”

(People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1032.) We interpret a statute to ascertain the

Legislature’s intent by first looking to the statute’s language, giving the words a

commonsense and plain meaning. (Ibid.) Whether Valdez’s sentence is the functional

equivalent of LWOP presents a question of law on undisputed facts, which we

independently review. (People v. Ashford University, LLC (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 485,

518.)

By its terms, subdivision (d) of section 1170 limits relief to juvenile defendants

who were either originally sentenced to LWOP or resentenced to LWOP upon petitioning

for resentencing under section 1170(d)(1). (§ 1170(d)(1)(A) & (10).) However, two

courts have recently held that constitutional principles of equal protection require that

relief under section 1170(d)(1) be extended to juvenile offenders who were originally

sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP. (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at

pp. 633-634; Sorto, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 454; see also People v. Bagsby (2024)

106 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1054-1063 [reaffirming the holding in Heard].) In Heard and

Sorto, the defendants were sentenced to terms of over 100 years to life before section

3051 was enacted; consequently, when the sentences were imposed they did not allow for

11 parole eligibility within the defendants’ lifetimes. (Heard, at pp. 613-614, 628; Sorto, at

pp. 440-441, 445.) The subsequent enactment of section 3051 rendered the defendants

eligible for youth offender parole after serving 25 years. (Heard, at p. 628; Sorto, at

p. 441.) The People consequently argued in both cases that under Franklin’s holding

concerning section 3051 and the functional equivalent of LWOP, the defendants were no

longer serving de facto LWOP sentences, so it was appropriate to deny them relief under

section 1170(d)(1). (Heard, at p. 628; Sorto, at p. 447.)

Both Heard and Sorto rejected the argument. (Heard, at pp. 628-629; Sorto, at

pp. 447-448.) Heard explained that because section 1170(d)(1)(A) “‘uses the phrase

“was sentenced” and refers to the past,’” the relevant inquiry under the provision is the

sentence that was originally imposed, which might not be the same as the sentence

currently being served by the defendant. (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 629.)

Heard reasoned: Although the defendant’s “sentence as it currently operates is no longer

the functional equivalent of life without parole, this does not change the fact that the

sentence was a de facto life without parole sentence at the time it was imposed. Because

section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A), refers to the ‘offense for which the defendant was

sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole’ (italics added), and

[the defendant] was sentenced to the functional equivalent of a life without parole

sentence, he is similarly situated with the juvenile offenders whose sentences make them

eligible to seek resentencing.” (Ibid.) Sorto rejected the People’s argument for the same

reason. (Sorto, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 448.)

12 In granting Valdez resentencing relief under section 1170(d)(10), the trial court

concluded that the equal protection analysis in Heard applies to juvenile offenders who

were resentenced under section 1170(d)(1) to the functional equivalent of LWOP and

then petition to be resentenced again under section 1170(d)(10). We need not decide the

issue, and we also need not decide whether Heard and Sorto were correctly decided. We

assume for the sake of argument that Heard and Sorto were correctly decided and that

their analysis applies equally to juvenile offenders who petition for resentencing under

section 1170(d)(10) after having been resentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP

pursuant to section 1170(d)(1). Even given all of those assumptions, Valdez is not

entitled to relief under section 1170(d)(10), because he was not resentenced to the

functional equivalent of LWOP.

Heard and Sorto concluded that the sentences of the defendants in those cases

were the functional equivalent of LWOP despite youth offender parole under section

3051, because section 3051 did not exist when those defendants were sentenced, which is

the relevant inquiry under section 1170(d)(1). (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 629;

Sorto, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 448.) But section 1170(d)(10) does not include the

same “was sentenced” language as section 1170(d)(1) and accordingly does not refer to

the sentence originally imposed. (Cf. Heard, at p. 629.) Rather, section 1170(d)(10)

provides for resentencing if the juvenile offender “is resentenced to imprisonment for life

without the possibility of parole,” so the relevant sentence is the one that was imposed

upon resentencing under section 1170(d)(1).

13 In 2018, Valdez was resentenced to 50 years to life, and his offenses did not

exclude him from youth offender parole eligibility. Valdez was resentenced after the

enactment of section 3051, so the 50-year-to-life sentence imposed on resentencing

included the availability of youth offender parole under section 3051. Franklin

characterized such a sentence as “a life sentence with parole eligibility during [the

defendant’s] 25th year of incarceration,” which Franklin concluded did not constitute the

functional equivalent of LWOP. (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 279.) We are bound

by that precedent. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1960) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)

Under Franklin, Valdez was resentenced to a life sentence with parole eligibility during

his 25th year of incarceration, which is not the functional equivalent of LWOP.

(Franklin, at p. 279.)

Contreras does not require a contrary result. Valdez’s 50-year-to-life sentence is

distinguishable from the 50- and 58-year-to-life sentences imposed on the juvenile

defendants in Contreras, because both of those defendants were sentenced under the one

strike law and consequently were ineligible for youth offender parole. (Contreras, supra,

4 Cal.5th at pp. 357, 359, 368-369; § 3051, subd. (h).) As a result, the defendants in

Contreras were not eligible for parole until the ages of 66 and 74. (Contreras, at pp. 359,

368.) In contrast, Valdez is eligible for youth offender parole and in fact already received

a youth offender parole hearing at age 42. (See Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 279-

280.)

14 For all of these reasons, we conclude that Valdez was not resentenced to the

functional equivalent of LWOP. Thus, even assuming for the sake of argument that equal

protection requires that resentencing under section 1170(d)(10) be available to defendants

resentenced under section 1170(d)(1) to the functional equivalent of LWOP, the trial

court still erred by granting Valdez’s petition for resentencing under section

1170(d)(10).1

DISPOSITION

The petition for writ of mandate is granted. Let a peremptory writ of mandate

issue directing the trial court (1) to vacate its order granting Valdez resentencing relief

under section 1170(d)(10), and (2) to enter a new and different order denying the petition

for resentencing. The stay of proceedings in the trial court shall be dissolved when this

opinion becomes final.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

MENETREZ

J. We concur:

RAMIREZ

P. J.

McKINSTER J.

1 Valdez requests judicial notice of a letter filed by the Attorney General in another appeal in the Second District in which the Attorney General withdrew its argument that Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th 608, was wrongly decided. The People, represented by the Riverside County District Attorney, oppose the request. We deny the request because the letter is not relevant to our analysis. (People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 268, fn. 6.)

15 Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two - No. E084222

S289792

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

En Banc ________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE, Petitioner,

v.

SUPERIOR COURT OF RIVERSIDE COUNTY, Respondent;

MARIANO VALDEZ, Real Party in Interest. ________________________________________________________________________

The request for an order directing depublication of the opinion in the above- entitled appeal is denied.

(See Concurring Statement by Justice Liu)

_______________/s/_____________ Chief Justice PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (VALDEZ)

S289792

Concurring Statement by Justice Liu

This case addresses resentencing eligibility under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d) (section 1170(d)) in an unusual set of circumstances. (All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.) In 2000, defendant Mariano Albert Valdez was sentenced to a term of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for a murder he committed at the age of 17. (People v. Superior Court (Valdez) (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 791, 794 (Valdez).) In 2018, Valdez petitioned for resentencing under section 1170(d)(1) and was resentenced to 50 years to life. (Valdez, at p. 794.) Valdez’s resentencing came after the 2014 enactment of youth offender parole under section 3051, such that unlike his original LWOP sentence, his new “50-year-to-life sentence . . . included the availability of youth offender parole.” (Valdez, at p. 801.) After People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608 (Heard) held that section 1170(d) resentencing must be made available to youth offenders sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP, Valdez sought a second resentencing. (Valdez, at p. 794.) He argued that because his new 50 years to life sentence was the functional equivalent of LWOP, Heard meant he must be given a second chance at section 1170(d) resentencing. (Valdez, at p. 794.) I express no view on the merits of Heard or the merits of Valdez’s resolution of its fact pattern. But I am concerned that Valdez is being cited as authority for something it does not say. 1 PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (VALDEZ) Liu, J., concurring statement upon denial of depublication

According to a depublication request jointly submitted by the Los Angeles County Public Defender’s Office and the Pacific Juvenile Defender Center, Valdez is cited as “controlling authority” in opposition to “all” of the initial resentencing petitions under section 1170(d)(1) that the public defender’s office is handling for petitioners otherwise eligible for such resentencing under Heard. They explain that the Los Angeles County District Attorney is arguing that Valdez stands for the proposition that a youth offender originally sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP is not eligible for resentencing under section 1170(d)(1) because youth offender parole has since become available. The Riverside County District Attorney’s opposition to depublication maintains this reading of Valdez and argues that any resulting confusion reflects a split of authority over the meaning of functional LWOP. In fact, Valdez says nothing about the meaning of functional LWOP for purposes of the inquiry under section 1170(d)(1). Consistent with the specific facts in Valdez, the opinion explains that its holding is limited to the inquiry for successive resentencing petitions under section 1170(d)(10). (Valdez, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 797 [“[T]he 50-year-to life sentence that Valdez received on resentencing in 2018 is not the functional equivalent of LWOP for purposes of resentencing under section 1170(d)(10)” (italics added)].) The notion that Valdez is “controlling authority” for initial petitions is all the more odd given that the opinion’s analysis is driven by the distinction it draws between the text of section 1170(d)(10)’s successive petition provision and initial resentencing under section 1170(d)(1). (Valdez, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at pp. 800–801.) Valdez notes that “Heard explained that because section 1170(d)(1)(A) ‘ “uses the phrase 2 PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (VALDEZ) Liu, J., concurring statement upon denial of depublication

‘was sentenced’ and refers to the past,” ’ the relevant inquiry under the provision is the sentence that was originally imposed, which might not be the same as the sentence currently being served by the defendant.” (Valdez, at p. 800.) The court in Valdez read Heard to say that a sentence of over 100 years to life was “the functional equivalent of LWOP despite youth offender parole under section 3051, because section 3051 did not exist when [the] defendant[] [was] sentenced, which is the relevant inquiry under section 1170(d)(1).” (Id. at p. 801; see also People v. Lopez (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 649, 654 [youth offenders whose original LWOP sentences were later modified on habeas to life sentences under Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48 were nevertheless entitled to section 1170(d)(1) relief because the “section uses the phrase ‘was sentenced’ and refers to the past,” and defendants “were sentenced to LWOP terms”].) By contrast, Valdez observed, “section 1170(d)(10) does not include the same ‘was sentenced’ language,” and therefore concluded that the provision “does not refer to the sentence originally imposed.” (Valdez, at p. 801.) For successive resentencing eligibility under section 1170(d)(10), “the relevant sentence is the one that was imposed upon [the first] resentencing under section 1170(d)(1).” (Valdez, at p. 801.) Because youth offender parole was available when Valdez was resentenced in 2018, he was not entitled to a second resentencing because his new 50 years to life sentence was “not the functional equivalent of LWOP.” (Ibid.) Valdez’s express rationale makes clear it should not be cited as authority for the meaning of functional LWOP under section 1170(d)(1). The opinion repeatedly states it does not disturb Heard’s conclusion that the subsequent creation of youth offender parole does not alter the meaning of functional LWOP for purposes of section 1170(d)(1). (Valdez, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at pp. 797, 801 [“We assume for the sake of argument that Heard . . . [was] correctly decided.”].) Appropriately, no Court of Appeal has endorsed the contention that Valdez is a barrier to resentencing under section 1170(d)(1).

LIU, J.

4