1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DOMINIQUE DANIELS, Case No. 8:25-cv-00022-JWH-JDE

12 Plaintiff,

ORDER REGARDING

13 v. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND [ECF No. 15] & 14 CHARLES R. NICHOLS, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO BRIAN GONZALES, DISMISS [ECF No. 21] 15 BRIANNA DOTSON,

JOSE FLORES,

16 MARISOL MENDOZA, THU HUYNH, and 17 DOES 1-10, inclusive,

18 Defendants.

19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 1 Before the Court are (1) the motion of Plaintiff Dominique Daniels to 2 remand this action to Orange County Superior Court;1 and (2) the motion of 3 Defendants Charles R. Nichols, Brian Gonzalez, Briana Dotson, Marisol 4 Mendoza (sued as “Marsol”), and Jose Flores to dismiss Daniels’s Complaint.2 5 The Court concludes that these matters are appropriate for resolution without a 6 hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7-15. After considering the papers filed in 7 support and in opposition,3 the Court DENIES Daniels’s Motion to Remand 8 and GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 9 I. BACKGROUND4 10 This action arises out of an incident that occurred in March 2024, at the 11 Santa Ana, California, Department of Motor Vehicles (the “CDMV”).5 12 According to the Complaint, Daniels visited the CDMV after learning that her 13 vehicle registration had been suspended.6 Daniels alleges that she was called to 14 a CDMV service window, where she discussed the possibility of reinstating her 15 16

17 1 Pl.’s Mot. to Remand (the “Motion to Remand”) [ECF No. 15]. 18 2 Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (the “Motion to Dismiss”) [ECF No. 21]. 3 The Court considered the documents of record in this action, including 19 the following papers: (1) Compl. (the “Complaint”) [ECF No. 1]; (2) Motion to 20 Remand; (3) Motion to Dismiss; (4) Defs.’ Opp’n to the Motion to Remand 21 [ECF No. 22]; (5) Pl.’s Reply in Supp. of the Motion to Remand [ECF No. 23]; (6) Decl. of Pl. Dominique Daniels in Supp. of Opp’n to the Motion to Dismiss 22 [ECF No. 30]; (7) Pl.’s Opp’n to the Motion to Dismiss (the “Motion to 23 Dismiss Opposition”) [ECF No. 31]; and (8) Defs.’ Reply in Supp. of the Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 33]. 24 4 This factual summary is based upon the allegations in the Complaint, 25 which the Court assumes to be true for the purpose of the instant Motions. See 26 Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). 27 5 Complaint ¶ 27. 1 vehicle registration with a CDMV employee. When that conversation did not 2 prove fruitful, Daniels asked the employee to call a supervisor.7 3 Defendants Huynh and Mendoza arrived, and Daniels once again asked 4 for the reinstatement of her vehicle registration.8 When Huynh and Mendoza 5 declined, Daniels requested to speak with another supervisor. 9 Defendant 6 Flores arrived at the window, and Daniels again made her request, again to no 7 avail.10 Daniels informed the CDMV employees that she believed that they 8 “were engaging in unlawful discrimination against her and that they were 9 wrongfully and unlawfully denying her public services to resolve her vehicle 10 matters.”11 Daniels also threatened to file a civil lawsuit against those 11 employees, and the CDMV employees responded by summoning law 12 enforcement—the California Highway Patrol (“CHP”).12 Defendants CHP 13 Officers Charles R. Nichols, Brian Gonzalez, and Briana Dotson arrived on the 14 scene.13 Nichols and Gonzalez arrested Daniels and performed a search incident 15 to the arrest.14 16 In November 2024, Daniels filed the instant action in state court against 17 CDMV Defendants Huynh, Flores, and Mendoza, as well as CHP Defendants 18 Nichols, Gonzalez, and Dotson.15 In January 2025, Defendants—apart from 19

20 7 Id. at ¶ 33. 21 8 Id. at ¶ 37. 22 9 Id. 23 10 Id. at ¶ 38. 24 11 Id. 25 12 Id. at ¶¶ 38 & 40. 26 13 Id. at ¶¶ 47 & 48. 27 14 Id. at ¶¶ 51, 52, & 55. 1|| Thu Huynh’’—removed this action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 2|| 1343, & 1441." In her Complaint, Daniels asserts the following 15 claims for relief:"® 4 e discrimination in violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, against Nichols, 5 Gonzales, Flores, Mendoza, and Huynh; 6 e discrimination in violation of the California Disabled Persons Act, against 7 Nichols, Gonzales, Flores, Mendoza, and Huynh; 8 e discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the 9 “ADA” ), against Nichols, Flores, Mendoza, and Huynh; 10 e discrimination in violation of Cal. Gov’t Code § 11135, against Nichols, 11 Flores, Mendoza, and Huynh; 12 e deprivation of personal rights in violation of the Ralph Civil Rights Act, 13 against Nichols, Gonzales, Flores, Mendoza, and Huynh; 14 e deprivation of personal rights in violation of the Tom Bane Civil Rights 15 Act, against Nichols, Gonzales, Flores, Mendoza, and Huynh; 16 e retaliation in violation of the First Amendment of the United States 17 Constitution, against Nichols, Gonzales, Dotson, Flores, Mendoza, and 18 Huynh; 19 e retaliation in violation of constitutional rights in violation of the California 20 Constitution, against Nichols, Gonzales, Dotson, Flores, Mendoza, and 21 Huynh; 22 e unreasonable search, seizure, and force, in violation of the Fourth 23 Amendment of the United States Constitution, against Nichols, 24 Gonzales, Dotson, Flores, Mendoza, and Huynh; 25 26|| © Notice of Removal (the Notice”) [ECF No. 1] J 12. ” Id. at J 8. * See generally Complaint.

1 e unreasonable search, seizure, and force in violation of the California 2 Constitution, against Nichols, Gonzales, Dotson, Flores, Mendoza, and 3 Huynh; 4 e denial of equal protection of the laws, in violation of constitutional 5 intimidation by threat of violence of the Fourteenth Amendment, against 6 Nichols, Gonzales, Dotson, Flores, Mendoza, and Huynh; 7 e denial of equal protection of the laws in violation of the California 8 Constitution, against Nichols, Gonzales, Dotson, Flores, Mendoza, and 9 Huynh; 10 ¢ conspiracy to interfear [séc| with civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. 11 §§ 1983 & 1985, against Nichols, Gonzales, Flores, Mendoza, and Huynh; 12 e assault and battery, against Nichols, Gonzales, and Dotson; and 13 e deprivation of personal rights in violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 43, against 14 Nichols, Gonzales, and Dotson. 15 In February 2025, Daniels moved to remand this action, arguing that 16 || (1) the removal was procedurally deficient because Defendants did not include a 17|| copy of all processes and pleadings; (2) Defendants failed to file a proof of 18 || service for Defendant Huynh; and (3) Defendants failed to obtain consent for 19|| the removal of the action from Defendants Flores, Mendoza, and Huynh.” Daniels also requested the Court to take judicial notice of three documents:”° 21 e the December 19, 2024, Notice of Case Reassignment; 22 e the December 23, 2024, Declaration in Support of Motion re 23 Disqualification of Judicial Officer; and 24 e the Proof of Service of Summons and Complaint upon Defendant Huynh 25 and the associated Declaration of Diligence. 26 ” Motion to Remand 2:9-28. *° Id. at 9:6-28.

1 In February 2025, Defendants (except for Huynh) moved to dismiss nine 2 of Daniels’s claims.21 That Motion is fully briefed. 3 II. LEGAL STANDARD 4 A. Motion to Remand 5 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Accordingly, “[t]hey 6 possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. 7 Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). In every federal case, the 8 basis for federal jurisdiction must appear affirmatively from the record. See 9 DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 n.3 (2006). “The right of 10 removal is entirely a creature of statute and a suit commenced in a state court 11 must remain there until cause is shown for its transfer under some act of 12 Congress.” Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002) (internal 13 quotation marks omitted). When Congress has acted to create a right of 14 removal, those statutes, unless otherwise stated, are strictly construed against 15 removal jurisdiction. See id. 16 To remove an action to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, the 17 removing defendant “must demonstrate that original subject-matter jurisdiction 18 lies in the federal courts.” Syngenta, 537 U.S. at 33. As such, a defendant may 19 remove civil actions in which either (1) a federal question exists; or (2) complete 20 diversity of citizenship between the parties exists and the amount in controversy 21 exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1332. 22 The right to remove is not absolute, even when original jurisdiction exists. 23 The removing defendant bears the burden of establishing that removal is proper. 24 See Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting 25 the “longstanding, near-canonical rule that the burden on removal rests with the 26 removing defendant”); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) 27 1 (“The strong presumption against removal jurisdiction means that the 2 defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.”) 3 (quotation marks omitted). Any doubt regarding the existence of subject matter 4 jurisdiction must be resolved in favor of remand. See id. (“Federal jurisdiction 5 must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first 6 instance.”). 7 B. Rule 201—Judicial Notice 8 The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that a court must take judicial 9 notice if “a party requests it and the court is supplied with the necessary 10 information.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(c)(2). The court may take notice of facts that 11 are “not subject to reasonable dispute” because they “can be accurately and 12 readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 13 questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). 14 Such facts include “matters of public record.” Intri-Plex Techs., Inc. v. 15 Crest Grp., Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007). “The court may judicially 16 notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it . . . can be 17 accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot 18 reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b) & (c). In the Ninth Circuit, 19 “court filings and other matters of public record” are sources whose accuracy 20 cannot reasonably be questioned for the purpose of Rule 201. Reyn’s Pasta Bella, 21 LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006). “The court . . . 22 must take judicial notice if a party requests it and the court is supplied with the 23 necessary information.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(c)(2). 24 C. Rule 12(b)(6)—Motion to Dismiss 25 A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 26 Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in a complaint. See 27 Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) 1 light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Am. Family Ass’n v. City & 2 County of San Francisco, 277 F.3d 1114, 1120 (9th Cir. 2002). Although a 3 complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion “does not need detailed factual 4 allegations,” a plaintiff must provide “more than labels and conclusions.” Bell 5 Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007). 6 To state a plausible claim for relief, the complaint “must contain 7 sufficient allegations of underlying facts” to support its legal conclusions. Starr 8 v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). “Factual allegations must be 9 enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption 10 that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact) . . . .” 11 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations and footnote omitted). Accordingly, to 12 survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, 13 accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” which 14 means that a plaintiff must plead sufficient factual content to “allow[] the Court 15 to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 16 alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks 17 omitted). A complaint must contain “well-pleaded facts” from which the court 18 can “infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Id. at 679. 19 Importantly, the court must construe all factual allegations and “draw all 20 reasonable inferences from them in favor of the nonmoving party.” Cahill v. 21 Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1996). 22 D. Rule 15(a)—Leave to Amend 23 A district court “should freely give leave when justice so requires.” 24 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). The purpose underlying the liberal amendment policy is to 25 “facilitate decision on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or 26 technicalities.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). Therefore, 27 leave to amend should be granted unless the court determines “that the pleading 1 could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Id. (quoting Doe v. 2 United States, 8 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)). 3 III. ANALYSIS 4 A. Motion to Remand 5 It is uncontested that this action presents a federal question.22 Thus, the 6 relevant inquiry is whether the removal was procedurally proper. To remove an 7 action from state court, a defendant must file a notice of removal containing “a 8 short and plain statement of the grounds for removal, together with a copy of all 9 process, pleadings, and orders served upon such defendant or defendants in 10 such action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446. Daniels argues that Defendants did not satisfy 11 that standard for three reasons.23 12 First, Daniels contends that Defendants failed to include three state court 13 documents: (1) Notice of Case Reassignment; (2) Motion Re Disqualification of 14 a Judicial Officer; and (3) Proof of Service of Summons and Complaint upon 15 Defendant Huynh and the associated Declaration of Diligence. Daniels supplied 16 the Court with those three documents24 and asked the Court to take judicial 17 notice of them.25 Because those documents are judicial records, the Court 18 grants Daniels’s request and takes judicial notice of those documents, which, 19 ironically, cures any procedural defect related to their omission from 20 Defendants’ Notice. See Kuxhausen v. BMW Fin. Servs. NA LLC, 707 F.3d 21 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that de minimis procedural defects can be 22 cured even after the expiration of the removal period). 23 24 22 See generally Notice; Motion to Remand. 25 23 See Motion to Remand. 26 24 See Decl. of Pl. Dominique Daniels in Supp. of the Motion to Remand 27 (the “First Daniels Declaration”), Exs. B, C, & G [ECF No. 18]. 1 Next, Daniels avers that Defendants failed to obtain consent to remove 2 the action from Defendants Flores, Mendoza, and Huynh. With respect to 3 Flores and Mendoza, Deputy Attorney General Michael Gasbarro submitted a 4 declaration in which he testified that all properly served defendants, including 5 Flores and Mendoza, consented to the removal.26 The Court finds that 6 Defendants’ averment of Flores and Mendoza’s consent is sufficient. See 7 Proctor v. Vishay Intertechnology Inc., 584 F.3d 1208, 1225 (9th Cir. 2009) (“One 8 defendant’s timely removal notice containing an averment of the other 9 defendants’ consent and signed by an attorney of record is sufficient.”). 10 Finally, Gasbarro admits that Hyunh did not consent to removal, but 11 Gasbarro asserts that, to the best of his knowledge, Huynh has not been properly 12 served, and, therefore, Huynh did not need to consent.27 Daniels, in contrast, 13 maintains that Hyunh was properly served and, accordingly, that Hyunh’s 14 consent was required.28 15 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(2)(a), all defendants who have been properly 16 served must join in or consent to the removal of the action. To effectuate a 17 service of process, a copy of the summons and complaint must be personally 18 delivered to the person to be served. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 415.10; 19 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e). In lieu of personal delivery, a copy of the summons and 20 complaint may be left at the defendant’s office with the person apparently in 21 charge during usual office hours, and a copy of the summons and complaint 22 must then be mailed to the place where the documents were left. See 23 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 415.20. 24

25 26 Decl. of Deputy Attorney General Michael Gasbarro (the “First Gasbarro 26 Declaration”) [ECF No. 1] ¶ 5. 27 27 Id. 1 Daniels asserts that she made numerous unsuccessful attempts to serve 2 Huynh in December 2024 and that service was finally accepted by Defendant 3 Flores, a supervisor at the CDMV.29 The summons and complaint were then 4 mailed to the CDMV on December 31, 2024.30 However, it appears that Huynh 5 did not authorize Flores to accept service on her behalf and that Huynh had not 6 been employed by the CDMV since May 2024.31 Thus, Huynh was not properly 7 served, and her consent was not required for removal. 8 Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants substantially complied with 9 all of the procedural requirements of removal. Daniel’s Motion to Remand is 10 DENIED. 11 B. Motion to Dismiss 12 1. Discrimination in Violation of the ADA 13 Through her third claim for relief, Daniels asserts that she was 14 discriminated against in violation of the ADA. 15 The ADA prohibits discrimination against any individual on the basis of 16 disability in a place of public accommodation. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Not 17 only does the ADA pertain to “obviously exclusionary conduct,” such as “a 18 sign stating that persons with disabilities are unwelcome,” but it also proscribes 19 “more subtle forms of discrimination—such as difficult-to-navigate restrooms 20 and hard-to-open doors—that interfere with disabled individuals’ full and equal 21 enjoyment of places of public accommodation.” Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports 22 (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 945 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations omitted). 23

24 29 See First Daniels Declaration, Ex. G (Proof of Service of Summons and Complaint); Decl. of Saryah Daniels re Diligence (the “Saryah Daniels 25 Declaration”) [ECF No. 18] ¶ 6. 26 30 Saryah Daniels Declaration ¶ 7. 27 31 Decl. of Deputy Attorney General Michael Gasbarro (the “Second 1 However, the duty to provide “reasonable accommodations” under the ADA 2 arises only when the discrimination occurs on the basis of the disability. See 42 3 U.S.C. § 12132. To prove that a public program or service is in violation of the 4 ADA, a plaintiff must show that: 5 (1) he is a “qualified individual with a disability”; (2) he was either 6 excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of a public 7 entity’s services, programs or activities, or was otherwise 8 discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) such exclusion, 9 denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his disability. 10 Weinreich v. Los Angeles Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir. 11 1997). 12 Daniels alleges that she is a qualified individual with a disability and that 13 she was denied the benefits of CDMV services.32 Those allegations satisfy the 14 first and second prongs of the Ninth Circuit test. Daniels fails to allege, 15 however, that the denial of services at the CDMV arose by reason of her 16 disability. Daniels assumes that any discrimination that she experienced was 17 based upon her disability, but she does not allege facts that support that 18 assumption. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Daniels’s ADA claim 19 is GRANTED. 20 2. Discrimination in Violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act 21 Through her first claim for relief, Daniels asserts that she was 22 discriminated against in violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act. The Unruh Act 23 provides that: 24 All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and 25 no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national 26 origin, disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital 27 1 status, sexual orientation, citizenship, primary language, or 2 immigration status are entitled to the full and equal 3 accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all 4 business establishments of every kind whatsoever. 5 Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b). 6 A plaintiff can recover under the Unruh Act by showing either: (1) a 7 violation of the ADA; or (2) the “denial of access to a business establishment 8 based on intentional discrimination.” Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f); see also Martinez v. 9 San Diego County Credit Union, 50 Cal. App. 5th 1048, 1059 (2020). Daniels 10 cannot recover under the Unruh Act for a violation of the ADA, as discussed 11 above. Instead, the Court examines whether Daniels plausibly alleged 12 intentional discrimination. 13 To establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination, Daniels must 14 allege facts suggesting “willful, affirmative misconduct with the specific intent 15 to accomplish discrimination on the basis of a protected trait.” Martinez v. 16 Cot’n Wash, Inc., 81 Cal. App. 5th 1026, 1036, (2022) (internal quotations, 17 citations, and punctuation omitted). Daniels does not allege any such facts. 18 Rather, she asserts, without any factual support, that Defendants’ conduct was 19 performed “direct[ly], substantial[ly], or [was] motivate[ed]” by Daniels “being 20 physically disabled and handicap and African America[n]/Black.”33 Defendants 21 contend that this claim is not viable because it does not sufficiently contain facts 22 that support that Defendant’s conduct was discriminatory to Daniels based 23 upon race or disability.34 The Court agrees with Defendants. “The bare 24 possibility of discrimination premised on speculation, without any underlying 25 factual basis, is insufficient to state a claim under the Unruh Act.” Dallas & 26

27 33 See, e.g., id. at ¶ 74. 1 Lashmi, Inc. v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 1048, 1063 (C.D. Cal. 2015). In the 2 absence of specific facts suggesting otherwise, the Court cannot assume that 3 Defendants intended to discriminate against Daniels. Accordingly, Defendants’ 4 Motion to Dismiss Daniels’s first claim for relief is GRANTED. 5 3. Discrimination in Violation of Cal. Gov’t Code § 11135 6 Through her fourth claim for relief, Daniels asserts that she was 7 discriminated against in violation of Cal. Gov’t Code § 11135. That statute 8 provides, in relevant part, that no person may “be unlawfully denied full and 9 equal access to the benefits of, or be unlawfully subjected to discrimination” on 10 the basis of race or disability “under, any program or activity that is conducted, 11 operated, or administered by the state or by any state agency, is funded directly 12 by the state, or receives any financial assistance from the state.” 13 Cal. Gov’t Code § 11135. Section 11135 is “coextensive with the ADA because it 14 incorporates the protections and prohibitions of the ADA and its implementing 15 regulations.” Bassilios v. City of Torrance, CA, 166 F. Supp. 3d 1061, 1084 (C.D. 16 Cal. 2015). Because Daniels failed to allege an ADA violation adequately, she 17 has also failed to allege a § 11135 violation. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 18 Daniels’s fourth claim for relief is, therefore, GRANTED. 19 4. Deprivation of Rights in Violation of the Ralph Civil Rights Act 20 The Ralph Act provides that all persons have the right to be free from any 21 violence or intimidation by threat of violence on account of political affiliation or 22 protected characteristic. See Cal. Civ. Code § 51.7. To prevail on a Ralph Act 23 claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant committed or threatened to 24 commit a violent act against the plaintiff or her property; (2) a motivating reason 25 for the defendant’s conduct was the plaintiff’s protected characteristic; (3) the 26 plaintiff was harmed; and (4) the defendant’s conduct was a “substantial 27 factor” in causing the harm. See Austin B. v. Escondido Union Sch. Dist., 149 1 In her Complaint, Daniels alleges that Defendants undertook their 2 conduct “as a direct, substantial, or motivating cause for [Daniels] being 3 physically disabled, handicap, and African American or Black,”35 but Daniels 4 does not provide any factual basis for that allegation. Instead, Daniels merely 5 recites the elements of a Ralph Act claim. To allege that Defendants violated 6 the Ralph Act, Daniels must provide the “grounds” for her claim for relief, 7 which requires “more than labels and conclusions” or the “formulaic recitation 8 of a cause of action’s elements.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545. Defendants’ 9 Motion to Dismiss Daniels’s fifth claim for relief is GRANTED. 10 5. Violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the 11 United States Constitution 12 Daniels asserts her seventh and eleventh claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. 13 § 1983. To prevail on a § 1983 claim, Daniels must show that “(1) the action 14 occurred under the ‘color of state law’ and (2) the action resulted in the 15 deprivation of a constitutional right.” Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th 16 Cir. 2002). No party disputes that Defendants acted under the color of state 17 law. 18 Daniels’s seventh claim for relief is for retaliation in violation of the First 19 Amendment.36 To succeed on a retaliation claim, Daniels must “alleg[e] that 20 public officials, acting in their official capacity, took action with the intent to 21 retaliate against, obstruct, or chill [her] First Amendment rights.” Ariz. 22 Students’ Ass’n v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 824 F.3d 858, 867 (9th Cir. 2016). Put 23 differently, Daniels must allege that: 24 (1) [she] engaged in constitutionally protected activity; (2) the 25 defendant’s actions would “chill a person of ordinary firmness” 26

27 35 Complaint ¶ 116. 1 from continuing to engage in the protected activity; and (3) the 2 protected activity was a substantial motivating factor in the 3 defendant’s conduct—i.e., that there was a nexus between the 4 defendant’s actions and an intent to chill speech. 5 Id. 6 Here, Daniels engaged in protected activity—she was petitioning the 7 CDMV for the redress of her car registration grievance.37 However, Daniels has 8 not alleged that Defendants’ conduct, which included “threat[ening] to call law 9 enforcement,” “carrying out threats to call law enforcement,” “using 10 unreasonable and excess force and detention against [Daniels],” and “making 11 intentional and known false reports and statements to law enforcement,”38 12 would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in 13 redressing a grievance related to a car registration. Similarly, Daniels has not 14 alleged that the protected activity itself—petitioning the CDMV to reinstate her 15 vehicle registration—motivated Defendants’ alleged refusal to reinstate her 16 vehicle registration, to contact law enforcement, or to arrest Daniels.39 17 Through her eleventh claim for relief, Daniels asserts that Defendants 18 denied her equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth 19 Amendment.40 Under the Equal Protection Clause, “all persons similarly 20 situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 21 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). To prevail on an Equal Protection claim, Daniels must 22 show that Defendants “acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against 23 24

25 37 Id. at ¶ 27. 26 38 Id. at ¶ 132. 27 39 See generally id. 1 the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class.” Barren v. Harrington, 2 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). 3 Daniels alleges that Defendants “treated her differently from the other 4 members of the general public who was not or appeared not to be physically 5 disabled or handicapped or African American or Black.”41 That allegation, on 6 its own, does not give rise to an equal protection claim. See Thornton v. City of 7 St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 2005) (“An equal protection claim will 8 not lie by ‘conflating all persons not injured into a preferred class receiving 9 better treatment’ than the plaintiff.” (internal citations omitted)). Because 10 Daniels has not alleged facts sufficient to link her membership in a protected 11 class to the motivation for Defendants’ actions, Daniels fails to state a claim 12 upon which relief can be granted. 13 Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Daniels’s seventh and 14 eleventh claims for relief is GRANTED. 15 6. Violations of the California Constitution 16 Daniels eighth and twelfth claims allege violations of Article I, sections 2, 17 3, and 7, of the California Constitution. Defendants challenge those claims on 18 the ground that neither claim supports an award of money damages.42 The 19 California Supreme Court has created a framework for determining whether a 20 damages action exists to remedy a constitutional violation. See Katzberg v. 21 Regents of Univ. of California, 29 Cal. 4th 300, 317 (2002). 22 Under the Katzberg framework, California courts have declined to 23 recognize a constitutional tort action for damages to remedy violations of 24 California Constitution Article I, sections 2, 3, and 7. See Katzenberg, 29 25 Cal. 4th at 323 (finding that Article I, section 7, does not include any indication 26

27 41 Id. at ¶ 155. 1 of “an implied right to seek damages for a violation of the due process liberty 2 interest”); see also Xue Lu v. Powell, 621 F.3d 944, 951 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding 3 that a plaintiff’s claim under Article 1, section 7, of the California Constitution 4 does not state a claim for damages under California law); Degrassi v. Cook, 29 5 Cal. 4th 333 (2002) (finding that Article I, section 2, of the California 6 Constitution “does not afford a right to seek money damages” in the situation 7 presented); MHC Fin. Ltd. P’ship Two v. City of Santee, 182 Cal. App. 4th 1169, 8 1188 (as modified on denial of reh’g) (2010) (concluding that money damages 9 are not an appropriate remedy for a violation of right to petition set forth in 10 Article I, section 3, of the California Constitution). 11 In addition to damages, Daniels requests “any further relief the Court 12 deems just and proper.”43 The California Supreme Court has recognized that 13 Article I, section 7, can “support[] an action, brought by a private plaintiff 14 against a proper defendant, for declaratory relief or for injunction.” Katzenberg, 15 29 Cal. 4th at 307. Here, there is no indication that the conduct described in 16 Daniels’s complaint supports an award of any relief that this Court could grant. 17 Because Daniels’s eight and twelfth claims are insufficient to sustain a 18 claim for damages or any other relief that this Court could bestow, Defendants’ 19 Motion to Dismiss Daniels’s eighth and twelfth claims for relief is GRANTED. 20 7. Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil Rights 21 Finally, Defendants move to dismiss Daniels’s conspiracy claim. 22 Although Daniels does not request leave to amend directly, she suggests that, if 23 she were granted leave to amend, she could allege additional facts to support this 24 claim.44 25 26

27 43 Complaint, Prayer for Relief, ¶ 6. 1 In view of the Court’s limited judicial resources, it is loath to adjudicate 2 serial motions under Rule 12(b)(6). Instead, the Court will direct the parties to 3 engage in another, more rigorous, L.R. 7-3 Conference of Counsel and, on its 4 own motion, will grant Daniels leave to file an amended pleading. See Eminence 5 Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (instructing 6 district courts that “Rule 15 advises the court that ‘leave shall be freely given 7 when justice so requires’” and that “[t]his policy is ‘to be applied with extreme 8 liberality’”) (citation and quotation omitted). The Court suggests that Daniels 9 take this opportunity to present her best-pleaded Amended Complaint. 10 IV. DISPOSITION 11 For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows: 12 1. Daniels’s Motion to Remand [ECF No. 15] is DENIED. 13 2. Daniels’s Request for Judicial Notice is GRANTED. 14 3. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 21] is GRANTED. 15 Specifically, Daniels’s first, third, fourth, fifth, seventh, eighth, eleventh, 16 twelfth, and thirteenth claims for relief are DISMISSED with leave to amend. 17 4. Daniels is DIRECTED to file an amended pleading, if at all, no 18 later than August 21, 2025. If Daniels chooses to file an amended pleading, then 19 she is also DIRECTED to file contemporaneously therewith a Notice of 20 Revisions to Complaint that provides the Court with a redline version that 21 shows the amendments. If Daniels fails to file an amended pleading by 22 August 21, 2025, then the Court will DISMISS Daniel’s first, fourth, fifth, 23 seventh, eleventh and thirteenth claims for relief with prejudice. 24 25 26 27 1 5. Defendants are DIRECTED to file their respective responses to 2|| Daniels’s operative complaint no later than September 11, 2025. 3 IT ISSO ORDERED.

5|| Dated: August 5, 2025 . 6 {SNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 8 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28