O 1

2 3 4 5 6 7

8 United States District Court 9 Central District of California

10

11 GERARDO CABANILLAS, Case № 2:24-cv-08027-ODW (BFMx)

12 Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT

13 v.

CITY OF SOUTH GATE’S

14 CITY OF SOUTH GATE et al., MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT VI 15 [121] Defendants.

16 17 I. INTRODUCTION 18 Plaintiff Gerardo Cabanillas brings this civil rights action against Defendants 19 City of South Gate (“South Gate”), City of Huntington Park (“Huntington Park”), and 20 individual officers Lee Jack Alirez, David Pixler, Jonathan Sekiya, Detective Lopez, 21 Officer Ayestas, Officer Salcido, John Navarrette, Cosme Lozano, and Anthony 22 Porter, following Cabanillas’s wrongful arrest and conviction for crimes he did not 23 commit. (First Am. Compl. (“FAC”), ECF No. 104.) South Gate now moves to 24 dismiss Count VI of Cabanillas’s First Amended Complaint for Monell liability under 25 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Mot. Dismiss (“Mot.” or “Motion”), ECF No. 121.) For the 26 reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS South Gate’s Motion.1 27

28 1 Having carefully considered the papers filed in connection with the Motion, the Court deemed the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. 1 II. BACKGROUND2 2 Cabanillas was eighteen years old when he was arrested and imprisoned for 3 crimes he did not commit. (FAC ¶¶ 1, 40.) On January 16, 1995, Raul Flores and 4 Maria A. were sitting in Flores’ parked car in South Gate when two men approached, 5 demanding their valuables at knife- and gunpoint. (Id. ¶¶ 22–27.) The two men then 6 drove Maria A. to an abandoned house nearby and sexually assaulted her. (Id. ¶¶ 29– 7 32.) On January 18, in the same general area, Ricardo Sanchez and Maria Lomeli 8 were sitting in a parked car when a man wearing red pants, a black leather jacket, and 9 huarache sandals robbed them at gunpoint. (Id. ¶¶ 33–39.) South Gate police officers 10 Alirez, Pixler, Sekiya, Lopez, Ayestas, and Salcido investigated both crimes under the 11 supervision of Sergeant Martin Vanlierop. (Id. ¶¶ 48–50.) In the days following, 12 officers showed the victims of both attacks a photo array of possible suspects, but no 13 one made a positive identification. (Id. ¶¶ 59, 70, 72.) 14 On January 20, with few leads, Officer Alirez saw Cabanillas standing on a 15 street corner in South Gate wearing red pants, which matched the description of the 16 January 18 attacker. (Id. ¶¶ 75–77.) Alirez arrested him for an outstanding traffic 17 warrant. (Id. ¶ 81.) He subsequently included Cabanillas’s booking photo in a photo 18 array with five other suspects who he knew the South Gate victims had already seen. 19 (Id. ¶¶ 83–84.) When presented with the photo array, Sanchez and Lomeli (after some 20 hesitation) identified Cabanillas as their attacker. (Id. ¶¶ 85–93.) Officers pressured 21 and misled Flores and Maria A. into identifying Cabanillas in a similar photo array, 22 despite their hesitation and objections. (Id. ¶¶ 128–34, 137–40.) 23 After Cabanillas’s arrest, Alirez used coercive tactics to extract a false 24 confession, including interrogating him in English, which was not his first language; 25 lying to him about the existence of incriminating evidence; and promising that “if he 26 confessed to the crimes against both couples, police would immediately release [him] 27 2 All factual references derive from Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint or attached exhibits, unless 28 otherwise noted, and well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true for purposes of this Motion. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 1 on probation.” (Id. ¶¶ 101–05.) After several hours of interrogation, Cabanillas 2 agreed to confess. (Id. ¶ 106.) Officers then supplied him with information about the 3 crimes, took him to one of the crime scenes, and then coached him into recording a 4 suitable confession. (Id. ¶¶ 107–13.) 5 In February 1995, while Cabanillas was in police custody, “a spree of strikingly 6 similar crimes occurred” in South Gate, including in Huntington Park. (Id. ¶¶ 147–49, 7 150.) The South Gate police officers, now joined by Huntington Park detectives 8 Lozano, Porter, and Navarrette, investigated these crimes and arrested Juan Jose 9 Angulo after victims of those attacks positively identified him. (Id. ¶¶ 151–55, 159, 10 161.) When officers searched his house, they found “numerous stolen items, 11 including watches and jewelry,” as well as red pants, a leather jacket, and huarache 12 sandals matching Lomeli’s description of her attacker. (Id. ¶ 166.) Angulo, unlike 13 Cabanillas, also matched the composite sketch based on Sanchez’s and Lomeli’s 14 descriptions. (Id.) 15 After arresting Angulo, South Gate police officers “continued their framing of” 16 Cabanillas by withholding exculpatory evidence obtained from the Angulo 17 investigation, writing police reports with “fabricated accounts of all their major 18 investigative steps,” and eliding their use of “manufactured” photo array 19 identifications. (Id. ¶¶ 167–68, 144–45, 176.) As a result, Cabanillas was convicted 20 of several crimes associated with the two January attacks, including carjacking, 21 robbery, kidnapping, and rape. (Id. ¶¶ 177–79.) He was sentenced to eighty-seven 22 years to life in prison. (Id. ¶ 182.) 23 Cabanillas alleges that South Gate police officers, including Officer Alirez, had 24 engaged in similar misconduct in the past. (Id. ¶ 251.) He cites a memorandum dated 25 March 16, 1995, from a Deputy Public Defender to the Deputy in Charge of South 26 Gate, explaining that “Alirez had developed a reputation among local attorneys . . . for 27 being the detective who ‘always had a confession.’” (Id.) He further alleges that 28 1 “several individuals accused of crimes reported being coerced into a confession with 2 promises of leniency.” (Id.) 3 In 2021, after new DNA testing, Cabanillas was excluded as a contributor to the 4 DNA obtained from Maria A.’s sexual assault. (Id. ¶¶ 185–86.) In 2023, Angulo 5 confessed to the crimes against Sanchez and Lomeli, and “credibly identified the 6 perpetrators of the crimes against Flores and Maria A.” (Id. ¶ 189.) As a result, on 7 September 21, 2023, the court granted Cabanillas’s habeas petition, releasing him 8 from wrongful incarceration after more than twenty-five years. (Id. ¶¶ 190–91.) 9 On September 19, 2024, Cabanillas initiated this action. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) 10 On February 14, 2025, Cabanillas filed the operative First Amended Complaint 11 against Defendants.3 (FAC.) He asserts six causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: 12 (1) due process violations under the Fourteenth Amendment, (2) coerced false 13 confession in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, (3) malicious 14 prosecution and unlawful detention in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth 15 Amendments, (4) failure to intervene, (5) conspiracy, and (6) municipal liability under 16 Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 17 (Id. ¶¶ 198–254.) He also pleads state law claims for (7) intentional infliction of 18 emotional distress, (8) civil conspiracy, (9) Bane Act violations, (10) respondeat 19 superior, and (11) indemnification. (Id. ¶¶ 255–282.) 20 South Gate now moves to dismiss Count VI for failure to state a claim. (Mot.) 21 The Motion is fully briefed. (Opp’n, ECF No. 125; Reply, ECF No. 126.) 22 III. LEGAL STANDARD 23 A court may dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for lack of a cognizable 24 legal theory or insufficient facts pleaded to support an otherwise cognizable legal 25 theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). To 26 survive a dismissal motion, a complaint need only satisfy the minimal notice pleading 27 3 Detective Gregory Wells, Sergeant Martin Vanlierop, Sergeant Sullivan, and Officer Reyes of the 28 South Gate Police Department, and Carl Heintz of the Huntington Park Police Department were dropped or dismissed from the lawsuit. (See FAC; Order Granting Dismissal, ECF No. 124.) 1 requirements of Rule 8(a)(2)—a short and plain statement of the claim. Porter v. 2 Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 494 (9th Cir. 2003). The factual “allegations must be enough to 3 raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 4 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). That is, the complaint must “contain sufficient factual 5 matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 6 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted). 7 The determination of whether a complaint satisfies the plausibility standard is a 8 “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 9 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. A court is generally limited to the 10 pleadings and must construe all “factual allegations set forth in the complaint . . . as 11 true and . . . in the light most favorable” to the plaintiff. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 12 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2001). However, a court need not blindly accept 13 conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of fact, and unreasonable inferences. 14 Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). 15 Where a district court grants a motion to dismiss, it should generally provide 16 leave to amend unless it is clear the complaint could not be saved by any amendment. 17 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 18 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). Leave to amend may be denied when “the court 19 determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading 20 could not possibly cure the deficiency.” Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture 21 Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986). Thus, leave to amend “is properly 22 denied . . . if amendment would be futile.” Carrico v. City & County of San 23 Francisco, 656 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2011). 24 IV. DISCUSSION 25 The Supreme Court has ruled that “[a] municipality may be held liable as a 26 ‘person’ under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when it maintains a policy or custom that causes the 27 deprivation of a plaintiff’s federally protected rights.” Park v. City & County of 28 Honolulu, 952 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). 1 However, liability is limited to actions taken pursuant to “a policy statement, 2 ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by [the 3 municipality’s] officers,” such that the policy is considered the “moving force” behind 4 the alleged violation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690, 694. Consequently, “a municipality 5 cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Id. at 691 6 (emphasis omitted). 7 There is no heightened pleading standard for Monell claims. Leatherman v. 8 Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intel. & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). The 9 Ninth Circuit analyzes the adequacy of Monell claims under the following standard: 10 First, to be entitled to the presumption of truth, allegations in a complaint or counterclaim may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, 11 but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair 12 notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively. Second, the factual allegations that are taken as true must plausibly 13 suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require the 14 opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery and continued 15 litigation. 16 AE ex rel. Hernandez v. County of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012). 17 In his First Amended Complaint, Cabanillas alleges four theories of municipal 18 liability for violations of his constitutional rights, based on (1) an official written 19 policy; (2) a longstanding custom or practice; (3) failure to train; and (4) ratification 20 by a final policymaker. (FAC ¶¶ 240–54; Opp’n 5.) In its Motion, South Gate argues 21 that Cabanillas does not plausibly plead any of these theories. 22 A. Official Policy or Widespread Custom/Practice 23 Cabanillas alleges that South Gate “promulgated policy, including written 24 policies and unwritten customs, that caused [his] wrongful conviction,” and identifies 25 five general areas where existing policies were inadequate: 26 (1) the conduct of interrogations and questioning of criminal suspects and witnesses; (2) the collection, documentation, preservation, testing, and 27 disclosure of evidence . . . ; (3) writing police reports and taking 28 investigative notes; . . . (4) intervention to prevent and redress misconduct by other officers; and (5) maintaining investigative files and 1 disclosing those files in criminal proceedings. 2 3 (FAC ¶¶ 240, 242.) 4 A plaintiff may establish municipal liability by showing that “the [municipality] 5 had a deliberate policy, custom, or practice that was the ‘moving force’ behind the 6 constitutional violation he suffered.” Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 7 667 (9th Cir. 2007). To state a claim based on official policy or longstanding custom, 8 a plaintiff must plausibly allege: “(1) that the plaintiff possessed a constitutional right 9 of which he was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy 10 amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional right; and, (4) that 11 the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Dougherty v. City 12 of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up). 13 1. Official Policy 14 Cabanillas first alleges that South Gate “promulgated . . . written policies” that 15 caused his wrongful conviction. (FAC ¶ 240.) 16 A municipality may be held liable for “an expressly adopted official policy” that 17 causes the injury in question. Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre, 710 F.3d 1049, 1066 18 (9th Cir. 2013). Cabanillas contends that he plausibly alleges “written policies” 19 because he “identifies deficiencies in South Gate’s written policies concerning the five 20 areas” discussed above and alleges that “the lack of adequate policies” caused his 21 constitutional violations. (Opp’n 8; FAC ¶ 242.) However, he fails to identify any 22 specific policy or written rule that caused the violations. (See generally FAC.) 23 Without identifying a specific written policy and how its deficiencies caused the 24 constitutional violations at issue, Cabanillas fails to plead a plausible claim for relief. 25 See Capp v. County of San Diego, 940 F.3d 1046, 1061 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[E]ven if 26 [p]laintiffs had pleaded a plausible Fourth Amendment claim, the [complaint] ascribes 27 [d]efendants’ alleged misconduct to official policy in a conclusory fashion that is 28 insufficient to state a viable claim.”); Santa Ana Police Officers Ass’n v. City of Santa 1 Ana, No. 8:15-cv-01280-DOC (DFMx), 2015 WL 13757346, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2 2015) (finding the plaintiff’s claim based on official policy was not viable because the 3 plaintiffs did not identify “a specific ‘official policy,’ related to either the [c]ity or 4 [p]olice [d]epartment, that gave rise to their claims.”). 5 Cabanillas has therefore failed to plausibly plead a Monell claim based on 6 official written policy. 7 2. Widespread Custom or Practice 8 In addition to official policy, Cabanillas alleges that South Gate had unofficial 9 customs and practices that resulted in violations of his constitutional rights. (FAC 10 ¶¶ 240–41, 246–50.) South Gate argues that Cabanillas fails to demonstrate a pattern 11 of similar violations establishing that it had notice of the alleged unconstitutional 12 practices. (Mot. 16–19.) 13 A plaintiff may assert municipal liability based on “a widespread practice that, 14 although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent 15 and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.” St. Louis v. 16 Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). The 17 existence of an informal policy can be shown with allegations of “repeated 18 constitutional violations for which the errant municipal officials were not discharged 19 or reprimanded.” Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1349 (9th Cir. 1992). “Liability 20 for improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must 21 be founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that the 22 conduct has become a traditional method of carrying out policy.” Trevino v. Gates, 23 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996); see, e.g., Perryman v. City of Pittsburg, 545 F. Supp. 24 3d 796, 800–02 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (finding that plaintiff plausibly pleaded a “custom or 25 practice” where he identified the specific customs responsible for his rights violations 26 and cited ten lawsuits against the police department involving similar facts). 27 For example, in Brown v. County of San Bernardino, the court found that the 28 plaintiff did not plead sufficient facts to establish that a widespread custom or practice 1 existed. No. 5:20-cv-01304-JGB (SHKx), 2021 WL 99722, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2 2021). In her complaint, the plaintiff alleged that several of the county police force’s 3 customs, including “using excessive force and providing inadequate training regarding 4 the use of force,” caused her injury. Id. (cleaned up). The court deemed these 5 allegations “overbroad and conclusory,” noting that “[c]ourts have repeatedly rejected 6 sweeping allegations of policies and customs in the absence of facts supporting their 7 existence and applicability.” Id. (collecting cases); see, e.g., Moore v. City of Orange, 8 No. 8:17-cv-01024-JVS (JCGx), 2017 WL 10518114, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2017) 9 (holding that “a speculative list of various customs, policies, and practices” employed 10 by county law enforcement was inadequate without “specific factual allegations” to 11 support the claim). The court in Brown also found the plaintiff’s “cursory references 12 to prior shootings . . . . far from sufficient to establish a widespread practice or 13 custom,” because the plaintiff “fail[ed] to explain what happened, when, who was 14 involved, any similarities to the facts here, or the [d]efendants’ subsequent actions.” 15 2021 WL 99722, at *5. As a result, the plaintiff did not demonstrate that the 16 defendant municipality had sufficient notice of the incidents to support a viable claim 17 under the custom or practice theory. Id. 18 Similarly, here, Cabanillas has not alleged sufficient facts to support a Monell 19 claim based on widespread custom or practice. Cabanillas alleges that the South Gate 20 police department maintained unofficial policies allowing the kinds of misconduct to 21 which he was subjected, including “pursuing convictions without regard to the truth, 22 through reliance on profoundly flawed investigations,” coercing suspects to “implicate 23 themselves in crimes they did not commit,” “deliberately cover[ing] up their wrongful 24 and illegal misconduct and assist[ing] each other in doing so,” and “shirk[ing] their 25 sworn duty to follow leads and conduct honest investigations.” (FAC ¶¶ 241, 246– 26 47.) As in Brown and Moore, these allegations are overbroad, conclusory, and lack 27 sufficient detail. Without additional factual allegations as to the existence of these 28 1 policies and how South Gate police officers carried them out as a department-wide 2 practice, Cabanillas fails to meet the pleading standard. 3 Cabanillas also fails to allege a pattern of similar misconduct establishing that 4 South Gate was deliberately indifferent to the alleged custom. He alleges two facts in 5 support of his contention that municipal officials were “well aware of the persistent 6 problem of officers coercing confessions,” and thus indifferent to it. (Id. ¶ 251.) The 7 first is a memo from a Deputy Public Defender to the Deputy in Charge of South 8 Gate’s police department, “explain[ing] that Defendant Alirez had developed a 9 reputation among local attorneys . . . for being the detective who ‘always had a 10 confession.’” (Id.; see Opp’n 13.) The second is a vague assertion that “several 11 individuals accused of crimes reported being coerced into a confession with promises 12 of leniency.” (FAC ¶ 251.) Neither of these allegations is sufficient to state a Monell 13 claim. As in Brown, Cabanillas makes only “cursory references” to previous coerced 14 confessions involving South Gate police officers, without identifying which officers 15 were involved, who was coerced, what the coerced individuals were accused of, or 16 where they “reported” the misconduct. Similarly, Cabanillas does not name the 17 individual who received the Deputy Public Defender’s vaguely accusatory memo, 18 identify his or her role, or describe the conduct Alirez was accused of committing in 19 sufficient detail to support an inference of deliberate indifference. Cabanillas also 20 fails to allege how the unknown deputy’s knowledge of Alirez’s reputation can be 21 attributed more broadly to the South Gate police department to show the municipality 22 knew of the complaints. 23 Absent additional allegations supporting the existence of these policies and 24 South Gate’s awareness of them, Cabanillas has not plausibly stated a claim based on 25 unofficial custom or practice. 26 B. Failure to Train 27 Cabanillas also alleges liability based on a failure-to-train theory. (Id. ¶ 253; 28 Opp’n 5, 7, 10–11.) South Gate contends Cabanillas does not plausibly plead a 1 Monell claim because he does not identify the specific training deficiencies at issue or 2 demonstrate South Gate’s deliberate indifference. (Mot. 19–22; Reply 4–6.) 3 “A municipality’s culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous 4 where a claim turns on a failure to train.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 5 (2011). Under this theory, “[a] pattern of similar constitutional violations by 6 untrained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate deliberate indifference.” 7 Id. at 62 (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 8 409 (1997)). However, the Supreme Court has “left open the possibility that, ‘in a 9 narrow range of circumstances,’ a pattern of similar violations might not be necessary 10 to show deliberate indifference,” in circumstances where “the unconstitutional 11 consequences of failing to train [are] so patently obvious” that the city can be held 12 liable based on a “single[]incident” without establishing a “pre-existing pattern of 13 violations.” Id. at 63–64, 71 (quoting Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 409). A need for 14 training could be considered “obvious” in recurrent situations where it is “highly 15 predictable” that “an officer lacking specific tools to handle that situation will violate 16 citizens’ rights.” Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 409–410. 17 In City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, the Supreme Court offered the example of 18 the obvious need to train law enforcement in the constitutional limits on the use of 19 force, which officers regularly encounter and are not presumed to know unless 20 specifically informed. 489 U.S. 378, 390 n.10 (1989). Conversely, in Connick, the 21 Supreme Court found that the municipality’s alleged failure to provide adequate 22 training to prosecutors regarding Brady violations did not fit the “single-incident” 23 exception for a “patently obvious” failure to train. 563 U.S. at 62–69, 71. There, the 24 plaintiff relied on four prior convictions overturned for Brady violations to show that 25 prosecutors had a pattern of misconduct of withholding potentially exculpatory 26 evidence. Id. at 62–63. However, the Court found that none of the cited cases had 27 sufficiently similar facts to suggest that officials had notice of training deficiencies of 28 the kind the plaintiff alleged. Id. The Court also found the claim did not fit the 1 narrow exception for “patently obvious” training deficiencies because the plaintiff 2 alleged that prosecutors had inadequate Brady training, rather than complete 3 ignorance of the rules. Id. at 64, 67. Whereas the Canton hypothetical assumed that 4 officers had “no knowledge at all of the constitutional limits on the use of deadly 5 force,” the prosecutors in Connick were “familiar with the general Brady rule.” Id. 6 at 67. As a result, the plaintiff in Connick could only “assert that prosecutors were not 7 trained about particular Brady evidence or the specific scenario related to the violation 8 in his case,” which was too nuanced an argument to support a “patently obvious” 9 failure to train theory. Id.; see Canton, 489 U.S. at 392 (“In virtually every instance 10 where a person has had his or her constitutional rights violated by a city employee, a 11 § 1983 plaintiff will be able to point to something the city ‘could have done’ to 12 prevent the unfortunate incident.”). 13 With respect to the existence of deficient policies, Cabanillas asserts that he 14 “identifies the deficient or challenged policies and explains how they were deficient.” 15 (Opp’n 4–5.). But he does not cite, and the Court is unable to locate, any allegations 16 in the First Amended Complaint identifying the specific training practices at issue, 17 which aspects of the training were deficient, or how those deficiencies caused 18 Cabanillas’s harm. (See generally FAC.) For example, while Cabanillas alleges that 19 South Gate “failed to implement adequate training and supervision of their police 20 officers with respect to . . . the collection, documentation, preservation, testing, and 21 disclosure of evidence,” he does not identify any specific inadequacy in those 22 practices that plausibly caused his injuries. (See FAC ¶ 243.) Accordingly, 23 Cabanillas has not alleged that his constitutional violations were the result of a policy 24 or custom, rather than the individual choices or conduct of the officers, which would 25 otherwise improperly place the claim within the ambit of respondeat superior. See 26 Canton, 489 U.S. at 379 (observing that “[t]o adopt lesser standards of fault and 27 causation . . . would engage federal courts in an endless exercise of second-guessing 28 municipal employee-training programs”). 1 Moreover, for the reasons discussed above, Cabanillas has not established a 2 pattern of similar misconduct that would have placed South Gate on notice of any 3 training deficiencies. It therefore appears his failure-to-train theory rests on the 4 argument that the alleged deficiencies were so obvious that no pattern of misconduct 5 is needed to establish deliberate indifference. To the extent that Cabanillas does 6 identify the basis for his “patently obvious” failure to train theory, his claim is more 7 akin to Connick’s inadequate Brady training than Canton’s deadly force training 8 example. He argues his injuries were caused by “gaps and deficiencies” in South 9 Gate’s training policies and “fail[ure] to implement adequate training,” rather than a 10 complete failure to train officers in the specified areas. (Opp’n 5; see FAC ¶ 243.) As 11 the Supreme Court noted in Connick, an allegation that training was provided but 12 deficient in a particular respect cannot support the theory that more or better training 13 is “obviously” needed to prevent constitutional violations that are otherwise likely to 14 result. 563 U.S. at 68, 71; cf. Perez v. City of Fresno, 98 F.4th 919, 932 (9th Cir. 15 2024) (finding the district court properly granted summary judgment on a failure to 16 train claim where some of the involved officers received adequate training while 17 others did not, which was insufficient to show that the need for more training was 18 patently obvious). Therefore, without more facts demonstrating the alleged training 19 deficiencies and South Gate’s awareness of them, Cabanillas fails to plausibly allege a 20 Monell claim under a “failure to train claim” theory. 21 C. Ratification By a Final Policymaker 22 Cabanillas also asserts a claim based on ratification by a final policymaking 23 official. (FAC ¶¶ 250, 252–53; Opp’n 5, 11–12.) South Gate argues that Cabanillas 24 has not identified a final policymaker with notice of the violations or any acts of 25 ratification. (Mot. 12–15; Reply 8–9.) 26 A municipality may also be held liable under § 1983 when “an official with 27 final policy-making authority ratified a subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or 28 action and the basis for it.” Gillette, 979 F.2d at 1346–47. “The key question in 1 determining whether a person is ‘a final policymaker’ is whether ‘he or she [is] in a 2 position of authority such that a final decision by that person may appropriately be 3 attributed to the [m]unicipality.’” Sanchez v. City of Fresno, 914 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 4 1097 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (first alteration in original) (quoting Lytle v. Carl, 382 F.3d 978, 5 983 (9th Cir. 2004)). “Heads of local departments do not automatically act with final 6 policymaking authority.” Santa Ana Police, 2015 WL 13757346, at *8 (citing 7 Gillette, 979 F.2d at 1350). Courts may evaluate “local charters, ordinances, and 8 policies to determine where final policymaking authority lies.” Id. at *8 (citing 9 Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1237 (9th Cir. 1999)). For liability to attach, “[t]he 10 policymaker must have knowledge of the constitutional violation and actually approve 11 of it,” Lytle, 382 F.3d at 987, by making “a deliberate choice from among various 12 alternatives to follow a particular course of action,” Gillette, 979 F.2d at 1348. “A 13 mere failure to overrule a subordinate’s actions, without more, is insufficient to 14 support a § 1983 claim.” Lytle, 382 F.3d at 987. 15 Here, Cabanillas claims that officers violated his rights “with the knowledge, 16 approval, or endorsement of persons with final policymaking authority” for South 17 Gate. (FAC ¶ 252.) He alleges that final policymakers ratified the officers’ 18 misconduct by “continuing to employ them, promote them, and approve of their 19 work” on the investigations that led to Cabanillas’s wrongful conviction, rather than 20 correcting their actions through discipline or training. (Id. ¶ 253.) In the Opposition, 21 Cabanillas specifically focuses on Sergeant Vanlierop as a final policymaker, alleging 22 that he was aware and “approved of his subordinates’ acts of misconduct” in his role 23 as department supervisor, including their decisions to “extract involuntary statements, 24 coerce eyewitness identifications, falsify evidence implicating Plaintiff, and suppress 25 exculpatory evidence.” (Opp’n 7–8.) In the First Amended Complaint, Cabanillas 26 alleges that, as supervisor, Vanlierop “participated in the day-to-day investigation 27 himself,” in addition to overseeing it; “was responsible for ensuring that investigative 28 information was reported and transmitted to state criminal prosecutors and to criminal 1 defense attorneys”; “kept himself apprised of all evidence collected in the case”; and 2 continued his supervisory role, including all relevant duties, in the subsequent joint 3 investigation with the Huntington Park Police Department. (FAC ¶¶ 50–53, 152, 156– 4 58.) However, Vanlierop’s adherence to these duties does not show his awareness of 5 the officers’ constitutional violations, which include procuring false witness 6 identifications, fabricating statements, concealing exculpatory evidence, falsifying 7 police reports, and coercing a false confession. (Id. ¶¶ 200–01, 203–04, 212.) Absent 8 a showing that Vanlierop was aware of the officers’ misconduct and its 9 unconstitutional basis, Vanlierop’s failure to overrule or discipline the officers cannot 10 be interpreted as an act of ratification. 11 Even if Cabanillas plausibly alleges that Vanlierop knew and approved of the 12 officers’ misconduct, he does not adequately allege—such as by citing municipal 13 ordinance or police department policy—that Vanlierop, or any other South Gate 14 supervisor, acted with the requisite authority as a policymaker “whose decisions 15 represent the official policy of the local government.” Christie, 176 F.3d at 1235. 16 See, e.g., Santa Ana Police, 2015 WL 13757346, at *8 (finding that plaintiff did not 17 plausibly allege police chief was a final policymaker because plaintiff did not cite 18 “any charter, municipal code, ordinance, or other enactment” other than a recent job 19 description). Nor does Cabanillas plausibly allege that any other unnamed supervisor 20 knew and approved of the officers’ actions. (See generally FAC.) Cabanillas must 21 provide additional factual allegations to proceed with a ratification theory. See, e.g., 22 Lucero v. County of Orange, 536 F. Supp. 3d 628, 633 n.2 (C.D. Cal. 2021) (rejecting 23 ratification theory where the plaintiff “fail[ed] to identify a policymaker or articulate 24 any facts surrounding the circumstances of ratification, including when or how it 25 occurred” (cleaned up)). Without alleging how Vanlierop or unnamed officials knew 26 about and ratified the constitutional violations, Cabanillas fails to plausibly allege a 27 Monell claim based on a ratification theory. 28 1 Given that Cabanillas does not meet the pleading standard under any of his 2|| alleged theories of liability under Monell—official policy, widespread custom or 3 || practice, failure to train, and ratification—the Court DISMISSES his Sixth Cause of 4] Action. South Gate has not shown that “amendment would be futile,” Carrico, 5 || 656 F.3d at 1008, so this dismissal is with leave to amend. 6 Vv. CONCLUSION 7 For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS South Gate’s Motion to 8 | Dismiss. (ECF No. 121.) Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Cabanillas’s sixth 9 || cause of action against South Gate WITH LEAVE TO AMEND to add factual 10 || allegations consistent with the challenged pleading to cure the above noted 11 || deficiencies. 12 If Cabanillas chooses to amend, he must file his Second Amended Complaint 13 || no later than fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order, in which case Defendants shall answer or otherwise respond within fourteen (14) days of the filing. If 15 || Cabanillas does not timely amend, this dismissal shall be deemed a dismissal with 16 || prejudice as to the sixth cause of action against South Gate, as of the lapse of the 17 || deadline to amend. 18 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 21 August 8, 2025 22 ees 3 fp: MM dep a OTIS i HT, I 05 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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