1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ESTATE OF KEVIN MARCUS JOSEPH, No. 2:25-cv-00496-DAD-AC et al., 12 Plaintiffs, 13 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION v. TO REMAND, REMANDING THIS ACTION 14 TO THE SACRAMENTO COUNTY SUB SEA SYSTEMS, INC., et al., SUPERIOR COURT, AND DENYING 15 DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS AS Defendants. MOOT 16 (Doc. Nos. 3, 17, 22) 17

18 19 This matter is before the court on plaintiffs’ motion to remand this action to the 20 Sacramento County Superior Court (Doc. No. 17) and the motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint 21 filed on behalf of defendant Sub Sea Systems, Inc. (“defendant Sub Sea”) (Doc. No. 22). The 22 motion to remand and motion to dismiss were taken under submission on the papers on March 24, 23 2025 and May 13, 2025, respectively. (Doc. Nos. 18, 23.) For the reasons explained below, 24 plaintiffs’ pending motion to remand will be granted. Defendant’s pending motion to dismiss will 25 therefore be denied as moot in light of this order. 26 BACKGROUND 27 On October 16, 2024, plaintiffs filed a complaint in Sacramento County Superior Court 28 initiating this suit, alleging that decedent Kevin Marcus Joseph died as a result of a defective 1 diving helmet manufactured by defendants. (Doc. No. 1 at 9–18.) Based upon that allegation, 2 plaintiffs assert 16 claims under California state law against defendants. (Id. at 9–10.) 3 On February 11, 2025, defendant Sub Sea removed the action to this federal court on the 4 basis of diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a) and 1441(b). (Doc. No. 1 at 1–2.) 5 Plaintiffs are citizens of North Carolina. (Id. at ¶¶ 4, 5.) Defendant Sub Sea is a citizen of 6 Wyoming and California. (Id. at ¶ 6.) Defendant Aquanautas Curacao B.V. is a citizen of 7 Curacao.1 (Id. at ¶ 7.) At the time of removal, plaintiffs had not yet served either defendant. (Id. 8 at ¶ 2.) Rather, on January 17, 2025, plaintiffs had emailed a copy of their complaint to defendant 9 Sub Sea’s counsel. (Id.) 10 On February 18, 2025, defendant Sub Sea filed its motion to dismiss.2 (Doc. No. 3.) On 11 March 11, 2025, plaintiffs their motion to remand. (Doc. No. 17.) Defendant Sub Sea filed its 12 opposition on March 25, 2025. (Doc. No. 19.) On April 6, 2025, plaintiffs filed their reply 13 thereto. (Doc. No. 21.) On May 14, 2025, plaintiffs filed their opposition to the motion to 14 dismiss. (Doc. No. 24.) On May 27, 2025, defendant Sub Sea filed its reply thereto. (Doc. 15 No. 25.) 16 LEGAL STANDARD 17 A suit filed in state court may be removed to federal court if the federal court would have 18 had original jurisdiction over the suit. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Removal is proper when a case 19 originally filed in state court presents a federal question or where there is diversity of citizenship 20 ///// 21 1 Defendant Sub Sea contends that this court has diversity jurisdiction over this action pursuant 22 to § 1332(a)(1) because the parties “are citizens of different states.” (Doc. Nos. 1 at ¶ 3; 19 at 23 10); see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (providing diversity jurisdiction where the parties are “citizens of different States”). However, as noted, defendant Aquanautas Curacao B.V. is “a foreign 24 corporation organized and existing under the laws of Curaçao.” (Id. at ¶ 7.) The court may nevertheless exercise diversity jurisdiction over this action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(3) 25 (providing diversity jurisdiction where the parties are “citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional parties”). 26

27 2 That motion was improperly noticed before the assigned magistrate judge, who issued a minute order on March 26, 2025 directing defendant Sub Sea to refile the motion before the undersigned. 28 (Doc. No. 20.) Defendant Sub Sea did so on April 30, 2025. (Doc. No. 22.) 1 among the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 2 1332(a). 3 “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter 4 jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). “The removal statute is strictly 5 construed against removal jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction falls to 6 the party invoking the statute.” Cal. ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir. 7 2004) (citation omitted); see also Provincial Gov’t of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d 8 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The defendant bears the burden of establishing that removal is 9 proper.”). If there is any doubt as to the right of removal, a federal court must reject jurisdiction 10 and remand the case to state court. Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 11 1090 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir. 2004). 12 “A civil action otherwise removable solely on the basis of [diversity jurisdiction] may not 13 be removed if any of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of 14 the State in which such action is brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2). This provision is commonly 15 known as the “forum defendant rule.” Casola v. Dexcom, Inc., 98 F.4th 947, 950 (9th Cir. 2024). 16 ANALYSIS 17 A. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand 18 Plaintiffs move to remand this action to the Sacramento County Superior Court on the 19 grounds that defendant Sub Sea engaged in a so-called “snap removal,” i.e., that defendant Sub 20 Sea removed this action prior to being served and despite being a citizen of the state in which the 21 action was brought. (Doc. No. 17.) Defendant Sub Sea does not dispute that it is a citizen of 22 California. (See Doc. No. 19 at 8.) Resolution of the pending motion therefore turns on whether 23 § 1441(b)(2) permits snap removal, at least in the circumstances present here, where an unserved 24 forum defendant—rather than a served or unserved out-of-state defendant—is the party removing 25 the action. 26 1. The Split Among Federal Courts on Snap Removal 27 As the Ninth Circuit recently noted, the permissibility of snap removal is an open question 28 in this circuit: 1 We do not today decide the final issue imbedded in the remand orders: whether Dexcom in fact violated the forum defendant rule in 2 these cases. . . . [Section] 1447(d) bars us from addressing the correctness of the district court’s implied finding that snap removals 3 are not allowed. . . . 4 It is now common practice for in-forum defendants in potential diversity actions to race to file a notice of removal before being 5 served with process and then claim shelter under the “properly joined and served” language in § 1441(b)(2). Three sister circuits have held 6 that § 1441(b)(2), by its plain text, permits snap removals— notwithstanding counterarguments that the basic premise of diversity 7 jurisdiction is to protect non-forum litigants from potential state court bias toward in-forum litigants. 8 9 Casola, 98 F.4th at 964 & n.17. 10 District courts across the country are divided as to the propriety of snap removal in 11 various circumstances. As one district court noted: 12 In considering whether § 1441(b)(2) permits snap removal, federal courts have split in their reasoning on almost every question of 13 statutory interpretation. First, courts disagree about whether the plain language is ambiguous. Moreover, courts who have found the 14 plain language unambiguous disagree about whether it permits or prohibits snap removal. Those courts who have found the plain 15 language unambiguously permits snap removal then disagree about whether that produces an absurd result. 16 17 Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. Old Republic Title Ins. Grp., 532 F. Supp. 3d 1004, 1011 (D. Nev. 18 2021). 19 “Speaking generally, district courts [in the Ninth Circuit] have coalesced within judicial 20 districts to, among other things, not ‘disrupt the settled expectations of litigants’ within the 21 relevant judicial district.” Villasenor v. Quadient, Inc., No. 25-cv-00300-FWS-JDE, 2025 WL 22 958379, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2025). For instance, courts in the Central District of California 23 and the District of Nevada generally prohibit snap removal, while courts in the Northern District 24 of California generally permit the practice. See id. (“Because this district favors remand in cases 25 like this, the court finds that rejecting snap removal is appropriate here.”); Warm Springs Road 26 CVS, LLC v. SS Mgmt., LLC, No. 24-cv-00467-MMD-CLB, 2024 WL 4589893, at *3 (D. Nev. 27 Oct. 28, 2024) (“[S]nap removals most often arise in diversity actions involving multiple 28 defendants, one or more of whom is not a forum resident. Courts in this district have largely 1 agreed that snap removals under those circumstances are impermissible.”); Adelaja v. Guillen, 2 No. 24-cv-08159-SI, 2025 WL 502050, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2025) (“These circumstances 3 suggest an element of gamesmanship in defendants’ removal action. Nonetheless, the Court 4 recognizes the importance of consistent holdings within the Northern District to provide clarity 5 and predictability for litigants and holds that a fair reading of the plain language of § 1441(b)(2) 6 allows snap removals. Accordingly, the Court will deny plaintiff’s motion to remand.”). No such 7 consensus among district judges exists in the Eastern District of California.3 8 2. Whether Snap Removal is Permissible in These Circumstances 9 As noted above, no defendant had been served at the time of the removal challenged here, 10 and this action was removed by the forum defendant. In these circumstances, for the reasons 11 explained below, the court finds that the plain language of § 1441(b)(2) is susceptible to two 12 reasonable interpretations and is therefore ambiguous. The court therefore considers the statute’s 13 history and purpose and concludes that those factors do not support snap removal. In light of the 14 presumption against removal, the court resolves all doubts in favor of remand and concludes that 15 snap removal is not permissible in the circumstances before the court in this case. 16 a. Whether the Plain Language of § 1441(b)(2) is Ambiguous 17 Statutory interpretation “begin[s] with the plain language of the statute.” Moran v. 18 Screening Pros, LLC, 943 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2019). “The plainness or ambiguity of 19 statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which 20 that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Id. “A statute must be

21 3 It appears that only one judge in this district has addressed the issue of snap removal directly. See May v. Haas, No. 2:12-cv-01791-MCE-DAD, 2012 WL 4961235 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2012). 22 That judge found “no reasons to depart from the plain language of § 1441(b)” because “the 23 concern of procedural gamesmanship by defendants [was] not present” in that case, where the removing defendant had already been served and was not the forum defendant. Id. at *1, *3. 24 Another judge of this court recently issued a decision suggesting skepticism of snap removal but granting the motion to remand in that case for a simpler reason, namely that “diversity of 25 citizenship [was] lacking.” Edwards v. UPS, No. 2:24-cv-01283-KJM-DMC, 2024 WL 4132664, at *3–*4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2024). Similarly, another judge in this district recently issued a 26 decision acknowledging the issue of the propriety of snap removal but, in denying a motion to 27 remand, finding that the defendant in that case was “not a California citizen such that the forum- defendant rule would be applicable” in the first place. Roe v. Doe, No. 2:24-cv-03488-DJC-CSK, 28 2025 WL 1065102, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2025). 1 ‘susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation’ to be ambiguous.” Guido v. Mount 2 Lemmon Fire Dist., 859 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2017). “If the language is ambiguous, [the 3 court] look[s] to ‘canons of construction, legislative history, and the statute’s overall purpose to 4 illuminate Congress’s intent.’” Moran, 943 F.3d at 1183. 5 District courts have divided over whether the plain language of § 1441(b)(2) permits snap 6 removal in circumstances where no defendant has been served. Many courts have concluded 7 “that ‘properly joined and served’ operates as a condition precedent to the forum defendant rule,” 8 that is, that § 1441(b)(2) does not apply to bar removal until a forum defendant has actually been 9 served. Deutsche Bank, 532 F. Supp. 3d at 1012; see also id. at 1012 n.4 (collecting cases). This 10 interpretation, endorsed by multiple federal courts of appeal, is clearly reasonable. See, e.g., 11 Gibbons v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 919 F.3d 699, 705 (2d Cir. 2019); Texas Brine Co., LLC v. 12 Am. Arb. Ass’n, Inc., 955 F.3d 482, 486 (5th Cir. 2020). Other courts, however, have followed 13 the district court’s decision in Gentile v. Biogen Idec, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 313 (D. Mass. 2013) 14 and “have found that the plain meaning of the statute requires at least one defendant to have been 15 properly served” before removal is permissible. Id. at 1012; see id. at 1012 n.5 (collecting cases); 16 Gentile, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 318–19 (D. Mass. 2013) (considering the dictionary definition of 17 “any,” the statute’s use of the definite article “the,” and the presumption against “render[ing] 18 statutory words or phrases meaningless, redundant or superfluous” to find that the plain language 19 of § 1441(b)(2) “assumes that there is one or more party in interest that has been properly joined 20 and served already at the time of removal”). 21 As acknowledged above, the first question before the court is whether the plain language 22 of § 1441(b)(2) is susceptible to two reasonable interpretations and is therefore ambiguous. The 23 undersigned finds the district court’s interpretation of § 1441(b)(2)’s language and reasoning 24 expressed in Gentile to be reasonable.4 Numerous district courts across the country have found 25 the reasoning of that decision to be persuasive, including, as noted, nearly all of the judges in at 26 least two districts of the Ninth Circuit. See, e.g., Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hyundai Motor 27 4 Having found its analysis to be reasonable, this court need not consider whether the district 28 court’s decision in Gentile is ultimately persuasive in this regard. 1 Am., No. 24-cv-01135-DOC-BFM, 2024 WL 3495340, at *3–*4 (C.D. Cal. July 22, 2024); Iraci 2 v. Bradford, No. 23-cv-00315-JAD-NJK, 2023 WL 3947564, at *2 (D. Nev. June 7, 2023) (“But 3 after carefully considering the parties’ authorities, I agree with the vast majority of the judges in 4 this district that Judge Woodlock’s interpretation in Gentile ‘is the most cogent.’”). Similarly, in 5 a decision addressing removal before service under § 1446(b)(1), the First Circuit declined to 6 address the issue of removal prior to service under § 1441(b)(2) but suggested that the 7 interpretation advanced by the district court in Gentile might well be persuasive. See Novak v. 8 Bank of N.Y. Mellon Tr. Co., NA., 783 F.3d 910, 911 & n.1 (1st Cir. 2015) (“See generally, 9 Gentile . . . ; Lothrop v. N. Am. Air Charter, Inc., No. 13-10235-DPW, 2013 WL 3863917, at *2 10 (D.[ ]Mass. July 11, 2013) (concluding that § 1441(b)(2) ‘create[s] only a narrow exception, in 11 cases involving forum defendants, to the generally-accepted rule that “formal service is not 12 required before a defendant can remove” ’ (citation omitted))”). Certainly the undersigned cannot 13 find that the interpretation advanced by the district court in Gentile, arrived at after thorough and 14 thoughtful analysis of the statutory text and adopted by district courts across the country, is 15 unreasonable. See Bank of Am., N.A. v. Fidelity Nat’l Title Grp., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1234, 1241 (D. 16 Nev. 2022) (“The fact that reasonable jurists differ on [§ 1441(b)(2)’s] language evidences its 17 ambiguity.”). 18 ///// 19 ///// 20 ///// 21 ///// 22 ///// 23 ///// 24 ///// 25 ///// 26 ///// 27 ///// 28 ///// 1 Because § 1441(b)(2) is “susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation,” at least 2 in regard to whether removal is permissible where no defendant has yet been served, the statute is 3 ambiguous. Guido, 859 F.3d at 1173.5 4 b. Whether the Purpose of the Statute Supports Snap Removal 5 Above, the court has determined that the language of § 1441(b)(2) is susceptible to more 6 than one reasonable interpretation and is therefore ambiguous. “If the language is ambiguous, 7 [the court] look[s] to ‘canons of construction, legislative history, and the statute’s overall purpose 8 to illuminate Congress’s intent.’” Moran, 943 F.3d at 1183. In Gentile, the district court aptly 9 summarized the history and purpose of § 1441 as follows: 10 The removal doctrine has been incorporated in federal court jurisprudence since the Judiciary Act of 1789. The removal power, 11 and by extension the forum defendant rule, is founded on the basic premise behind diversity jurisdiction itself, the roots of which were 12 described in the Federalist Papers. Diversity jurisdiction was designed to protect non-forum litigants from possible state court bias 13 in favor of forum-state litigants. 14 The removal power serves this purpose by giving a non-forum defendant the ability to seek the protection of the federal court 15 against any perceived local bias in the state court chosen by the plaintiff. But the protection-from-bias rationale behind the removal 16 power evaporates when the defendant seeking removal is a citizen of

17 5 While it did not directly advance the following argument, the court notes that one of the district court decisions cited by defendant Sub Sea contends that the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in 18 Mayes v. American Hallmark Insurance Co. of Texas, 114 F.4th 1077 (9th Cir. 2024) 19 “undermines a key premise relied upon by many courts” that have found ambiguity in the plain language of § 1441(b)(2). Country Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hyundai Motor Am., No. 24-cv-02428-SB- 20 JDE, 2025 WL 242194, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2025) (citing Gentile, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 316– 18). As is the norm in cases addressing snap removal, at least one other district court disagrees. 21 See Adirondack Ins. Exchange v. Kia Corp., No. 24-cv-01134-JWH-MRW, 2024 WL 4213586, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2024) (“Mayes does not alter the Court’s conclusion with respect to the 22 impropriety of snap removal.”). In its decision in Mayes, the Ninth Circuit held that 23 “§ 1446(b)(1) does not require service before removal.” 114 F.4th at 1079. The Ninth Circuit “note[d] that all other circuit courts that have considered this issue have reached the same 24 conclusion. See Novak[, 783 F.3d at 914.]” Id. As discussed above, the First Circuit in its decision in Novak expressly declined to consider whether “§ 1441(b)(2) create[s] only a narrow 25 exception, in cases involving forum defendants, to the generally-accepted rule that formal service is not required before a defendant can remove[.]” Novak, 783 F.3d at 911 n.1 (internal quotation 26 marks omitted) (citing Gentile, 934 F. Supp. 2d 313). The court finds that the Ninth Circuit’s 27 decision in Mayes, addressing different language appearing in a separate statute, does not undermine the reasoning of the district court in Gentile and similar decisions—regardless of 28 whether the court ultimately finds that reasoning to be persuasive. 1 the forum state. Thus, the forum defendant rule provides some measure of protection for a plaintiff’s choice of forum, when the 2 overarching concerns about local bias against the defendant underlying the removal power are not present, by allowing a plaintiff 3 to move for a remand of the case to the state court if he chooses. The “properly joined and served” limitation in § 1441(b) is a more 4 recent development, added to the removal statute by Congress in 1948. Courts have generally recognized that the legislative history 5 of the 1948 revision provides no explanation for the inclusion of the “properly joined and served” language. A review of the Supreme 6 Court jurisprudence at the time of the 1948 revision, however, suggests the purpose of the “properly joined and served” language 7 was to prevent plaintiffs from defeating removal through improper joinder of a forum defendant; incomplete service appears to have 8 been included as a means of identifying and policing such abuse by proxy. 9 10 Gentile, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 319–20 (internal citations omitted). Or as another district court 11 succinctly put it, “[a]n interpretation of the forum defendant rule that would allow a forum 12 defendant to remove an action to federal court would clash with the policy behind the statute.” 13 Am. Fam. Connect Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hyundai Motor Am., No. 24-cv-01141-DOC-DFM, 14 2024 WL 4454097, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2024). 15 There is no indication that Congress intended to eviscerate the forum defendant rule by 16 way of its 1948 amendment of § 1441. Cf. Rogers v. Gosney, No. 16-cv-08154-PCT-GMS, 2016 17 WL 4771376, at *3 (D. Ariz. Sept. 14, 2016) (“[I]t is inconceivable that Congress, in adding the 18 ‘properly joined and served’ language, intended to create an arbitrary means for a forum 19 defendant to avoid the forum defendant rule simply by filing a notice of removal before the 20 Plaintiff is able to effect process.”).6 Perhaps notably, nearly half a century passed after the 1948 21 amendment of § 1441 before the first report of a party even attempting snap removal. See Valerie 22 M. Nannery, Closing the Snap Removal Loophole, 86 U. Cin. L. Rev. 541, 550 (2018) (stating 23

24 6 Nor is there any indication that the 2011 amendment to § 1441(b)(2)—which changed the statutory text from “shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and 25 served” to “may not be removed if any of the parties in interest properly joined and served”— reflected an intent by Congress to permit snap removal. Gentile, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 316 n.2 26 (emphasis added); id. at 321 (“Congress’ further silence when amending the statute in 2011, 27 despite its presumed knowledge of the disparate interpretations of the district courts, also indicates that it intended no substantive change. Even courts reading section 1441(b) differently 28 than I have agree on this point.”). 1 that the first documented instance of snap removal occurred in 1997); Recognition Commc’ns, 2 Inc. v. Am. Auto. Ass’n, Inc., No. 97-cv-00945-JAS, 1998 WL 119528, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 3 1998) (“On April 24, 1997, before RCI had formally served any of the Defendants, AAA, ACSC, 4 and Club Services filed a Notice of Removal in this Court.”). 5 Accordingly, the court concludes that the “legislative history, and the statute’s overall 6 purpose” weigh against a finding that Congress intended to permit snap removal. Moran, 943 7 F.3d at 1183. 8 c. The Presumption Against Removal 9 Of course, “[r]emoval statutes are ‘strictly construed, and any doubt about the right of 10 removal requires resolution in favor of remand.’” Casola, 98 F.4th at 954. The presumption 11 against removal is applicable here in light of the ambiguity found by this court in the statutory 12 text. Cf. Texas Brine Co., LLC v. Am. Arb. Ass’n, Inc., 955 F.3d 482, 487 (5th Cir. 2020) (“It is 13 true, as Texas Brine points out, that we strictly construe the removal statute and favor remand. 14 Here, though, we do not have ‘any doubt about the propriety of removal’ because, as discussed, 15 the text is unambiguous.”); Corber v. Xanodyne Pharms., Inc., 771 F.3d 1218, 1226 n.8 (9th Cir. 16 2014) (finding that “the principles of ambiguity not favoring federal jurisdiction and of strict 17 construction of jurisdictional statutes are not offended here because there is nothing ambiguous 18 about” the statutory text).7 19 Here, the court has concluded that the plain language of § 1441(b)(2) is susceptible to 20 multiple reasonable interpretations and is therefore ambiguous, and that the history and purpose 21 of the statute weigh against a finding that Congress intended to authorize snap removal. There is 22 certainly “doubt about the right of removal,” Casola, 98 F.4th at 954, at least in the circumstances 23 applicable here where a forum defendant removed the action to federal court at a time when no 24 defendant had yet been served. 25

7 The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Corber considered the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) 26 prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 27 U.S. 81 (2014), in which the Supreme Court concluded that “no antiremoval presumption attends cases invoking CAFA,” 574 U.S. at 89. The Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Corber was applying the 28 presumption that is applicable to this action. 1 Accordingly, plaintiffs’ motion to remand will be granted. See Crawford v. Top Rank, 2 | Inc., No. 22-cv-00081-APG-EJY, 2022 WL 2315591, at *2—*3 (D. Nev. June 28, 2022) (“While 3 | this interpretation [advanced by the district court’s decision in Gentile] is not the only one 4 | possible, it is the most cogent. Reasonable jurists have interpreted this statute differently, and the 5 | fact that ‘[d]istrict courts are in disarray on the question’ confirms that the statute’s language is 6 | ambiguous. I thus ‘look to canons of construction, legislative history, and the statute’s overall 7 | purpose to illuminate Congress’s intent.’ ... The purposes underlying § 1441(b)(2) are better 8 | served by disallowing removal before any defendant is served. ... Here, there is more than 9 | considerable doubt as to Top Rank’s right to remove, so federal jurisdiction must be rejected. 10 | Top Rank is a forum defendant, and its removal was premature because it had not yet been served 11 | and only three days elapsed between filing the complaint and removal.”) (second alteration in 12 | original) Gnternal citations omitted). 13 | B. Defendant Sub Sea’s Motion to Dismiss 14 This action will be remanded to the Sacramento County Superior Court. Accordingly, 15 | defendant Sub Sea’s motion to dismiss will be denied as moot in light of this order. 16 CONCLUSION 17 For the reasons discussed above: 18 1. Plaintiffs’ motion to remand (Doc. No. 17) is GRANTED; 19 2. Defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint (Doc. Nos. 3, 22) is DENIED 20 as moot in light of this order; 21 3. This action is REMANDED to the Sacramento County Superior Court; and 22 4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to CLOSE this case. 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. | Dated: _ August 8, 2025 Dal A. 2, axel 25 DALE A. DROZD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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