1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JEREMIAH-MATTHEW STORER, Case No. 2:25-cv-02065-DC-CSK PS 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

DENYING IFP REQUEST, DENYING

14 NEVADA COUNTY SUPERIOR PLAINTIFF’S EX PARTE MOTION FOR COURT, et al., TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 15 AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT Defendants. 16 (ECF Nos. 1-3) 17 18 Plaintiff Jeremiah-Matthew Storer, who is proceeding pro se, brings this action 19 against Defendants Nevada County Superior Court, Judge Alissa Bjerkhoel1 in her 20 official and individual capacities, District Attorney Jesse Wilson in his official and 21 individual capacities, the Nevada County Sheriff’s Department, and Sheriff Shannon 22 Moon in her official and individual capacities.2 See Compl. (ECF No. 1). Pending before 23 the Court is Plaintiff’s “Petition for Writ of Mandamus with Ex Parte Application for 24 Emergency Temporary Restraining Order.” See Pl. Mot. (ECF No. 2). Pursuant to Local 25 Rule 230(g), the Court submits the motion upon the record and briefs on file.

26 1 Judge Alissa Bjerkhoel was improperly sued as Alyssa Bjerkhoel. 27 2 This matter proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, and Local Rule 302(c), and was referred to the undersigned by the District 28 Judge assigned to the case (ECF No. 4). 1 For the reasons that follow, the Court recommends DENYING Plaintiff’s motion 2 for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”), recommends DENYING Plaintiff’s motion to 3 proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2), and recommends DISMISSING Plaintiff’s 4 Complaint without leave to amend. 5 I. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP 6 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) provides that the court may authorize the commencement, 7 prosecution or defense of any suit without prepayment of fees or security “by a person 8 who submits an affidavit stating the person is “unable to pay such fees or give security 9 therefor.” This affidavit is to include, among other things, a statement of all assets the 10 person possesses. Id. The IFP statute does not itself define what constitutes insufficient 11 assets. See Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015). In Escobedo, 12 the Ninth Circuit stated that an affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient 13 where it alleges that the affiant cannot pay court costs and still afford the necessities of 14 life. Id. “One need not be absolutely destitute to obtain benefits of the in forma pauperis 15 statute.” Id. Nonetheless, a party seeking IFP status must allege poverty “with some 16 particularity, definiteness and certainty.” Id. According to the United States Department 17 of Health and Human Services, the current poverty guideline for a household of one (not 18 residing in Alaska or Hawaii) is $15,060.00. See U.S. Dpt. Health & Human Service 19 (available at https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines). 20 Here, Plaintiff’s IFP shows that he has no monthly income and greater than $100 21 in cash or a checking or savings account. See ECF No. 3. Plaintiff has made the 22 required showing under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See id. However, the Court will 23 recommend Plaintiff’s IFP application be denied because the action is facially frivolous 24 and without merit because it fails to state a claim and lacks subject matter jurisdiction. 25 “‘A district court may deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis at the outset if it appears 26 from the face of the proposed complaint that the action is frivolous or without merit.’” 27 Minetti v. Port of Seattle, 152 F.3d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Tripati v. First 28 Nat. Bank & Tr., 821 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 1987)); see also McGee v. Dep’t of Child 1 Support Servs., 584 Fed. App’x. 638 (9th Cir. 2014) (“the district court did not abuse its 2 discretion by denying McGee's request to proceed IFP because it appears from the face 3 of the amended complaint that McGee's action is frivolous or without merit”); Smart v. 4 Heinze, 347 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir. 1965) (“It is the duty of the District Court to examine 5 any application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis to determine whether the 6 proposed proceeding has merit and if it appears that the proceeding is without merit, the 7 court is bound to deny a motion seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis.”). Because 8 it appears from the face of the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) that this action is 9 frivolous and is without merit as discussed in more detail below, the Court recommends 10 denying Plaintiff’s IFP motion. 11 II. BACKGROUND 12 Plaintiff filed this action on July 24, 2025 against Defendants Nevada County 13 Superior Court, Judge Alissa Bjerkhoel in her official and individual capacities, District 14 Attorney Jesse Wilson in his official and individual capacities, the Nevada County 15 Sheriff’s Department, and Sheriff Shannon Moon in her official and individual capacities. 16 See Compl. Plaintiff concurrently filed a “Petition for Writ of Mandamus with Ex Parte 17 Application for Emergency Temporary Restraining Order.” See Pl. Mot. 18 In the Complaint, Plaintiff lists that his is bringing the following claims: (1) Fourth 19 Amendment violations; (2) Sixth Amendment violations; (3) Eighth Amendment 20 violations; (4) Fourteenth Amendment violations; (5) Vindictive prosecution; and 21 (6) California Constitutional and statutory violations. Compl. at 4-5. Plaintiff alleges that 22 he was kidnapped and held hostage for ransom by Nevada County Sheriffs after an 23 unlawful search and seizure at his private property. Id. at 6. Plaintiff alleges that he and 24 his wife were “divided by an unlawful restraining order” placed on Plaintiff by Defendant 25 Bjerkhoel and “banning him from his wife and home.” Id. On the Civil Cover Sheet 26 attached to the Complaint, Plaintiff lists a related criminal case in the Nevada County 27 Superior Court, case number CR0004272. (ECF No. 1-1.) 28 In Plaintiff’s TRO motion, he states that he requests immediate relief for a July 17, 1 2025 state court hearing held in Nevada County. Pl. Mot. at 1. Plaintiff states that on July 2 8, 2024, Nevada County Sheriff’s deputies conducted a warrantless entry into his private 3 property without probable cause. Id. at 8. Plaintiff alleges that he was arrested without a 4 warrant and was detained in jail for four days. Id. Plaintiff further alleges that on July 11, 5 2024, Defendant Judge Bjerkhoel violated his Sixth Amendment rights by “forcing 6 appointment of counsel” against Plaintiff’s objections. Id. According to Plaintiff, 7 Defendant Judge Bjerkhoel imposed excessive bail. Id. Plaintiff alleges that there is an 8 imminent threat of an unlawful bench warrant, revocation of bail, and continued 9 prosecution. Id. at 7. Plaintiff also attaches multiple documents that appear to have been 10 filed in the Nevada County Superior Court related to Plaintiff’s state court criminal case 11 number CR0004272. See Pl. Mot. at 21-24, 46-50. 12 III. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 13 A. Legal Standards 14 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the court must screen every in forma pauperis 15 proceeding, and must order dismissal of the case if it is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to 16 state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a 17 defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 18 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (2000) (en banc). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an 19 arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In 20 reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court accepts as true the factual 21 allegations contained in the complaint, unless they are clearly baseless or fanciful, and 22 construes those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Neitzke, 490 23 U.S. at 327; Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 24 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 564 U.S. 1037 (2011). 25 Pleadings by self-represented litigants are liberally construed. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 26 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (liberal construction appropriate even post–Iqbal). 27 However, the court need not accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable 28 inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 1 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action does 2 not suffice to state a claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007); 3 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 4 To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege enough 5 facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A 6 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court 7 to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 8 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the 9 complaint and an opportunity to amend unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be 10 cured by amendment. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31; Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 11 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996). 12 B. Discussion 13 1. Younger Abstention 14 In Younger v. Harris, the Supreme Court held that when there is a pending state 15 criminal proceeding, federal courts must refrain from enjoining the state prosecution 16 absent special or extraordinary circumstances. 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971). The Ninth Circuit 17 has “articulated a four-part test to determine when Younger requires that federal courts 18 abstain from adjudicating cases that would enjoin or risk interfering with pending state- 19 court proceedings.” Duke v. Gastelo, 64 F.4th 1088, 1094 (9th Cir. 2023). “Younger 20 abstention is appropriate when: (1) there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) the 21 proceeding implicate[s] important state interests; (3) there is an adequate opportunity in 22 the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges; and (4) the requested relief 23 seek[s] to enjoin or has the practical effect of enjoining the ongoing state judicial 24 proceeding.” Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 765 (9th Cir. 2018) (alterations in 25 original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). All four factors must be met to 26 find abstention appropriate. Duke, 64 F.4th at 1094. But even if all four Younger factors 27 are satisfied, federal courts will not invoke the abstention doctrine if there is a “showing 28 of bad faith, harassment, or some other extraordinary circumstance that would make 1 abstention inappropriate.” Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 2 U.S. 423, 435 (1982). 3 Based on Plaintiff’s Complaint and TRO, it appears that Plaintiff’s allegations are 4 related to an ongoing criminal case in the Nevada County Superior Court. In the 5 Complaint, Plaintiff discussed an allegedly unlawful restraining order placed on him that 6 was issued by Defendant Judge Bjerkhoel at the request of Defendant District Attorney 7 Wilson. Compl. at 6. Plaintiff also lists a related criminal case from the Nevada County 8 Superior Court on the Civil Cover Sheet filed with Plaintiff’s Complaint in this Court. (ECF 9 No. 1-1.) Further, in Plaintiff’s TRO motion, Plaintiff states that Defendant Judge 10 Bjerkhoel violated his Sixth Amendment rights in the Nevada County Superior Court, that 11 a demurrer was filed and heard, and that Plaintiff appeared and verbally entered a 12 Faretta motion. Pl. Mot. at 6. Plaintiff also states that he requests immediate relief for a 13 July 17, 2025 hearing in Nevada County. Id. at 1. Plaintiff requests an immediate stay of 14 all Nevada County Superior Court proceedings in his ongoing criminal case number 15 CR0004272 pending resolution of the federal action. Id. at 15. 16 A review of the Nevada County Superior Court docket for case number 17 CR0004272 confirms that this criminal case is ongoing, which implicate important state 18 interests, meeting the first two factors under Younger. As to the third factor, there is no 19 indication that Plaintiff is unable to raise any constitutional claims in the pending state 20 case. See Penzoil Co. v. Texaco, 481 U.S. 1, 15 (1987) (holding that federal courts 21 should assume that state procedures will afford an adequate opportunity for 22 consideration of constitutional claims “in the absence of unambiguous authority to the 23 contrary”). Finally, Plaintiff’s presumptive relief, a stay of the Nevada County Superior 24 Court proceedings, would enjoin the ongoing state criminal prosecution, meeting the 25 fourth Younger factor. Thus, all four factors under Younger are met. Further, Plaintiff 26 includes no facts or evidence demonstrating that extraordinary circumstances warrant 27 this Court’s interference with the Nevada County Superior Court proceedings. 28 Because the Younger abstention doctrine applies, the Court recommends that this 1 action be dismissed without prejudice. 2 2. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine 3 Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts may not “review the 4 final determinations of a state court in judicial proceedings.” Worldwide Church of God v. 5 McNair, et al., 805 F.2d 888, 890 (9th Cir. 1986). The doctrine reflects the fact that the 6 only federal court with the jurisdiction to review state court decisions is the United States 7 Supreme Court. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923). Lower 8 federal courts can review the constitutionality of laws, but not the judgment of a state 9 court in a particular case. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 10 U.S. 462, 482-83 (1983). District courts therefore lack subject matter jurisdiction if the 11 current claims are “inextricably intertwined” with a state court decision and “the 12 adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling or require the district 13 court to interpret the application of state laws or procedural rules[.]” Bianchi v. 14 Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003). 15 Plaintiff states that he and “his wife were divided by an unlawful restraining order.” 16 Compl. at 6. To the extent Plaintiff is asking this Court to review the state court’s 17 issuance of a restraining order, this is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because it 18 is a final determination of the state court. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims should be 19 dismissed. 20 3. Judicial Immunity 21 One of the defendants in this case is Nevada County Superior Court Judge Alissa 22 Bjerkhoel. Under the doctrine of judicial immunity, judges have absolute immunity for 23 their acts related to the judicial process. See In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 24 2002); Demoran v. Witt, 781 F.2d 155, 158 (9th Cir. 1985). 25 Here, Plaintiff brings suit against Defendant Judge Bjerkhoel for issuing an 26 allegedly “unlawful restraining order” (Compl. at 6), for attempting to appoint Plaintiff 27 counsel in his criminal case, and for requesting allegedly excessive bail (Pl. Mot. at 8). 28 Plaintiff challenges conduct related to Judge Bjerkhoel’s judicial duties (see Compl. at 6; 1 Pl. Mot. at 8), and Judge Bjerkhoel has absolute immunity for these acts. Therefore, 2 Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Judge Bjerkhoel should be dismissed. See In re 3 Castillo, 297 F.3d at 947. 4 4. Prosecutorial Immunity 5 One of the Defendants in this case is Jesse Wilson, who Plaintiff identifies as the 6 District Attorney. Compl. at 3. “Attorneys who prosecute cases on behalf of the 7 Government are absolutely immune from claims based on their participation in the 8 judicial process.” Joelson v. United States, 2020 WL 6449196, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 9 2020) (citations omitted); see Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422-23, 429-30. 10 Plaintiff alleges that the District Attorney unlawfully requested that the judge issue 11 a restraining order. Compl. at 6. The conduct Plaintiff challenges relates to Wilson’s acts 12 related to his prosecutorial role in the judicial process, and Wilson has absolute immunity 13 for these acts. Therefore, Defendant Wilson is immune from this suit, and Plaintiff’s 14 claims against Defendant Wilson should be dismissed. See Joelson, 2020 WL 6449196, 15 at *3. 16 5. Eleventh Amendment Immunity 17 One of the Defendants in this action is the Nevada County Superior Court. The 18 Ninth Circuit has held that the Superior Court of the State of California is an arm of the 19 state, and therefore has Eleventh Amendment immunity. Munoz v. Superior Court of Los 20 Angeles Cnty., 91 F.4th 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2024). Accordingly, the Nevada County 21 Superior Court is immune from suit, and should be dismissed. 22 6. Failure to Comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 23 The Complaint also does not contain a short and plain statement of a claim as 24 required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. In order to give fair notice of the claims 25 and the grounds on which they rest, a plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of 26 particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims. See Kimes v. 27 Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). From the Complaint, Plaintiff brings claims 28 under the Fourth Amendment, Sixth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, Fourteenth 1 Amendment, for “vindictive prosecution,” and California Constitutional and statutory 2 violations. Compl. at 4-5. Plaintiff provides general statements related to these claims, 3 such as that he was kidnapped and held hostage for ransom by Nevada County Sheriffs, 4 that Defendant Judge Bjerkhoel issued an unlawful restraining order that was requested 5 by the District Attorney, and that Judge Bjerkhoel requested excessive bail. See Compl. 6 at 6. However, Plaintiff does not describe these allegedly unlawful acts in detail or 7 provide sufficient information to put Defendants on notice of the claims against them. 8 The Complaint also does not clearly state the elements of any claim. See Compl. 9 Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, even a pro se litigant’s 10 complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of a claim plainly and succinctly. 11 Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). 12 The Complaint is therefore subject to dismissal. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 13 1172, 1178-80 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal of complaint where “one cannot 14 determine from the complaint who is being sued, for what relief, and on what theory, with 15 enough detail to guide discovery”). 16 IV. TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 17 In the ex parte TRO motion, Plaintiff seeks an “immediate TRO staying all Nevada 18 County criminal, prosecutorial, or contempt proceedings, warrant issuance, and bail 19 modifications, pending further order of this Court.” Pl. Mot. at 14. 20 A. Legal Standards 21 Plaintiff moves ex parte for a temporary restraining order and writ of mandamus 22 pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 65 against all Defendants. The standard for 23 issuing a TRO is the same as the standard for issuing a preliminary injunction, which 24 requires the plaintiff to “establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is 25 likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of 26 equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. 27 Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Because the first factor “is a threshold 28 inquiry and is the most important factor,” a “court need not consider the other factors” if a 1 movant fails to show a likelihood of success on the merits. Baird v. Bonta, 81 F.4th 1036, 2 1040 (9th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 3 “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right,” 4 and may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. 5 Winter, 555 U.S. at 22, 24 (citation omitted). “Under Winter, plaintiffs must establish that 6 irreparable harm is likely, not just possible, in order to obtain a preliminary injunction.” 7 Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). 8 B. Discussion 9 1. Plaintiff’s Motion Is Procedurally Deficient 10 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(1) permits the court to issue a TRO without 11 notice to the adverse party only if (1) specific facts in the affidavit or underlying pleading 12 show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result before the 13 opposing party may be heard; and (2) the movant certifies in writing efforts made to give 14 notice and the reasons why notice should not be required. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1). This 15 Court’s Local Rules also set forth certain procedural mandates for a temporary 16 restraining order to issue, including that the movant provide the following documents: 17 (1) a complaint; (2) a motion for temporary restraining order; (3) a brief on the relevant 18 legal issues; (4) an affidavit to support the existence of irreparable harm; (5) an affidavit 19 detailing the notice or efforts undertaken or showing good cause why notice should not 20 be given; (6) a proposed temporary restraining order and provision for bond; (7) a 21 proposed order with blank for fixing time and date for a hearing; and (8) where a 22 temporary restraining order is requested ex parte, the proposed order should also notify 23 the affected parties of the right to apply to the Court for modification or dissolution on two 24 (2) days’ notice or such shorter notice as the Court may allow. E.D. Cal. Local Rule 25 231(c). 26 Plaintiff’s motion is procedurally deficient because it does not appear that Plaintiff 27 provided proper notice to Defendants. On the TRO checklist, Plaintiff writes that “Notice 28 had not been given. However, Notice was given as well as copies of the Complete 1 Writ/TRO on July 17, 2025 approximately 11:00AM.” (ECF No. 2-2 at 1.) But Plaintiff 2 does not include an affidavit or declaration indicating Plaintiff’s attempt to provide notice. 3 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(B); E.D. Cal. Local Rule 231(c)(5). Further, Plaintiff has not 4 provided specific facts in an affidavit clearly showing that immediate and irreparable 5 injury will result before the adverse party can be heard in opposition. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 65(b)(1)(A). 7 Plaintiff failed to comply with Rule 65(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 231(c)(5) because 8 he did not outline his efforts to provide notice to Defendants. See Pl. Mot. Courts 9 regularly deny TROs for failing to comply with the stringent requirements of Rule 65(b)(1), 10 including those sought by pro se plaintiffs. See Reno Air Racing Ass'n, Inc. v. McCord, 11 452 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2006) (“courts have recognized very few circumstances 12 justifying the issuance of an ex parte TRO”); Abdel-Malak v. Doe, 2020 WL 5775818, at 13 *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2020) (denying TRO sought by pro se plaintiff for failure to satisfy 14 Rule 65(b)’s “strict requirements”); Seymour v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 2010 WL 3385994, at 15 *1 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2010) (same); Roman v. Nw. Tr. Servs., Inc., 2010 WL 3489962, 16 at *1 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 31, 2010) (same). In addition, Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the 17 Local Rules’ requirements for TROs is sufficient justification to deny the motion. See 18 Nible v. Macomber, 2024 WL 2133319, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2024) (denying TRO 19 sought by pro se plaintiff as procedurally deficient); see, e.g., Tri-Valley CAREs v. U.S. 20 Dep’t of Energy, 671 F.3d 1113, 1131 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Denial of a motion as the result of 21 a failure to comply with local rules is well within a district court’s discretion.”). 22 The Court therefore recommends denial of the TRO motion based on these 23 procedural deficiencies. 24 2. Plaintiff Has Not Clearly Shown a Likelihood of Success on the 25 Merits 26 The Court also examines the first and most important Winter element: likelihood 27 of success on the merits. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he is likely to succeed on 28 the merits of his claims because, as discussed above, the Complaint fails to sufficiently 1 plead any claims and many Defendants are immune from suit. Because the first Winter 2 factor of likelihood of success is a threshold inquiry and the most important factor, a 3 “court need not consider the other factors” if a movant fails to show a likelihood of 4 success on the merits. Baird, 81 F.4th at 1040; see Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 5 740 (9th Cir. 2015). Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, see Haines v. 6 Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), they are still required to conform to the Federal 7 Rules of Civil Procedure. See Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53-54 (9th Cir. 1995). 8 As discussed above, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against any Defendant. 9 Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to establish the likelihood of success on the merits. See 10 Feathers v. U.S. SEC, 2022 WL 17330840, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2022) (dismissing 11 complaint under Rule 8 with leave to amend, and denying TRO based on no available 12 plausible claims); In re Trotochau v. Bennet, 2018 WL 6262843, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 13 2018) (denying TRO where pro se plaintiff failed to state a claim and failed to provide 14 notice to defendants under Rule 65(b)); Hanson v. Hanson, 2014 WL 587867, at *3 (S.D. 15 Cal. Feb. 14, 2014) (denying TRO because even when construing pro se complaint 16 liberally, allegations were insufficient to show likely success on the merits). The Court 17 need not address the other Winter factors based on Plaintiff’s failure to show a likelihood 18 of success on the merits. See Apartment Ass'n of Los Angeles Cnty., Inc. v. City of Los 19 Angeles, 10 F.4th 905, 917 (9th Cir. 2021); see also Baird, 81 F.4th at 1040. The Court 20 therefore also recommends DENYING Plaintiff’s motion for failing to establish the 21 likelihood of success on the merits. 22 V. WRIT OF MANDAMUS 23 Plaintiff also appears to be seeking a writ of mandamus. Pl. Mot. at 1, 10-11. The 24 federal mandamus statute set forth at 28 U.S.C. § 1361 provides: “The district courts 25 shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an 26 officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to 27 the plaintiff.” Here, Plaintiff has not brought his claims against any officer of employee of 28 the United States or any United States agency. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for a writ 1 of mandamus is deficient, and should be dismissed. 2 VI. LEAVE TO AMEND 3 In considering whether leave to amend should be granted, the Court considers 4 that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Younger abstention and Rooker-Feldmen 5 doctrines, and that most Defendants are entitled to immunity. Further, Plaintiff’s current 6 Complaint does not present a cogent, non-frivolous claim. In light of the Complaint’s 7 deficiencies, it appears granting leave to amend would be futile. The Complaint should 8 therefore be dismissed without leave to amend. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31; Cato v. 9 United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 1995). 10 VII. CONCLUSION 11 Based upon the findings above, it is RECOMMENDED: 12 1. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 3) should be 13 DENIED; 14 2. Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order (ECF No. 2) should be 15 DENIED; 16 3. Plaintiff’s request for a writ of mandamus (ECF No. 2) should be 17 DISMISSED; 18 4. Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) should be DISMISSED without leave to 19 amend; and 20 5. The Clerk of the Court be directed to CLOSE this case. 21 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District 22 Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 23 14 days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file 24 written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. This document should 25 be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any 26 reply to the objections shall be served on all parties and filed with the Court within 14 27 days after service of the objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time 28 may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 1 | 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991). 2 | Dated: 08/11/25 V0) - . 3 Aw Spo WA 4 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 5 || 5, stor.2065.25 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 14