1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JEREMIAH-MATTHEW STORER, Case No. 2:25-cv-02066-DC-CSK PS 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

DENYING IFP REQUEST, DENYING

14 PLACER COUNTY SUPERIOR PLAINTIFF’S EX PARTE MOTION FOR COURT, et al., TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, 15 AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT Defendants. 16 (ECF Nos. 1-3) 17 18 Plaintiff Jeremiah-Matthew Storer, who is proceeding pro se, brings this action 19 against Defendants Placer County Superior Court, Placer County, Placer County District 20 Attorney, Placer County Sheriffs Office, Placer County Superior Court Judge Todd Irby in 21 his official and individual capacities, Placer County Superior Court Judge Alan Pineschi 22 in his official and individual capacities, Deputy District Attorney Aryn Gordon in her 23 official and individual capacities, and Placer County Deputy Sheriff Daniel Cunningham 24 in his official and individual capacities.1 See Compl. (ECF No. 1). Pending before the 25 Court is Plaintiff’s “Petition for Writ of Mandamus with Ex Parte Application for 26

27 1 This matter proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, and Local Rule 302(c), and was referred to the undersigned by the District 28 Judge assigned to the case (ECF No. 4). 1 Emergency Temporary Restraining Order.” See Pl. Mot. (ECF No. 2). 2 For the reasons that follow, the Court recommends DENYING Plaintiff’s motion 3 for Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”); recommends DENYING Plaintiff’s motion to 4 proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 3); and recommends DISMISSING Plaintiff’s 5 Complaint without leave to amend. 6 I. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP 7 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) provides that the court may authorize the commencement, 8 prosecution or defense of any suit without prepayment of fees or security “by a person 9 who submits an affidavit stating the person is “unable to pay such fees or give security 10 therefor.” This affidavit is to include, among other things, a statement of all assets the 11 person possesses. Id. The IFP statute does not itself define what constitutes insufficient 12 assets. See Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015). In Escobedo, 13 the Ninth Circuit stated that an affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient 14 where it alleges that the affiant cannot pay court costs and still afford the necessities of 15 life. Id. “One need not be absolutely destitute to obtain benefits of the in forma pauperis 16 statute.” Id. Nonetheless, a party seeking IFP status must allege poverty “with some 17 particularity, definiteness and certainty.” Id. According to the United States Department 18 of Health and Human Services, the current poverty guideline for a household of one (not 19 residing in Alaska or Hawaii) is $15,060.00. See U.S. Dpt. Health & Human Service 20 (available at https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines). 21 Here, Plaintiff’s IFP shows that he has no monthly income and greater than $100 22 in cash or a checking or savings account. See ECF No. 2. Plaintiff has made the 23 required showing under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See id. However, the Court will 24 recommend Plaintiff’s IFP application be denied because the action is facially frivolous 25 and without merit because it fails to state a claim and lacks subject matter jurisdiction. 26 “‘A district court may deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis at the outset if it appears 27 from the face of the proposed complaint that the action is frivolous or without merit.’” 28 Minetti v. Port of Seattle, 152 F.3d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Tripati v. First 1 Nat. Bank & Tr., 821 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 1987)); see also McGee v. Dep’t of Child 2 Support Servs., 584 Fed. App’x. 638 (9th Cir. 2014) (“the district court did not abuse its 3 discretion by denying McGee's request to proceed IFP because it appears from the face 4 of the amended complaint that McGee's action is frivolous or without merit”); Smart v. 5 Heinze, 347 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir. 1965) (“It is the duty of the District Court to examine 6 any application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis to determine whether the 7 proposed proceeding has merit and if it appears that the proceeding is without merit, the 8 court is bound to deny a motion seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis.”). Because 9 it appears from the face of the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) that this action is 10 frivolous and is without merit as discussed in more detail below, the Court recommends 11 denying Plaintiff’s IFP motion. 12 II. BACKGROUND 13 Plaintiff filed this action on July 24, 2025 against Defendants Placer County 14 Superior Court, Placer County, Placer County District Attorney, Placer County Sheriffs 15 Office, Placer County Superior Court Judge Todd Irby in his official and individual 16 capacities, Placer County Superior Court Judge Alan Pineschi in his official and 17 individual capacities, Deputy District Attorney Aryn Gordon in her official and individual 18 capacities, and Placer County Deputy Sheriff Daniel Cunningham in his official and 19 individual capacities. See Compl. Plaintiff concurrently filed a “Petition for Writ of 20 Mandamus with Ex Parte Application for Emergency Temporary Restraining Order.” See 21 Pl. Mot. Plaintiff filed another federal action on the same day against a different group of 22 defendants in Case No. 2:25-cv-02065-DC-CSK PS. 23 In the Complaint, Plaintiff lists that he is bringing the following claims: (1) “the 24 right to domicile privacy”; (2) “substantive/procedural due process”; (3) “freedom of 25 speech, association, and religion”; (4) “peaceful enjoyment”; (5) “right of parents to make 26 decisions regarding the care, custody, and control of their children”; (6) “using 27 deadly/excessive force, intimidation, threats, duress and coercion”; (7) “protection 28 against unreasonable/illegal searches and seizures”; (8) “right against self-incrimination 1 and due process”; (9) “right to a fair trial”; (10) equal protection and due process 2 clauses”; (11) Penal Code sections 1004, 1005(b), 1009, 802, 988, 990, 1382, 186; 3 (12) California Government Code section 815.2; and (13) California Civil Code 4 section 52.1. Compl. at 5-6. Plaintiff alleges that he was kidnapped and held hostage for 5 ransom by Placer County Sheriffs during an unlawful search and seizure at his private 6 property. Id. at 7. On the Civil Cover Sheet attached to the Complaint, Plaintiff lists a 7 related criminal case in Placer County Superior Court with docket number 62-198183. 8 (ECF No. 1-1.) 9 In Plaintiff’s TRO motion, he states that he requests immediate relief for July 18 10 and 25, 2025 hearings held in Placer County, and for an unlawful warrant issued July 18, 11 2025. Pl. Mot. at 4. Plaintiff states that he was arrested on March 2, 2024; that there was 12 a demurrer to the original complaint on May 20, 2024; that the demurrer was overruled 13 on November 26, 2024; that an allegedly unlawful warrant was issued on June 10, 2025, 14 and he was forced to enter a plea on July 1, 2025. Id. at 8-9. Plaintiff alleges that there 15 was excessive delay because a new charge was filed against him one year and four 16 months after his arrest. Id. at 10. Plaintiff also alleges that multiple judges and district 17 attorneys were substituted in his case. Id. at 10-11. Plaintiff states that he was denied his 18 right to a speedy trial and denied the right to respond via a demurrer. Id. at 19, 23. 19 Plaintiff also attaches multiple documents that appear to have been filed in two separate 20 cases, a criminal case in Placer County Superior Court, case number 62-198183, and a 21 family law case in the San Joaquin County Superior Court, case number STA-FL-DWC- 22 2011-0003284. (See ECF No. 2-1 at 59-96.) A review of the Placer County Superior 23 Court docket for criminal case number 62-198183 indicates this case is still open. A 24 review of the San Joaquin County Superior Court docket for family law case number 25 STA-FL-DWC-2011-0003284 indicates this case was disposed in 2012. 26 III. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 27 A. Legal Standards 28 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the court must screen every in forma pauperis 1 proceeding, and must order dismissal of the case if it is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to 2 state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a 3 defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 4 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (2000) (en banc). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an 5 arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In 6 reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court accepts as true the factual 7 allegations contained in the complaint, unless they are clearly baseless or fanciful, and 8 construes those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Neitzke, 490 9 U.S. at 327; Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 10 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 564 U.S. 1037 (2011). 11 Pleadings by self-represented litigants are liberally construed. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 12 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (liberal construction appropriate even post–Iqbal). 13 However, the court need not accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable 14 inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 15 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action does 16 not suffice to state a claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007); 17 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 18 To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege enough 19 facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A 20 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court 21 to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 22 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the 23 complaint and an opportunity to amend unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be 24 cured by amendment. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31; Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 25 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996). 26 B. Discussion 27 1. Younger Abstention 28 In Younger v. Harris, the Supreme Court held that when there is a pending state 1 criminal proceeding, federal courts must refrain from enjoining the state prosecution 2 absent special or extraordinary circumstances. 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971). The Ninth Circuit 3 has “articulated a four-part test to determine when Younger requires that federal courts 4 abstain from adjudicating cases that would enjoin or risk interfering with pending state- 5 court proceedings.” Duke v. Gastelo, 64 F.4th 1088, 1094 (9th Cir. 2023). “Younger 6 abstention is appropriate when: (1) there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) the 7 proceeding implicate[s] important state interests; (3) there is an adequate opportunity in 8 the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges; and (4) the requested relief 9 seek[s] to enjoin or has the practical effect of enjoining the ongoing state judicial 10 proceeding.” Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 765 (9th Cir. 2018) (alterations in 11 original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). All four factors must be met to 12 find abstention appropriate. Duke, 64 F.4th at 1094. But even if all four Younger factors 13 are satisfied, federal courts will not invoke the abstention doctrine if there is a “showing 14 of bad faith, harassment, or some other extraordinary circumstance that would make 15 abstention inappropriate.” Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 16 U.S. 423, 435 (1982). 17 Based on Plaintiff’s Complaint and TRO, it appears that Plaintiff’s allegations are 18 related to an ongoing criminal case in the Placer County Superior Court. In the 19 Complaint, Plaintiff discussed how a judge issued an unlawful warrant, and lists a case 20 from the Placer County Superior Court on the Civil Cover Sheet. Compl. at 7; ECF No. 1- 21 1. Further, in Plaintiff’s TRO motion, Plaintiff requests relief from two hearings that took 22 place in July 2025 in Placer County. Pl. Mot. at 4. Plaintiff also discusses the date he 23 was arrested, when an allegedly unlawful warrant was issued, and cites to attached 24 exhibits from the Placer Court Superior Court. Id. at 9; see ECF No. 2-1 at 72. Plaintiff 25 also discusses how no plea was entered in his case. Pl. Mot. at 11-12. Plaintiff requests 26 a stay of all Placer County Superior Court proceedings pending resolution of this case. 27 Id. at 39. 28 A review of the Placer County Superior Court docket for case 62-198183 indicates 1 that this criminal case is ongoing, which implicates important state interests, meeting the 2 first two factors under Younger. As to the third factor, there is no indication that Plaintiff 3 is unable to raise any constitutional claims in the pending state case. See Penzoil Co. v. 4 Texaco, 481 U.S. 1, 15 (1987) (holding that federal courts should assume that state 5 procedures will afford an adequate opportunity for consideration of constitutional claims 6 “in the absence of unambiguous authority to the contrary”). Finally, Plaintiff’s 7 presumptive relief, a stay of the Placer County Superior Court proceedings, would enjoin 8 the ongoing state criminal prosecution, meeting the fourth Younger factor. Thus, all four 9 factors under Younger are met. Further, Plaintiff includes no facts or evidence 10 demonstrating that extraordinary circumstances warrant this Court’s interference with the 11 Placer County Superior Court proceedings. 12 Because the Younger abstention doctrine applies, the Court recommends that this 13 action be dismissed without prejudice. 14 2. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine 15 Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts may not “review the 16 final determinations of a state court in judicial proceedings.” Worldwide Church of God v. 17 McNair, et al., 805 F.2d 888, 890 (9th Cir. 1986). The doctrine reflects the fact that the 18 only federal court with the jurisdiction to review state court decisions is the United States 19 Supreme Court. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923). Lower 20 federal courts can review the constitutionality of laws, but not the judgment of a state 21 court in a particular case. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 22 U.S. 462, 482-83 (1983). District courts therefore lack subject matter jurisdiction if the 23 current claims are “inextricably intertwined” with a state court decision and “the 24 adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling or require the district 25 court to interpret the application of state laws or procedural rules[.]” Bianchi v. 26 Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003). 27 Plaintiff states in his TRO motion that he was denied the right to file a demurrer to 28 an amended complaint. Pl. Mot. at 19. To the extent Plaintiff is asking this Court to 1 review the state court’s denial of the right to file a demurrer, this is barred by the Rooker- 2 Feldman doctrine because it is a final determination of the state court. Accordingly, 3 Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed. 4 3. Judicial Immunity 5 Two of the defendants in this case are Placer County Superior Court Judges, 6 Presiding Judge Alan Pineschi and Judge Todd Irby. Under the doctrine of judicial 7 immunity, judges have absolute immunity for their acts related to the judicial process. 8 See In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 2002); Demoran v. Witt, 781 F.2d 155, 9 158 (9th Cir. 1985). 10 Here, Plaintiff names both judges as Defendants, but does not make specific 11 claims against either Defendant. Plaintiff states that judges “issued unlawful warrants, 12 [and] used systemic rotation tactics to evade accountability and obscure constitutional 13 and due process violations.” Compl. at 6. The conduct Plaintiff challenges—issuing 14 warrants—relates to judicial duties, and Judge Pineschi and Judge Irby have absolute 15 immunity for these acts. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim against Defendants Judge Pineschi 16 and Judge Irby should be dismissed. See In re Castillo, 297 F.3d at 947. 17 4. Prosecutorial Immunity 18 Plaintiff lists Aryn Gordon, Deputy District Attorney, as a Defendant, and also lists 19 the Placer County District Attorney in general as a Defendant. Compl. at 3, 4. “Attorneys 20 who prosecute cases on behalf of the Government are absolutely immune from claims 21 based on their participation in the judicial process.” Joelson v. United States, 2020 WL 22 6449196, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2020) (citations omitted); see Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 23 U.S. 409, 422-23, 429-30. 24 Plaintiff does not make any specific allegations against either District Attorney. 25 Rather Plaintiff makes general allegations that the district attorneys “used systemic 26 rotation tactics to evade accountability, and obscure constitutional and due process 27 violations, repeatedly failed to follow statutory guidelines and limitations and, prevented 28 access to remedy within state court.” Compl. at 6. To the extent the conduct Plaintiff 1 challenges relates to the district attorneys’ prosecutorial role in the judicial process, the 2 district attorneys have absolute immunity for these acts. Therefore, the Placer County 3 District Attorney and Defendant Gordon are immune from this suit, and Plaintiff’s claims 4 against them should be dismissed. See Joelson, 2020 WL 6449196, at *3. 5 5. Eleventh Amendment Immunity 6 One of the Defendants in this action is the Placer County Superior Court. The 7 Ninth Circuit has held that the Superior Court of the State of California is an arm of the 8 state, and therefore has Eleventh Amendment immunity. Munoz v. Superior Court of Los 9 Angeles Cnty., 91 F.4th 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2024). Accordingly, the Placer County 10 Superior Court is immune from suit, and should be dismissed. 11 6. Failure to Comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 12 The Complaint also does not contain a short and plain statement of a claim as 13 required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. In order to give fair notice of the claims 14 and the grounds on which they rest, a plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of 15 particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims. See Kimes v. 16 Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). From the Complaint, Plaintiff brings the 17 following claims: (1) “the right to domicile privacy”; (2) “substantive/procedural due 18 process”; (3) “freedom of speech, association, and religion”; (4) “peaceful enjoyment”; 19 (5) “right of parents to make decisions regarding the care, custody, and control of their 20 children”; (6) “using deadly/excessive force, intimidation, threats, duress and coercion”; 21 (7) “protection against unreasonable/illegal searches and seizures”; (8) “right against 22 self-incrimination and due process”; (9) “right to a fair trial”; (10) equal protection and due 23 process clauses”; (11) Penal Code sections 1004, 1005(b), 1009, 802, 988, 990, 1382, 24 186; (12) California Government Code section 815.2; and (13) California Civil Code 25 section 52.1. Compl. at 5-6. Plaintiff provides general statements related to these claims, 26 such as that he was kidnapped and held hostage for ransom by Placer County Sheriffs 27 during an unlawful search and seizure. See Compl. at 7. However, Plaintiff does not 28 describe these allegedly unlawful acts in detail or provide sufficient information to put 1 Defendants on notice of the claims against them. The Complaint also does not clearly 2 state the elements of each claim. See Compl. The Complaint also raises claims based 3 on state criminal statutes that cannot be brought by an individual. See id. Although the 4 Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, even a pro se litigant’s complaint must 5 give fair notice and state the elements of a claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v. 6 Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). 7 The Complaint is therefore subject to dismissal. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 8 1172, 1178-80 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal of complaint where “one cannot 9 determine from the complaint who is being sued, for what relief, and on what theory, with 10 enough detail to guide discovery”). 11 IV. TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 12 In the ex parte TRO motion, Plaintiff seeks an TRO “staying all Placer County 13 Superior Court proceedings pending resolution.” Pl. Mot. at 40. 14 A. Legal Standards 15 Plaintiff moves ex parte for a temporary restraining order and writ of mandamus 16 pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 65 against all Defendants. The standard for 17 issuing a TRO is the same as the standard for issuing a preliminary injunction, which 18 requires the plaintiff to “establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is 19 likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of 20 equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. 21 Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Because the first factor “is a threshold 22 inquiry and is the most important factor,” a “court need not consider the other factors” if a 23 movant fails to show a likelihood of success on the merits. Baird v. Bonta, 81 F.4th 1036, 24 1040 (9th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 25 “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right,” 26 and may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. 27 Winter, 555 U.S. at 22, 24 (citation omitted). “Under Winter, plaintiffs must establish that 28 irreparable harm is likely, not just possible, in order to obtain a preliminary injunction.” 1 Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). 2 B. Discussion 3 1. Plaintiff’s Motion Is Procedurally Deficient 4 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(1) permits the court to issue a TRO without 5 notice to the adverse party only if (1) specific facts in the affidavit or underlying pleading 6 show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result before the 7 opposing party may be heard; and (2) the movant certifies in writing efforts made to give 8 notice and the reasons why notice should not be required. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1). This 9 Court’s Local Rules also set forth certain procedural mandates for a temporary 10 restraining order to issue, including that the movant provide the following documents: 11 (1) a complaint; (2) a motion for temporary restraining order; (3) a brief on the relevant 12 legal issues; (4) an affidavit to support the existence of irreparable harm; (5) an affidavit 13 detailing the notice or efforts undertaken or showing good cause why notice should not 14 be given; (6) a proposed temporary restraining order and provision for bond; (7) a 15 proposed order with blank for fixing time and date for a hearing; and (8) where a 16 temporary restraining order is requested ex parte, the proposed order should also notify 17 the affected parties of the right to apply to the Court for modification or dissolution on two 18 (2) days’ notice or such shorter notice as the Court may allow. E.D. Cal. Local Rule 19 231(c). 20 Plaintiff’s motion is procedurally deficient because it does not appear that Plaintiff 21 provided proper notice to Defendants. Plaintiff states that providing notice would defeat 22 the purpose of emergency relief by allowing continued violations, create substantial risk 23 of retaliation, enable further evasion, and allow harm to continue during the notice period. 24 Pl. Mot. at 39. On the TRO checklist, Plaintiff stated that notice was not given. (ECF No. 25 2-2 at 1.) Plaintiff does not include an affidavit or declaration indicating Plaintiff’s attempt 26 to provide notice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(B); E.D. Cal. Local Rule 231(c)(5). Further, 27 Plaintiff has not provided specific facts in an affidavit clearly showing that immediate and 28 irreparable injury will result before the adverse party can be heard in opposition. See Fed. 1 R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A). 2 Plaintiff failed to comply with Rule 65(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 231(c)(5) because 3 he did not provide notice to Defendants or outline his efforts to provide notice to 4 Defendants. See Pl. Mot. Courts regularly deny TROs for failing to comply with the 5 stringent requirements of Rule 65(b)(1), including those sought by pro se plaintiffs. See 6 Reno Air Racing Ass'n, Inc. v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2006) (“courts 7 have recognized very few circumstances justifying the issuance of an ex parte TRO”); 8 Abdel-Malak v. Doe, 2020 WL 5775818, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2020) (denying TRO 9 sought by pro se plaintiff for failure to satisfy Rule 65(b)’s “strict requirements”); Seymour 10 v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 2010 WL 3385994, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2010) (same); Roman 11 v. Nw. Tr. Servs., Inc., 2010 WL 3489962, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 31, 2010) (same). In 12 addition, Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Local Rules’ requirements for TROs is 13 sufficient justification to deny the motion. See Nible v. Macomber, 2024 WL 2133319, at 14 *2 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2024) (denying TRO sought by pro se plaintiff as procedurally 15 deficient); see, e.g., Tri-Valley CAREs v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 671 F.3d 1113, 1131 (9th 16 Cir. 2012) (“Denial of a motion as the result of a failure to comply with local rules is well 17 within a district court’s discretion.”). 18 The Court therefore recommends denial of the TRO motion based on these 19 procedural deficiencies. 20 2. Plaintiff Has Not Clearly Shown a Likelihood of Success on the 21 Merits 22 The Court also examines the first and most important Winter element: likelihood 23 of success on the merits. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he is likely to succeed on 24 the merits of his claims because, as discussed above, the Complaint fails to sufficiently 25 plead any claims and many Defendants are immune from suit. Because the first Winter 26 factor of likelihood of success is a threshold inquiry and the most important factor, a 27 “court need not consider the other factors” if a movant fails to show a likelihood of 28 success on the merits. Baird, 81 F.4th at 1040; see Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 1 740 (9th Cir. 2015). Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, see Haines v. 2 Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), they are still required to conform to the Federal 3 Rules of Civil Procedure. See Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53-54 (9th Cir. 1995). 4 As discussed above, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against any Defendant. 5 Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to establish the likelihood of success on the merits. See 6 Feathers v. U.S. SEC, 2022 WL 17330840, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2022) (dismissing 7 complaint under Rule 8 with leave to amend, and denying TRO based on no available 8 plausible claims); In re Trotochau v. Bennet, 2018 WL 6262843, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 9 2018) (denying TRO where pro se plaintiff failed to state a claim and failed to provide 10 notice to defendants under Rule 65(b)); Hanson v. Hanson, 2014 WL 587867, at *3 (S.D. 11 Cal. Feb. 14, 2014) (denying TRO because even when construing pro se complaint 12 liberally, allegations were insufficient to show likely success on the merits). The Court 13 need not address the other Winter factors based on Plaintiff’s failure to show a likelihood 14 of success on the merits. See Apartment Ass'n of Los Angeles Cnty., Inc. v. City of Los 15 Angeles, 10 F.4th 905, 917 (9th Cir. 2021); see also Baird, 81 F.4th at 1040. The Court 16 therefore also recommends DENYING Plaintiff’s TRO motion for failing to establish the 17 likelihood of success on the merits. 18 V. WRIT OF MANDAMUS 19 Plaintiff also appears to be seeking a writ of mandamus. Pl. Mot. at 12-15. The 20 federal mandamus statute set forth at 28 U.S.C. § 1361 provides: “The district courts 21 shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an 22 officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to 23 the plaintiff.” Here, Plaintiff has not brought his claims against any officer of employee of 24 the United States or any United States agency. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for a writ 25 of mandamus is deficient, and should be dismissed. 26 VI. LEAVE TO AMEND 27 In considering whether leave to amend should be granted, the Court considers 28 that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Younger abstention and Rooker-Feldmen 1 doctrines, and that most Defendants are entitled to immunity. Further, Plaintiff's current 2 | Complaint does not present a cogent, non-frivolous claim. In light of the Complaint’s 3 || deficiencies, it appears granting leave to amend would be futile. The Complaint should 4 || therefore be dismissed without leave to amend. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31; Cato v 5 | United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 1995). 6 | Vil. CONCLUSION 7 Based upon the findings above, it is RECOMMENDED: 8 1. Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 3) should be 9 DENIED; 10 2. Plaintiffs motion for a temporary restraining order (ECF No. 2) should be 11 DENIED; 12 3. Plaintiff's request for a writ of mandamus (ECF No. 2) should be 13 DISMISSED; 14 4. Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 1) should be DISMISSED without leave to 15 amend; and 16 5. The Clerk of the Court be directed to CLOSE this case. 17 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District 18 | Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 19 | 14 days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file 20 | written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. This document should 21 | be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any 22 | reply to the objections shall be served on all parties and filed with the Court within 14 23 | days after service of the objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time 24 || may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 25 || 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991). 26 | Dated: 08/11/25 OC i □ 27 CHI S00 KIM 28 | 5 stor.2006.25 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 14