NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 18 2025

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ARMEN BAGUMIAN; ANNA No. 24-6800 BAGUMIAN; DAVID BAGUMIAN, Agency Nos.

A220-287-773

Petitioners, A220-287-774

A220-287-775

v.

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General, MEMORANDUM*

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted August 14, 2025** Pasadena, California

Before: NGUYEN, FORREST, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

Petitioner Armen Bagumian, a native and citizen of Russia, alleges

persecution faced in Russia on account of his membership in a particular social

group of ethnic Armenians, and in Armenia on account of his political opinion.1

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 1 Petitioner’s wife, Anna Bagumian, and minor son, David Bagumian, filed separate asylum applications. The applications are substantively similar to Petitioner seeks review of a dismissal of his appeal from the Board of Immigration

Appeals (“BIA”). An immigration judge (“IJ”) (collectively with the BIA,

“agency”) denied his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection

under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) after finding that he did not testify

credibly. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

“When, like here, the BIA issues its own decision but adopts particular parts

of the IJ’s reasoning, we review both decisions.” Iman v. Barr, 972 F.3d 1058,

1064 (9th Cir. 2020). We review adverse credibility findings for substantial

evidence, such that they are “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would

be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Yali Wang v. Sessions, 861 F.3d 1003,

1007 (9th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up).

1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility

determination. The BIA affirmed the adverse credibility finding based on five

grounds relied upon by the IJ. These grounds are (1) an inconsistency regarding

Petitioner’s residency, (2) an inconsistency regarding an investigation of a fire at

Petitioner’s workshop, (3) the implausibility of Petitioner’s claim that everyone in

Armenia’s capital knew “each other’s political party membership” and that

Petitioner’s, and the IJ adjudicated them together. Petitioner provided the only declaration and witness testimony in support of all three applications. We therefore discuss his claim but the analysis applies to all the petitioners.

2 Petitioner was a “pariah” due to his political affiliation, (4) Petitioner’s repeated

return trips to Russia, and (5) the implausibility of Petitioner “walking at night in

an area where skinheads were known to attack non-Russians.”

We conclude that substantial evidence supports the IJ’s adverse credibility

finding based on the residency inconsistency. Petitioner’s application only listed

his registered addresses in Russia, but he admitted that he “went back and forth

between Russia and Armenia” in his declaration and testimony. This inconsistency

is not “trivial” as Petitioner’s time living in localities where he allegedly faced

persecution is “at issue.” Mukulumbutu v. Barr, 977 F.3d 924, 926 (9th Cir. 2020).

Petitioner explained that “registered addresses are considered official addresses in

many parts of the world.” The IJ considered this explanation but did “not find [it]

credible” as Petitioner was represented by counsel that had “practic[ed]

immigration law for decades.” The IJ was not required to accept Petitioner’s

explanation after providing a specific and cogent reason for rejecting it. See

Blanco v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 714, 721 (9th Cir. 2008).

The fire investigation inconsistency also supports the adverse credibility

finding. Petitioner “provided inconsistent testimony regarding whether the police

investigated the fire at his workplace,” as he “said none was conducted but also

said an ‘expert’ determined there was an electrical short.” Petitioner failed to

3 explain this inconsistency. This inconsistency is not trivial, as the fire was one of

the alleged acts of persecution he experienced.

The IJ also found Petitioner’s testimony that everyone in Armenia’s capital

knew each other’s political affiliation “implausible given the capital’s population.”

Petitioner explained that the capital “is a small city, and everybody at work, at

places where people know each other, know of each other’s political affiliation.”

The IJ was not required to accept this explanation where “reasonable minds could

differ” regarding the proper interpretation of the evidence. Duran-Rodriguez v.

Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1029 (9th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). Here, substantial evidence

supports the IJ’s view that Petitioner exaggerated the degree that individuals’

political affiliations were known to “everyone” in order to support his political

persecution claim.

These grounds are sufficient to conclude that the agency’s adverse

credibility determination is “supported by the totality of the circumstances,”

Kumar v. Garland, 18 F.4th 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 2021), so we do not address the

remaining grounds.

2. Petitioner did not exhaust his argument that the agency erred in denying

CAT relief because he failed to raise this challenge before the BIA. We therefore

do not address this challenge. See Umana-Escobar v. Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 550

(9th Cir. 2023).

4 3. Finally, we reject Petitioner’s argument to remand based on alleged

changed country conditions in Russia and Armenia. Like the denial of CAT relief,

these arguments were not raised before the BIA.

PETITION DENIED.2

2 We also deny Petitioner’s motion to stay order of removal (Dkt. No. 2).

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