discussion of Sambrano’s criminal history and its concerns about Sambrano’s

current gang ties and public safety. We reject the contention that our decision in

United States v. Bare, 806 F.3d 1011, 1017–18 (9th Cir. 2015), established a

heightened procedural standard for imposing search conditions of electronics.

3. Gang-Paraphernalia Condition. Finally, Sambrano argues that the

district court erred by imposing an unconstitutionally vague and overbroad condition

prohibiting him from using, wearing, or possessing paraphernalia “known to

represent” affiliation with any “criminal street gang.” We have held that conditions

forbidding association with “any criminal street gang” are constitutional. See United

States v. Soltero, 510 F.3d 858, 866 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam); United States v.

3 24-5140 Vega, 545 F.3d 743, 750 (9th Cir. 2008). And while Sambrano contends that the

phrase “known to represent” does not specify that Sambrano, as opposed to the larger

community, must have the requisite knowledge, we construe supervised-release

conditions to require an element of mens rea so as “to exclude inadvertent

violations.” Vega, 545 F.3d at 750 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 446 F.3d 272,

281 (2d Cir. 2006)); see also United States v. Evans, 883 F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir.

2018). “Thus construed, the condition . . . is not vague or overbroad.” Evans, 883

F.3d at 1161.

AFFIRMED.

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