NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 21 2025

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HENRY MUZGAY, No. 24-4340

Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 6:22-cv-01839-JR

v.

MEMORANDUM*

FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Jolie A. Russo, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 19, 2025** Portland, Oregon

Before: CALLAHAN and MENDOZA, Circuit Judges, and SNOW, District Judge. ***

Henry Muzgay appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable G. Murray Snow, United States District Judge for the District of Arizona, sitting by designation. 1 Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his application for disability insurance

benefits under the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. “We review a district court’s judgment de novo and set aside a denial of

benefits only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal

error.” Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 494 (9th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla. It

means—and means only—such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103

(2019) (cleaned up). We affirm.

1. Muzgay argues that the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) erroneously

discredited his testimony based on general findings. “A finding that a claimant’s

testimony is not credible ‘must be sufficiently specific to allow a reviewing court

to conclude the adjudicator rejected the claimant’s testimony on permissible

grounds and did not arbitrarily discredit a claimant’s testimony regarding pain.’”

Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 493 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Bunnell v.

Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345–46 (9th Cir. 1991)). We conclude that the ALJ did not

err. Unlike Brown-Hunter, the ALJ here provided “specific reasons” to discount

Muzgay’s testimony, and we are not left to “comb the administrative record to find

specific conflicts.” Id. at 494 (citation omitted).

2 2. The ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons for discounting

Muzgay’s testimony that is supported by substantial evidence. See Smartt, 53 F.4th

at 493. Despite Muzgay’s hand complaints, an exam showed he “had no atrophy”

of his hands. And following surgery, his range of motion and strength improved.

Regarding Muzgay’s foot and leg complaints, the ALJ also explained that Muzgay

“continues to be active, which suggests his limitations are not as significant as

alleged.” For example, Muzgay “reported he currently used his ankle-foot

orthotics for hunting, fishing, hiking, and gold panning,” and he could also “walk

18 holes of golf.” See Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1165 (9th Cir. 2014)

(“Engaging in daily activities that are incompatible with the severity of symptoms

alleged can support an adverse credibility determination.”). With respect to

Muzgay’s mental impairments, Muzgay tested “in the low average range” for

general intellectual ability. In addition, Muzgay’s symptoms appeared to improve

with treatment. See Warre v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir.

2006) (“Impairments that can be controlled effectively with medication are not

disabling . . . .”).

3. Substantial evidence supports the limited weight the ALJ gave to the

medical opinion of Dr. Weniger. For claims that were filed before March 27, 2017,

like this one, the ALJ weighs medical opinions by considering several factors, such

as the examining relationship, the treatment relationship, the supportability of the

3 opinion, and whether it is consistent with the record as a whole. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1527(c). Despite Dr. Weniger’s opinion regarding Muzgay’s functional

limitations, Muzgay’s overall intellectual ability tested “in the low average range.”

Many of Dr. Weniger’s opinions also focused on what would be “helpful,”

“optimal” or “most effective[]” for Muzgay rather than what was necessary for him

to work. And while Muzgay argues that the ALJ should have credited Dr.

Weniger’s opinions about Muzgay’s reading and writing skills and limited

interpersonal skills, the ALJ formulated Muzgay’s residual functional capacity

(“RFC”) to account for these limitations.

4. The ALJ was not precluded from affording weight to the opinions of

Drs. Rozenfeld and Williams. In the prior remand order, the district court did not

find any error in the weight the ALJ assigned to these opinions but instead

concluded that the ALJ’s rationale for discounting Dr. Weniger’s testimony solely

because it conflicted with Drs. Rozenfeld and Williams was insufficient.

5. Lastly, the hypotheticals the ALJ posed to the vocational expert

properly “include[d] [only] those limitations supported by substantial evidence.”

Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 886 (9th Cir. 2006).

AFFIRMED.

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