NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 21 2025

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARIA CAROLINA ESTRADA- No. 24-4343 CARRETO; J.O.F.E.; N.A.B.E., Agency Nos.

A206-141-455

Petitioners, A206-141-454

A206-141-456

v.

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General, MEMORANDUM*

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted August 18, 2025** Portland, Oregon

Before: CALLAHAN and MENDOZA, Circuit Judges, and SNOW, District Judge.***

Petitioners Maria Carolina Estrada-Carreto and two of her children (J.O.F.E.

and N.A.B.E.), who are natives and citizens of Guatemala, petition for review of a

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) order dismissing their appeal from an

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable G. Murray Snow, United States District Judge for the District of Arizona, sitting by designation. Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) order denying their applications for asylum,

withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture

(“CAT”). Petitioners’ applications were primarily based on abusive conduct by

J.O.F.E.’s father and extortion by an unknown caller who threatened to kidnap one

of Estrada’s children if she did not pay a sum of money. We have jurisdiction

under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. “Because the BIA agreed with the IJ’s reasoning and

added some of its own, we review the BIA’s decision and those parts of the IJ’s

decision upon which it relied.” Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1059 (9th Cir.

2021) (citation omitted). We review legal conclusions de novo and factual

findings for substantial evidence. Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051,

1059 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc). We deny the petition.

1. Petitioners claim that the IJ violated their due process rights by

abdicating her role as a neutral arbiter by subjecting Estrada to “an aggressive

cross-examination” and by “disregard[ing]” a report concerning Estrada’s mental

health.

“Although an IJ may ‘aggressively and sometimes harshly’ question a

witness, he or she may not become a ‘partisan adjudicator seeking to intimidate’

the petitioner rather than ‘a neutral fact-finder interested in hearing the petitioner’s

evidence.’” Arrey v. Barr, 916 F.3d 1149, 1158 (9th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted).

Here, Petitioners have not shown that the IJ’s questioning was improper. On

2 24-4343 direct examination, Estrada admitted that she had falsely testified that her current

partner (N.A.B.E.’s father) was living in Guatemala, when he was in fact living in

the United States. Further, there were inconsistencies between documents that

Estrada had submitted and her testimony, as well as within her testimony. These

inconsistencies included when J.O.F.E.’s father began mistreating her, when

J.O.F.E.’s father hit her, the frequency of domestic violence by J.O.F.E.’s father,

and when Estrada’s family members had last seen J.O.F.E.’s father. The IJ was

responsible for assessing Estrada’s credibility and, before making any adverse

credibility finding, the IJ was required to give Estrada an opportunity to explain

these inconsistencies. See Solo-Olarte v. Holder, 555 F.3d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir.

2009). Given these circumstances, the IJ’s “active[] questioning” of Estrada

“[does] not show a ‘predisposition to discredit’” Estrada’s testimony in a manner

“that would cause us to question the IJ’s impartiality.” Yan Liu v. Holder, 640

F.3d 918, 931 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted); see also Antonio-Cruz v. INS, 147

F.3d 1129, 1131 (9th Cir. 1998) (rejecting claim that an IJ violated due process by

conducting “the lion’s share of cross-examination” in a “harsh manner and tone”).

Petitioners also have not shown that the IJ acted improperly by not

assigning “full weight” to a report by Angela Newburg, MA, LPC, that opined that

Estrada has major depressive disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder. The IJ

reasonably assigned little weight to the report given that the report does not

3 24-4343 reference any abuse by J.O.F.E.’s father and given the IJ’s finding that the report

was likely obtained solely for litigation purposes.1

2. The IJ and the BIA (collectively, the “Agency”) denied Petitioners’

applications for asylum and withholding of removal on the alternative grounds that

Estrada was not credible and that, even assuming Estrada was credible, Petitioners’

applications failed on the merits. Because we reject Petitioners’ due process

challenge to the adverse credibility finding, and because Petitioners do not dispute

that the adverse credibility finding was otherwise a sufficient basis to deny their

applications for asylum or withholding of removal, we need not address

Petitioners’ arguments that the Agency erred in alternatively denying their

applications on the merits.

3. With respect to CAT protection, Petitioners challenge the Agency’s

finding that they failed to establish a likelihood of future torture. The Agency did

not err. Petitioners do not dispute that they failed to establish past torture. Nor

have J.O.F.E.’s father or the unknown extortionist bothered Estrada or her family

since 2014 or 2015. The facts of this case therefore do not compel a finding of a

likelihood of future torture. See generally Dawson v. Garland, 998 F.3d 876, 882-

1 To the extent Petitioners claim that the IJ erred in failing to address whether Estrada’s mental health conditions contributed to the inconsistencies in her testimony, Petitioners failed to exhaust that claim, as the Government argues. We therefore may not consider it. See Suate-Orellana v. Garland, 101 F.4th 624, 629 (9th Cir. 2024).

4 24-4343 84 (9th Cir. 2021) (upholding a finding of no-likelihood-of-future torture where the

petitioner had previously suffered severe physical and verbal abuse by her ex-

partner but there was evidence that conditions had improved after she had stopped

living with her ex-partner and before she had left her home country); Duran-

Rodriguez, 918 F.3d at 1029-30 (upholding a finding of no-likelihood-of-future

torture where the petitioner had previously received death threats but there was “no

evidence or claim that anyone ha[d] sought him or ha[d] any continuing interest in

him” in the years “since he [had] departed” his hometown).

PETITION DENIED.2

2 The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues. See Dkt. No. 13.

5 24-4343