NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 22 2025

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BISHAL LAMA, No. 24-4232 Agency No. Petitioner, A216-254-898 v.

MEMORANDUM*

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted August 13, 2025** San Francisco, California

Before: RAWLINSON and KOH, Circuit Judges, and FITZWATER, District Judge.***

Bishal Lama (Lama), a native and citizen of Nepal, petitions for review of an

order from the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his appeal of the

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation. Immigration Judge’s (IJ’s) denial of his application for asylum, withholding of

removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We deny

the petition.

1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that the violence and

harassment Lama faced in Nepal were not committed “by forces that the

government was unable or unwilling to control.” Velasquez-Gaspar v. Barr, 976

F.3d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). Lama did not report his first

four encounters with Maoist Communists to the police.1 When he reported the

fifth encounter, which involved physical violence, the police inquired about when,

where, and how the attack occurred. When Lama followed up two days later, the

police informed him that they were investigating. The agency reasonably relied on

this evidence that the police conducted an appropriate inquiry and investigated the

attack. See Truong v. Holder, 613 F.3d 938, 941 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)

(holding that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s conclusion that the

government was not unable or unwilling to protect petitioners because the

petitioners “sought assistance from the Italian police, who dutifully made reports

after each incident and indicated that they would investigate”). Accordingly, the

evidence does not compel the conclusion that Lama suffered past persecution.

1 These encounters involved verbal threats in person, in a letter, and over the telephone. According to Lama, these threats resulted from his work with the Nepali Congress Party.

2 24-4232 2. Absent evidence of past persecution, Lama may obtain relief by showing

a well-founded fear of future persecution that is subjectively genuine and

objectively reasonable. See Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1060 (9th Cir.

2009). Lama did not argue to this Court that he has a well-founded fear of future

persecution. Rather, Lama argued that the agency’s “flawed conclusion that Mr.

Lama failed to establish past persecution” resulted in an erroneous finding

regarding his fear of future persecution. As discussed above, substantial evidence

supports the conclusion that Lama failed to establish past persecution. Thus, this

argument fails.

In any event, substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Lama does

not have an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution. Lama’s father, a

worker for the Nepali Congress Party for which Lama also worked, continues to

live in Nepal without any reports of harm. See Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083,

1094 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that “a petitioner’s fear of future persecution is

weakened, even undercut, when similarly situated family members living in the

petitioner’s home country are not harmed”) (citation, emphasis, and internal

quotation marks omitted). In addition, the country conditions evidence Lama

submitted to the BIA indicates that positive changes have occurred in Nepal, which

mitigates any fear of continued harm. See id.

3. Because Lama failed to show either past persecution or an objectively

3 24-4232 reasonable fear of future persecution, he failed to demonstrate his eligibility for

asylum or withholding of removal. See Velasquez-Gaspar, 976 F.3d at 1065. The

BIA did not “evaluate Mr. Lama’s CAT claim under an incorrect legal standard,”

as Lama contends. See Garcia v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2021)

(explaining that we review the BIA’s legal conclusions de novo). The BIA

affirmed the determination that the harm Lama suffered did not rise to the level of

torture. This determination is consistent with our precedent. See Acevedo

Granados v. Garland, 992 F.3d 755, 764–65 (9th Cir. 2021) (upholding the BIA’s

denial of CAT relief because the petitioner failed to show that officials possessed

the “requisite specific intent” to torture him).

Because Lama failed to meet the less demanding burden of demonstrating a

well-founded fear of persecution for asylum, he necessarily failed to satisfy the

higher burden for CAT relief. See Rodriguez Tornes v. Garland, 993 F.3d 743,

754 (9th Cir. 2021) (explaining that meeting the “high burden of demonstrating” a

likelihood of torture “necessarily meets the lower burden” of demonstrating “a

well-founded fear of future persecution” for purposes of asylum eligibility)

(citation and alterations omitted). Thus, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s

determination that Lama is not eligible for CAT relief. See Tamang, 598 F.3d at

1095.

PETITION DENIED.

4 24-4232