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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10 11 JOSE SARMIENTO, Case No. 2:25-cv-04025-MAA on behalf of himself and others 12 similarly situated,

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

13 Plaintiff, MOTION TO REMAND THE

ACTION TO STATE COURT AND

14 v. REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES 15 IN THE AMOUNT OF $9,375.00 [ECF VITAS HEALTHCARE No. 21] 16 CORPORATION OF 17 CALIFORNIA, et al., 18 Defendants. 19 20 I. INTRODUCTION 21 This putative class action arises from Plaintiff Jose Sarmiento’s (“Plaintiff”) 22 employment with Defendants VITAS Healthcare Corporation of California dba 23 VITAS Healthcare (“Vitas”) and VITAS HME Solutions, Inc. (“Vitas HME”) 24 (collectively, “Defendants”), whom he alleges were joint employers or agents of 25 each other with respect to the alleged violations. Plaintiff brings a series of wage- 26 and-hour claims under California law alleging Defendants failed to pay minimum 27 and overtime wages, authorize or permit meal periods and rest breaks, failed to 28 provide accurate wage statements, failed to timely pay all wages earned upon 1 separation, and, in so doing, engaged in unfair business practices (“Complaint”). 2 (See generally Compl., ECF No. 1-3.) 3 Defendants removed the case to this Court on May 5, 2025 on the basis of 4 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)—the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) (“Removal”). 5 (Removal, ECF No. 1, at 2.)1 In support of the Removal, Defendants filed (1) the 6 Declaration of Reena Maico-Smith (“Maico-Smith Declaration”) (Maico-Smith 7 Decl., ECF No. 1-1), and (2) the Declaration of Jesse C. Ferrantella (ECF No. 1-2) 8 with its accompanying Defendants’ Exhibit 1 (the Complaint); Defendants’ Exhibit 9 2 (the proof of service); and Defendants’ Exhibit 3 (Defendants’ answer to the 10 Complaint) (ECF Nos. 1-3, 1-4, and 1-5, respectively). In satisfaction of CAFA 11 jurisdiction, Defendants contend that (1) minimal diversity exists between 12 Defendants, on the one hand, and Plaintiff and many of the putative class members, 13 on the other; (2) the aggregate number of putative members among all proposed 14 classes exceeds 100; and (3) the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of 15 $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs. (See generally Removal.) 16 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand the Action to State Court 17 and Request for Attorneys’ Fees in the Amount of $9,375.00 (“Motion”). (Mot., 18 ECF No. 21.) In support of the Motion, Plaintiff filed (1) the Declaration of 19 Cassandra A. Castro (ECF No. 21-2), and (2) a Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”) 20 with its accompanying Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1 and Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2 (RJN, ECF No. 21 21-3). Defendants filed an amended opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion 22 (“Opposition”). (Opp’n, ECF No. 36.)2 In Support of the Opposition, Defendants 23 filed the Supplemental Declaration of Reena Maico-Smith (“Maico-Smith 24 25 1 Pinpoint citations of docketed documents refer to the page numbers in the ECF- generated headers. 26 2 Defendants originally filed an opposition that contained unintelligible and 27 undecipherable content. (See ECF No. 26 at 23–27). Upon the Court’s order, Defendants filed the amended opposition. For ease of reference, the Court refers to 28 the amended opposition as the “Opposition.” 1 Supplemental Declaration”). (Maico-Smith Suppl. Decl., ECF No. 26-1.) Plaintiff 2 filed a reply in support of the Motion (“Reply”).3 (Reply, ECF No. 30.) 3 The matter stands submitted. The hearing on the Motion, previously set for 4 July 18, 2025 was vacated on July 10, 2025. (ECF No. 33.) After considering the 5 papers filed in support and in opposition, the Court deems the Motion appropriate 6 for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); C.D. Cal. L.R. 7- 7 15. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion in its 8 entirety. 9 10 II. BACKGROUND 11 A. Allegations in the Complaint4 12 Plaintiff is an individual who previously was employed by Defendants from 13 on or about January 19, 2024 until in or around October 2024 as an hourly non- 14 exempt employee. (Compl. ¶ 4.) Defendants operate in California and employed 15 Plaintiff and the putative class members in locations throughout California. (See id. 16 at ¶ 2.) 17 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants required him and the putative class members 18 to “work[] more minutes per shift than Defendants credited them with having 19 worked”— including requiring them “to remain on-duty during their off-the-clock 20 meal breaks” by forcing them “to keep their employer-issued cell phone on them at 21 all times during their shift to monitor and respond to calls from Defendant” and 22 requiring them “to work on-call hours without being paid for all on-call hours 23 worked—and “failed to pay [them] all wages at the applicable minimum wage for 24 all hours.” (See id. at ¶¶ 16, 21.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants failed to pay 25 3 Plaintiff was given an opportunity to respond to Defendants’ amended opposition 26 but elected to not do so. (See ECF No. 37.) 27 4 The Court summarizes the allegations and claims in the Complaint. In doing so, the Court neither opines on the veracity or merit of Plaintiff’s allegations and 28 claims nor make any findings of fact. 1 him and the putative class members for any hours worked in excess of eight in a 2 day and forty in a workweek at the legal overtime rate. (See id. at ¶ 23.) In 3 addition, Plaintiff alleges Defendants not only failed to authorize or permit 4 compliant meal periods and rest breaks for him and the putative class members, but 5 Defendants also failed to pay them the required meal period premium wage of one 6 additional hour of pay for each day in which they did not receive the required and 7 compliant meal periods. (See id. at ¶¶ 27–28, 32–33.) As a derivative of these 8 claims, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to provide accurate wage statements 9 to him and the putative class members. (See id. at ¶ 36.) Finally, Plaintiff contends 10 that, also as a result of these alleged violations, he and the putative class members 11 were not paid their final wages—made up of minimum wages, overtime wages, 12 meal period and rest break premium wages—in a timely manner upon their 13 separation from employment. (See id. at ¶ 38.) 14 On this basis, Plaintiff brings eight claims for relief as a class action on 15 behalf of himself and the putative class members. The Complaint purports to 16 certify a “California Class” of “all current and former hourly non-exempt 17 employees employed by Defendants” consisting of multiple sub-classes, including 18 (1) a minimum wage class; (2) an overtime class; (3) a meal period class; (4) a rest 19 period class; (5) a wage statement class; and (6) a waiting time class. (See id. at 20 ¶ 39.) 21 B. The Maico-Smith Declarations 22 In support of the Removal, Defendants submitted the Maico-Smith 23 Declaration, and in support of the Opposition, they submit the Maico-Smith 24 Supplemental Declaration. (Maico-Smith Decl.; Maico-Smith Suppl. Decl.) In 25 both, Maico-Smith declares that she is the Senior Regional Human Resources 26 Director, West Coast Division, California Region and that, in this capacity, she has 27 “knowledge, access to, possession, custody, and/or control of certain personnel data 28 of [Defendants’] employee workforce in California, including [that] of Plaintiff . . . 1 || and the putative class... .” (Maico-Smith Decl. 4 1; Maico-Smith Suppl. Decl. § 2 || 1.) She avers that, in preparing her declarations, she “directed the retrieval of and 3 || reviewed the employee and personnel data for Plaintiff and the putative class, 4 || including but not limited to their applicable hire dates, termination dates (where 5 || applicable), and rates of pay,” all included in records maintained by Defendants in 6 || their regular practice. (Maico-Smith Decl. 4 1; Maico-Smith Suppl. Decl. 4 1.) 7 || Based on this analysis, Maico-Smith provides the following data: 8 e From March 26, 2021 to April 24, 2025, Vitas: 9 o employed, in the aggregate, at least 2,348 non-exempt employees in California, who worked approximately 211,470 workweeks, and 10 whose average rate of pay was $31.12, and oO separated at least 893 such employees. 12 e From March 26, 2024 to April 24, 2025, Vitas: 13 o employed at least 1,284 non-exempt employees in California for 14 whom there were approximately 27,506 pay periods during which 15 wage statements would be issued, and 16 © no such employee received more than 40 wage statements.

7 (Maico-Smith Decl. J] 3—5.) Ig e From January 17, 2023 to May 5, 2025, Vitas: o employed, in the aggregate, at least 1,626 non-exempt employees in 19 California, who worked approximately 113,730 workweeks, and 20 whose average rate of pay was $30.66, and 71 oO separated at least 630 such employees. 09 e From March 26, 2021 to May 5, 2025, Vitas HME: 3 o employed, in the aggregate, at least 157 non-exempt employees in California, who worked approximately 9,309 workweeks, and whose 24 average rate of pay was $19.71, and 25 © separated at least 64 such employees. 26 || /// 27 28 || ///

I e From March 26, 2024 to May 5, 2025, Vitas HME: 2 o Employed at least 58 non-exempt employees in California, who 3 worked approximately 1,220 pay periods for which wage statements 4 would be issued, and o No such employee received more than 40 wage statements during this 5 period. 6 7 || (Maico-Smith Suppl. Decl. 2-4.) 8 9 || I. LEGAL STANDARD 10 Remand may be ordered either for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or for 11 || any defect in removal procedure. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The Court strictly 12 || construes the removal statutes against removal jurisdiction, and jurisdiction must be 13 || rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal. See Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 14 || F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). 15 CAFA gives federal courts original jurisdiction over certain class actions if 16 || (1) “the class has more than 100 members”; (2) “the parties are minimally diverse”; 17 || and (3) “the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million.” Dart Cherokee Basin 18 || Operating Co. v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 84-85 (2014). There is no presumption 19 || against removal jurisdiction in CAFA cases; rather, “Congress intended CAFA to 20 || be interpreted expansively.” /barra v. Manheim Invs., Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1197 21 || (9th Cir. 2015). Still, the defendant bears the burden of establishing removal 22 || jurisdiction. See Gaus, 980 F.2d at 564. CAFA’s “minimal diversity” requirement 23 || means that “a federal court may exercise jurisdiction over a class action if ‘any 24 || member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant.’” 25 || Mississippi ex rel. Hood vy. AU Optronics Corp., 571 U.S. 161, 165 (2014) (quoting 26 || 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A) through (d)(10)). 27 When a defendant removes a class action to federal court based on CAFA, 28 || the “notice of removal need include only a plausible allegation that the amount in

1 controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 89. 2 “Evidence establishing the amount is required . . . only when the plaintiff contests, 3 or the court questions, the defendant’s allegation.” Id. If the allegation is disputed, 4 the party seeking removal—and invoking the jurisdiction of the federal courts— 5 bears the burden of demonstrating that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 6 million. See Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1197. 7 The Ninth Circuit has explained that the amount in controversy is the 8 “amount at stake in the underlying litigation.” Gonzales v. CarMax Auto 9 Superstores, LLC, 840 F.3d 644, 648 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Theis Rsch., Inc. v. 10 Brown & Bain, 400 F.3d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 2005)). “[T]his includes any result of 11 the litigation, excluding interests and costs, that ‘entail[s] a payment’ by the 12 defendant.” Id. (quoting Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 701 13 (9th Cir. 2007)). Among other items, the amount in controversy includes damages 14 (compensatory, punitive, or otherwise), the costs of complying with an injunction, 15 and attorneys’ fees awarded under fee-shifting statutes or contract. See id. at 648– 16 59 (citing Chabner v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 225 F.3d 1042, 1046 n.3 (9th 17 Cir. 2000)); see also Kroske v. U.S. Bank Corp., 432 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2005) 18 (citing Galt G/S v. JSS Scandinavia, 142 F.3d 1150, 1155–56 (9th Cir. 1998)). 19 Under CAFA removal, “[t]he amount in controversy is simply an estimate of 20 the total amount in dispute, not a prospective assessment of [the] defendant’s 21 liability.” Lewis v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 627 F.3d 395, 400 (9th Cir. 2010) 22 (citing McPhail v. Deere & Co., 529 F.3d 947, 956 (10th Cir. 2008)). Thus, the 23 removing defendant “need not present evidence of what its ultimate liability will 24 be.” Perez v. Rose Hills Co., 131 F.4th 804, 808 (9th Cir. 2025). Although the 25 defendant’s amount-in-controversy estimate must be grounded in the plaintiff’s 26 complaint, the parties also may submit additional “evidence outside the complaint,” 27 such as “affidavits or declarations, or other ‘summary-judgment-type evidence 28 relevant to the amount in controversy at the time of removal.’” Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1 1197 (quoting Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 2 1997)). In addition, the parties may rely on a “chain of reasoning that includes 3 assumptions.” Id. at 1199; see also Jauregui v. Roadrunner Transp. Servs., Inc., 28 4 F.4th 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2022). These assumptions, however, must have “some 5 reasonable ground underlying them” and cannot be based on “mere speculation and 6 conjecture.” Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1197; see also Jauregui, 28 F.4th at 993. 7 The Court evaluates a challenged amount-in-controversy estimate under the 8 preponderance of the evidence standard. Rea v. Michaels Stores Inc., 742 F.3d 9 1234, 1239 (9th Cir. 2014). Under this framework, the defendant need only 10 establish “that the potential damages could exceed the jurisdictional amount.” Id. 11 (quoting Lewis, 627 F.3d at 397). Here, a court looks to see if, based on the 12 evidence provided by the defendant, “it is more likely than not that the amount in 13 controversy exceeds [the jurisdictional] amount.” Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. 14 Co., 102 F.3d 398, 404 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation omitted). In determining 15 whether the removing party has satisfied this burden, the district court may consider 16 facts in the removal petition and “‘summary-judgment-type evidence relevant to the 17 amount in controversy at the time of removal.’” Singer, 116 F.3d at 377 (quoting 18 Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1335–36 (5th Cir. 1995)). If, upon 19 such review, the court determines that the defendant has failed to meet this burden, 20 the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and the case must be remanded. 21 See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 22 23 IV. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 24 Plaintiff asks the Court to take judicial notice of two documents in a class 25 action entitled Reyes v. Vitas Healthcare Corporation of California, Santa Clara 26 Superior Court, Case No. 21CV383902, filed June 16, 2021 (“Reyes Action”) 27 (“RJN”). (See generally RJN, ECF No. 21-3.) Specifically, Plaintiff seeks judicial 28 notice of (1) Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1—the Order Granting Final Approval of Class 1 Action Settlement and Final Judgment filed on March 7, 2024 in the Reyes Action 2 (“Reyes Judgment”), and (2) Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2—the Reyes Second Amended 3 Complaint (“Reyes SAC”). (RJN 1.) Plaintiff seeks this judicial notice in order to 4 introduce three facts purportedly relevant to the calculation of the amount in 5 controversy: (1) that the claims released in the Reyes Action subsume a majority of 6 the Class Action claims asserted in his Complaint; (2) that the liability period in the 7 Reyes Judgment overlaps significantly with the liability period in his Complaint; 8 and (3) that only three of the 2,287 class members in the Reyes Action opted out of 9 the Reyes settlement. (Mot. 8.) These facts, he contends, are necessary to establish 10 that Defendants’ amount-in-controversy calculation is “inflated and inaccurate” in 11 that it does not account for “the preclusive effect of the Reyes Judgment . . . as 12 applied to nearly two years of the relevant time period [here].” (Mot. 8–9, 11, 13– 13 14, 17.) 14 Defendants do not object to Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice. (See 15 generally Opp’n.)5 While the absence of objection by Defendants is, without more, 16 sufficient grounds to grant Plaintiff’s request (see C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-12; see also 17 Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53–54 (9th Cir. 1995)), the Court is mindful of its 18 obligation to ensure that the evidence presented in support of (or opposition to) the 19 Motion satisfies the “summary-judgment-type evidence standard.” Accordingly, 20 the Court analyzes Plaintiff’s RJN on its merits. 21 Federal Rule of Evidence 201 allows “a court [to] take judicial notice of 22 ‘matters of public record.’” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 23 2001) (citing Mack v. S. Bay Beer Distribs., Inc., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 24 1986)). Because the Reyes SAC and the Reyes Judgment are public records, 25 Plaintiff’s Exhibits 1 and 2 are appropriate for judicial notice. See, e.g., Irvin v. 26 Madrid, No. CV-16-1198-DMG-JEMx), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188966, at *3 27 5 Indeed, Defendants identified the Reyes Action as a related action. (See ECF 28 No. 4.) 1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2016) (taking judicial notice of court filings). On this basis, the 2 Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s RJN and takes judicial notice of the Reyes SAC and the 3 Reyes Judgment. 4 5 V. DISCUSSION 6 Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendants have satisfied CAFA’s 7 jurisdictional requirements of minimum diversity and class numerosity. (See 8 generally Mot.) Rather, Plaintiff’s challenge to CAFA jurisdiction is limited to 9 whether CAFA’s requirement that the amount in controversy exceed $5 million is 10 met. (See generally Mot.; see generally Reply.) 11 Defendants argue that they satisfy the amount in controversy requirement 12 solely through their calculation of the potential penalties claim under California 13 Labor Code section 203 (“Section 203”) and the attorneys’ fees Plaintiff and the 14 putative class could recover if they prevail on that claim. (See Removal ¶¶ 19–30; 15 Opp’n 13–23.) Therefore, the Court must analyze the amount in controversy as to 16 Plaintiff’s Section 203 penalties claim and associated attorneys’ fees, see Ibarra, 17 775 F.3d at 1199, and whether that estimated amount is reasonably supported by a 18 preponderance of the evidence, see Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 88. 19 20 A. The Removal Plausibly Alleges a Basis for CAFA Jurisdiction 21 In the Removal, Defendants contend that the CAFA amount-in-controversy 22 requirement is satisfied because Plaintiff’s Section 203 claim totals at least 23 $6,669,638 and the associated attorneys’ fees total $1,667,409, for a total estimated 24 amount in controversy of $8,337,047. (Removal ¶¶ 19–30.) 25 “A defendant’s notice of removal need include only a plausible allegation 26 that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Arias v. 27 Residence Inn by Marriott, 936 F.3d 920, 924–25 (9th Cir. 2019) (internal 28 quotation marks and citation omitted). Under Section 203, an employer must pay a 1 penalty if it fails to pay all wages due upon termination. See Cal. Lab. Code § 203. 2 This penalty is the daily wages of the separated employee, accruing daily until the 3 wages are paid for a maximum of thirty (30) days). See id. Defendants calculate 4 the $6,669,638 amount in controversy for this claim based on the separation of 893 5 putative class members during the relevant period, multiplied by their average daily 6 rate of $248.96 ($31.12 average hourly rate multiplied by 8 hours per day), 7 multiplied by a violation rate of 30 days. (Removal 8.) With the exception of the 8 violation rate, the data points are provided through the Maico-Smith Declaration. 9 (Maico-Smith Decl. ¶¶ 3–5.) 10 This, without more, is sufficient to exceed the $5 million amount-in- 11 controversy floor for CAFA jurisdiction. However, Defendants bolster their 12 jurisdictional argument by adding $1,667,409 in attorneys’ fees to the amount in 13 controversy. (Removal ¶¶ 28–29.) The Complaint seeks attorneys’ fees in 14 connection with, among other claims, the Section 203 claim. (Compl. 64 (Prayer 15 for Relief on the Sixth Cause of Action).) The additional $1,667,409 is calculated 16 by multiplying the $6,669,638 Section 203 amount in controversy by a benchmark 17 percentage of 25%. (Removal ¶ 29.) 18 In sum, the Removal properly provided the required “short and plain 19 statement of the grounds for removal.” Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 83. 20 21 B. Plaintiff’s Challenge of Defendants’ Amount-in-Controversy 22 Calculation Is Unavailing 23 Plaintiff challenges Defendants’ amount-in-controversy calculation on two 24 theories. First, Plaintiff contends that Defendants failed to account for—and 25 thereby overstated their amount-in-controversy calculation by—the preclusive 26 effect of the Reyes Judgment. (Mot. 12–14.) Second, Plaintiff contends that 27 Defendants’ amount-in-controversy calculation is based upon flawed facts and 28 /// 1 speculative and flawed assumptions. (Id. at 15–17.) The Court addresses each 2 theory in turn. 3 4 1. The Reyes Judgment does not affect, let alone require a 5 reduction of, Defendants’ amount-in-controversy 6 calculation. 7 Plaintiff contends that Defendants’ amount-in-controversy calculation should 8 be discredited because it fails to account for the effect of the Reyes Judgment and 9 thus is overstated. (Mot. 13, 17.) He argues that the Court should consider only 10 “what the Court in reality could award” as the amount in controversy. (Id. at 9.) 11 Specifically, Plaintiff notes that the Reyes Judgment released the claims Plaintiff 12 brings here to the extent the liability period for released claims in the Reyes 13 Action—May 16, 2019 to January 16, 2023—overlaps with the liability period 14 here—March 26, 2021 to present. (Id. at 13.) On this basis, he argues that 15 Defendants’ amount-in-controversy calculation for the Section 203 claim—which 16 includes all former employees since March 26, 2022—is overinclusive because it 17 should not have included the overlapping period of March 26, 2022 to January 16, 18 2023 that contains claims released in the Reyes Action. (Id.) 19 Defendants respond that the amount-in-controversy need not be adjusted 20 based upon the Reyes Judgment. (Opp’n 21–23.)6 For the reasons stated below, the 21 Court agrees. 22 First, Defendants contend that “the amount in controversy in any case is 23 ‘determined by the complaint operative at the time of removal and encompasses all 24 relief a court may grant on that complaint.’” (Opp’n 20 (quoting Fritsch v. Swift 25 6 Defendants also contend that they satisfy the amount in controversy requirement 26 even after adjusting for the Reyes Judgment. (Opp’n 23–27.) However, because 27 the Court concludes, as detailed below, that the amount in controversy is satisfied based solely on the Section 203 penalties claim, the Court does not reach this 28 argument. 1 Transp. Co. of Arizona, 899 F.3d 785, 791 (9th Cir. 2018) (emphasis in Opposition 2 added).) They posit that to adjust the amount in controversy here based upon any 3 impact that the Reyes Judgment may have, as Plaintiff suggests, would be to 4 improperly “conflate[] the amount in controversy with the amount ultimately 5 recoverable.” (Opp’n 21 (quoting Gonzales, 840 F.3d at 648.) They argue that the 6 Ninth Circuit considers such an adjustment improper because the “‘strength of any 7 defenses . . . is irrelevant to determining the amount that is at stake in the 8 litigation.’” (Opp’n 21 (quoting Arias, 936 F.3d at 928).) The Court agrees. 9 Indeed, this reasoning was recently applied in the Central District of California in 10 the matter entitled Marin v. Lowes Hollywood Hotel, LLC, No. CV 24-6696-GW- 11 MARx, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 209108 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2024). There, the 12 district court considered the very question presented here—whether a previous class 13 action settlement with claims and liability periods that overlapped with the Marin 14 class action had preclusive effects on the Marin amount-in-controversy 15 calculation—and noted that “the weight of authority on the matter suggests that this 16 previous settlement should be considered as an affirmative defense that does not 17 limit the amount in controversy at this stage . . . .” Marin, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18 209108, at *14 (citations omitted). 19 Second, Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s own class definition does not 20 limit the class period to one that begins after the Reyes class period and, as such, 21 cannot affect the amount-in-controversy calculation in the manner Plaintiff 22 suggests. (Opp’n 21–22.) The Court again agrees. Had Plaintiff intended to limit 23 the class period in the way he now asserts, he could have done so with a single 24 stroke of his pen (or a few clicks of his keyboard). He did not. Instead, the 25 Complaint asserts, among others, a Section 203 look-back period of three years (to 26 March 26, 2022). (See Compl. ¶ 39.) That Plaintiff may now, after the fact and for 27 purposes of this Motion, concede that the Reyes Judgment “subsume[s] a majority 28 of the Class Action claims asserted in [his] Complaint” (Mot. 8), is of no 1 consequence as the Complaint stands on its allegations unless and until Plaintiff 2 amends it. This he has not done. 3 Plaintiff’s authorities—Priddy v. Lane Bryant, Inc., No. C 08-5377 JL, 2010 4 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155361 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2010), and DeLeon v. NCR Corp., 5 No. C 12-01637 SBA, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17528 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2013)—do 6 not compel a different result. Plaintiff points to both cases for the proposition that a 7 class-wide release entered into after a second, overlapping class action is filed and 8 removed to federal court can defeat CAFA jurisdiction in the second case, requiring 9 its remand. (Mot. 13–14.) But these cases do not help Plaintiff. Although, as in 10 Priddy and DeLeon, the Court finds that there exists an identity of claims and class 11 period between this and the Reyes Action, subsequent authorities firmly establish 12 that the affirmative defense of res judicata—forever barring and enjoining class 13 members from bringing claims released by a prior settlement—cannot defeat CAFA 14 jurisdiction. See Arias, 936 F.3d at 928; see also Visendi v. Bank of Am., N.A., 733 15 F.3d 863, 868 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, 16 Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO, CLC v. Shell 17 Oil Co., 602 F.3d 1087, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 2010)). 18 19 * * * 20 In sum, for the reasons stated above, the Court declines to find, as Plaintiff 21 requests, that the amount in controversy is overstated due to Defendants’ failure to 22 account for the preclusive effect of the Reyes Judgment. 23 24 2. Defendants’ amount-in-controversy calculation is not based 25 upon flawed facts and speculative and flawed assumptions. 26 For removal purposes, Defendants calculated the $6,669,638 amount in 27 controversy based solely on the Section 203 penalty claim. As noted above, this 28 penalty is the daily wages of the separated employee, accruing daily until the wages 1 are paid for a maximum of 30 days. See Cal. Labor Code § 203. Defendants’ 2 amount in controversy is based on the separation of 893 putative class members 3 during the relevant period, multiplied by their average daily rate of $248.96 ($31.12 4 average hourly rate multiplied by 8 hours per day), multiplied by the 30 allowable 5 days. (Removal 8.) With the exception of the violation rate, the data points are 6 provided through the Maico-Smith Declaration. (Maico-Smith Decl. ¶¶ 3–5.) 7 Plaintiff contends that Defendants’ amount-in-controversy calculation should 8 be discredited because it is based on Defendants’ “flawed foundation” of facts upon 9 which Defendants, in turn, apply “speculative and flawed assumptions.” (Mot. 15– 10 17.) With respect to the factual underpinnings of Defendants’ calculation, Plaintiff 11 takes issue with the number of qualifying putative class members and their average 12 daily rate of pay.7 (Mot. 16; Reply 5.) With respect to the assumptions applied to 13 those data points, Plaintiff takes issue with Defendants’ assumption of a 100% 14 violation rate. (Id.) 15 Defendants respond that the Maico-Smith Declaration adequately supports 16 the factual foundation of the calculation and the allegations in the Complaint 17 support their amount-in-controversy assumptions. For the reasons set forth below, 18 the Court agrees. 19 Plaintiff’s first contention—that Defendants’ data points provide a flawed 20 factual foundation for the amount-in-controversy calculation (Mot. 16)—is without 21 merit. Plaintiff challenges Defendants’ 893-count of former employees and their 22 related $31.12 average hourly rate on the ground that Defendants did not adjust 23 these figures by excluding former employees whose claims are released under the 24 Reyes Judgment. (Id. at 17.) This argument is unavailing. As a starting point, 25 Plaintiff puts forth no evidence to rebut Defendants’ calculation. (See generally 26 27 7 Plaintiff also takes issue with the number of workweeks used by Defendants. (Mot. 16.) However, this data point is not used for the Section 203 penalty 28 calculation and, as such, is not relevant to this analysis. 1 Mot.; see generally Reply.) While Plaintiff is correct that, under a factual attack of 2 the amount in controversy, it is not his burden to provide alternative calculations 3 (Reply 3–5), he still must present “a reasoned argument as to why any 4 assumptions . . . are not supported by the evidence.” Bernardo v. Carl’s Jr. Rests. 5 LLC, No. 2:25-cv-00226-CAS-PVCx, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105288, at *11 (C.D. 6 Cal. June 2, 2025). This he has not done. Plaintiff’s factual attack is based on the 7 argument that Defendants should have accounted for the impact of the Reyes 8 Judgment. (Mot. 16; Reply 5.) But as the Court already decided above, any 9 possible impact that the Reyes Judgment might have on Plaintiff’s ultimate recovery 10 cannot defeat the amount in controversy calculation at the time of removal. (See 11 supra, Section V.B.1.) Thus, Plaintiff’s factual attack fails because his argument is 12 not reasoned; indeed, it is legally flawed. 13 Plaintiff’s second contention—that Defendants’ amount in controversy 14 calculation is based on an improper 100% violation rate assumption (Mot. 15–17; 15 Reply 6–8)—also lacks merit. Plaintiff challenges the underpinnings of the 100% 16 violation rate: (1) that all former employees are entitled to Section 203 penalties, 17 and (2) that all such employees are entitled to the maximum thirty (30) days’ of 18 such penalties at a maximum of eight (8) hours per day. (Mot. 16–17.) Defendants 19 respond that their violation rate assumption is reasonable based on the allegations in 20 the Complaint. (Opp’n 15–16.) The Court agrees. 21 The reasonableness of an assumption turns on which element of the amount- 22 in-controversy calculation is at issue. Perez, 131 F.4th at 808. Thus, “in a wage- 23 and-hour case, the number of employees in the class may be most easily determined 24 by examining the defendant’s employment records,” making it reasonable to expect 25 the defendant to introduce such evidence. Id. (citation omitted). In contrast, “it 26 makes little sense to require a CAFA defendant to introduce evidence of the 27 violation rate—really, the alleged violation rate—because the defendant likely 28 believes that the real rate is zero and thus that the evidence does not exist.” Id. To 1 require evidence proving a violation-rate assumption “would ‘impose[] a 2 requirement that [the defendant] prove it actually violated the law at the assumed 3 rate,’ even when the defendant maintains that it did not violate the law at all.” Id. at 4 808–09 (quoting Arias, 936 F.3d at 927 (alterations in original)). Thus, “a CAFA 5 defendant can most readily ascertain the violation rate by looking at the plaintiff’s 6 complaint.” Id. (quoting Arias, 936 F.3d at 927). “[A]n assumption is not 7 unreasonable simply because another equally valid assumption may exist.” Id. at 8 809 (quoting Arias, 936 F.3d at 927). Thus, an amount-in-controversy assumption 9 “is not defeated merely because it is equally possible that damages might be ‘less 10 than the requisite . . . amount.’” Id. at 810 (quoting Arias, 936 F.3d at 927). 11 Here, the three elements of Plaintiff’s 100% violation rate are supported by 12 the allegations in the Complaint. The assumption that all former employees are 13 owed some amount of Section 203 penalties is supported by the allegation “that the 14 putative class was owed, at the least, unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime, 15 unpaid meal and rest premiums, all of which were unpaid or underpaid based on 16 Defendants’ ‘policy and practice,’” coupled with the allegation of “per shift” 17 violations, which together reasonably suggest that all terminated employees during 18 the three-year lookback period would be owed some amount of unpaid wages. 19 (Compl. ¶¶ 16, 44, 55, 63, 71).) The assumption that the separated employees were 20 owed a maximum of 30 days of penalties is reasonably supported by the allegations 21 that Defendants not only failed to pay, but, more significantly have yet to pay, “all 22 wages earned and unpaid prior to separation of employment.” (Compl. ¶¶ 160, 23 162.) Finally, the assumption that the 30 days’ penalties should be calculated based 24 on an 8-hour day is supported by the allegation that putative class members are 25 owed overtime wages (Compl. ¶¶ 19–20) which, by definition under California law, 26 contemplates that the employees worked more than 8 hours per day. See Cal. Labor 27 Code § 510; California Industrial Welfare Commission Order No. 5-2001 at § 3. 28 /// 1 This is consistent with Ninth Circuit authority. In Jauregui, the Ninth Circuit 2 rejected as “inappropriate” the district court’s “demand for certitude” over the 3 assumptions used in calculating the amount in controversy. Jauregui, 28 F.4th at 4 993. It explained:

5 The problem with that approach is that a CAFA defendant’s 6 amount in controversy assumptions in support of removal 7 will always be just that: assumptions. At that stage of the litigation, the defendant is being asked to use the plaintiff’s 8 complaint—much of which it presumably disagrees with— 9 to estimate an amount in controversy. This is also at a stage of the litigation before any of the disputes over key facts 10 have been resolved. We have therefore made it clear that 11 when calculating the amount in controversy, “the parties need not predict the trier of fact’s eventual award with one 12 hundred percent accuracy.” . . . As is inescapable at this 13 early stage of the litigation, the removing party must be able to rely “on a chain of reasoning that includes assumptions to 14 satisfy its burden to prove by a preponderance of the 15 evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 16 million,” as long as the reasoning and underlying assumptions are reasonable. 17 18 Id. In rejecting the district court’s criticism that the defendant “provide[d] no 19 evidence” in support of the maximum 30-day waiting time penalty, the Ninth 20 Circuit went on to hold that “it was not unreasonable for [the defendant] to assume 21 that the vast majority (if not all) of the alleged violations . . . would have happened 22 more than 30 days before the suit was filed, which would entitle the employees to 23 the 30-day penalty.” Id. at 993–94. It clarified: “The fact that a very small 24 percentage of employees might possibly not be entitled to the maximum penalty is 25 not an appropriate reason to dismiss altogether Defendant’s estimate for this claim.” 26 Id. at 994. 27 As Defendants point out, countless district courts have found a 100% 28 violation rate appropriate for Section 203 penalties premised on underlying facts 1 similar to those alleged here. (See Opp’n 17–19 (listing fifteen cases between 2010 2 and 2025 approving 100% violation rates in the context of “pattern and practice” 3 allegations).) Plaintiff’s reliance on Toribio v. ITT Aero. Controls LLC, No. CV 4 19-5430-GW-JPRx, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153461 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 5, 2019), to 5 undermine the holdings in these cases, is of no avail. While Plaintiff is correct that 6 the court in Toribio found the assertion that courts routinely accept assumptions 7 involving “pattern and practice” allegations to be an “overstatement,” Plaintiff 8 seems to ignore that the court also acknowledged that this question is largely 9 unsettled, noting that “[d]istrict courts are all-over-the-map deciding how to 10 handle” this issue. Toribio, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153461, at *9–10. More 11 importantly here, the concern raised by the court in Toribio involved the violation 12 rate assumption for meal period, rest break, and wage statement claims, not a 13 Section 203 claim, Toribio, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153461, at *2, 11, which 14 Defendant argues, and the Court agrees, is inherently different from a Section 203 15 violation rate in that the latter is premised on the assumed violation of multiple 16 underlying statutes, only one of which has to be true during the entire class period 17 to trigger Section 203 penalties for each putative class member. (Mot. 15–16.) 18 Plaintiff’s two other authorities also are of no avail. Neither Dupre v. GM, 19 No. CV-10-00955-RGK(Ex), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95049 (C.D. Cal. 2010), nor 20 Marshall v. G2 Secure Staff, LLC, No. 2:14-cv-04322-ODW(MANx), 2014 U.S. 21 Dist. LEXIS 95620 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2014), addresses the violation rate for the 22 amount-in-controversy calculation of a Section 203 claim. As with Toribio, these 23 authorities are inapposite. 24 25 * * * 26 In sum, for the reasons stated above, the Court declines to find, as Plaintiff 27 contends, that the amount in controversy is overstated based on a flawed factual 28 foundation and speculative and flawed assumptions. 1 3. Conclusion as to Plaintiff’s request for remand 2 Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the amount placed in 3 controversy in Defendants’ notice of removal and supporting evidence, based solely 4 on Plaintiff’s Section 203 claim, is $6,669,638. As this exceeds the $5 million 5 threshold required for original federal court jurisdiction under CAFA, the Court 6 finds that it has jurisdiction to hear this case. In light of this conclusion, the Court 7 declines to reach the issue of whether the alleged 25% in associated attorneys’ fees 8 (Removal ¶¶ 27–28) or Plaintiff’s other claims (Opp’n 23–27) are appropriate 9 and/or necessary to satisfy the CAFA amount in controversy. 10 11 C. Plaintiff Is Not Entitled To Attorneys’ Fees 12 Plaintiff contends he is entitled to an award of the attorneys’ fees and costs 13 he incurred in litigating this motion. (Mot. 18–19; Reply 10–11.) Defendants 14 oppose this request. (Opp’n 27–28.) 15 In a successful motion to remand, a district court may order the defendant to 16 pay the prevailing plaintiff its “just costs and any actual expenses, including 17 attorney’s fees, incurred as a result of the removal.” Padilla v. AT&T Corp., 697 F. 18 Supp. 2d 1156, 1160 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)). 19 Here, Plaintiff did not prevail on his Motion. On this basis, the Court 20 declines to award Plaintiff his attorneys’ fees and costs. 21 22 VI. CONCLUSION 23 On the basis of the foregoing, the Court ORDERS as follows: 24 1. The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s RJN; 25 2. The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion in its entirety; 26 3. The matter is TEMPORARILY STAYED pending the Court’s 27 decision on Defendants’ motion to stay the case, presently under 28 submission. (See ECF Nos. 27, 33.) The Court DIRECTS the Clerk 1 to administratively close the action (JS-6). The sole effect of 2 administrative closure is to remove the action from the Court’s active 3 docket for record-keeping purposes. Administrative closure does not 4 affect the merits of Plaintiff's claims and does not prejudice any party 5 to this action. The Court retains jurisdiction over this action. 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. per 8 | DATED: August 19, 2025 alt 9 HONORA RIA A. AUDERO 10 UNITED S ES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 21