I. BACKGROUND

15 In December 2024, Plaintiff’s attorney, Patricia Mireles, filed an administrative motion to 16 be relieved as counsel. See Dkt. No. 9-1. She informed the Court that a “breakdown” in attorney- 17 client communications left the “attorney-client relationship . . . unalterably deteriorated.” Id. 18 Three months later, Ms. Mireles filed a motion to withdraw as counsel on the basis that “failure to 19 communicate render[ed] it unreasonably difficult to carry out effective representation.” Dkt. No. 20 23. 21 The Court met with the parties five times between February 2025 and June 2025. Plaintiff 22 Garcia-Rabago appeared at two of these hearings and stated that she intended to hire new counsel. 23 Although Ms. Mireles and Plaintiff Garcia-Rabago had some communication, Ms. Mireles 24 informed the Court that she remained unable to reliably contact her client. According to Ms. 25 Mireles, her client was also no longer able to pay her. On March 27, 2025, the Court set a thirty- 26 day deadline for Plaintiff Garcia-Rabago to hire new counsel. See Dkt. No. 34. On May 1, 2025, 27 the Court met with the parties, and Plaintiff Garcia-Rabago informed that Court that she had not 1 retained new counsel because she could not afford to do so. See Dkt. No. 35. The Court gave 2 Plaintiff Garcia-Rabago additional time to retain new counsel and set a further hearing on the 3 matter for June 26, 2025. Plaintiff Garcia-Rabago did not appear at that hearing, and Ms. Mireles 4 informed the Court that she had not heard from her client. See Dkt. No. 37. The Court then issued 5 an order to show cause why this case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute and directed 6 Ms. Mireles to provide her client with the Order. See Dkt. No. 36. 7 Plaintiff Garcia-Rabago’s response to the order to show cause was due on July 10, 2025. 8 Plaintiff did not file a response. The Court then issued a second order (1) directing Plaintiff 9 Garcia-Rabago to file a response, (2) warning that it would “dismiss this case for failure to 10 prosecute unless Ms. Garcia-Rabago files a response by July 29, 2025,” and (3) directing Ms. 11 Mireles to “file a declaration by July 17, 2025 documenting when and how she supplied Ms. 12 Garcia-Rabago with a copy of this Order.” Dkt. No. 38. Neither Plaintiff Garcia-Rabago, nor Ms. 13 Mireles filed the requested materials, in violation of the Court’s Order. See id. The Court then 14 issued two additional orders directing Ms. Mireles to file the requested declaration. Dkt. Nos. 39, 15 40. Ms. Mireles did not respond to either order. 16 II. DISCUSSION 17 The district court may dismiss a case for failure to prosecute or for failure to comply with a 18 court order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). “The authority of a court to dismiss sua sponte for lack of 19 prosecution has generally been considered an ‘inherent power,’ governed not by rule or statute but 20 by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly 21 and expeditious disposition of cases.” Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962). 22 “Despite this authority, dismissal is a harsh penalty and, therefore, it should only be imposed in 23 extreme circumstances.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations 24 omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) (stating that dismissal for failure to prosecute “operates as 25 an adjudication on the merits” unless the order says otherwise). 26 Courts “must weigh five factors” in determining whether to dismiss a case for failure to 27 prosecute: “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to 1 disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives.” See 2 Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1260–61. A court need not make “explicit findings in order to show that it has 3 considered these factors,” although such findings are preferred. Id. at 1261. Here, the Court finds 4 that these factors weigh in favor of dismissal. 5 First, “[t]he public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation always favors 6 dismissal.” Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Yourish v. Cal. 7 Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999)). That is true here. Plaintiff failed to respond to the 8 Court’s Order to Show Cause and all subsequent orders. Dkt. Nos. 36, 38. Plaintiff did not appear 9 at the most recent hearing, Dkt. No. 37, and Ms. Mireles states that she has been unable to 10 communicate with her client. Plaintiff’s counsel, Ms. Mireles, has been similarly unresponsive 11 and failed to comply with multiple orders. See Dkt. Nos. 39, 40. The Court is satisfied that the 12 lack of responsiveness demonstrated by Plaintiff and her attorney contravenes the “public’s 13 interest in expeditious resolution of litigation.” See Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 642. This factor 14 therefore weighs in favor of dismissal. 15 Second, it is “incumbent” upon courts “to manage [their] docket[s] without being subject 16 to routine noncompliance” of litigants. See id. (citing Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1261). Moreover, “[t]he 17 trial judge is in the best position to determine whether the delay in a particular case interferes with 18 docket management and the public interest.” Id. Here, Plaintiff has not appeared at scheduled 19 hearings or responded to multiple orders. This noncompliance “has consumed some of the court’s 20 time that could have been devoted to other cases on the docket.” See Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 642. 21 This factor therefore weighs in favor of dismissal. 22 Third, in order to prove prejudice, “a defendant must establish that plaintiff’s actions 23 impaired defendant’s ability to proceed to trial or threatened to interfere with the rightful decision 24 of the case.” Id. (citing Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 131 (9th Cir. 1987)). 25 “Whether prejudice is sufficient to support an order of dismissal is in part judged with reference to 26 the strength of the plaintiff’s excuse for the default.” Id. (citation omitted). In Malone, which 27 involved a Rule 41(b) dismissal for failure to comply with a court order, the district court found 1 dismissal. Id. And in Yourish, which also involved plaintiffs who failed to obey a court order, the 2 court concluded that the defendants had suffered “sufficient prejudice” where the plaintiffs had 3 only a “paltry excuse” for why they failed to timely amend their complaint. 191 F.3d at 991–92. 4 In this case, Plaintiff has failed to obey (1) an order to show cause, and (2) an order directing her 5 to respond to the order to show cause. See Dkt. Nos. 36, 38. And, despite multiple meetings with 6 the Court, Plaintiff has not retained new counsel or become more communicative with her current 7 attorney. As a result, Ms. Mireles’ motions to withdraw remain unresolved and the matter remains 8 at a standstill. This factor therefore weighs in favor of dismissal. 9 Fourth, the Court has attempted to avail itself of less drastic alternatives that have proven 10 ineffective in advancing the case. The Court entered an order to show cause, expressly warning 11 Plaintiff that her case was at risk of dismissal for failure to prosecute. See Dkt. No. 36. She failed 12 to respond. The Court followed up with a second order directing a response. See Dkt. No. 38. 13 Plaintiff again failed to respond. The Court also issued multiple orders directing Plaintiff’s 14 counsel to comply with Court orders. Counsel did not respond to those orders. See Dkt. Nos. 39, 15 40. This factor therefore weighs in favor of dismissal. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262 (stating that 16 Ninth Circuit authority “suggest[s] that a district court’s warning to a party that his [or her] failure 17 to obey the court’s order will result in dismissal can satisfy the ‘consideration of alternatives’ 18 requirement”). 19 The last factor—the public policy favoring disposition on the merits—weighs against 20 dismissal here, as it always will even when a party entirely fails to prosecute. See Pagtalunan, 21 291 F.3d at 643. 22 III. FINAL ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 23 Plaintiff’s counsel is directed to show cause why she should not be sanctioned or referred 24 to this district’s Standing Committee on Professional Conduct for failing to comply with three 25 Court orders, which directed her (1) to file a declaration by August 20, 2025, Dkt. Nos. 38, 39, and 26 (2) to show cause why she should not be sanctioned, Dkt. No. 40. Ms. Mireles shall file a 27 statement of five pages or less by September 10, 2025. Failure to respond to this order to show 1 investigation, without further notice to counsel. 2 || IV. CONCLUSION 3 Because four of the five factors weigh in favor of dismissal, the Court finds that dismissal 4 || of Plaintiff's case for failure to prosecute is appropriate. The Court thus DISMISSES this case 5 without prejudice to renewal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). This Order TERMINATES AS 6 MOOT Ms. Mireles’ motions to withdraw as counsel, Dkt. Nos. 9 and 23. The Clerk is directed 7 to close the file. 8 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 Dated: August 28, 2025 Alaywed 5 Sbl|).

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

12 United States District Judge

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