1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 N.M., a minor, by and through No. 2:25-cv-1389 WBS JDP Guardian Ad Litem STACIE MILLER, 13 individually and as successor in interest to, ESTATE OF VINTON 14 MILLER, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE:

DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO

15 Plaintiffs, DISMISS 16 v. 17 PLACER COUNTY, a municipal corporation; THE PLACER COUNTY 18 SHERIFF’S OFFICE, a public entity; PLACER COUNTY SHERIFF’S 19 OFFICER DEPUTY CORONER ERIC HINTZE, individually; CALIFORNIA 20 HIGHWAY PATROL, a public entity;

CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL

21 OFFICER CLAYTON GUILLEMIN, individually; CALIFORNIA STATE 22 PARKS, a public entity;

CALIFORNIA STATE PARKS OFFICER

23 MATTHEW YARBROUGH, individually, EVAN MATSHES, individually; NAAG 24 FORENSICS PC, an entity, and DOES 1 to 100, individually, 25 Defendants. 26

27 ----oo0oo---- 28 1 Plaintiff Stacie Miller (“plaintiff”) brought this 2 action against Placer County, the Placer County Sheriff’s Office, 3 (collectively, “Placer County entities”), Deputy Coroner Eric 4 Hintze (“Hintze”), the California Highway Patrol (“CHP”), CHP 5 Officer Clayton Guillemin (“Guillemin”), California State Parks & 6 Recreation (“State Parks”), State Parks Officer Matthew Yarbrough 7 (“Yarbrough”), and one-hundred (100) fictitiously named Doe 8 defendants, in connection with the death of her spouse Vinton 9 Miller (“decedent”) on January 26, 2024. (See Compl. at 2-26 10 (Docket No. 1).) With the exception of the Doe defendants, each 11 remaining defendant (collectively, “defendants”) now moves to 12 dismiss all claims. (See Docket Nos. 19, 21-22, 31.) 13 I. Factual Background 14 The decedent lived in Placer County, worked at a ski 15 resort known as Palisades Tahoe in Olympic Valley, and struggled 16 “with mental health issues, including diagnosed schizophrenia.” 17 (See Compl. at 9.) On the morning of January 26, 2024, the 18 decedent told plaintiff that he was leaving for work despite the 19 fact that “he did not have to be at work” then. (See id. at 10- 20 11.) Sometime later, plaintiff learned that the decedent “was 21 driving to an unknown location in an unknown vehicle that was not 22 his and told her that someone was trying to kill him.” (See id. 23 (citation modified).) She dialed 911 to inform law enforcement 24 about the situation. (See id.) 25 After contacting the police, plaintiff spoke with the 26 decedent once more to encourage him to go to the nearby Olympic 27 Valley Events Center, which he agreed to do. (See id.) She then 28 called law enforcement once again to provide an update on where 1 she thought her husband was headed. (See id.) Soon after, CHP 2 officer Guillemin learned about the decedent driving “a white 3 Ford F-150 truck northbound on Highway 89 in the North Lake Tahoe 4 area, heading towards Olympic Valley in the County of Placer.” 5 (See id. at 11-12 (citation modified).) 6 One of the decedent’s coworkers called law enforcement 7 around the same time to notify them that he had taken a company 8 vehicle which matched the F-150’s profile and drove away in it. 9 (See id. at 12.) Guillemin began his pursuit of the decedent and 10 notified his dispatch “that he was going to make a stop on the 11 truck.” (See id. at 12-13.) After Guillemin lost track of the 12 decedent, he began heading towards the decedent’s workplace. 13 (See id. at 13.) 14 Guillemin eventually approached the decedent’s supposed 15 destination and pulled over “onto the right shoulder at the 16 intersection of Highway 89 and the entrance of Olympic Valley 17 Events Center.” (See id.) State Parks officer Yarbrough then 18 appeared and stopped his vehicle next to Guillemin’s own to 19 discuss the situation. (See id.) While doing so, “the white 20 truck with the Palisades Tahoe logo drove past the officers, on 21 the right side of the road, heading towards Olympic Valley Events 22 Center, which is a dead-end street.” (See id. at 13-14 (citation 23 modified).) Yarbrough “almost immediately took off at a high 24 rate of speed after the white truck” without “activating his 25 emergency sirens.” (See id. at 14 (citation modified).) 26 While nearing the dead end, Yarbrough crashed his 27 vehicle “into the driver’s side of the white truck with the 28 Palisades logo that the decedent was driving.” (See id. at 14- 1 15.) As both vehicles’ doors opened, Guillemin appeared at the 2 scene in his own vehicle. (See id. at 15.) The decedent emerged 3 from the white truck and approached Yarbrough in his vehicle. 4 (See id. at 15-16.) The decedent turned around to flee, and then 5 Yarbrough used a firearm against him. (See id. at 16.) The 6 decedent was shot in the back and “immediately fell to the ground 7 on his stomach, severely wounded.” (See id. at 18.) Both 8 officers shouted “drop the knife” to the decedent, which “was the 9 first and only command they gave to him.” (See id. (citation 10 modified).) 11 Yarbrough and Guillemin “then pounced on the decedent 12 and handcuffed him.” (See id. at 18-19 (citation modified).) 13 The officers claim that they began administering medical aid to 14 the decedent after handcuffing him. (See id. at 18-19.) Neither 15 Yarbrough nor Guillemin “called dispatch for additional medical 16 aid for the decedent after he was shot. Instead, the decedent 17 was assisted by Palisades Tahoe ski patrol paramedics.” (See id. 18 at 21.) Nobody ever took the decedent to a hospital, and “30 to 19 40 minutes after he was shot,” he was “pronounced dead” at the 20 scene that morning. (See id. at 21, 26.) 21 On February 1, 2024, the decedent was autopsied at the 22 direction of the Placer County entities, which concluded that a 23 bullet had entered his “upper back” in an autopsy report. (See 24 id. at 24.) On the death certificate, Hintze noted that the 25 decedent’s cause of death was a “gunshot wound of chest.” (See 26 id.) 27 II. Procedural Background 28 Plaintiff brings eleven claims against defendants: (1) 1 excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the CHP, Guillemin 2 (collectively, “CHP defendants”), State Parks, and Yarbrough 3 (collectively, “State Parks defendants”); (2) violation of the 4 Tom Bane Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1, against the 5 Placer County entities, the CHP defendants, and the State Parks 6 defendants; (3) negligence against the CHP defendants, the State 7 Parks defendants, and the Placer County entities; (4) assault and 8 battery against the CHP defendants, and the State Parks 9 defendants; (5) violation of the American with Disabilities Act 10 (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 701, 11 12101 against the Placer County entities, State Parks, and the 12 CHP; (6) denial of medical care under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 13 Yarbrough and Guillemin; (7) unwarranted interference with 14 familial association under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the State 15 Parks defendants, the CHP defendants, and the Placer County 16 entities; (8) intentional infliction of emotional distress 17 against the State Parks defendants, the CHP defendants, and the 18 Placer County entities; (9) wrongful death, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 19 § 377.60, against the State Parks defendants, the CHP defendants, 20 and the Placer County entities; (10) supervisory liability under 21 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against State Parks, the CHP, and the Placer 22 County entities; and (11) fraudulent misrepresentation against 23 Hintze and the Placer County entities.1 (See Compl. at 27-51.) 24 1 “Under California law, a cause of action is not lost by 25 reason of a plaintiff's death.” Wheeler v. City of Santa Clara, 894 F.3d 1046, 1052-53 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Cal. Civ. Proc. 26 Code § 377.20). In such a case, “a survival action can be 27 maintained by the decedent's ‘personal representative’ or ‘successor in interest.’” See id. (quoting Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 28 § 377.30). “‘Successor in interest’ is defined as the 1 Defendants move to dismiss all claims under Federal 2 Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for “failure to state a claim 3 upon which relief can be granted.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 12(b)(6).2 5 III. Discussion 6 A. Eleventh Amendment 7 In addition to moving to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), 8 State Parks moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of 9 subject-matter jurisdiction based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. 10 (See Docket No. 22 at 11-15 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)).) 11 Under separate cover, the CHP joined State Parks’ motion in that 12 respect. (See Docket No. 23 at 1-2.) 13 Plaintiff concedes that the Eleventh Amendment 14 insulates the CHP and State Parks from civil liability. (See, 15 e.g., Docket No. 22 at 13-18, Docket No. 23 at 1-2.) “The 16 Eleventh Amendment protects states and state instrumentalities 17 from suit in federal court.” See Doe v. Regents of the Univ. of 18 Cal., 891 F.3d 1147, 1152-54 (9th Cir. 2018). It is undisputed 19 that the CHP and State Parks are both “state instrumentalities.” 20 See id. Accordingly, the court will grant defendants’ motions to 21 dismiss this action in its entirety as against defendants CHP and 22

23 beneficiary of the decedent's estate or ‘other successor in interest who succeeds to a cause of action.’” See id. (citation 24 modified) (quoting Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 377.11). Plaintiff attests that she is the decedent’s successor in interest. (See 25 Compl. at 3-4, 54.)

26 2 At the conclusion of oral argument on August 18, 2025, 27 counsel for plaintiffs agreed to dismiss the claims of the decedent’s minor child N.M. as well all claims as against Dr. 28 Evan Matshes and his medical practice Naag Forensics PC. 1 State Parks. 2 B. Excessive Force Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count One) 3 Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s claims for 4 excessive force as against Yarbrough and Guillemin. (See Compl. 5 at 27-28.) 6 To determine whether police officers’ use of force was 7 excessive, “our question is whether the officers employed an 8 ‘objectively unreasonable’ amount of force under the ‘totality of 9 the circumstances.’” See Estate of Strickland v. Nevada County, 10 69 F.4th 614, 618-20 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Brooks v. Clark 11 County, 828 F.3d 910, 919-20 (9th Cir. 2016)), cert. denied, 144 12 S. Ct. 599, 599 (2024). As part of this inquiry, the court must 13 consider factors such as “the nature and quality of the intrusion 14 on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the 15 countervailing governmental interests at stake.” See id. 16 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989)). It must 17 also assess “the type and amount of force inflicted, the severity 18 of the crime at issue, whether the suspect posed an immediate 19 threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether the 20 suspect was actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade 21 arrest by flight.” Id. (citation modified). 22 “Each government official is only liable for his or her 23 own misconduct. It follows that liability may not be imposed on 24 a team effort theory that would allow the jury to lump all the 25 defendants together, rather than require it to base each 26 individual’s liability on his own conduct.” See Peck v. Montoya, 27 51 F.4th 877, 888-91 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation modified). 28 “Instead, for an official to be liable for another actor’s 1 depriving a third party of his constitutional rights, that 2 official must have at least the same level of intent as would be 3 required if the official were directly to deprive the third party 4 of his constitutional rights.” Id. (citation modified). 5 Plaintiff alleges that Yarbrough shot the decedent in 6 the back while he faced away from the officer. (See Compl. at 7 16-19, 21, 24.) Because decedent was not actively trying to 8 escape from the scene or endanger anybody while walking away from 9 Yarbrough, this allegation is sufficient to state a claim that 10 Yarbrough used excessive force against the decedent. See Estate 11 of Aguirre v. County of Riverside, 131 F.4th 702, 704-08 (9th 12 Cir. 2025). Construing the allegations of the complaint in the 13 light most favorable to plaintiff, it can be inferred that while 14 the decedent had stolen a vehicle and evaded arrest prior to his 15 face-to-face confrontation with Yarbrough, he posed no threat to 16 the officers’ safety in the moment with his back turned to them. 17 (See Compl. at 16-19, 27-31.) Therefore, the defendants’ motions 18 to dismiss plaintiff’s excessive force claim against Yarbrough in 19 Count One will be denied. 20 Plaintiff also alleges that Guillemin used excessive 21 force against the decedent. (See id.) Unlike Yarbrough, 22 Guillemin did not shoot or attempt to shoot the decedent, so it 23 cannot be reasonably inferred that Guillemin had the same level 24 of intent that Yarbrough did. See Peck, 51 F.4th at 888-91. The 25 complaint alleges only that Guillemin helped handcuff the 26 decedent after Yarbrough shot the decedent in the back. Another 27 judge of tis court has previously recognized that “the use of 28 handcuffs during an arrest is quite common and often a standard 1 practice and, ordinarily, the use of handcuffs during an arrest 2 is a very low quantum of force that will not constitute excessive 3 force.” See Knickerbocker v. United States, No. 1:16-cv-1811 DAD 4 JLT, 2020 WL 1433141, at *4-5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2020), aff’d, 5 858 F. App’x 243, 244 (9th Cir. 2021). 6 However, the court has acknowledged that “the manner in 7 which an individual is handcuffed may, under some circumstances, 8 amount to excessive force,” such as if the handcuffs are too 9 tight. Id. (citing Wall v. County of Orange, 364 F.3d 1107, 10 1111-12 (9th Cir. 2004)); see also Spencer v. Pew, 117 F.4th 11 1130, 1137-45 (9th Cir. 2024) (holding that police officers who 12 used a Taser repeatedly on the plaintiff, beat him repeatedly, 13 and then handcuffed him did not use excessive force until an 14 officer started “kneeling on the plaintiff after he was 15 handcuffed”). But no such facts are alleged here. (See Compl. 16 at 19, 27-28.) To state a claim for excessive force against 17 Guillemin, plaintiff would need to allege that Guillemin used 18 additional force against the decedent beyond just assisting in 19 handcuffing him. (See id.) Thus, the court will grant 20 defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiff’s excessive force claim 21 against Guillemin in Count One. 22 C. Denial of Medical Care (Count Six) 23 Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s claims for 24 unconstitutional denial of medical care against Yarbrough and 25 Guillemin under the Fourth Amendment. (See Compl. at 39-40 26 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983).) 27 The Fourth Amendment requires “‘objectively reasonable 28 post-arrest care,’ which means that police officers must seek 1 ‘the necessary medical attention for a detainee when he has been 2 injured while being apprehended by either promptly summoning the 3 necessary medical help or by taking the injured detainee to a 4 hospital.’” See D’Braunstein v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 131 F.4th 5 764, 769-70 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting Tatum v. City & County of 6 San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1098-1100 (9th Cir. 2006)). This 7 rule “does not ‘require an officer to provide what hindsight 8 reveals to be the most effective medical care for an arrested 9 suspect.’” Id. 10 Plaintiff alleges that Yarbrough and Guillemin failed 11 to provide the decedent with sufficient medical care after he was 12 shot in the back and handcuffed on the ground. (See Compl. at 13 18-21, 39-40.) Specifically, the complaint states that Yarbrough 14 and Guillemin attempted to “administer medical aid to the 15 decedent,” but neither officer “called dispatch for additional 16 medical aid.” (See id. at 19-21.) Because neither officer 17 “summoned medical help or took the injured arrestee to a 18 hospital,” plaintiff states a claim for denial of medical care 19 against Yarbrough and Guillemin. See Holcomb v. Ramar, No. 1:13- 20 cv-1102 AWI SKO, 2013 WL 5947621, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 21 2013); see also Estate of F.R. v. County of Yuba, No. 2:23-cv- 22 846, 2023 WL 6130049, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2023) (denying 23 police officer’s motion to dismiss where plaintiffs alleged that 24 the officer prevented the decedent there from receiving medical 25 aid after a third party shot him). Accordingly, the court will 26 deny defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiff’s denial of medical 27 care claims against Yarbrough and Guillemin in Count Six. D. Interference with Familial Relations in Violation of 42 28 1 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count Seven) 2 Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s claims for 3 unwarranted interference with familial relations under the First 4 Amendment against Yarbrough, Guillemin, and the Placer County 5 entities.3 (See Compl. at 40-41.) 6 The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly dodged the question of 7 whether a widow may assert a § 1983 claim for unwarranted 8 interference with familial association for loss of her spouse. 9 See, e.g., Peck, 51 F.4th at 892-94 (“This case involves a 10 familial-association claim asserted by a spouse, rather than a 11 parent or child. We have not previously held whether a 12 substantive due process right exists in that context, and other 13 courts of appeals have reached conflicting conclusions.”); 14 Hampton v. California, No. 22-15481, 2023 WL 6443897, at *1 (9th 15 Cir. Oct. 3, 2023) (same), cert. denied sub nom. Diaz v. Polanco, 16 144 S. Ct. 2520 (2024); Estate of Elkins v. Pelayo, No. 22-16027, 17 2023 WL 9020556, at *2-3 & n.4 (9th Cir. Dec. 29, 2023) (citation 18 modified) (“This court has not established whether spouses may 19 bring a loss of companionship claim under the Fourteenth 20 Amendment.”). 21 Similar claims have had mixed results in other courts. 22 In Griffin v. Strong, the Tenth Circuit considered a spousal 23 3 Courts disagree on whether the First Amendment or the 24 Fourteenth Amendment protects familial relations. See Estate of Chivrell v. City of Arcata (Chivrell I), 623 F. Supp. 3d 1032, 25 1043-45 & n.6 (N.D. Cal. 2022) (citing IDK, Inc. v. Clark County, 836 F.2d 1185, 1191-93 (9th Cir. 1988)). However, courts treat 26 “the liability analysis of a familial association claim brought 27 under the First Amendment as the same as for a familial association claim brought under the Fourteenth Amendment.” See 28 id. (citation modified). 1 claim for unwarranted interference with familial relations and 2 reversed a judgment against a defendant police officer on that 3 claim. See 983 F.2d 1544, 1546-49 (10th Cir. 1993). In Harbury 4 v. Deutch, the D.C. Circuit affirmed as a matter of law the 5 dismissal of a spousal claim for unwarranted interference with 6 familial association. See 233 F.3d 596, 604-07 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 7 However, the Supreme Court overruled its decision on other 8 grounds in Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 405-06, 421-22 9 (2002). 10 As the Ninth Circuit did in Peck, this court will 11 assume that plaintiff’s claim is cognizable and address whether 12 her allegations satisfy its elements, instead of deciding a 13 constitutional question on motions to dismiss under Rule 14 12(b)(6). See 51 F.4th at 892-94. 15 To state a claim for unwarranted interference with 16 familial relations, the complaint must contain more than 17 “conclusory statements that do not allow the court to draw a 18 reasonable inference that plaintiff had the deep attachments and 19 commitments with the decedent required to merit such 20 constitutional protections.” See Chivrell I, 623 F. Supp. 3d at 21 1044-45 (citing IDK, 836 F.2d at 1192-93). 22 Plaintiff pleads that she was intimately involved in 23 the decedent’s life. (See Compl. at 3-4, 9-11.) The complaint 24 indicates that she lived with him, bore a child with him, was 25 involved in his day-to-day life (by, inter alia, being aware of 26 his work schedule and routines), and looked out for his safety. 27 (See id.) The complaint goes beyond “merely labelling the 28 decedent as plaintiff’s spouse,” and therefore plaintiff has 1 sufficiently alleged an underlying intimate relationship. See 2 Chivrell I, 623 F. Supp. 3d at 1044-45 (citation modified). 3 However, plaintiff must also allege that “the officers’ 4 conduct deprived plaintiff of her familial interest in a manner 5 that shocks the conscience.” See Peck, 51 F.4th at 892-94 6 (citation modified). The Ninth Circuit applies a “deliberate- 7 indifference standard when officials had ample time to correct 8 their wrongful conduct. But if the defendants had to make a snap 9 judgment because of an escalating situation, then their conduct 10 does not shock the conscience unless they acted with a purpose to 11 harm unrelated to legitimate law enforcement objectives.” Id. 12 (citation modified). 13 Plaintiff’s allegations of the officers’ misconduct can 14 be divided into at least three sets of acts: Yarbrough crashing 15 his car into the decedent’s vehicle, Yarbrough shooting the 16 decedent in the back, and both officers failing to find adequate 17 medical care for the decedent after he was shot. (See Compl. at 18 15-21.) 19 Plaintiff alleges that the officers had “30 to 40 20 minutes after he was shot” to connect the decedent with adequate 21 medical care. (See id. at 21-26.) Plaintiff thus states a claim 22 based on the third set of acts because “actual deliberation was 23 practical” under these circumstances. See Porter v. Osborn, 546 24 F.3d 1131, 1137-38 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation modified) (quoting 25 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 850-51 (1998)). At 26 the point that Yarbrough and Guillemin had handcuffed the 27 decedent and left him lying on the ground for 30 minutes, “an 28 escalating situation” was no longer present, and the officers had 1 “ample time to correct their wrongful conduct.” See Peck, 51 2 F.4th at 892-94; see also Corbera v. Taylor, No. 2:21-cv-1998 WBS 3 KJN, 2022 WL 17741089, at *4-6 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2022) (denying 4 officer’s motion to dismiss familial association claim under 5 deliberate indifference standard where officer had “approximately 6 seven minutes between the time the officer agreed to respond to 7 the call and the time of his collision with the decedent’s 8 vehicle, which tends to show that he had sufficient time to 9 deliberate on his actions”). Because plaintiff sufficiently 10 alleges that the officers’ conduct shocks the conscience, the 11 court need not address whether the other allegations state a 12 familial association claim. 13 Therefore, the court will deny defendants’ motions to 14 dismiss plaintiff’s unwarranted interference with familial 15 relations claims against Yarbrough and Guillemin in Count Seven. 16 E. Tom Bane Act (Count Two) 17 Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s claims for 18 violation of the Tom Bane Act against Yarbrough, Guillemin, and 19 the Placer County entities. (See Compl. at 28-31 (citing Cal. 20 Civ. Code § 52.1).) 21 “The Tom Bane Act provides a cause of action for 22 violations of a plaintiff’s state or federal civil rights 23 committed by threats, intimidation, or coercion.” Reese v. 24 County of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1040-41 & n.2 (9th Cir. 25 2018) (citation modified) (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1). “The 26 elements of an excessive force claim under the Tom Bane Act are 27 the same as under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Id. (citation modified). 28 Because plaintiff has stated a claim that Yarbrough 1 violated the Fourth Amendment in using excessive force against 2 the decedent, she also states a claim against him under the Tom 3 Bane Act. See Rivera v. Cater, No. 2:18-cv-56 WBS EFB, 2018 WL 4 1621095, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2018). The complaint also 5 states a claim for violation of the Tom Bane Act against 6 Guillemin. (See Compl. at 28-31, 40-41.) Plaintiff premises 7 this claim against him upon unwarranted interference with 8 familial associations. (See id.) Therefore, the court will deny 9 defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiff’s claim under the Tom 10 Bane Act against Yarbrough and Guillemin in Count Two. 11 F. Negligence (Count Three) 12 Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s claims for 13 negligence against the State Parks defendants and the CHP 14 defendants. (See Compl. at 31-33.) 15 “Under California negligence law, ‘a plaintiff must 16 show that the defendant had a duty to use due care, that he 17 breached that duty, and that the breach was the proximate or 18 legal cause of the resulting injury.’” Tabares v. City of 19 Huntington Beach, 988 F.3d 1119, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting 20 Hayes v. County of San Diego, 57 Cal. 4th 622, 628-33 (2013)). 21 “The officer’s conduct must only ‘fall within the range 22 of conduct that is reasonable’ viewed ‘in light of the totality 23 of circumstances.’” Id. (citation modified). “California 24 negligence law regarding the use of deadly force overall is 25 ‘‘broader than federal Fourth Amendment law.’” Id. (quoting 26 Villegas ex rel. C.V. v. City of Anaheim, 823 F.3d 1252, 1257-58 27 & n.6 (9th Cir. 2016)). 28 Because plaintiff states a claim for excessive force 1 against Yarbrough, she states a claim for negligence against him. 2 (See Compl. at 15, 31-33.) The Ninth Circuit’s holding in 3 Tabares that California negligence law is broader than what the 4 Fourth Amendment circumscribes means that police conduct which 5 runs afoul of the Fourth Amendment is also unreasonable. See 988 6 F.3d at 1125-26. However, the converse is not true: a police 7 officer’s negligent conduct does not necessarily violate the 8 Fourth Amendment. See Alves v. County of Riverside, 135 F.4th 9 1161, 1171-74 (9th Cir. 2025). Thus, the court will deny 10 defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiff’s negligence claim 11 against Yarbrough in Count Three. 12 The complaint also states a claim for negligence 13 against Guillemin. (See Compl. at 21, 31-33, 39-40.) It alleges 14 that Guillemin owed the decedent a duty of due care, which he 15 breached by not calling for the decedent to receive medical 16 attention, after restraining the decedent. See Estate of F.R., 17 2023 WL 6130049, at *3-4 (citation omitted) (“Plaintiffs allege 18 that F.R. was in custody and in need of urgent medical attention. 19 The court therefore concludes that plaintiffs have sufficiently 20 alleged that defendants owed F.R. a duty of care.”); see also 21 Alves, 135 F.4th at 1171-74 (citation modified) (“The officers 22 owed the decedent a duty of due care after restraining him in 23 handcuffs and breached their duty of care by not placing him in a 24 recovery position and failing to check whether he was breathing 25 and had a pulse.”). Accordingly, the court will deny defendants’ 26 motions to dismiss plaintiff’s negligence claim against Guillemin 27 in Count Three. 28 G. Battery (Count Four) 1 Under California law, a plaintiff bringing a battery 2 claim against a police officer must show that the officer used 3 “unreasonable force.” See Monzon v. City of Murrieta, 978 F.3d 4 1150, 1164-65 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Edson v. City of Anaheim, 5 63 Cal. App. 4th 1269, 1272-73 (4th Dist. 1998)). “This analysis 6 requires the same ‘totality of the circumstances’ inquiry applied 7 to negligence claims.” McLeod v. City of Redding, No. 2:22-cv- 8 585 WBS JDP, 2024 WL 3011227, at *7-8 (E.D. Cal. June 12, 2024) 9 (citation modified) (quoting Hayes, 57 Cal. 4th at 639-40). 10 Because plaintiff pleads that Yarbrough’s use of force 11 against the decedent was unreasonable, she also states a claim 12 for battery against him. (See Compl. at 27-34.) The same 13 reasoning applies to plaintiff’s allegation that Guillemin used 14 unreasonable force against the decedent. See id. While 15 Guillemin did not shoot the decedent, the complaint alleges that 16 he negligently assisted Yarbrough in handcuffing the decedent 17 after he had fallen to the ground wounded. See id. Thus, the 18 court will deny defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiff’s 19 battery claims against Yarbrough and Guillemin in Count Four. 20 H. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count Eight) 21 22 Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s claims for 23 intentional infliction of emotional distress against Yarbrough, 24 Guillemin, and the Placer County Entities. (See Compl. at 42- 25 43.) To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional 26 distress, plaintiff must show “extreme and outrageous conduct by 27 the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless 28 1 disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; 2 plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and 3 actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the 4 defendant's outrageous conduct.” See Catsouras v. Dep’t of Cal. 5 Highway Patrol, 181 Cal. App. 4th 856, 874-75 (4th Dist. 2010) 6 (citation modified) (quoting Christensen v. Superior Ct., 54 Cal. 7 3d 868, 902-04 (1991)). 8 “Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to 9 exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized 10 community.” Id. Further, “it is not enough that the conduct be 11 intentional and outrageous. It must be conduct directed at the 12 plaintiff or occur in the presence of a plaintiff of whom the 13 defendant is aware.” Id. (citation modified). 14 The court concludes that plaintiff has sufficiently 15 stated claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress 16 against Yarbrough and Guillemin in Count Eight of the complaint. 17 (See Compl. at 42-43.) Plaintiff alleges that Yarbrough and 18 Guillemin “engaged in extreme conduct, with reckless disregard of 19 the probability that the decedent would suffer emotional distress 20 and did suffer severe emotional distress pre-mortem.” (See id. 21 (citation modified).) 22 In Estate of F.R., this court denied a police officer’s 23 motion to dismiss a claim for intentional infliction of emotional 24 distress where the defendant prevented the decedent from 25 receiving medical attention for an ultimately fatal gunshot 26 wound. See 2023 WL 6130049, at *8-9. The court will do the same 27 here because the officers’ seizure of the decedent prevented him 28 from receiving medical attention and they failed to summon 1 medical attention for an extended period of time. See id. 2 (“Whether defendants’ conduct was sufficiently ‘outrageous’ to 3 support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress 4 is a question of fact, and therefore inappropriate for resolution 5 at the motion to dismiss stage.”). Thus, the court will deny 6 defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiff’s intentional infliction 7 of emotional distress claims against Yarbrough and Guillemin in 8 Count Eight. 9 I. Wrongful Death (Count Nine) 10 “A family member may bring a state law wrongful death 11 claim to recover damages based on her own injuries resulting from 12 a decedent’s death. A plaintiff who brings a wrongful death 13 claim must plead and prove standing.” Chivrell I, 623 F. Supp. 14 3d at 1045-46 (citation modified) (citing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 15 § 377.60). Here, plaintiff states that she was “the decedent’s 16 spouse, and his successor in interest and succeeds to the 17 decedent’s interest in this action.” (See Compl. at 54 (citation 18 modified) (citing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 377.11).) The complaint 19 also states the manner in which defendant was negligent and how 20 such negligence caused or contributed to any specified injury. 21 See Estate of Chivrell v. City of Arcata (Chivrell II), 694 F. 22 Supp. 3d 1218, 1240-41 (N.D. Cal. 2023) (citing Norgart v. Upjohn 23 Co., 21 Cal. 4th 383, 389-91 (1999)). Further, Yarbrough’s use 24 of excessive force and Guillemin’s denial of medical care would 25 each suffice to meet the wrongful act or neglect element of a 26 wrongful death claim. (See Compl. at 27-34, 39-40, 43-45.) 27 Accordingly, the complaint sufficiently alleges a wrongful death 28 claim against Yarbrough and Guillemin. 1 J. Fraudulent Misrepresentation (Count Eleven) 2 Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s claims for 3 fraudulent misrepresentation against Hintze and the Placer County 4 entities. (See Compl. at 49-50.) The elements of fraudulent 5 misrepresentation are: “defendants represented that an important 6 fact was true; that representation was false; defendants knew 7 that the representation was false when defendants made it, or 8 defendants made the representation recklessly and without regard 9 for its truth; and defendants intended that plaintiff rely on the 10 representation.” See Thomas v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 97 11 Cal. App. 5th 587, 637-38 (1st Dist. 2023) (citation modified). 12 Plaintiff must also show that she “reasonably relied on the 13 representation,” the misrepresentation “harmed” her, and that her 14 “reliance on defendant’s representation was a substantial factor 15 in causing that harm.” Id. (citation modified). 16 Plaintiff seeks to impose fraud liability on Hintze and 17 the Placer County entities because the decedent’s death 18 certificate states that he died of “a gunshot wound to the chest” 19 when the decedent was shot in the back. (See Compl. at 23-24, 20 49-50.) Plaintiff does not cite any authority for the 21 proposition that the wording of the decedent’s death certificate 22 is grounds for such a claim. (See, e.g., Docket No. 41 at 4-8.) 23 Because she does not allege that any representation 24 defendants made to this effect was false, plaintiff fails to 25 state a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation. (See Compl. at 26 24, 49-51.) Further, plaintiff does not indicate that she 27 reasonably relied on the Hintze’s wording in the autopsy report 28 1 or on the death certificate.4 (See id.) Thus, the court finds 2 plaintiff’s fraudulent misrepresentation claims in Count Eleven 3 to be frivolous at best, and will grant defendants’ motions to 4 dismiss those claims. 5 K. Municipal Liability (Count Ten) 6 The Placer County entities move to dismiss all claims 7 against them. (See Compl. at 28-33, 34-38, 40-51.) 8 “In California, a public entity is not liable for an 9 injury arising from an act or omission of the public entity or a 10 public employee except as provided by statute.” Doe v. L.A. 11 Cnty. Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs., 37 Cal. App. 5th 675, 686-87 12 (2d Dist. 2019) (citing Cal. Gov’t Code § 815(a)). However, “a 13 public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act 14 or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope 15 of his employment if the act or omission would have given rise to 16 a cause of action against that employee or his personal 17 representative.”5 See Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.2(a) (citation 18 modified). 19 Plaintiff concedes that the Placer County entities are 20 4 At oral argument, plaintiffs’ counsel was not able to 21 explain how her client relied at all on the language of the death 22 certificate or in the autopsy report.

23 5 Plaintiff brings claims against Doe 1, “a dispatcher for the Placer County Sheriff’s Office who communicated messages 24 to law enforcement agents during the incident giving rise to this action at all material times.” (See Compl. at 6, 28-34, 39-45 25 (citation modified).) Because Doe 1 has not moved to dismiss, plaintiff’s claims against Doe 1 and any potential vicarious 26 liability that may attach to the Placer County entities as a 27 result are not in front of the court at this time. (See Docket No. 39 at 8.) Therefore, the court declines to decide whether 28 plaintiff states claims against Doe 1. 1 public entities. (See Compl. at 4-5 (citing Cal. Gov’t Code 2 § 811.2).) Because plaintiff does not state a claim against any 3 of the Placer County entities’ employees, such as Hintze, 4 plaintiff does not state a tort claim against the Placer County 5 entities either. See Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 815, 815.2(a), 815.4. 6 Therefore, the court will grant defendants’ motions to dismiss 7 plaintiff’s claims against the Placer County entities in Counts 8 Two, Three, Five, Eight, Nine, and Eleven.6 9 Plaintiff’s claims against the Placer County entities 10 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Counts Seven and Ten similarly fail. 11 (See Compl. at 40-41, 45-48.) “Because § 1983 imposes liability 12 only where a state actor, ‘under color of some official policy, 13 ‘causes’ an employee to violate another's constitutional rights,’ 14 Congress did not intend to impose vicarious liability on 15 municipalities ‘solely on the basis of the existence of an 16 employer-employee relationship with a tortfeasor.’” Colorado 17 City, 935 F.3d at 808-09 (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. 18 of N.Y.C., 436 U.S. 658, 690-95 (1978)). “Moreover, Congress did 19 not intend municipalities to be held liable unless action 20 pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a 21 constitutional tort.” Id. (citation modified). “Instead, to 22 establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must show that a local 23 government’s policy or custom led to the plaintiff’s injury.” 24 Id. (citation modified). 25

26 6 Count Five for violations of the ADA and RA is a federal claim, but state law mirrors federal law in terms of 27 municipal and vicarious liability for purposes of this claim. See United States v. Town of Colorado City, 935 F.3d 804, 808-09 28 (9th Cir. 2019). 1 Plaintiff fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 2 against either of the Placer County entities because she does not 3 identify a specific “policy or custom” upon which an agent of the 4 Placer County entities acted. See T.O. ex rel. Morris v. County 5 of Nevada, No. 2:24-cv-1131, 2024 WL 4216754, at *1-2 (E.D. Cal. 6 Sept. 17, 2024) (citation modified) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 7 691-95 (1978)). Accordingly, the court will grant defendants’ 8 motions to dismiss plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 9 against the Placer County entities in Counts Seven and Ten.7 10 L. Qualified Immunity 11 In the current preliminary posture, the court declines 12 to address whether qualified immunity shields any defendants from 13 liability. See Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 14 2018). “While courts are permitted to consider qualified 15 immunity at the pleadings stage, the Ninth Circuit has explained 16 that doing so ‘raises special problems for legal decision 17 making.’” Jones v. City of Vallejo, No. 2:22-cv-1574 WBS JDP, 18 2024 WL 2153646, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. May 14, 2024) (quoting 19 Keates, 883 F.3d at 1234-35). 20 “By considering qualified immunity at the pleadings 21 stage, the courts may be called upon to decide far-reaching 22 constitutional questions on a nonexistent factual record.” Id. 23 (citation modified). “At this stage, if the operative complaint 24 7 In the alternative, the court construes plaintiff’s 25 untimely response to Hintze and the Placer County Entities’ motion to dismiss as a non-opposition to it. See L.R. 230(c). 26 They moved to dismiss on June 23, 2025. (See Docket No. 21.) 27 The parties stipulated to giving plaintiff until July 28, 2025 to oppose the motion. (See Docket No. 33.) Plaintiff did not do so 28 until August 4, 2025. (See Docket No. 41.) 1 contains even one allegation of a harmful act that would 2 constitute a violation of a clearly established constitutional 3 right, then plaintiff is entitled to go forward with her claims.” 4 Id. (citation modified). 5 As discussed above, plaintiff pleads facts which make 6 it “possible that defendants violated a clearly established 7 right” under the Fourth Amendment, such as Yarbrough’s alleged 8 use of excessive force. See id. (citation modified). “Denial of 9 qualified immunity at this juncture therefore sheds little light 10 on whether defendants might ultimately be entitled to qualified 11 immunity once the case proceeds at least to the summary judgment 12 stage, where the court is presented with facts providing context 13 for the challenged actions.” Id. (citation modified). Thus, the 14 court will deny defendants’ motions to dismiss for qualified 15 immunity at this stage of the proceeding.8 16 M. Leave to Amend 17 Defendants request that the court dismiss plaintiff’s 18 claims with prejudice and without leave to amend. (See, e.g., 19 Docket No. 22 at 15-16, 26-27.) However, “Federal Rule of Civil 20 Procedure 15(a)(2) provides that the court should ‘freely give 21 leave when justice so requires.’” Herring Networks, Inc. v. 22 Maddow, 8 F.4th 1148, 1160-61 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Fed. R. 23 8 For a similar reason, the court does not reach 24 defendants’ arguments that plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed because she did not timely comply with the California Government 25 Claims Act to avoid using “extrinsic evidence.” See Wilson v. Timec Servs. Co., No. 2:23-cv-172 WBS KJN, 2023 WL 5753617, at 26 *1-2 & n.2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2023) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12). 27 Such defenses are better suited for adjudication on a motion for summary judgment. See id. Accordingly, the CHP defendants’ 28 request for judicial notice is DENIED. (See Docket No. 19-6.) 1 Civ. P. 15(a)(2)). “This policy is to be applied with extreme 2 liberality.’” Id. (citation modified). Given that some of the 3 described pleading defects may be curable, the court will grant 4 plaintiff leave to amend the complaint. 5 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that all claims by or on behalf 6 of plaintiff N.M., and all claims as against defendants Dr. Evan 7 Matshes and Naag Forensics PC be, and the same hereby are, 8 DISMISSED with prejudice; 9 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Count One of the complaint 10 be, and the same hereby is, DISMISSED without prejudice as 11 against defendants Guillemin, State Parks, and the CHP; Count Two 12 is DISMISSED without prejudice as against defendants Placer 13 County, the Placer County Sheriff’s Office, and the CHP; Counts 14 Three, Seven, and Nine are DISMISSED without prejudice as against 15 defendants State Parks, the CHP, Placer County, and the Placer 16 County Sheriff’s Office; Count Four is DISMISSED without 17 prejudice as against defendants State Parks and the CHP; and 18 Counts Five, Ten, and Eleven are DISMISSED without prejudice as 19 against all defendants; Count Eight is DISMISSED without 20 prejudice as against defendants State Parks, Placer County, and 21 the Placer County Sheriff’s Office; 22 AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ motions to 23 dismiss be, and the same hereby are, DENIED in all other 24 respects.9 25 Plaintiff has twenty-one (21) days from the date of 26

27 9 In other words, the sole remaining claims are Count One against Yarbrough, and Counts Two, Three, Four, Six, Seven, Eight 28 and Nine against both Yarbrough and Guillemin. eee NE EIR EEE NE ON

1 this Order to file an amended complaint if she can do so 2 consistent with this Order. 3 Dated: August 22, 2025 hte a ~ ak pag! sé 4 WILLIAM B. SHUBB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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