1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 SAUL HERNANDO ACOSTA ROA, et al., 10 Case No. 25-cv-07802-RS Plaintiffs, 11 v. TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 12

OFFICIAL FULFILLING THE DUTIES

13 OF FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR, et al., 14 Defendants.

15 16 Petitioners Saul Hernando Acosta Roa, Cristian Alberto Cedeno Correa, Diana Sofia 17 Cuadros Carreno, Geni Viviana Henao Zambrano, Yeison Fabiany Garcia Hurtatis, Yina Paola 18 Hoyos Carvajal, Jenyffer Karina Pabon Jimenez, and Andres Felipe Restrepo Motta are 19 individuals with pending applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under 20 the Convention Against Torture. Petitioners all appeared on September 12, 2025, for what they 21 contend should have been routine preliminary hearings before an immigration judge. In each case, 22 the government orally moved to dismiss, purportedly for the purpose of placing petitioners in 23 “expedited removal” proceedings. Although the immigration judge declined to rule on the 24 dismissal motions and gave each petitioner additional time to respond, petitioners were arrested by 25 DHS agents upon exiting the courtroom, before they could leave the courthouse. 26 Petitioners have joined in a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of each of them, and seek 27 a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) against the “Official Fulfilling The Duties Of Field Office 1 Director,”1 Acting Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement Todd M. Lyons, Secretary 2 of the Department of Homeland Security Kristi Noem, and United States Attorney General Pamela 3 Bondi. Petitioners request an order for their immediate release from custody, and enjoining 4 respondents from transferring them out of this District or deporting them during the pendency of 5 these proceedings. The TRO will be granted as specified below. 6 7 I. BACKGROUND 8 All of the eight petitioners fled Colombia and arrived in the United States at various times 9 in 2023. Each was apprehended by immigration officials at the border, who allegedly determined 10 they posed little if any flight risk or danger to the community and released them into the 11 community under 8 USC §1226a to wait for their immigration court dates. Petitioners all 12 thereafter moved to California and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection 13 under the Convention Against Torture. Each petitioner alleges he or she has complied with all 14 applicable ICE and immigration court obligations and has no criminal history anywhere in the 15 world, with the exception of one petitioner, who acknowledges she was once arrested on suspicion 16 of DUI, although she contends a blood test showed her innocence and that she was never charged. 17 As noted, all the petitioners were detained upon exiting the courtroom following 18 immigration hearings. All are currently being held in custody at 630 Sansome Street, San 19 Francisco. 20 This petition was filed shortly before noon on this date. Petitioners’ counsel declares that 21 immediately after the filing, he provided a copy by email to Pamela Johann, Civil Chief of the San 22 Francisco office of the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of California. Counsel also advised 23 that a motion for a temporary restraining order would be filed shortly. Counsel then provided a 24 copy of the TRO motion and supporting documents just prior to the filing. 25

26 1 Because they are unsure who is currently serving as the Field Office Director, petitioners invoke 27 the court’s jurisdiction over whomever may be in that role. 1 In the motion, petitioner contends the arrests and detention violate the Due Process Clause 2 of the Fifth Amendment, both substantively (because respondents allegedly have no valid interest 3 in detaining them) and procedurally (because they were not provided with a pre-detention bond 4 hearing). 5 6 II. LEGAL STANDARD 7 The standard for issuing a temporary restraining order is substantially identical to the 8 standard for issuing a preliminary injunction. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1159 n.3 (9th 9 Cir. 2017). Thus, a party seeking a temporary restraining order must establish “[1] that he is likely 10 to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 11 preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in 12 the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 13 “[I]f a plaintiff can only show that there are serious questions going to the merits – a lesser 14 showing than likelihood of success on the merits – then a preliminary injunction may still issue if 15 the balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff’s favor, and the other two Winter factors are 16 satisfied.” Friends of the Wild Swan v. Weber, 767 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal 17 quotation marks and citations omitted). “[W]hen the Government is the opposing party,” the final 18 two factors “merge.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). 19 An injunction is a matter of equitable discretion and is “an extraordinary remedy that may 20 only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555 21 U.S. at 22. A “TRO ‘should be restricted to . . . preserving the status quo and preventing 22 irreparable harm just so long as is necessary to hold a [preliminary injunction] hearing, and no 23 longer.’” E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 932 F.3d 742, 779 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting 24 Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Local No. 70, 415 U.S. 25 423, 439 (1974)). 26 27

III. DISCUSSION

1 As noted above, petitioners provided actual notice of their TRO application. Petitioners’ 2 counsel further advised the court that respondents indicated an intent to file opposition this 3 afternoon. As of this time no opposition has been submitted. Given petitioners’ showing and the 4 analysis and authority below, however, entry of this order is warranted, particularly given the 5 upcoming weekend. 6 Petitioners have demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim that their 7 ongoing detention violates their procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. 8 Petitioners have a substantial interest in remaining out of custody, and the Due Process Clause 9 entitles them to a bond hearing before an immigration judge prior to any arrest or detention. 10 Pinchi v. Noem, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, No. 25-cv-05632-PCP, 2025 WL 2084921, at *2-6 (N.D. Cal. 11 July 24, 2025) (applying the three-part test established in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 12 (1976) to similar circumstances); see also Pablo Sequen v. Kaiser, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, No. 25-cv- 13 06487-PCP, 2025 WL 2203419, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2025) (collecting cases). 14 Petitioners have also demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable injury in the absence of 15 temporary relief. The likely unconstitutional deprivation of liberty they face is an immediate and 16 irreparable harm. “It is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights 17 ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 994 (9th 18 Cir. 2017) (quoting Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012)); see also Warsoldier 19 v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 1001-02 (9th Cir. 2005). “[I]t follows inexorably from [the] 20 conclusion” that petitioners’ detention without a hearing is “likely unconstitutional” that they have 21 “also carried [their] burden as to irreparable harm.” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 995. 22 The final two Winter factors, the balance of the equities and public interest, also weigh 23 heavily in favor of granting temporary relief. “[T]he public has a strong interest in upholding 24 procedural protections against unlawful detention, and the Ninth Circuit has recognized that the 25 costs to the public of immigration detention are staggering.” Jorge M. F. v. Wilkinson, No. 21-cv- 26 01434-JST, 2021 WL 783561, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2021) (cleaned up); see Melendres, 695 27 1 F.3d at 1002 (“[I]t is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s 2 constitutional rights.” (quotation omitted)); Preminger v. Principi, 422 F.3d 815, 826 (9th Cir. 3 2005) (“Generally, public interest concerns are implicated when a constitutional right has been 4 violated, because all citizens have a stake in upholding the Constitution.”). As other courts both 5 inside and outside this district have concluded under similar circumstances, “the potential harm to 6 [Petitioner] is significant, while the potential harm to the government is minimal.” Pablo Sequen, 7 2025 WL 2203419, at *3. At most, the government faces a short delay in detaining petitioners if it 8 ultimately demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence, that their detention is necessary to 9 prevent danger to the community or flight. See Jorge M. F., 2021 WL 783561, at *3; Diaz v. 10 Kaiser, No. 25-cv-05071, 2025 WL 1676854, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2025). The government is 11 not “harmed in any legally cognizable sense by being enjoined from constitutional violations.” 12 Zepeda v. U.S. Immigr. & Nat. Serv., 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983). Faced with “a conflict 13 between [administrative] concerns and preventable human suffering, [the Court has] little 14 difficulty concluding that the balance of hardships tips decidedly in [Petitioner’s] favor.” 15 Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 996) (quoting Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1437 (9th Cir. 1983)). 16 A TRO immediately releasing petitioners is appropriate to return them to the status quo. 17 E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 932 F.3d at 779. The status quo refers to “the last uncontested status 18 which preceded the pending controversy.” Doe v. Noem, 778 F. Supp. 3d 1151, 1166 (W.D. Wash. 19 2025) (quoting GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th Cir. 2000)). That is 20 the moment prior to petitioners’ likely illegal detention. See Kuzmenko v. Phillips, No. 25-cv- 21 00663, 2025 WL 779743, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2025) (granting a temporary restraining order 22 requiring immediate release of the petitioner back to home confinement from custody, as a 23 restoration of the status quo). 24 Because petitioners satisfy all requirements for temporary injunctive relief and such relief 25 is necessary to restore the status quo, the TRO is granted as detailed below. This Order accords 26 with many other recent grants of temporary relief in similar circumstances. See, e.g., Alva v. 27 Kaiser, No. 25-cv-06676, 2025 WL 2294917, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2025) (granting temporary 1 restraining order); Pinchi v. Noem, No. 25-cv-05632, 2025 WL 1853763, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 4, 2 2025) (granting temporary restraining order requiring release of asylum seeker and a pre-detention 3 bond hearing before re-arrest); Singh, 2025 WL 1918679, at *10 (granting preliminary injunction); 4 Doe v. Becerra, No. 25-cv-647-DJC-DMC, 2025 WL 691664, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2025) 5 (granting temporary restraining order); see also Diaz, 2025 WL 1676854 (granting temporary 6 restraining order requiring pre-detention hearing before re-detention of noncitizen out of custody 7 five years); Garcia v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-5070, 2025 WL 1676855, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2025) 8 (granting temporary restraining order requiring pre-detention hearing before re-detention of 9 noncitizen out of custody six years ); Enamorado v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-4072-NW, 2025 WL 10 1382859, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2025). 11 Finally, the Court exercises its discretion under Rule 65(c) to dispense with the filing of 12 bond. “[T]here is no realistic likelihood of harm to the [respondents] from enjoining [their] 13 conduct.” Jorgensen v. Cassiday, 320 F.3d 906, 919 (9th Cir. 2003). Therefore, no security is 14 needed to ensure that respondents will be reimbursed for “costs and damages sustained by . . . 15 hav[ing] been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). 16 17 IV. ORDER 18 For the foregoing reasons, that petitioners’ motion for a TRO is granted to preserve the 19 status quo pending further briefing and a hearing on this matter. Respondents are ordered 20 immediately to release petitioners from custody and are enjoined and restrained from re-detaining 21 any of them without notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decision maker, and 22 from removing any of them from the United States.2 This Order shall remain in effect until 23

24 2 Petitioners also asks the Court to order that they not be removed from the Northern District of California in order to preserve this Court’s jurisdiction, but it is well-established that “when the 25 Government moves a habeas petitioner after she properly files a petition naming her immediate custodian, the District Court retains jurisdiction and may direct the writ to any respondent within 26 its jurisdiction who has legal authority to effectuate the prisoner’s release.” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 27 542 U.S. 426, 441 (2004). 1 September 26, 2025, unless otherwise ordered. 2 A hearing on preliminary injunction will be heard on September 24, 2025, at 9:30 a.m. 3 Respondents shall file papers showing cause why a preliminary injunction should not enter no 4 || later than September 17, 2025, at 5:00 p.m. Petitioners may file a reply no later than September 5 22, 2025, at noon. 6 7 || ITISSO ORDERED. 8 9 Dated: September 12, 2025 10

RICHARD SEEBORG

Chief United States District Judge a 12

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