NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 18 2025

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JANNET SOSA-MERCADO, No. 24-3416 Agency No. Petitioner, A077-790-764 v.

MEMORANDUM*

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted September 16, 2025** San Francisco, California

Before: M. SMITH and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges, and BARKER, District Judge.***

Jannet Sosa-Mercado, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of

the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision to sustain the government’s

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable J. Campbell Barker, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Texas, sitting by designation. appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) order granting her cancellation of removal

under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). Because we lack jurisdiction to review the discretionary

part of a decision on cancellation of removal, we dismiss the petition.

Cancellation of removal is a discretionary form of relief, which allows the

government to “cancel removal in the case of an alien who is inadmissible or

deportable from the United States if the alien” meets specific criteria. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229b(a). We lack jurisdiction to review “any judgment regarding the granting of

relief under section . . . 1229b.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Notwithstanding this

general jurisdictional bar, we may review the BIA’s decision for “questions of law

raised upon a petition for review.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); see Ridore v. Holder,

696 F.3d 907, 911 (9th Cir. 2012).

Sosa-Mercado argues we have jurisdiction over her challenge because the

BIA engaged in “impermissible fact finding” in reversing the IJ’s discretionary

decision to grant her cancellation of removal. Sosa-Mercado argues that the BIA

failed to properly apply the de novo review standard to the IJ’s discretionary

determination and the clear error review standard to the IJ’s factual findings, which

are questions of law.

We disagree. As an example, Sosa-Mercado claims that BIA engaged in fact-

finding when it concluded that she only had three positive equities weigh in in her

favor when the IJ found six factors in her favor. She claims that the BIA ignored the

2 IJ’s findings of her sobriety since 2017, her concern for her children, and her interest

in becoming a drug counselor when she gets out of immigration custody. But the

BIA expressly cited all of these facts in its decision and credited her “acceptance of

responsibility” and “continued efforts and desire to remain sober.” Instead, the BIA

found that her undisputed criminal history “outweigh[s]” any positive equities. How

the BIA weighs the equities is not a “question of law,” and we lack jurisdiction to

review it. See § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i); Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 225 n.4

(2024) (“[The] step-two discretionary determination on whether or not to grant

cancellation of removal in the particular case is not reviewable as a question of

law.”).

PETITION DISMISSED.

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