1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 GLENN O’CONNOR, Case No. 1:25-cv-478-BAM (PC) 10 Plaintiff, ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO

RANDOMLY ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE TO

11 v. ACTION 12 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO

CORRECTIONS AND DISMISS ACTION, WITH PREJUDICE, FOR

13 REHABILITATION, FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, FAILURE

TO OBEY COURT ORDER, AND FAILURE

14 Defendant. TO PROSECUTE 15 (ECF NO. 7) 16 FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE 17 18 I. Background 19 Plaintiff Glenn O’Connor (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 20 pauperis in this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s complaint is currently 21 before the Court for screening. (ECF No. 1.) 22 On July 17, 2025, the Court screened the complaint and found that it failed to comply with 23 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and failed to state a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 24 (ECF No. 7.) The Court issued an order granting Plaintiff leave to file a first amended complaint 25 or notice of voluntary dismissal within thirty (30) days. (Id.) The Court expressly warned 26 Plaintiff that the failure to comply with the Court’s order would result in a recommendation for 27 dismissal of this action, with prejudice, for failure to obey a court order and for failure to state a 28 claim. (Id.) Plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint or otherwise communicate with the 1 Court, and the deadline to do so has expired. 2 II. Failure to State a Claim 3 A. Screening Requirement and Standard 4 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 5 governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 6 § 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous 7 or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary 8 relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b). 9 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 10 pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 11 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 12 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 13 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as 14 true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 15 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 16 To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires 17 sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable 18 for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret 19 Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully 20 is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility 21 standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 22 B. Plaintiff’s Allegations 23 Plaintiff is currently housed in Valley State Prison in Chowchilla, California. Plaintiff 24 alleges the events in the complaint occurred while he was housed at California Substance Abuse 25 Treatment Facility (“SATF”). Plaintiff names the California Department of Corrections and 26 Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) as the sole defendant. 27 Plaintiff alleges violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the 28 Eighth Amendment of the Constitution. Plaintiff alleges: 1 “Petitioner was placed into restricted housing unit upon reception into SATF. 2 Custody staff refused to permit petitioner to possess his personal rollator walker 3 inside the large cell. Petitioner was partially paralyzed and had to use the walker by doctor’s orders. Petitioner was at high risk for falls, but had to walk from the bed at 4 the rear of the cell to the front to get his food, medication or use the bathroom. Petition was constantly afraid he would fall again. 5 Petitioner filed an ADA appeal. The ADA coordinator responded posting a 6 computer generated door sign on petitioner’s cell door. It authorized his possession 7 of his prescribed walker. Custody staff continued to deny petitioner the walker.

8 Plaintiff alleges he was in a constant state of fear of falling. 9 As remedies, Plaintiff states that the prison already changed the offending policy and 10 petitioner seeks monetary damages. 11 C. Discussion 12 1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 13 Pursuant to Rule 8, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim 14 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Detailed factual allegations 15 are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 16 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). Plaintiff must 17 set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on 18 its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual allegations 19 are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57; Moss, 20 572 F.3d at 969. 21 As explained below, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim. 22 2. Eleventh Amendment 23 To the extent Plaintiff is claiming money damages against CDCR for an Eighth 24 Amendment claim, “[t]he Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages in federal court 25 against a state, its agencies, and state officials acting in their official capacities.” Aholelei v. 26 Dep’t of Public Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007). Indeed, the Eleventh Amendment 27 prohibits federal courts from hearing a Section 1983 lawsuit in which damages or injunctive relief 28 1 is sought against a state, its agencies (such as CDCR) or individual prisons, absent “a waiver by 2 the state or a valid congressional override. . . .” Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th 3 Cir. 1999). “The Eleventh Amendment bars suits which seek either damages or injunctive relief 4 against a state, ‘an arm of the state,’ its instrumentalities, or its agencies.” See Fireman’s Fund 5 Ins. Co. v. City of Lodi, Cal., 302 F.3d 928, 957 n.28 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation and 6 citations omitted), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 961 (2003). “The State of California has not waived its 7 Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to claims brought under § 1983 in federal 8 court. . . .” Dittman, 191 F.3d at 1025–26 (citing Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 9 234, 241 (1985)); see also Brown v. Cal. Dep’t. of Corrs., 554 F.3d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 2009) 10 (finding California Department of Corrections and California Board of Prison Terms entitled to 11 Eleventh Amendment immunity). 12 3. Americans With Disabilities Act 13 The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) provides, “no qualified individual with a 14 disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the 15 benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination 16 by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The ADA defines “qualified individual with a disability” 17 as “an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, 18 policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or 19 the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the 20 receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.” Id. § 21 12131(2). The Supreme Court has held that “public entity” includes state prisons. United States 22 v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 154 (2006) (citation omitted). To state a claim under the ADA, the 23 plaintiff must have been “improperly excluded from participation in, and denied the benefit of, a 24 prison service, program, or activity on the basis of his physical handicap.” Armstrong v. Wilson, 25 124 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 1997). In addition, “[t]o recover monetary damages under Title II 26 of the ADA ... a plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination on the part of the defendant,” and 27 the standard for intentional discrimination is at least deliberate indifference. Duvall v. County of 28 Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001). 1 Plaintiff does not state a viable claim under the ADA. He alleges that defendant CDCR 2 denied him adequate accommodations, but he does not allege facts that show he was excluded 3 from participation in, or denied the benefits of, any service or programs offered by the prison 4 because of his disability, or that he was subjected to any type of discrimination by reason of his 5 disability. Further, any allegations of inadequate medical care do not state a claim under the 6 ADA. Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 249 (7th Cir. 1996) (“The ADA does not create a remedy 7 for medical malpractice.”). 8 4. Eighth Amendment 9 A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in 10 violation of the Eighth Amendment where the mistreatment rises to the level of “deliberate 11 indifference to serious medical needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) 12 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). The two-part test for deliberate 13 indifference requires Plaintiff to show (1) “a ‘serious medical need’ by demonstrating that failure 14 to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and 15 wanton infliction of pain,’” and (2) “the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately 16 indifferent.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. 17 A defendant does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless the defendant “knows 18 of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 19 837 (1994). “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard,” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 20 1060 (9th Cir. 2004), and is shown where there was “a purposeful act or failure to respond to a 21 prisoner’s pain or possible medical need” and the indifference caused harm. Jett, 439 F.3d at 22 1096. In applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit has held that before it can be said that a 23 prisoner’s civil rights have been abridged, “the indifference to his medical needs must be 24 substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this 25 cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Estelle, 26 429 U.S. at 105–06). Even gross negligence is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference to 27 serious medical needs. See Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990). 28 Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim for medical deliberate indifference. Plaintiff 1 fails to allege any individual defendant knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to his serious 2 medical need. 3 III. Failure to Prosecute and Failure to Obey a Court Order 4 A. Legal Standard 5 Local Rule 110 provides that “[f]ailure . . . of a party to comply with these Rules or with 6 any order of the Court may be grounds for imposition by the Court of any and all sanctions . . . 7 within the inherent power of the Court.” District courts have the inherent power to control their 8 dockets and “[i]n the exercise of that power they may impose sanctions including, where 9 appropriate, . . . dismissal.” Thompson v. Hous. Auth., 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A 10 court may dismiss an action, with prejudice, based on a party’s failure to prosecute an action, 11 failure to obey a court order, or failure to comply with local rules. See, e.g., Ghazali v. Moran, 46 12 F.3d 52, 53–54 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissal for noncompliance with local rule); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 13 963 F.2d 1258, 1260–61 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissal for failure to comply with an order requiring 14 amendment of complaint); Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130–33 (9th Cir. 1987) 15 (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). 16 In determining whether to dismiss an action, the Court must consider several factors: 17 (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its 18 docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 19 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions. Henderson v. Duncan, 779 20 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986); Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440 (9th Cir. 1988). 21 B. Discussion 22 Here, Plaintiff’s first amended complaint is overdue, and he has failed to comply the with 23 the Court’s order. The Court cannot effectively manage its docket if Plaintiff ceases litigating his 24 case. Thus, the Court finds that both the first and second factors weigh in favor of dismissal. 25 The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendant, also weighs in favor of dismissal, since a 26 presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in prosecuting an action. 27 Anderson v. Air W., 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor usually weighs against 28 dismissal because public policy favors disposition on the merits. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 1 639, 643 (9th Cir. 2002). However, “this factor lends little support to a party whose 2 responsibility it is to move a case toward disposition on the merits but whose conduct impedes 3 progress in that direction,” which is the case here. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products 4 Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d 1217, 1228 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). 5 Finally, the Court’s warning to a party that failure to obey the court’s order will result in 6 dismissal satisfies the “considerations of the alternatives” requirement. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262; 7 Malone, 833 at 132–33; Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424. The Court’s July 17, 2025 screening order 8 expressly warned Plaintiff that his failure to file an amended complaint would result in a 9 recommendation of dismissal of this action, with prejudice, for failure to obey a court order and 10 for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 7.) Thus, Plaintiff had adequate warning that dismissal 11 could result from his noncompliance. 12 Additionally, at this stage in the proceedings there is little available to the Court that 13 would constitute a satisfactory lesser sanction while protecting the Court from further 14 unnecessary expenditure of its scarce resources. As Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis in 15 this action, it appears that monetary sanctions will be of little use and the preclusion of evidence 16 or witnesses is likely to have no effect given that Plaintiff has ceased litigating his case. 17 IV. Conclusion and Recommendation 18 Accordingly, the Court HEREBY ORDERS the Clerk of the Court to randomly assign a 19 District Judge to this action. 20 Furthermore, the Court finds that dismissal is the appropriate sanction and HEREBY 21 RECOMMENDS that this action be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim 22 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, for failure to obey a court order, and for Plaintiff’s failure to 23 prosecute this action. 24 These Findings and Recommendation will be submitted to the United States District Judge 25 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen 26 (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendation, the parties may file 27 written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate 28 Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Objections, if any, shall not exceed fifteen (15) pages 1 or include exhibits. Exhibits may be referenced by document and page number if already in 2 the record before the Court. Any pages filed in excess of the 15-page limit may not be 3 considered. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 4 result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual findings” on 5 appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838–39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 6 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 7

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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9 Dated: September 2, 2025 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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