1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ALEX A. VYALKOV, et al., No. 2:25-cv-02478-DAD-AC (PS) 12 Plaintiffs, 13 v. ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ EX PARTE

MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY

14 UNITED GUARD SERVICES OF RESTRAINING ORDER AMERICA, et al., 15 (Doc. No. 3) Defendants. 16

17 18 This matter is before the court on an ex parte motion for a temporary restraining order 19 filed on August 29, 2025 by plaintiff Alex A. Vyalkov, proceeding pro se. (Doc. No. 3.) For the 20 reasons explained below, plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order will be denied. 21 BACKGROUND 22 On August 29, 2025, plaintiffs Alex A. Vyalkov and Julius M. Engel filed their complaint 23 against defendants United Guard Services of America, Michael Burke, Kyle Sprague, Kristopher 24 Jimenez, and Paragon Systems Inc. (Doc. No. 1.) In their complaint, plaintiffs allege as follows. 25 Plaintiffs were terminated from their employment with defendant Paragon Systems Inc. 26 (Id. at ¶¶ 10–11.) Following their terminations, plaintiffs’ union, defendant United Guard 27 Services of America, refused to arbitrate on the employees’ behalf to contest their terminations. 28 (Id.) 1 Based on these allegations, plaintiffs assert the following claims against defendants: 2 (1) conspiracy; (2) wrongful discharge; (3) breach of contract; (4) Unfair Labor Practices under 3 the National Labor Relations Act; (5) racketeering in violation of the Racketeer Influence and 4 Corrupt Organizations Act; and (6) violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. 5 (Id. at ¶¶ 10–21.) 6 On the same day plaintiffs filed their complaint, August 29, 2025, plaintiff Vyalkov filed 7 the pending ex parte motion for a temporary restraining order seeking to compel plaintiffs’ union 8 and certain individual defendants to file for arbitration on behalf of plaintiff Vyalkov. (Doc. No. 9 3 at 1.) 10 LEGAL STANDARD 11 The standard governing the issuing of a temporary restraining order is “substantially 12 identical” to the standard for issuing a preliminary injunction. See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. 13 John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). “The proper legal standard for 14 preliminary injunctive relief requires a party to demonstrate ‘that he is likely to succeed on the 15 merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the 16 balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.’” Stormans, 17 Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 18 Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)); see also Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 636 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th 19 Cir. 2011) (“After Winter, ‘plaintiffs must establish that irreparable harm is likely, not just 20 possible, in order to obtain a preliminary injunction.’”); Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Los 21 Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009). A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must 22 make a showing on all four of these prongs. All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 23 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). The Ninth Circuit has also held that “[a] preliminary injunction is 24 appropriate when a plaintiff demonstrates . . . that serious questions going to the merits were 25 raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff’s favor.” Id. at 1134–35 (citation 26 omitted). The party seeking the injunction bears the burden of proving these elements. Klein v. 27 City of San Clemente, 584 F.3d 1196, 1201 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Caribbean Marine Servs. Co. 28 v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted) (“A plaintiff must do more than 1 merely allege imminent harm sufficient to establish standing; a plaintiff must demonstrate 2 immediate threatened injury as a prerequisite to preliminary injunctive relief.”). Finally, an 3 injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the 4 plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. 5 The likelihood of success on the merits is the most important Winter factor. See Disney 6 Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 856 (9th Cir. 2017). Plaintiff bears the burden of 7 demonstrating that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claims or, at the very least, that 8 “serious questions going to the merits were raised.” All. for Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1131. 9 ANALYSIS 10 In certain circumstances, where a union has breached its duty of fair representation to one 11 or more of its members, “compelling arbitration should be viewed as one of the available 12 remedies[.]” Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 196 (1967). Regardless of whether those 13 circumstances may apply here, the union may only be compelled to arbitrate after a finding on the 14 merits, either through a dispositive motion or trial. Id. (“[A]n order compelling arbitration should 15 be viewed as one of the available remedies when a breach of the union’s duty is proved.”) 16 (emphasis added); Anderson v. Legal Aid Soc’y, No. 95-cv-02408-SAS, 1995 WL 322182, at *4 17 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 1995) (“Thus, an order compelling arbitration may be an appropriate remedy 18 only after it has been determined—by way of dispositive motion or by a trial on the merits—that 19 a union has breached its duty of fair representation.”). Compelling arbitration at this stage of this 20 action would therefore be premature. Anderson, 1995 WL 322182, at *4 (“Here, of course, 21 plaintiffs seek to compel arbitration before any determination of the underlying merits of their 22 claims, and an order compelling arbitration would therefore be premature.”). In this regard, one 23 district court explained as follows: 24 [T]he union has exercised its authority to supervise the grievance resolution process. Whether it properly exercised that authority is a 25 question for the trier of fact. To order arbitration prior to that determination being made would be to disregard the orderly 26 grievance machinery provided for in the parties’ collective bargaining agreement. An order compelling arbitration is merely one 27 of the remedies available after a breach of the union’s duty of fair representation has been proved. 28 1 | Safran vy. United Steel Workers of Am., AFL-CIO, 678 F. Supp. 1178, 1182 (W.D. Pa. 1988). 2 Because the preliminary relief requested by plaintiff Vyalkov in his pending motion is not 3 | available at this stage of this action, the court need not examine the temporary restraining order 4 | factors. 5 CONCLUSION 6 For the reasons explained above, plaintiff Vyalkov’s motion for a temporary restraining 7 | order (Doc. No. 3) is DENIED. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. | Dated: _ September 2, 2025 Dae A. 2, sel 10 DALE A. DROZD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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