NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 10 2025

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DREW EDEN, No. 24-5963 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 3:24-cv-00111-LB v.

MEMORANDUM*

FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Laurel D. Beeler, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 8, 2025** San Francisco, California

Before: S.R. THOMAS, NGUYEN, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.

Drew Eden appeals from a district court decision affirming the Commissioner

of Social Security’s denial of his application for Social Security disability benefits.

“We ‘review the district court’s order affirming the ALJ’s denial of social security

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). benefits de novo and will disturb the denial of benefits only if the decision contains

legal error or is not supported by substantial evidence.’” Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d

1266, 1270 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th

Cir. 2008)). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1. The ALJ gave “clear and convincing reasons” for discounting Eden’s

testimony about the severity of his symptoms. Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 497

(9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155,

1160 (9th Cir. 2008)). The ALJ noted that, in contrast to Eden’s testimony that he

cannot work because of a “bullet lodged in his vertebrae,” Eden’s physical

examinations were “unremarkable,” hospital records “show that the bullet lodged in

soft tissue without entering or striking anything critical to him,” and Eden was able

to return to work within three months of the injury. “When objective medical

evidence in the record is inconsistent with the claimant’s subjective testimony, the

ALJ may indeed weigh it as undercutting such testimony.” Id. at 498 (emphasis

omitted).

Further, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Eden’s

resistance to medical treatment was not reflective of the severity of his depressive,

anxiety, or PTSD symptoms. Eden actively sought and received consistent

substance abuse treatment, attended his psychological evaluations, and interacted

appropriately with his clinicians. In evaluating Eden’s testimony, the ALJ was also

2 24-5963 entitled to consider “inconsistencies . . . in the claimant’s testimony,” which

included his misrepresentations to providers regarding his drug use. Molina v.

Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) superseded on other grounds by 20

C.F.R. § 404.1502(a). Substantial evidence likewise supports the ALJ’s

determination that Eden’s claimed difficulties communicating with others were not

supported by the record and that his testimony was otherwise inconsistent with the

objective medical evidence, including tests performed by Drs. Wiebe and Catlin.

Although Eden faults the ALJ for failing to discuss additional aspects of his

testimony, an ALJ must only provide enough “reasoning in order for us to

meaningfully determine whether [her] conclusions were supported by substantial

evidence.” Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1103 (9th Cir.

2014). The ALJ did so here. Nor did the ALJ reject Eden’s testimony based on

vague or boilerplate explanations.

2. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to assign little weight to

the psychological evaluation opinions of Dr. Wiebe and Dr. Catlin. Under the 2017

regulations that govern Eden’s claim, the ALJ was required to evaluate the medical

opinion evidence under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c. See Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th

785, 791–92 (9th Cir. 2022). Under these rules, “‘[t]he most important factors’ that

the agency considers when evaluating the persuasiveness of medical opinions are

‘supportability’ and ‘consistency.’” Id. at 791 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a)).

3 24-5963 But “an ALJ’s decision, including the decision to discredit any medical opinion,

must simply be supported by substantial evidence.” Id. at 787.

The ALJ permissibly concluded that Dr. Wiebe’s findings were unsupported

by her testing and inconsistent with the record as a whole. Eden’s psychological test

results did not suggest significant limitations that would prevent Eden from

performing any work, and the ALJ could thus conclude that Dr. Wiebe’s conclusions

were inconsistent with this medical evidence. Dr. Wiebe’s finding of a severe

impairment related to Eden’s memory was also contradicted by Dr. Catlin’s

evaluation that “[t]here was no evidence of [Eden’s] significant cognitive problems.”

And Dr. Wiebe’s reliance on Eden’s subjective reports was also “compromised” by

Eden’s inconsistent statements regarding his use of drugs.

Substantial evidence likewise supports the ALJ’s finding that Dr. Catlin’s

opinion was unpersuasive. Like Dr. Wiebe, the ALJ could conclude that Dr. Catlin’s

findings were unsupported by her testing, which indicated normal cognitive

functioning. Moreover, Dr. Catlin was not informed of Eden’s ongoing use of

methamphetamine. The ALJ also reasonably concluded that Dr. Catlin’s

consideration of Eden’s chronic pain was inconsistent with the objective medical

evidence discussed above. Substantial evidence thus supported the ALJ’s

conclusion that Dr. Wiebe’s and Dr. Catlin’s opinions did not align with the record

as a whole.

4 24-5963 3. Because the ALJ did not err when assessing Eden’s residual functional

capacity, the hypothetical she posed to the vocational expert was not incomplete.

See Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 2008).

AFFIRMED.

5 24-5963