1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10 11 ALFONSO L., ) Case No. 5:24-cv-00840-SP ) 12 Plaintiff, ) ) 13 v. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ) ORDER 14 FRANK BISIGNANO, ) Commissioner of Social Security ) 15 Administration, ) ) 16 Defendant. ) ) 17 )

18 19 I. 20 INTRODUCTION 21 On April 22, 2024, plaintiff Alfonso L. filed a complaint against defendant, the 22 Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”), seeking a review 23 of a denial of an application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits 24 (“DIB”). The parties have fully briefed the issues in dispute, and the court deems the 25 matter suitable for adjudication without oral argument. 26 Plaintiff presents two disputed issues for decision: (1) whether the administrative 27 law judge’s (“ALJ”) residual functional capacity (“RFC”) determination was supported 28 by substantial evidence; and (2) whether the ALJ failed to properly evaluate plaintiff’s 1 subjective symptom testimony. Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Complaint (“P. Mem.”) at 2 4-22;1 see Defendant’s Brief (“D. Mem.”) at 2-14. 3 Having carefully studied the parties’ memoranda, the Administrative Record 4 (“AR”), and the decision of the ALJ, the court concludes that, as detailed herein, the 5 ALJ’s RFC determination was supported by substantial evidence and the ALJ properly 6 evaluated plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony. Consequently, the court affirms the 7 decision of the Commissioner denying benefits. 8 II. 9 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 10 Plaintiff was 48 years old on his alleged disability onset date, July 3, 2020. AR at 11 64. He attended some college and has past relevant work as a receiving clerk. AR at 57, 12 226. 13 On July 8, 2021, plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and DIB due 14 to osteoarthritis, back pain, chondromalacia of the patella, tension headaches, post- 15 traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), anxiety, planta facial fibromatosis, sleep apnea, 16 allergic rhinitis, pain in the testicle, tinea pedis, varicocele, diabetes, SARS COVID 17 infection, hypercholesterolemia, fatigue, migraine headaches, shortness of breath, and 18 pain in the knees and ankles. AR at 65. The Commissioner denied plaintiff’s application 19 initially and upon reconsideration, after which plaintiff filed a request for a hearing. AR 20 at 64-86, 88-109, 126. 21 On August 1, 2023, plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared and testified at a 22 hearing before the ALJ. AR at 38-63. The ALJ also heard testimony from David 23 Rinehart, a vocational expert. AR at 56-62. On September 11, 2023, the ALJ denied 24 plaintiff’s claim for benefits. AR at 17-33. 25 1 The court notes plaintiff failed to comply with Local Rule 11-8 by filing a 26 memorandum of points and authorities that exceeded 10 pages without an indexed table 27 of contents or table of authorities. The court excuses this lack of compliance in this case; however, plaintiff’s counsel is reminded to ensure all papers submitted to the court are in 28 compliance with the local rules going forward. 1 Applying the well-known five-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found, 2 at step one, that claimant had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since July 3, 3 2020, the alleged onset date. AR at 19. 4 At step two, the ALJ found plaintiff suffered from the severe impairments of 5 degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, degenerative joint disease of the bilateral 6 knees, pulmonary fibrosis, headaches, major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety 7 disorder, PTSD, and substance abuse disorder (alcohol) in reported remission. Id. 8 At step three, the ALJ found plaintiff’s impairments, whether individually or in 9 combination did not meet or medically equal one of the listed impairments set forth in 20 10 C.F.R. part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. AR at 21. 11 The ALJ then assessed plaintiff’s RFC and determined plaintiff could perform 12 medium work with the limitations that plaintiff could: lift and carry 50 pounds 13 occasionally and 25 pounds frequently; stand and walk for six hours out of an eight-hour 14 workday with regular breaks; sit for six hours out of an eight-hour workday with regular 15 breaks; frequently push and pull within the weight limits indicated for lifting and carrying 16 with the bilateral lower extremities; frequently climb ramps and stairs; occasionally climb 17 ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; frequently balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; must 18 avoid concentrated exposure to extreme heat or cold, dust, odors, fumes, pulmonary 19 irritants, and hazards such as heavy moving machinery or unprotected heights; could 20 occasionally interact with supervisors and coworkers; have no interactions with the 21 public; and occasionally deal with changes in a routine work setting. AR at 23. 22 The ALJ found, at step four, that plaintiff was unable to perform his past relevant 23 work as a receiving clerk. AR at 30-31. 24 At step five, the ALJ found there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in 25 the national economy that plaintiff could perform, including hand packager, electronics 26 worker, and office helper. AR at 31-32. Consequently, the ALJ determined plaintiff did 27 not suffer from a disability as defined by the Social Security Act. AR at 32. 28 1 Plaintiff filed a timely request for review of the ALJ’s decision, which the Appeals 2 Council denied. AR at 1-6. The ALJ’s decision stands as the final decision of the 3 Commissioner. 4 III. 5 STANDARD OF REVIEW 6 This court is empowered to review decisions by the Commissioner to deny 7 benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The findings and decision of the Social Security 8 Administration must be upheld if they are free of legal error and supported by substantial 9 evidence. Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 458-59 (9th Cir. 2001) (as amended). But 10 if the court determines the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error or are not supported by 11 substantial evidence in the record, the court may reject the findings and set aside the 12 decision to deny benefits. Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001); 13 Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2001). 14 “Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” 15 Aukland, 257 F.3d at 1035. Substantial evidence is such “relevant evidence which a 16 reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Reddick v. Chater, 17 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998); Mayes, 276 F.3d at 459. To determine whether 18 substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding, the reviewing court must review the 19 administrative record as a whole, “weighing both the evidence that supports and the 20 evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s conclusion.” Mayes, 276 F.3d at 459. The ALJ’s 21 decision “‘cannot be affirmed simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting 22 evidence.’” Aukland, 257 F.3d at 1035 (quoting Sousa v. Callahan, 143 F.3d 1240, 1243 23 (9th Cir. 1998)). If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing the 24 ALJ’s decision, the reviewing court “‘may not substitute its judgment for that of the 25 ALJ.’” Id. (quoting Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1018 (9th Cir. 1992)). 26 // 27 // 28 1 IV. 2 DISCUSSION 3 A. The ALJ’s RFC Determination Was Supported by Substantial Evidence 4 Plaintiff first argues the ALJ’s RFC determination was not supported by substantial 5 evidence. P. Mem. at 4-15. In particular, plaintiff argues: (1) the ALJ erred by “ignoring 6 the voluminous medical evidence of record in this case and instead relying on the 7 opinions of the non-examining/non-treating state agency consultants [sic] opinions” to 8 conclude plaintiff could perform medium work with postural limitations; and (2) the ALJ 9 erred in finding plaintiff limited to simple instructions when the record supported more 10 extensive mental limitations. P. Mem. at 11, 15. 11 Residual functional capacity is what one can “still do despite [his or her] 12 limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). The ALJ reaches an RFC determination by 13 reviewing and considering all of the relevant evidence, including non-severe 14 impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1)-(2); see Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-8p 15 (“In assessing RFC, the adjudicator must consider limitations and restrictions imposed by 16 all of an individual’s impairments, even those that are not ‘severe.’”). 17 1. The ALJ Properly Relied on the Medical Opinions in the Record 18 The evidence an ALJ relies on in an RFC assessment includes medical evidence 19 and opinions. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). An ALJ considers the persuasiveness of the 20 medical opinions and findings based on five factors: (1) supportability; (2) consistency; 21 (3) relationship with the claimant; (4) specialization; and (5) other factors that tend to 22 support or contradict the medical opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)-(c). The most 23 important of these factors are supportability and consistency. 20 C.F.R. 24 § 404.1520c(b)(2). The ALJ “must ‘articulate . . . how persuasive’ [he or she] finds ‘all 25 of the medical opinions’ from each doctor or other source . . . and ‘explain how [he or 26 she] considered the supportability and consistency factors’ in reaching these findings.” 27 Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 792 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting 20 C.F.R. 28 § 404.1520c(b)(2)). The ALJ may, but generally is not required to, explain how she or he 1 considered the other three factors. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2). But when two or more 2 medical opinions “about the same issue are both equally well-supported . . . and 3 consistent with the record . . . but are not exactly the same,” the ALJ is then required to 4 explain how “the other most persuasive factors in paragraphs (c)(3) through (c)(5)” were 5 considered. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(3). 6 In determining plaintiff’s physical exertional limitations, the ALJ relied in part on 7 the opinions of internal medicine consultative examiner Dr. Luay Alalawi and the State 8 Agency medical consultants. AR at 29. In his March 12, 2022 opinion, Dr. Alalawi 9 opined plaintiff had the ability to perform a range of medium work, namely, that he could 10 lift and carry 50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently, stand and walk for six 11 hours in an eight-hour workday, and frequently push, pull, bend, stoop, kneel, crawl, 12 walk on uneven terrain, climb ladders, and work at heights. AR at 1222. With the 13 exception of the findings that plaintiff had no sitting limitations and could frequently 14 walk on uneven terrain, climb ladders, and works at heights, the ALJ found Dr. Alalawi’s 15 findings persuasive because the ALJ determined that these limitations were both 16 “supported by the objective medical evidence and consistent with the evidence from other 17 medical and nonmedical sources.” AR at 29. 18 The State Agency medical consultants also opined plaintiff could perform a range 19 of medium work, including: lifting and carrying 50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds 20 frequently; standing and walking for six hours in an eight-hour workday; sitting for six 21 hours in an eight-hour workday; unlimited pushing and pulling other than as stated for 22 lifting and carrying; frequent climbing of ramps and stairs, stooping, kneeling, crouching, 23 and crawling; occasional climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; and unlimited 24 balancing. AR at 78, 101-02. The ALJ found portions of their opinions to be 25 unpersuasive, but found their opined exertional limitations to be persuasive because they 26 were “supported by the objective medical evidence and consistent with evidence other 27 medical and non-medical sources.” AR at 29. 28 1 Plaintiff essentially argues the ALJ should have rejected these largely consistent 2 medical opinions and adopted a more restrictive RFC based on the raw medical data 3 contained in plaintiff’s medical records. P. Mem. at 11. Although plaintiff summarizes 4 his medical history at length, he fails to point to any physician who opined he was 5 incapable of medium work or was more limited in his exertional capabilities. Plaintiff 6 also fails to explain how the ALJ was supposed to assess his functional limitations absent 7 such an opinion, given that an ALJ is “simply not qualified to interpret raw medical data 8 in functional terms.” Nguyen v. Chater, 172 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 1999); see Day v. 9 Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 1975) (ALJ should not make his “own 10 exploration and assessment” as to a claimant’s impairments); Rohan v. Chater, 98 F.3d 11 966, 970 (7th Cir. 1996) (“ALJs must not succumb to the temptation to play doctor and 12 make their own independent medical findings.”); Hamasyan v. Berryhill, 2018 WL 13 6025596, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2018) (the ALJ could not properly rely on his own lay 14 understanding of medical records and exams to gauge the functional limitations); Miller 15 v. Astrue, 695 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1048 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (it is improper for the ALJ to act 16 as the medical expert); Padilla v. Astrue, 541 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1106 (C.D. Cal. 2008) 17 (ALJ is not qualified to extrapolate functional limitations from raw medical data). 18 Plaintiff makes no argument that the ALJ improperly evaluated the supportability 19 and consistency factors for either Dr. Alalawi’s opinion or the opinions of the State 20 Agency medical consultants. The ALJ evaluated the persuasiveness of the medical 21 opinions before her and properly incorporated the portions of the opinions she found 22 persuasive into plaintiff’s RFC, while explaining why she rejected certain other portions 23 that, for example, did not account for later received evidence. See, e.g., AR at 29. 24 Plaintiff’s mere disagreement with the medical opinions is insufficient to show that the 25 ALJ erred in her RFC determination. 26 // 27 // 28 1 2. The ALJ’s Limitation to Simple Instructions Is a Reasonable 2 Interpretation of the Record 3 Plaintiff also argues “[i]t is completely unclear” how the ALJ made her RFC 4 determination with respect to plaintiff’s mental impairments. AR at 13-14. In particular, 5 plaintiff argues the ALJ fails to reconcile her RFC determination that plaintiff could 6 perform work with “simple instructions” with the opinion of the consultative psychiatric 7 examiner, who found plaintiff was moderately limited in his ability to perform simple, 8 one- to two-step instructions over an eight-hour period. Id. 9 On April 1 2022, plaintiff underwent a comprehensive psychological evaluation 10 performed by Dr. Kara Cross, a clinical psychologist. AR at 1224-29. Dr. Cross opined 11 plaintiff: was mildly limited in his ability to understand, remember, and carry out simple 12 one- to two-step instructions, maintain concentration and attention, and associate day to 13 day work activity; was moderately limited in his ability to understand, remember, and 14 carry out simple one- or two-step job instructions over an 8-hour day or 40-hour work 15 week without emotionally decompensating, do detailed and complex tasks, do detailed 16 and complex tasks over an 8-hour day or 40-hour work week without emotionally 17 decompensating, maintain reasonable persistence and pace, maintain regular attendance 18 in the workplace and perform activities on a consistent basis, and relate to coworkers and 19 the public in an appropriate manner; and had no limitations in his ability to understand 20 safety rules and regulations to maintain safety on the job, accept instructions from 21 supervisors, or perform work activities without special or additional supervision. AR at 22 1228-29. The ALJ found Dr. Cross’s opinion to be persuasive because her opinion was 23 “supported by the examination of the [plaintiff], references to specific findings, and well- 24 supported explanations,” and was “consistent with evidence from other medical or 25 nonmedical sources.” AR at 29-30. 26 In her RFC determination, the ALJ stated plaintiff could “understand, remember 27 and carry out simple instructions; occasionally interact with supervisors and coworkers; 28 [have] no interactions with the public; and occasionally deal with changes in a routine 1 work setting.” AR at 23. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s failure to explain the 2 contradiction between the RFC’s limitation to “simple instructions” and Dr. Cross’s 3 opinion that plaintiff has moderate limitations in his ability to understand, remember, and 4 carry out simple one- to two-step instructions over an 8-hour day 40-hour work week 5 constitutes error.2 P. Mem. at 13-14. The court disagrees. 6 Defendant directs the court to Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 7 2008), and Kitchen v. Kijakazi, 82 F.4th 732 (9th Cir. 2023), to resolve the discrepancy. 8 D. Mem. at 12. But neither case is directly on point. In Stubbs-Danielson, the court held 9 merely that an RFC containing a restriction to simple tasks adequately encapsulates 10 moderate restrictions to “concentration persistence, or pace.” 539 F.3d at 1174. The 11 court said nothing about a restriction to simple tasks adequately capturing moderate 12 restrictions in understanding. See id. at 1173-74. Moreover, in the portion of Kitchen 13 cited by defendant, the court discussed the plaintiff’s mild to moderate mental 14 impairments in the context of his subjective symptom testimony and nowhere concluded 15 a limitation to simple instructions adequately captured moderate limitations in 16 understanding. See 82 F.4th at 739. Accordingly, neither case in on point. 17 Nonetheless, defendant also correctly points out that an RFC determination is 18 designed to reflect an individual’s maximum capabilities, not their minimum capabilities. 19 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). Here, Dr. Cross did not opine that plaintiff was 20 incapable of understanding and following simple instructions. Rather, she opined 21 plaintiff has moderate limitations in his ability to understand simple one- to two-step 22 instructions. AR at 1228. Moreover, she also opined plaintiff retains some ability to 23 follow and complete detailed and complex tasks, since he has only moderate limitations 24 2 The court notes part of the confusion may be due to an apparent typographical 25 error made by the ALJ. The ALJ stated Dr. Cross opined that plaintiff “had mild 26 limitation in ability to understand, remember, and carry out simple one or two step task 27 instructions, and he had moderate limitations in in [sic] ability to understand, remember, carry out simple one or two step job instructions.” AR at 29. The ALJ may have 28 accidentally neglected to include the phrase “over an 8-hour day 40-hour work week without emotionally decompensating” at the end of the last sentence just quoted. 1 in his ability to do so. See id. It is thus inaccurate to state Dr. Cross limited plaintiff to 2 one- to two-step instructions in any way. The ALJ permissibly determined that a 3 limitation to simple instructions balanced plaintiff’s moderate limitations with respect to 4 one- to two-step instructions with his apparent ability to perform at least some detailed 5 and complex tasks. See Dunn v. O’Malley, 2024 WL 3439583, at *2 (9th Cir. July 17, 6 2024) (holding that because doctors opined plaintiff could perform both one- to two-step 7 tasks and simple tasks, “the ALJ’s decision to adopt the broader limitation was 8 reasonable”). Accordingly, the ALJ’s limitation of plaintiff to simple instructions was a 9 reasonable interpretation of the record. 10 In sum, the ALJ properly relied on the medical opinions and reasonably 11 determined plaintiff could perform medium work with certain additional limitations, and 12 that plaintiff was limited to work with simple instructions. As such, the ALJ’s RFC 13 determination was supported by substantial evidence. 14 B. The ALJ Properly Evaluated Plaintiff’s Subjective Symptom Testimony 15 Plaintiff next argues the ALJ improperly evaluated plaintiff’s subjective symptom 16 testimony and failed to provide a clear and convincing reason to reject his testimony. P. 17 Mem. at 16-22. In particular, plaintiff argues that the ALJ rejected his testimony solely 18 because the ALJ found the testimony was inconsistent with the medical record. P. Mem. 19 at 16. 20 The court looks to Social Security Ruling 16-3p for guidance on evaluating 21 plaintiff’s alleged symptoms.3 In adopting SSR 16-3p, the Social Security 22 Administration sought to “clarify that subjective symptom evaluation is not an 23 24 3 “The Commissioner issues Social Security Rulings to clarify the Act’s 25 implementing regulations and the agency’s policies. SSRs are binding on all components 26 of the SSA. SSRs do not have the force of law. However, because they represent the 27 Commissioner’s interpretation of the agency’s regulations, we give them some deference. We will not defer to SSRs if they are inconsistent with the statute or regulations.” 28 Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1202 n.1 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted). 1 examination of an individual’s character.” SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *2 (Oct. 2 25, 2017). 3 [SSR 16-3p] makes clear what our precedent already required: that 4 assessments of an individual’s testimony by an ALJ are designed to evaluate 5 the intensity and persistence of symptoms after the ALJ finds that the 6 individual has a medically determinable impairment(s) that could reasonably 7 be expected to produce those symptoms, and not to delve into wide-ranging 8 scrutiny of the claimant’s character and apparent truthfulness. 9 Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 678 n.5 (9th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). 10 To evaluate a claimant’s symptom testimony, the ALJ engages in a two-step 11 analysis. Christine G. v. Saul, 402 F. Supp. 3d 913, 921 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (citing Trevizo, 12 871 F.3d at 678). First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant produced objective 13 medical evidence of an underlying impairment that could reasonably be expected to 14 produce the symptoms alleged. Id. Second, if the claimant satisfies the first step and 15 there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ must evaluate the intensity and persistence 16 of the claimant’s symptoms and determine the extent to which they limit her ability to 17 perform work-related activities. Id. 18 In assessing intensity and persistence, the ALJ may consider: the claimant’s daily 19 activities; the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of the symptoms; precipitating 20 and aggravating factors; the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medication 21 taken to alleviate the symptoms; other treatment received; other measures used to relieve 22 the symptoms; and other factors concerning the claimant’s functional limitations and 23 restrictions due to the symptoms. Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.929); SSR 16-3p at *4; 24 Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996). To reject the claimant’s subjective 25 symptom statements at step two, the ALJ must provide “specific, clear, and convincing” 26 reasons, supported by substantial evidence in the record, for doing so. Burrell v. Colvin, 27 775 F.3d 1133, 1136-37 (9th Cir. 2014); Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281, 1283-84. 28 1 At the first step here, the ALJ found plaintiff’s medically determinable 2 impairments could be reasonably expected to cause plaintiff’s alleged symptoms. AR at 3 24. At the second step, because the ALJ did not find evidence of malingering, the ALJ 4 was required to provide clear and convincing reasons for discounting plaintiff’s 5 testimony. The ALJ found plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence 6 and limiting effects” of his symptoms were “not entirely consistent with the medical 7 evidence and other evidence in the record.” AR at 25. 8 The ALJ first reasoned that the objective medical evidence and other evidence in 9 the record did “not support the level of symptomology that the [plaintiff] alleged” and 10 was sometimes inconsistent with plaintiff’s testimony. AR at 25. Had the ALJ found 11 only that plaintiff’s subjective testimony was not fully supported by the objective medical 12 evidence, she would have erred. See Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 498 (9th Cir. 2022) 13 (“an ALJ cannot insistent on clear medical evidence to support each part of a claimant’s 14 subjective pain testimony when there is no objective testimony evincing otherwise”). But 15 “[w]hen objective medical evidence in the record is inconsistent with the claimant’s 16 subjective testimony, the ALJ may . . . weigh it as undercutting such testimony.” Id. The 17 Ninth Circuit has made clear “[c]ontradiction with the medical record is a sufficient basis 18 for rejecting the claimant’s subjective testimony.” Id. at 499 (quoting Carmickle v. 19 Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks 20 omitted). 21 The ALJ identifies several pieces of testimony that are contradicted by the record. 22 For example, the ALJ notes that while plaintiff testifies his impairments make it difficult 23 to stand and walk, multiple medical records dating from July 3, 2020 through May 17, 24 2023 indicate plaintiff walked with a steady gait. See e.g., AR at 24-25,1183, 1253, 25 1275, 1577, 1681. The ALJ also notes that while plaintiff reported that he was unable to 26 be around people and had difficulty concentrating, several of plaintiff’s mental status 27 examinations show plaintiff was cooperative and calm, made eye contact, had a linear, 28 goal oriented thought processes, lacked disorganized thoughts, and had fair insight and 1 appropriate cognition. AR at 25, 559, 696, 763, 1644. The ALJ further notes that 2 plaintiff’s complaints of numbness and tingling of the feet is sometimes contradicted by 3 the record. AR at 25. Although the record contains medical notes documenting 4 plaintiff’s complaints, the record also contains several notes dating from January 2020 5 through April 2023 stating plaintiff had no focal weakness, numbness, or tingling. AR at 6 1187, 1630, 1876. Other neurological notes show plaintiff had intact sensation and an 7 “[e]ssentially [n]ormal neuro exam.” AR at 466, 779, 948, 1411, 1633, 1789. Taken 8 together, these inconsistencies between plaintiff’s testimony and his medical records 9 constitute a clear and convincing reason to reject his subjective symptom testimony. 10 The ALJ additionally discounted plaintiff’s testimony because it was inconsistent 11 with his reported activities of daily living. AR at 25; see Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 12 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008) (inconsistency between a claimant’s alleged symptoms and 13 daily activities is a basis to discount his testimony). The ALJ reasoned plaintiff’s ability 14 to drive on an occasional basis, visit his mother, go to the park, date, travel, dine out, and 15 drive to the beach with his girlfriend are inconsistent with his testimony. AR at 25. 16 Indeed, although some of plaintiff’s activities may be consistent with extreme social 17 anxiety, other activities, including shopping, dining out, going to the church, visiting the 18 park, and dating are inconsistent with plaintiff’s statement that he “can’t be around other 19 people.” See AR at 25, 219-20. These contradictions between plaintiff’s testimony and 20 his daily activities constitute another clear and convincing reason to reject plaintiff’s 21 subjective symptom testimony. See Smartt, 53 F.4th at 499 (Plaintiff’s “daily activities 22 may be grounds for discrediting the claimant’s testimony to the extent that they 23 contradict claims of a totally debilitating impairment.”) (internal quotation marks and 24 citation omitted). 25 Accordingly, by providing two clear and convincing reasons to discount plaintiff’s 26 testimony, the ALJ properly evaluated plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony. 27 // 28 1 V. 2 CONCLUSION 3 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Judgment shall be entered AFFIRMING the 4 || decision of the Commissioner denying benefits, and dismissing the complaint with 5 || prejudice. 6 7 || Dated: September 29, 2025 LRP 8 ON ee 9 SHERI PYM 10 United States Magistrate Judge 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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