1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION 7 8 JEFFERIES FUNDING LLC, Case No. 24-cv-05639-TLT (PHK)

9 Plaintiff, ORDER RESOLVING DISPUTES RE

INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS

10 v. FOR ADMISSION

11 DASAGROUP HOLDINGS CORP., et al., Re: Dkt. 146 12 Defendants.

13 14 This case has been referred to the undersigned for all discovery purposes. See Dkt. 74. 15 Now pending before the Court is a letter brief submitted by Plaintiff Jefferies Funding LLC and 16 Third-Party Defendant Silo Technologies Inc. (collectively “Jefferies”) regarding a dispute with 17 Defendant Dasagroup Holdings Corp. (“Dasagroup”) as to the sufficiency of Dasagroup’s 18 responses to certain interrogatories and requests for admission. [Dkt. 146]. Dasagroup has filed 19 an opposition letter brief, stating the dispute at issue is “very narrow” in scope and asking that 20 Court’s resolution of the matter be deferred “until a reasonable time after the Court adjudicates the 21 pending motion to withdraw.” [Dkt. 151]. As discussed below, the Parties did not file a joint 22 discovery letter brief, in violation of this Court’s Standing Order for Discovery. The Court has 23 reviewed the Parties’ briefing and finds this matter suitable for resolution without oral argument. 24 See Civil L.R. 7-1(b). 25 LEGAL STANDARD 26 The Parties and their counsel are presumably well aware of the well-known legal standards 27 for discovery in federal actions. With regard to the scope of discovery in federal civil actions, 1 any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the 2 needs of the case.” Information need not be admissible to be discoverable. Id. Relevancy for 3 purposes of discovery is broadly defined to encompass “any matter that bears on, or that 4 reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” 5 In re Williams-Sonoma, Inc., 947 F.3d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. 6 v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 350-51 (1978)); see also In re Facebook, Inc. Consumer Privacy User 7 Profile Litig., No. 18-md-2843 VC (JSC), 2021 WL 10282215, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2021) 8 (“Courts generally recognize that relevancy for purposes of discovery is broader than relevancy 9 for purposes of trial.”) (alteration omitted). 10 While the scope of relevance is broad, discovery is not unlimited. ATS Prods., Inc. v. 11 Champion Fiberglass, Inc., 309 F.R.D. 527, 531 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“Relevancy, for the purposes 12 of discovery, is defined broadly, although it is not without ultimate and necessary boundaries.”). 13 Information, even if relevant, must be “proportional to the needs of the case” to fall within the 14 scope of permissible discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The 2015 amendments to Rule 26(b)(1) 15 emphasize the need to impose reasonable limits on discovery through increased reliance on the 16 common-sense concept of proportionality: “The objective is to guard against redundant or 17 disproportionate discovery by giving the court authority to reduce the amount of discovery that 18 may be directed to matters that are otherwise proper subjects of inquiry. The [proportionality 19 requirement] is intended to encourage judges to be more aggressive in identifying and 20 discouraging discovery overuse.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 21 amendment. In evaluating the proportionality of a discovery request, a court should consider “the 22 importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative 23 access to the information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the 24 issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” 25 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). 26 The party seeking discovery bears the burden of establishing that its request satisfies the 27 relevancy requirements under Rule 26(b)(1). La. Pac. Corp. v. Money Mkt. 1 Inst. Inv. Dealer, 1 discovery should not be allowed. Id. The resisting party must specifically explain the reasons 2 why the request at issue is objectionable and may not rely on boilerplate, conclusory, or 3 speculative arguments. Id.; see also Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 4 1975) (“Under the liberal discovery principles of the Federal Rules defendants were required to 5 carry a heavy burden of showing why discovery was denied.”). 6 The Court has broad discretion and authority to manage discovery. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. 7 Co. v. Lee Inv. LLC, 641 F.3d 1126, 1136 n.10 (9th Cir. 2011) (“District courts have wide latitude 8 in controlling discovery, and their rulings will not be overturned in the absence of a clear abuse of 9 discretion.”); Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of Int., 342 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003). As part of its 10 inherent discretion and authority, the Court has broad discretion in determining relevancy for 11 discovery purposes. Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2005) 12 (citing Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002)). Similarly, a district court’s 13 determination as to proportionality of discovery is within the district court’s discretion. See Jones 14 v. Riot Hospitality Grp. LLC, 95 F.4th 730, 737-38 (9th Cir. 2024) (finding district court did not 15 abuse discretion on proportionality ruling). 16 Ultimately, “the timing, sequencing and proportionality of discovery is left to the 17 discretion of the Court.” Toro v. Centene Corp., 2020 WL 6108643, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 18 2020). The Court’s discretion extends to crafting discovery orders that may expand, limit, or 19 differ from the relief requested. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998) (holding 20 trial courts have “broad discretion to tailor discovery narrowly and to dictate the sequence of 21 discovery”). For example, the Court may limit the scope of any discovery method if it determines 22 that “the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from 23 some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 26(b)(2)(C)(i). 25 ANALYSIS 26 While Jefferies’ letter brief goes to lengths to describe Dasagroup’s failure to reasonably 27 engage in discovery and communicate in the meet and confer process, the letter brief presents 1 the final dispute relating to a response to a request for admission. [Dkt. 146]. 2 I. INTERROGATORY NO. 5 3 Jefferies first raises a dispute as to the sufficiency of Dasagroup’s response to Interrogatory 4 No. 5 (“ROG 5”). ROG 5 asks Dasagroup to “[e]xplain all circumstances, if any, that increased or 5 decreased the amount London Fruit owed on the Affected Receivables after issuance of the 6 Invoices.” [Dkt. 146 at 2]. Dasagroup’s original response to ROG 5 reportedly referenced or 7 repeated the response to an unrelated interrogatory. Id. Dasagroup reportedly acknowledged this 8 error on June 24, 2025, and again, on August 1, 2025. Id. 9 As noted, Dasagroup did not participate in the filing of a joint discovery letter brief on this 10 issue. It is, however, unclear how much effort Jefferies expended in attempting to coordinate the 11 preparation of a joint brief. See Standing Order for Discovery at § H(3) (“Parties are expected to 12 plan for and cooperate in preparing the joint letter so that each side has adequate time to address 13 the arguments.”). Dasagroup’s responsive one-page letter does not dispute the representation as to 14 the error in the original response to ROG 5 and does not dispute that Dasagroup acknowledged 15 that error over several months. See Dkt. 151. 16 To date, Dasagroup has not served an amended response which corrects or addresses the 17 apparently admitted error in the original response to ROG 5. Thus, Dasagroup has failed to 18 provide an adequate response to ROG 5. 19 Accordingly, Jefferies’ motion is GRANTED with regard to ROG 5. Dasagroup is 20 ORDERED to serve an amended response to ROG 5 which cures the error and in good faith 21 responds to that interrogatory (subject to any specific and justified objections) by no later than 22 OCTOBER 31, 2025.

23

II. INTERROGATORY NO. 12

24 Jefferies next request for relief relates to a dispute over the adequacy of Dasagroup’s 25 response to Interrogatory No. 12 (“ROG 12”). [Dkt. 146 at 2]. ROG 12 asks Dasagroup to 26 “[s]tate the amount, if any, that You contend London Fruit currently owes on the Affected 27 1 Jefferies argues that Dasagroup’s original response to ROG 12 is inadequate because that response 2 “merely” referred to documents produced in this litigation. Id. While Jefferies does not reference 3 Rule 33(d), the Court presumes that Dasagroup’s response to ROG 12 referenced documents or 4 business records under the provisions of that rule. 5 As a general matter, under Rule 33 it is not inappropriate to refer to documents in a 6 response to an interrogatory. See Gamevice, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 2019 WL 2763008, at *2 (N.D. 7 Cal. July 2, 2019) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(d)(1)) (“Rule 33(d) allows a reference to documents 8 ‘if the burden of deriving or ascertaining the answer will be substantially the same for either 9 party,’ and the responding party ‘specif[ies] the records that must be reviewed, in sufficient detail 10 to enable the interrogating party to locate and identify them as readily as the responding party 11 could.’”); accord Lyft, Inc. v. Quartz Auto Techs. LLC, 2022 WL 17076703, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 12 18, 2022). 13 Unlike the other discovery disputes discussed herein, Jefferies did not attach as an exhibit 14 to their letter brief a copy of Dasagroup’s response to ROG 12. Therefore, Court does not have 15 sufficient information to determine whether Dasagroup properly invoked Rule 33(d) in responding 16 to ROG 12. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(d)(1) (“If the answer to an interrogatory may be determined by 17 examining, auditing, compiling, abstracting, or summarizing a party's business records (including 18 electronically stored information), and if the burden of deriving or ascertaining the answer will be 19 substantially the same for either party, the responding party may answer by: (1) specifying the 20 records that must be reviewed, in sufficient detail to enable the interrogating party to locate and 21 identify them as readily as the responding party could[.]”). 22 However, Jefferies represents that the referenced documents do not even refer to the 23 Receivables at issue which are referenced in ROG 12 directly. [Dkt. 146 at 2]. Further, Jefferies 24 cites case law to argue that relying “exclusively” on documents in a response to a contention 25 interrogatory is “under most circumstances impermissible.” Id. (quoting Moeller v. Taco Bell 26 Corp., No. C 02-5849 PJH (JL), 2008 WL 11454816, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2008)). 27 As noted, Dasagroup did not participate in the filing of a joint discovery letter brief on this 1 Dasagroup’s response to ROG 12 and, more importantly, does not dispute the characterization that 2 the referenced documents do not even refer to the Receivables which are the subject of ROG 12. 3 See Dkt. 151. 4 Accordingly, based on Jefferies’ counsel’s representation that the documents referenced in 5 the response to ROG 12 do not address the Affected Receivables which are the subject of the 6 interrogatory, Dasagroup does not appear to dispute that its original response does not fairly 7 respond to ROG 12. On this basis, the Court concludes that Dasagroup’s original response to 8 ROG 12 is inadequate. 9 In light of the discussion above, Jefferies’ motion with regard to ROG 12 is GRANTED. 10 Dasagroup is ORDERED to serve an amended response to ROG 12 which responds in good faith 11 to that interrogatory (subject to any specific and justified objections) by no later than OCTOBER 12 31, 2025. 13 III. REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 22 14 The final dispute raised by Jefferies concerns Dasagroup’s response to Request for 15 Admission No. 22 (“RFA 22”). That RFA 22 asks that Dasagroup “[a]dmit that London Fruit paid 16 Dasagroup, in full, for the Affected Receivables.” [Dkt. 146 at 2, 12]. 17 Jefferies argues that Dasagroup’s original response to RFA 22 is evasive and non- 18 responsive. Id. Unlike the dispute as to ROG 12 above, Jefferies provided a copy of Dasagroup’s 19 response to RFA 22. See id. at 12. The Court has reviewed Dasagroup’s response to RFA 22 20 which states in full as follows: 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 1 RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 22: 2 Responding Party objects that the request is vague and ambiguous. Responding Party 3 objects to this request on the grounds that. as written. it seeks all information in existence, and is not limited to information that is within the current knowledge of Responding Party. There may 4 be additional facts, documents, and persons in support of Responding Party's claims that are 5 within the knowledge of Defendants or other third parties and that have not yet been identified or 6 disclosed to Responding Party, and Responding Party reserves the right to use any such evidence at trial. Responding Party objects to the extent that the request presumes that the amount paid 7 by London Fruit, Inc. and/or Grubmarket. Inc. was accurate and reflected the true price earned 8 on London's sale of avocados. 9 Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, following a diligent search and 10 reasonable inquiry, the Responding Party responds as follows: Admitted to the extent that Dasagroup received what was purported to be full payment by London Fnuit, Inc. and/or Grubmarket. Inc. on those receivables, but denied to the extent that other evidence may show 12 that Dasagroup was underpaid on those invoices.

13 | dd.

Y 14 As is evident from the response to RFA 22, Jefferies’ characterization that this response to

15 “evasive” and “non-responsive” is not well-supported. Dasagroup’s response to RFA 22 sets forth Sa

A 16 || objections which explain why Dasagroup cannot admit to this RFA 22 in full: Dasagroup “objects

. : = 17 || to the extent that the request presumes that the amount paid by London Fruit, Inc. and/or

. Z 18 Grubmarket, Inc. was accurate and reflected the true price earned on London’s sale of avocados.” 19 || /d. A denial in response to a request for admission is required to specifically deny the request or 20 || state in detail why the responding party is unable to truthfully admit or deny that request. See Fed. 21 R. Civ. P. 36(a)(4). While Jefferies may dispute the substantive merit of this objection, the fact 22 || that Dasagroup explained its position is neither fairly described as “evasive” or “non-responsive.” 23 || See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(5) (“The grounds for objecting to a request must be stated.”). Notably, 24 || Jefferies does not argue the merits of this objection and nowhere seeks an order overruling this 25 objection. As presented to the Court, this appears to be a situation in which the Parties have a 26 || dispute over an issue of fact. Simply because Jefferies believes it is correct as to this issue of fact 27 || (which has not been resolved at this stage and for which the Court makes no implied or express 28 findings), that alone does not make Dasagroup’s response to RFA 22 inadequate. □□

] Further, as shown above, Dasagroup responded to the RFA 22 by admitting in part and 2 || denying in part different portions of the subject matter of RFA 22. Under Rule 36, a responding 3 || party like Dasagroup is supposed to do precisely that. “A denial must fairly respond to the 4 || substance of the matter; and when good faith requires that a party qualify an answer or deny only a 5 || part of a matter, the answer must specify the part admitted and qualify or deny the rest.” See Fed. 6 || R. Civ. P. 36(a)(4). 7 Normally, the discussion above would end the matter. However, counsel for Jefferies 8 || reports that Dasagroup committed to serve an amended response to RFA 22. [Dkt. 146 at 3]. As 9 || noted, Dasagroup did not participate in the filing of a joint discovery letter brief on this issue. 10 || Dasagroup’s responsive one-page letter does not dispute the representation that Dasagroup 11 previously agreed to serve an amended response to RFA 22. See Dkt. 151. To that extent, then, 12 || this dispute would appear to be moot as to the merits of the issue. 13 Accordingly, Jefferies’ motion to compel an amended response to RFA 22 is DENIED 14 || WITHOUT PREJUDICE as moot. Based on Jefferies’s counsel’s representation and the lack of 3 15 objection from Dasagroup, the Court ORDERS Dasagroup to comply with its agreement to serve a 16 || an amended response to RFA 22, and Dasagroup SHALL serve that amended response by no later 2 17 || than NOVEMBER 14, 2025. 18 CONCLUSION 19 For all the reasons discussed herein, the Court GRANTS-IN-PART and DENIES-IN- 20 || PART Jefferies’ motion to compel. 21 This RESOLVES Dkt. 146. 22 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 Dated: October 14, 2025 25

PETER H. KANG

26 United States Magistrate Judge 27 28