Filed 10/15/25 County of Riverside v. City of Moreno Valley CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE et al.,

Plaintiffs and Respondents, E085031

v. (Super.Ct.No. CVRI2301559)

CITY OF MORENO VALLEY, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant;

LAWRENCE FAMILY TRUST, et al.,

Real Parties in Interest and Appellants.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Harold W. Hopp, Judge.

Affirmed.

Elkins Kalt Weintraub Reuben Gartside, John M. Bowman, and Jackson D.

McNeill; Law Offices of Quintanilla & Associates, Steven B. Quintanilla, Gulan F.

Tahir, for Defendant and Appellant and Real Parties in Interest and Appellants.

1 Best Best & Krieger, Amy E. Hoyt, Sarah E. Owsowitz, and Tiffany M. Michou,

for Plaintiff and Respondent, March Joint Powers Authority.

Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, G. Ross Trindle III, and Melissa R. Cushman, for

Plaintiff and Respondent, County of Riverside.

In 2023, defendant City of Moreno Valley (City) approved the Heacock Logistics

Parking Lot Plot Plan (the Project), which proposes the construction of a 24-hour-a-day

paved parking lot for 194 cars on land located at the end of an active March Air Reserve

Base/Inland Port Airport (March ARB Airport) runway and owned by real parties in

interest Lawrence Family Trust (the Trust) and Douglas “David” Schiepe, Trustee

(collectively Real Parties).1 As the lead agency for the Project under the California

Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000, et seq.), the City

passed a resolution adopting a mitigated negative declaration (MND) for the Project

(Pub. Resources Code, § 21064.5; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15369.5). Plaintiffs and

respondents March Joint Powers Authority (March JPA) and County of Riverside

(County) (collectively Respondents) challenged the City’s approval of the Project via

petitions for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, asking

the superior court to order the City to set aside the MND and approvals to the Project and

refrain from granting any further approvals or permits for the Project unless the City and

Real Parties (collectively Appellants) comply fully with the requirements of CEQA,

1 Douglas “David” Schiepe is the sole trustee of the Trust.

2 California Planning and Zoning Law, and the City’s General Plan and Municipal Code.

The court granted Respondents’ writ petitions.

On appeal, Appellants contend the superior court (1) erroneously interpreted the

State Aeronautics Act (SAA) (Pub. Util. Code § 21001 et seq.), ruling on an issue that

was not presented during the administrative proceedings; (2) improperly substituted its

judgment for the City’s by ruling the Project was inconsistent with applicable land use

plans; and (3) erred in concluding the City was required to prepare an Environmental

Impact Report (EIR). We reject these contentions and affirm.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND FACTS2

A. The Project.

In or about 2012, Mr. Schiepe purchased a 9.14-acre vacant lot (Property) on

Heacock Street in the southwest portion of the City, located at the end of a March ARB

Airport runway, and transferred it to the Trust. Mr. Schiepe purchased the Property from

the Riverside County Tax Auction and was told by the planning department that he could

only use it for agricultural purposes. Surrounding land uses include a vacant land and

industrial uses to the north and east, the Perris Valley Storm Drain to the south, and the

March ARB Airport to the northwest. The Property is subject to the Moreno Valley

2 Respondents request this court take judicial notice of the United States District Court, Central District of California, Western Division’s Order Granting Joint Stipulation to Stay Proceedings Pending Final Outcome of State Court Action entered on October 7, 2024, in Case No. 2:24-cv-01280-HDV-JC entitled United States of America v. Lawrence Family Trust and David Schiepe. Appellants oppose the request on the ground the order has no bearing on this court’s analysis and disposition of the issues presented. We agree with Appellants and deny the request for judicial notice.

3 Industrial Area Plan, Specific Plan 208 (SP208), which allows “industrial/business

support uses” of the land, and is located within an area designated by SP208 as Zone A,

the Clear Zone, of the March Air Reserve Base/Inland Port Airport Land Use

Compatibility Plan (ALUC Plan). In May 2021, the Trust applied to the City to develop

the Property into a parking lot for employees of the numerous logistics businesses in the

area.

B. Land Use Plans That Govern the Project’s Site.

1. The ALUC Plan

An ALUC plan is a “State-required, long-range master plan that reflects the

anticipated growth of an airport over a 20-year time period. State law requires general

and specific plans to be consistent with any [ALUC plan] affecting the City.” In 2014,

Riverside County ALUC (ALUC) adopted the ALUC Plan, which includes compatibility

criteria and maps for influence areas of the March Air Reserve Base/Inland Port Airport.

The ALUC Plan is primarily based upon the United States Air Force’s 2005 Air

Installations Compatible Use Zones Study (2005 AICUZ) for March ARB Airport. The

2005 AICUZ is intended to promote compatible land uses in nongovernment areas

adjacent to military airfields, and it is designed to aid in the development of local

planning mechanisms that will protect public safety and health and preserve March ARB

Airport’s mission and operational capabilities; it was updated in 2018 (2018 AICUZ).

The Property is located in an area identified by the ALUC Plan as Zone A, the

Clear Zone. The Clear Zone is the “square area beyond the end of the runway and

4 centered on the runway centerline extending outward for 3,000 feet.” It is a critical area

where vital aviation maneuvers occur for take-off and landing and is considered

dangerous because 27.4 percent of all aircraft accidents occur there. Due to these safety

concerns, the 2005 AICUZ and 2018 AICUZ both specify a Clear Zone “should remain

undeveloped” and automobile parking is not compatible with the Clear Zone.

The ALUC Plan speaks to these dangers, identifying the Clear Zone as a “Very

High” Risk Level, and is primarily based upon the United States Air Force’s 2005

AICUZ. Thus, properties within the Clear Zone are “[g]enerally on air base property or

controlled by easements.” The ALUC Plan’s Basic Compatibility Criteria Table MA-2

also prohibits all assemblages of people, non-aeronautical structures, and storage of

hazardous materials in the Clear Zone. The ALUC Plan notes that a Clear Zone or

Zone A requires an avigation easement that must be dedicated to the March Inland Port

Airport Authority and the United States of America.

2. Moreno Valley Industrial Area Plan (SP208)

The Project site is within SP208, adopted by the City in June 1989. SP208 covers

approximately 1,540 acres in the southwestern end of the City, including 50 acres within

the Clear Zone. SP208 affirms that the Clear Zone was established to be consistent with

the March ARB Airport’s safety regulations and is subject to the most recent AICUZ.

Per SP208, the Clear Zone “has a high accident potential and requires that no structures

be allowed in this area.” Further discussion of the Clear Zone notes that it is “planned for

passive, non-structure uses, primarily agriculture.” While SP208 notes that the

5 compatible uses in the Clear Zone are limited to roads, agriculture, and open space, one

sentence states: “In accordance with the Study[,] land uses are restricted to open space,

agricultural, automobile parking and roads.” However, the 2005 AICUZ and

2018 AICUZ both identify a parking lot as an incompatible use.

3. Moreno Valley General Plan 2040

Under the City’s General Plan 2040 (General Plan), adopted in June 2021, the

Project site is designated as Open Space. Per the General Plan, Open Space is to be

substantially unimproved and utilized for uses such as outdoor passive recreation,

preservation of natural resources, livestock grazing, and cultivating crops. It does not

identify parking as an appropriate use. According to the General Plan, a “portion of

Heacock Street is located within an area that is currently identified as the Clear Zone.”

Thus, it requires conformity to the ALUC Plan, and incorporates by reference: the

ALUC Plan, the City’s airport compatibility zoning overlay, the 2018 AICUZ, and

applicable Air Force and Department of Defense (DOD) instructions. Due to those

documents’ restrictions, the General Plan cautions that “future improvements of the street

segment in the Clear Zone may be constrained.”

C. The Project Site Is Subject to a Clear Zone Easement

According to the Air Force Instruction AFI 32-7063, dated December 18, 2015,

“[T]he Clear Zone warrants special attention. The potential for accidents is so high that

the land use restrictions necessary to ensure compatibility would prohibit reasonable

economic use of the land. Therefore, it is DOD and AF policy to own the land within the

6 Clear Zone, or control the land through restrictive use easements. Although primarily

designed to protect people on the ground from accident potential, the area should remain

as clear as possible to minimize objects that could increase damage should an aircraft

accident occur.” Thus, in 1984 the Air Force paid $77,090 to acquire a recorded

perpetual easement on the Property (Clear Zone Easement). It grants the United States

the “right to prohibit all land uses other than the following: a. agriculture; b. grazing . . . ;

c. permanent open space; d. existing water areas; e. rights-of-ways for fenced two-land

highways . . ., and single tract railroads; and f. communications and utilities rights-of-

ways.”

D. The City’s Environmental Review of the Project.

As required by CEQA and the CEQA Guidelines, the City, with the assistance of

qualified consultants, prepared an initial study of the Project (Initial Study) to determine

whether it may have significant environmental effects. The Initial Study concluded the

Project would not have any significant impacts on the environment with the imposition of

specified mitigation measures. With respect to the Project’s potential impacts on public

safety, the Initial Study acknowledged the Project’s site is within Zone A of the

March ARB Airport and within SP208’s Clear Zone, but concluded any potential impacts

would be less than significant because “there are no structures, assemblage of people,

objects exceeding FAA height limits, nor storage of hazardous materials proposed on the

Project site.” The Initial Study also determined that the Project was consistent with the

7 ALUC Plan, SP208, and other applicable land use plans. Accordingly, an MND was

prepared and circulated for public comment.

During the public review period, March JPA submitted comments noting defects

in the MND and urging the City’s Planning Commission (Planning Commission) to

address aviation accidents within the Clear Zone and the existence of the controlling

Clear Zone Easement. It also requested the preparation of an EIR. Other public agencies

and officials, including the County, Riverside ALUC, March ARB, the City of Norco, the

City of Perris, the Air Force, Congressmen Ken Calvert and Mark Takano, and State

Senator Richard D. Roth, submitted comments noting MND defects, including public

health and safety hazards and conflicts with land use plans, and urging the Planning

Commission to deny the Project or prepare an EIR. In response to these comments, the

public hearing, originally set for October 27, 2022, was continued to December 22.

E. The MND and Project Approvals

Subsequently, the Planning Commission considered the Project during its meeting

on December 22, 2022. The Planning Commission’s staff report recommended

conditional approval. According to the report, the Project had “been considered by all

appropriate agencies within and outside of the City, consistent with the standard review

process required for these types of development applications.” Nonetheless, a number of

those agencies opposed the Project and their representatives testified against it during the

public hearing. The opposing agencies argued that (1) an EIR was required due to the

Project’s alleged public safety impacts and alleged inconsistency with various adopted

8 plans; (2) the Property is subject to the Clear Zone Easement; (3) automobile parking is

not a permitted use of the Property under the applicable land use regulations; and (4) the

Property should remain undeveloped. The Planning Commission also heard from

representatives of the Trust in support of the Project. After considering the staff report

and the public testimony, the Planning Commission voted unanimously (5 to 0) to adopt

the MND and approve the Project subject to 102 conditions of approval.

On February 21, 2023, the City Council held a public hearing and approved the

Project by a vote of 3 to 2.

F. The Superior Court Proceedings

On March 27, 2023, March JPA and the County separately filed petitions for writ

of mandate under CEQA together with complaints for declaratory and injunctive relief

asking the superior court to set aside its resolution challenging the Project approvals. The

cases were later consolidated for trial. The parties submitted briefs to the superior court.3

A hearing was held on May 22, 2024. After taking the matter under submission, the

court issued an order granting the petitions. The court found substantial evidence that the

Project may have significant environmental effects since (1) people will be assembling in

the parking lot 24 hours per day, seven days per week, driving on and off the lot and

waiting for shuttles, (2) hazardous materials will be stored in the form of fuel within each

of the nearly 200 vehicles parking on the lot, (3) ignition of the parked vehicles as a result

of an aircraft crash and fire will result in the release of toxic fumes, and (4) there could be

3 On March 6, 2024, the United States filed an amicus brief in this case, which the superior court considered.

9 a mass casualty event if the crash occurs when many people are on the lot. The court

further found that the Project is inconsistent with SP208 because the 2018 AICUZ states

that automobile parking is not compatible with the Clear Zone, and the City violated the

SAA by relying on SP208, which was never reviewed by ALUC. Appellants appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

Appellants challenge the superior court’s conclusions that (1) the City violated the

SAA by relying on SP208 to approve the Project, (2) the Project is inconsistent with

applicable land use plans, and (3) the City was required to prepare an EIR.

A. Violation of SAA

Appellants begin by arguing there was no violation of the SAA. Still, even if there

was, Respondents failed to present this issue to the City during the administrative

proceedings. As we explain, we disagree.

1. Exhaustion doctrine

According to Appellants, Respondents failed to present their SAA contentions to

the City and therefor failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking relief

from the superior court. Specifically, they argue “vague references to the SAA made by

representatives of ALUC and the Air Force failed to put the City on notice of (or allowed

the City to respond to) [the issue of violating the SAA by not submitting the Project,

SP208, or both to ALUC for a consistency determination] and were clearly insufficient to

preserve the issue for judicial review.” We disagree.

10 During the Initial Study, several people raised the issue the City had not sought

ALUC’s approval of the Project, simply relying on SP208 (a specific plan that was less

protective than the ALUC Plan) which ALUC had not reviewed. The March JPA

informed the Planning Commission that the Project is incompatible with AICUZ and is

subject to ALUC and the Clear Zone Easement. The Air Force concurred. Paul Rull,

Director of ALUC, expressed concerns that the Project “will have significant impacts to

the public health and safety based on its use as a parking lot and its location within” the

Clear Zone, and is not consistent with the General Plan and Zoning Code Amendments,

which require consistency with the ALUC Plan. At the Planning Commission’s public

hearing, Simon Housman (formerly Chair of ALUC) explained ALUC had not reviewed

the Project because it was informed the Project fell under the General Plan, which was

found to be consistent with the ALUC Plan. Subsequently, ALUC discovered the Project

was not relying on the General Plan, but on SP208, which is not consistent with ALUC

and not exempt from the more stringent requirements of the ALUC Plan. The Planning

Commission approved the Project and sent it to the City Council.

Prior to the City Council’s hearing, legal counsel for March ARB alerted the City

that the Project was not consistent with its General Plan, and Council members could not

rely on SP208 to approve the Project. Counsel pointed out that (1) state law “requires

that local government’s General Plans include land use elements that consider the impact

of new growth on military readiness,” (2) SP208 is not consistent with the General Plan

because SP208 references “an outdated, superseded AICUZ study to state that automobile

11 parking is one of a few land uses not prohibited for the Clear Zone,” (3) “finding that

[SP208] eliminates the need to coordinate and ensure compatibility of the proposed use in

the Clear Zone is not consistent with the General Plan,” and (4) “a reasonable

interpretation of both the General Plan and [SP208] finds that proposed land uses in the

Clear Zone that change from passive to active use—such as a parking lot with hundreds

of spaces—require analysis of any proposed new use for safety considerations and

compatibility with March ARB.”

More specifically, legal counsel referenced Attorney General’s opinion #03-0805

from 2004, which held that an ALUC may not exempt a city’s specific plan from

complying with the more stringent compatibility standards for land use, development

density, and development intensity in the vicinity of a public use airport. The opinion

provides, “‘In light of the elaborate procedures set forth in [the Aeronautics Act (SAA)]

for identifying and resolving inconsistencies between a specific plan and an [ALUC

P]lan, it is apparent that the Legislature did not intend to authorize a commission to grant

“exemptions” for a specific plan with less stringent standards than a compatibility plan.’

Moreover, there is nothing in the [SAA] giving a commission authority to exempt a

specific plan. To allow exemptions would not promote the legislative goals of ‘orderly

development’ and discouraging incompatible land uses near existing airports. Similarly

to the way an airport commission cannot exempt a specific City plan from the airport

land use plan requirements, the City cannot do that either, and is bound by the [ALUC

Plan].” Citing Public Utilities Code sections 21670 and 21676, counsel argued that since

12 ALUC found the Project was inconsistent with the ALUC Plan, further procedural

requirements were triggered under state law. These concerns were reiterated at the City

Council’s hearing.

Given the above, we conclude Respondents did raise the issue of the City’s

violation of the SAA prior to approval of the Project.

2. Violation of the SAA

a. Applicable legal principles

The SAA provides for the establishment of ALUC’s in California counties “to

protect public health, safety, and welfare by ensuring the orderly expansion of airports

and the adoption of land use measures that minimize the public’s exposure to excessive

noise and safety hazards within areas around public airports to the extent that these areas

are not already devoted to incompatible uses.” (Pub. Util. Code, § 21670, subd. (a)(2).)

Each ALUC must include at least two aviation experts. (Pub. Util. Code, §§ 21670,

subd. (b)(3), 21670.1, subd. (b).) ALUC’s powers and duties include: “(a) To assist local

agencies in ensuring compatible land uses in the vicinity of all new airports and in the

vicinity of existing airports to the extent that the land in the vicinity of those airports is

not already devoted to incompatible uses. [¶] (b) To coordinate planning at the state,

regional, and local levels so as to provide for the orderly development of air

transportation, while at the same time protecting the public health, safety, and welfare.

[¶] (c) To prepare and adopt an airport land use compatibility plan [an ALUC plan]

pursuant to Section 21675. [¶] (d) To review the plans, regulations, and other actions of

13 local agencies and airport operators pursuant to Section 21676.” (Pub. Util. Code,

§ 21674.) Incompatible uses may continue to exist around airports where they existed

before the SAA, but the goal is “to prevent the creation of new noise and safety

problems.” (Pub. Util. Code, § 21670, subd. (a)(1).)

ALUC’s have jurisdiction over the areas around civilian and military airports.

(Pub. Util. Code, § 21675, subds. (a), (b).) ALUC plans provide specific land use and

compatibility requirements for ensuring that new growth in areas around airports

safeguards the public near airports. (Pub. Util. Code, §§ 21674, 21675.) ALUC plans are

“multijurisdictional general plan[s] [that] trump the land use planning authority that

affected jurisdictions might otherwise exercise through general and specific plans or

zoning.” (Muzzy Ranch Co. v. Solano County Airport Land Use Com. (2007)

41 Cal.4th 372, 384-385 (Muzzy Ranch 2007).) While authority over land use decisions

for an area covered by an ALUC Plan is shared between the local ALUC, the city, the

county, and local agencies are subject to the SAA’s airport land use laws and ALUC’s

authority. (Pub. Util. Code, §§ 21670, subd. (a)(2), 21676, subd. (b).) Safety and noise

standards in an ALUC plan for any military airport “shall be consistent with the safety

and noise standards in the [AICUZ] prepared for that military airport.” (Pub. Util. Code,

§ 21675, subd. (b).) In other words, the safety and noise standards in the ALUC plan

need not be identical to those in the AICUZ, but they must be compatible. (Muzzy Ranch

Co. v. Solano County Airport Land Use Com. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1, 11 (Muzzy

Ranch 2008).)

14 An ALUC determines whether a city’s general plan, specific plans, and

amendments thereto, are consistent or inconsistent with the applicable ALUC plan.

(Pub. Util. Code, § 21676, subds. (a), (b).) If ALUC finds the proposed action

inconsistent, the local agency may only overrule ALUC if, after a public hearing, it votes

to do so by a two-thirds vote and makes findings, supported by substantial evidence, that

the project protects public health, safety, and welfare and minimizes public exposure to

excessive noise and safety hazards. (Pub. Util. Code, § 21676, subd. (b).) Because

ALUC plans trump specific plans, the “city must amend its . . . specific plans as

necessary to keep them consistent with an applicable [ALUC] plan.” (Muzzy Ranch

2007, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 384, fn. omitted; see Gov. Code, § 65302.3.)

b. Analysis

Here, SP208 was adopted in June 1989 and last amended in 2013, However, there

is no indication that it, or any amendment thereto, was reviewed and approved by

Riverside ALUC. Public Utilities Code, section 21676, subdivision (a), in relevant part,

provides, “Each local agency whose general plan includes areas covered by an [ALUC

plan] shall, by July 1, 1983, submit a copy of its plan or specific plans to the airport land

use commission. The commission shall determine by August 31, 1983, whether the plan

or plans are consistent or inconsistent with the airport land use compatibility plan.”

Assuming for the sake of argument that Public Utilities Code, section 21676,

subdivision (a), “by its own terms . . . only applies to specific plans in existence before

July 1, 1983,” and SP208 was adopted after 1983, the ALUC Handbook states that the

15 City is required to refer “any proposal to adopt or amend a local plan to the ALUC for

review if the proposal involves land within an airport influence area defined by the

ALUC.” (Pub. Util. Code, § 21676, subd. (b).) The City never sought review of any of

the amendments to SP208. Having failed to submit SP208, or any of its amended

versions, to ALUC for a consistency determination, the City violated the SAA.

In contrast to SP208, the General Plan, and section 9.07.060 of the Moreno Valley

Municipal Code (Section 9.07.060),4 both adopted in the summer of 2021, were reviewed

and approved by ALUC. Both were found to be consistent with the ALUC Plan upon the

adoption of specified changes, including requiring areas within the Clear Zone to be

consistent with the underlying Airport Compatibility Zone and the Air Force

Instruction 32-7063, which addresses Air Force policies on land use compatibility in

accordance with the DOD Instruction No. 4165.57.

Regarding the Project, there were two approaches for it to be reviewed for

consistency with the ALUC Plan. Under the first approach, if ALUC had not previously

4 Section 9.07.060, entitled Airport Land Use Compatibility Plan, establishes and implements “the requirements of the [ALUC Plan] that affects land uses within the City.” “The provisions of the [ALUC Plan] shall apply in addition to the provisions of the underlying district. If there are inconsistencies between the underlying zone and the [ALUC Plan], the [ALUC Plan] shall take precedence.” Moreover, section 9.07.060 recognizes that “the [ALUC Plan] may be more restrictive than what would otherwise be allowed per City zoning designation applicable to” property within an airport compatibility zone. When this is the case, proposed uses and development on such property “must be determined to be consistent with, and comply with the compatibility criteria of the applicable compatibility zone and [the ALUC Plan,]” in addition to “complying with the zoning requirements of this title.” Section 9.07.060 references the ALUC Plan Table MA-1, which establishes the criteria for determining whether a proposed project is consistent with the ALUC Plan.

16 reviewed and approved the General Plan, Section 9.07.060, and any applicable specific

plan (here SP208), then the City was required to submit all actions to ALUC for review.

(Pub. Util. Code, § 21676, subd. (b).) If ALUC determined the Project was not consistent

with the ALUC Plan, the City could overrule the determination by a two-thirds vote, with

specified findings. (Pub. Util. Code, § 21676, subds. (b), (d).) Under the second

approach, if ALUC had reviewed the General Plan, Section 9.07.060, and any applicable

specific plan (here SP208), determined they were consistent with the ALUC Plan, and no

amendments were proposed, then ALUC could no longer require that “all actions” be sent

to it for review.

In this case, only the General Plan and Section 9.07.060 had been previously

reviewed by ALUC and found to be consistent with the ALUC Plan if the City adopted

specified changes (including forbidding parking in the Clear Zone). Unaware of SP208,

Mr. Rull (ALUC Director) informed the City that it had jurisdiction to review the Project

for consistency. However, he warned that the Project was in the Clear Zone which

“prohibits the assemblages of people, which would be generated by the parking lot.

Historically, [ALUC] has viewed the use of parking spaces within Zone A Clear Zone as

a prohibited use due to the potential hazard to flight. Also . . . according to the Air Force

2018 AICUZ permitted land use table . . . parking lots are prohibited in the Clear Zone.”

Subsequently, ALUC learned that the City primarily relied upon SP208 to approve the

Project. Since SP208 had not been sent to ALUC, the City had to either send both the

Project and SP208 to ALUC for review, or review the Project without relying on SP208.

17 (Pub. Util. Code, §§ 21676 subds. (b), (d), 21676.5, subd. (a).) The City did neither.

Thus, it violated the SAA. (Pub. Util. Code, §§ 21670, 21676.5.)

B. Consistency with Applicable Land Use Plans.

Appellants contend the superior court improperly substituted its judgment for the

City’s by ruling the Project was inconsistent with applicable land use plans. We disagree.

1. Standard of review

“We review a city’s determination whether a project is consistent with its

[applicable land use plans] for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] . . . [A] city’s

determination of . . . consistency can only be reversed if, on the evidence before the city

at the time of the determination, ‘no reasonable person could have reached the same

conclusion.’ [Citation.]” (Olen Properties Corp. v. City of Newport Beach (2023) 93

Cal.App.5th 270, 277.)

2. Analysis

The land use policies at issue here are the ALUC Plan and AICUZ. Appellants

contend the 2018 AICUZ does not forbid parking lots in the Clear Zone, and the City

correctly concluded the Project is consistent with the ALUC Plan because automobile

parking is not prohibited and the Project does not result in an assemblage of people, does

not include the storage of hazardous materials, does not constitute a non-aeronautical

structure, and reasonably qualifies as open land. Appellants further assert the superior

court’s ruling fails to explain how the City’s conclusion was “arbitrary and capricious” or

18 how a reasonable person could not have found the Project was consistent with the ALUC

Plan.

a. Automobile parking lots in the Clear Zone

Pursuant to Government Code section 65302.3, subdivision (a),5 a city’s general

plan and any applicable specific plan must be consistent with the relevant ALUC Plan.

Specific plans must also be consistent with a city’s general plans. (Gov. Code, § 65454.)

Here, the General Plan includes policies to mitigate safety impacts inherent near March

ARB Airport by restricting the land uses allowed. More precisely, policy LCC.1-11 of

the General Plan requires “new development be compatible with the standards for land

uses, density and intensity specified in the [ALUC Plan].” Also, via policies S.4-1 and

S.4-2, the General Plan seeks to “[l]imit hazards from flight operations in Moreno Valley

through consistency with the [ALUC Plan]” and “review all projects within the March

Air Reserve Base/Inland Port Airport Influence Area for conformance with the

compatibility criteria outlined in the March ALUC Plan.”

Section 9.07.060 creates a special use district overlay that applies the ALUC Plan

requirements to the Project site and states that “[i]f there are inconsistencies between the

underlying zone and the [ALUC Plan], the [ALUC Plan] shall take precedence.” Section

9.07.060 notes that the compatibility zones for March ARB Airport are established per

Table MA-1 within the ALUC Plan, and for discretionary actions proposed within the

5 “The general plan, and any applicable specific plan prepared pursuant to Article 8 (commencing with Section 65450), shall be consistent with the plan adopted or amended pursuant to Section 21675 of the Public Utilities Code.” (Gov. Code, § 65302.3, subd. (a).)

19 Clear Zone, the proposed use and/or development must meet “the compatibility criteria of

the [ALUC Plan and] be consistent with current Air Force Guidance including:

[¶] a. [DOD] Instruction 4165.57 for [AICUZ], March 12, 2015, or as amended, and

[¶] b. Air Force Instruction AFI 32-7063 for [AICUZ] Program, December 18, 2015, or

as amended[, s]pecifically AFI 32-7063, Table A.2.1 of Attachment 2 - Land Use

Compatibility Recommendations . . . . [¶] c. Where a discretionary action is proposed

within . . . [a] Clear Zone, the Department of the Air Force, 452d Air Mobility Wing

(AFRC) March Air Reserve Base shall be consulted to determine whether the proposed

discretionary action is consistent with the Air Force Guidance referenced above. Such

consultation would be in addition to, and shall not be in lieu of requirements of the

[ALUC Plan], or any review for airport land use compatibility that may be required by

the Riverside County ALUC.”

SP208 acknowledges (1) the Clear Zone is located in an area identified in the

AICUZ as “required for public safety due to the high accident potential,” and (2) AICUZ

restricts uses in the Clear Zone to “passive, non-structural uses, primarily agriculture.”

However, SP208 also states that “[i]n accordance with the [AICUZ] Study land uses are

restricted to open space, agricultural, automobile parking and roads.”

As previously noted, Public Utilities Code section 21675, subdivision (b), requires

an ALUC Plan be consistent with the safety and noise standards identified in the

applicable AICUZ. To be consistent, the ALUC Plan must be “at least as protective” of

military operations at the military airport as the AICUZ requires. (Muzzy Ranch 2008,

20 supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 11.) The 2018 AICUZ identifies the Clear Zone and states

that it “is required for all active runways and should remain undeveloped.” Since “most

uses [in the Clear Zone] are incompatible with military aircraft operations,” the Air

Force, where possible, acquires real property interests in the land to “ensure incompatible

development does not occur.” Appendix A of the AICUZ Study, Table A-1 (Land Use

Compatibility Recommendations in APZs and CZs) recommends “N” (or “No”) for

automobile parking in the Clear Zone. However, footnote 1 to Table A-1 states that a

“‘Yes’ or a ‘No’ designation for compatible land use is to be used only for general

comparison. Within each, uses exist where further evaluation may be needed in each

category as to whether it is clearly compatible, normally compatible, or not compatible

due to the variation of densities of people and structures. In order to assist air

installations and local governments, general suggestions as to [Federal Aviation

Regulations (FARs)] are provided as a guide to density in some categories. . . .”

Appellants assert that since the ALUC Plan does not incorporate the AICUZ Study

by reference or otherwise require that uses or development projects conform to it, the

AICUZ Study was never intended to be applied in a regulatory fashion, but only as a

collaborative tool. Not so. According to Public Utilities Code section 21675, subdivision

(b), the AICUZ restriction on parking lots in the Clear Zone is mandatory because the

ALUC Plan must be “at least as protective” as the AICUZ. (Muzzy Ranch 2008, supra,

164 Cal.App.4th at p. 11.) Nonetheless, relying on footnote 1 (AICUZ Study, Appendix

A, Table A-1), Appellants contend the AICUZ compatibility table is for comparison

21 purposes only, not to ban all automobile parking in the Clear Zone. They argue that

further evaluation may be needed to determine compatibility. Given the specific

language in AICUZ that strictly prohibits parking lots in the Clear Zone, we disagree.

Nonetheless, assuming without deciding Appellants’ argument, further evaluation (more

than a negative declaration) is necessary to determine the parking lot’s compatibility in

the Clear Zone.

b. Other prohibited uses in the Clear Zone

The “compatibility criteria” that shall be applicable to the March ARB/IPA

influence area are set forth in Table MA-2 of the ALUC Plan. Table MA-2 identifies the

Clear Zone’s prohibited uses as all non-aeronautical structures, assemblages of people,

objects exceeding FAR Part 77 height limits, all storage of hazardous materials, and

hazards to flight. Table MA-2 also imposes a density/intensity standard of zero people

per acre in the Clear Zone. According to Appellants, the Project does not result in an

assemblage of people, does not include the storage of hazardous materials, and does not

constitute a non-aeronautical structure. They maintain that it reasonably qualifies as open

land.

To begin with, Appellants argue the ALUC Plan does not forbid automobile

parking because the statement in Table MA-2 that identifies automobile parking as a

prohibited use is subject to footnote 3. Footnote 3 states that the uses listed are the ones

that are “explicitly prohibited regardless of whether they meet the intensity criteria.”

However, the footnote refers to Appendix D “for a full list of compatibility designations

22 for specific land uses.” According to Appendix D, automobile parking is “[p]otentially

compatible with restrictions” in Compatibility Zone A, the Clear Zone. While we

conclude the specific language prohibiting parking lots controls, assuming, for the sake of

argument, Appellants’ interpretation of Appendix D, further evaluation (more than a

negative declaration) is necessary to determine the parking lot’s compatibility in the

Clear Zone.

Appellants argue the Project will not result in an “assemblage of people” because

users will not remain in the parking lot for extended periods of time, but will drive in and

out and wait for a shuttle bus. Pointing out that agricultural use of the property would

involve the entry of people into the Clear Zone, Appellants argue Respondents’

interpretation of assemblage of peoples results in “both a regulatory and physical ‘taking’

of the Property under the 5th and 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution.” In

contrast to agricultural use, the proposed automobile parking lot will have nearly 200

vehicles with at least one driver, possibly passenger(s), accessing the lot 24 hours a day,

seven days a week. The occupants of the vehicles will have to gather and wait on site for

shuttles, up to 12 shuttles driving people on and off the site every day. There will also be

two on-site security guards. As Respondents point out, assemblage means “a collection”

or “gathering” of “persons.” (Meriam-Webster.com (2025)

webster.com/dictionary/assemblage> [as of Oct. 14, 2025].) From the time of their

arrival until their departure, people will be gathering in the parking lot.

23 Next, Appellants argue the Project does not include the storage of hazardous

materials because ordinary gasoline tanks in cars do not constitute “aviation fuel and

other aviation-related flammable materials,” the “manufacture or bulk storage of

hazardous materials (toxic, explosive, corrosive),” or the “aboveground storage of more

than 6,000 gallons of nonaviation flammable materials per tank.” Footnote 14 of Table

MA-2 defines hazardous materials as “toxic, explosive, corrosive,” and “[a]ll storage of

hazardous materials” is prohibited. Gasoline in automobile tanks constitute hazardous

materials. (Code of Reg, Title 8, section 339, subd. (b)(3);

Regulations, Title 8, Section 339. The Hazardous Substances List> [as of Oct. 14, 2025].)

Appellants assert the Project does not qualify as a “non-aeronautical structure”

because it is not a “structure.” Respondents point out that the Project includes the

installation of parking gates and bollards. Although the ALUC Plan does not define the

term “structure,” the City defines it as including “anything constructed or erected that

requires a location on the ground . . . but not including a fence or a wall used as a fence

. . . or access drives or walks.” Based on the City’s definition, parking gates and bollards

constitute structures.

Finally, Appellants contend the parking lot reasonably qualifies as “open land”

pursuant to ALUC Policy 4.2.4. The ALUC Handbook identifies the criteria for open

land as being “free of most structures and other major obstacles such as walls, large trees

or poles (greater than 4 inches in diameter, measured 4 feet above the ground), and

overhead wires,” and having “minimum dimensions of approximately 75 feet by 300 feet

24 (0.5 acres).” It further states that road and automobile parking lots are acceptable as open

land areas if they meet this criteria, and “providing contiguous landscaped and parking

areas is encouraged as a means of increasing the size of open land areas.” Again,

assuming without deciding Appellants’ argument, further evaluation (more than a

negative declaration) is necessary to determine the parking lot’s compatibility in the

Clear Zone.

c. The City’s conclusion was “arbitrary and capricious”

Appellants assert the superior court’s ruling fails to explain how the City’s

conclusion was “arbitrary and capricious” or how a reasonable person could not have

found the Project was consistent with the ALUC Plan. Not so. Having considered each

of the court’s reasons for finding the Project to be inconsistent with the ALUC Plan, we

agree with its ruling. No reasonable person could have found the Project to be consistent

with the ALUC Plan when the 2018 AICUZ prohibits parking lots in the Clear Zone.

Appellants’ argument to the contrary, at best, warrants further evaluation.

d. SP208

Finally, Appellants contend the parking lot is consistent with SP208; however, as

we explained in section II.A.2.b., ante, since SP208 was never reviewed by the ALUC for

consistency purposes, reliance upon SP208 is unwarranted.

C. CEQA Compliance.

Appellants argue the superior court erred in concluding the City violated CEQA

by adopting an MND instead of preparing an EIR for the Project.

25 1. MNDs Under CEQA

“‘“[A] public agency pursuing or approving a project need not prepare an EIR

unless the project may result in a ‘significant effect on the environment’ [citations],

defined as a ‘substantial, or potentially substantial, adverse change in the environment’

[citation]. If the agency’s initial study of a project produces substantial evidence

supporting a fair argument the project may have significant adverse effects, the agency

must (assuming the project is not exempt from CEQA) prepare an EIR.”’ [Citations.]

“Substantial evidence is ‘“enough relevant information and reasonable inferences

. . . that a fair argument can be made to support a conclusion, even though other

conclusions might also be reached.”’ [Citations.] Substantial evidence includes ‘facts,

reasonable assumptions predicated upon facts, and expert opinion supported by facts,’ but

does not include ‘[a]rgument, speculation, unsubstantiated opinion or narrative.’

[Citation.]

“If, following the initial study, ‘“[t]here is no substantial evidence, in light of the

whole record . . . that the project may have a significant effect on the environment,”’ the

agency may prepare a negative declaration for the project. [Citations.] If, however,

substantial evidence shows the project may have a significant environmental impact, but

the impact can be mitigated to insignificance through project revisions that the applicant

agrees to before the agency approves the project, the agency may prepare a mitigated

negative declaration (MND) for the project. [Citations.]” (Upland Community First v.

City of Upland (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 1, 13-14 (Upland Community First).)

26 2. Standard of Review for MNDs

“On appeal from a judgment in a mandamus proceeding under CEQA, our

standard of review is the same as the trial court’s: we independently review the

administrative record and the lead agency’s action, not the trial court’s decision and in

this sense our review under CEQA is de novo. [Citations.] We review an agency’s

decision to rely on an MND for a ‘“‘prejudicial abuse of discretion,’ which ‘is established

if the agency has not proceeded in a manner required by law or if the [agency’s]

determination or decision is not supported by substantial evidence.’”’ [Citations.]

“‘In reviewing an agency’s decision to adopt an MND, a court (whether at the trial

or the appellate level) must determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record

to support a “fair argument” that a proposed project may have a significant effect on the

environment. [Citation.] The fair argument standard creates a “low threshold” for

requiring an EIR, reflecting a legislative preference for resolving doubts in favor of

environmental review. [Citation.] [¶] Whether the evidence establishes a fair argument

that a project may result in significant environmental impacts is a question of law.’

[Citations.] The petitioner has the burden of proving ‘the existence of substantial

evidence supporting a fair argument of significant environmental impact.’ [Citation.]

“Under the fair argument standard, a court may not uphold an agency’s decision to

adopt an MND, ‘“‘merely because substantial evidence was presented that the project

would not have [a significant environmental] impact. The [reviewing] court’s function is

to determine whether substantial evidence support[s] the agency’s conclusion as to

27 whether the prescribed “fair argument” could be made. If there [is] substantial evidence

that the proposed project might have a significant environmental impact, evidence to the

contrary is not sufficient to support a decision to dispense with preparation of an EIR and

adopt a negative declaration, because it [can] be “fairly argued” that the project might

have a significant environmental impact. Stated another way, if the . . . court perceives

substantial evidence that the project might have such an impact, but the agency failed to

secure preparation of the required EIR, the agency’s action is to be set aside because the

agency abused its discretion by failing to proceed “in a manner required by law.”’”’

[Citations.] In sum, under the fair argument standard, ‘deference to the agency’s

determination is not appropriate and [the agency’s] decision not to require an EIR can be

upheld only when there is no credible evidence to the contrary.’ [Citation.]” (Upland

Community First, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at pp. 14-15.)

3. Analysis

Appellants contend the City complied with CEQA because any alleged public

safety impacts from the Project are speculative and fail to constitute a significant impact

on the environment. They further maintain the Initial Study adequately discussed the

Project’s potential conflicts with applicable land use plans and correctly concluded that

none exist. As we explain, we disagree.

The Project site is located in an area subject to an ALUC plan and designated as

Zone A (Clear Zone). Given this location, CEQA has special requirements for projects

within an ALUC Plan area that expressly discourage MNDs: “[a] lead agency shall not

28 adopt a negative declaration [or MND] for a project [within an ALUC Plan] unless [it]

considers whether the project will result in a safety hazard or noise problem for persons

using the airport or for persons residing or working in the project area.” (Pub. Res. Code,

§ 21096, subd. (b); see California Building Industry Assn. v. Bay Area Air Quality

Management Dist. (2015) 62 Cal.4th 369, 391; Cal. Code Regs. Tit. 14, § 15074,

subd. (e).)

Here, the MND notes that the Project is located within Zone A of the ALUC Plan

(Clear Zone) which “prohibits non-aeronautical structures, assemblages of people,

objects exceeding height limits determined by the Federal Aviation Administration

(FAA), all storage of hazardous materials and all hazards to flight,” and “within [SP208]

[Clear Zone,] which identifies agriculture, automobile parking and open space as

compatible land uses.” Nonetheless, the City relied primarily on SP208 and reasoned

that because “there are no structures, assemblage of people, objects exceeding FAA

height limits, nor storage of hazardous materials proposed on the Project site. . . . Project

implementation would cause a less than significant impact”

The City erred in solely relying on SP208 to approve an MND for the Project. As

we previously discussed, SP208 is inconsistent with other applicable land use plans

(AICUZ, the ALUC Plan, and the General Plan) and was never reviewed by ALUC.

Moreover, the MND fails to disclose that (1) the most recent AICUZ specifies that

automobile parking is not compatible with the Clear Zone, and (2) the Project site is

subject to an avigation easement. Interestingly, a prior draft version of the MND

29 disclosed the easement. City Associate Planner Julia Descoteaux (JD) asked, “Has the

easement holder concurred with the proposed project/land use?” and “Was there a

discussion with the [March ARB] on the Applicants [sic] side?”

According to the prior draft MND, the Clear Zone easement was recorded in 1984

and “grants March Air Force Base (AICUZ) the right to prohibit all land uses other than

agriculture; grazing (excluding feed lots and dairy herds); permanent open space; existing

water areas; rights-of-way for fenced two-lane highways, without sidewalks or bicycle

trails, and single tract railroads; and communications and utilities rights-of-way (see

Appendix J).” The draft MND also stated that “the City adopted [SP208] on June 27,

1989, which permits open space, agricultural, automobile parking, and roads. Thus,

under the approved Specific Plan, the parking lot is permitted.” Regarding the last

sentence’s claim, JD emailed City personnel and questioned whether “SP208 overrides

the [Base AICUZ’s] easement.” Subsequently, she emailed the applicant’s consultant

and asked, “Have you or the applicant contacted the Base to discuss the proposed

project? If so, can you please provide documentation of their support of the project given

they have easements over the property that restrict its use.”

Despite JD’s questions and concerns, the final MND failed to mention the AICUZ

or the Clear Zone Easement. CEQA requires a good faith effort at full disclosure, “it

does not require perfection, nor exhaustive analysis.” (South of Market Community

Action Network v. City and County of San Francisco (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 321, 342; see

Sierra Club v. County of Fresno (2018) 6 Cal.5th 502, 515 [courts look for “‘“‘adequacy,

30 completeness and a good-faith effort at full disclosure’”’”].) By failing to disclose the

AICUZ and the Clear Zone Easement, the final MND ignored the substantial evidence of

a fair argument that the Project may result in a potentially significant environmental

impact by locating an incompatible use within the Clear Zone in violation of the 2018

AICUZ, the ALUC Plan, and the avigation easement. (Cal. Code Regs. Tit. 14,

§§ 15064, subd. (f)(1), 15384, subd. (a); McCann v. City of San Diego (2021) 70

Cal.App.5th 51, 87 [MND sufficient only if no substantial evidence supporting a fair

argument the project may have significant effect].)

The City’s failure to disclose the conflicting land use plans alone provided

sufficient reason for the superior court to grant the peremptory writ of mandate.

However, the court also found substantial evidence the Project may have significant

environmental risks in the event of an aircraft crash due to the presence of hazardous

materials and the assemblages of people. Appellants contend this finding “concerns

potential impacts that could occur if and only if a plane were to crash into the Parking Lot

at some point in the future.” They argue these potential public safety impacts are not

“environmental effects” as defined by CEQA because they are not “caused” by the

Project. (Ballona Wetlands Land Trust v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th

455, 473-474 [an EIR did not need to address impacts relating to “sea level rise resulting

from global climate change” on a proposed mixed-use development where the project

itself would not cause sea levels to rise].) They maintain that these alleged impacts are

31 indirect and not reasonably foreseeable because they are speculative and unlikely to

occur. We disagree.

As Respondents note, Appellants dismiss the fact that CEQA imposes additional

requirements for projects within an ALUC Plan boundary. (Pub. Res. Code, § 21096.6)

More specifically, a lead agency must “use certain technical resources when addressing

airport-related safety hazards and noise problems in EIRs for projects near airports ([Pub.

Res. Code,] § 21096, subd. (a)),” and may not “adopt[] a negative declaration without

considering ‘whether the project will result in a safety hazard or noise problem for

persons using the airport or for persons residing or working in the project area.’ ([Pub.

Res. Code, § 21096, subd. (b).)” (California Building Industry Assn. v. Bay Area Air

Quality Management Dist. (2015) 62 Cal.4th 369, 391.) The record contains substantial

evidence that demonstrates the Project will result in safety hazards.

Representatives of several public agencies presented evidence of the safety

hazards associated with a parking lot located in the Clear Zone. Appellants fault the

superior court’s reliance on “comments from [these] public agencies, including the Air

Force, March JPA, Riverside County, and ALUC,” which they claim do not constitute

6 “(a) If a lead agency prepares an environmental impact report for a project situated within airport land use compatibility plan boundaries . . . the Airport Land Use Planning Handbook published by the Division of Aeronautics of the Department of Transportation, in compliance with Section 21674.5 of the Public Utilities Code and other documents, shall be utilized as technical resources to assist in the preparation of the environmental impact report as the report relates to airport-related safety hazards and noise problems. [¶] (b) A lead agency shall not adopt a negative declaration for a project described in subdivision (a) unless the lead agency considers whether the project will result in a safety hazard or noise problem for persons using the airport or for persons residing or working in the project area.” (Pub. Res. Code, § 21096.)

32 expert testimony. Assuming, without deciding, their claim as to the Air Force, March

JPA, and Riverside County, we reject it as to ALUC.

As previously stated, the SAA provides for the establishment of ALUC’s in

California counties “to protect public health, safety, and welfare by ensuring the orderly

expansion of airports and the adoption of land use measures that minimize the public’s

exposure to excessive noise and safety hazards within areas around public airports to the

extent that these areas are not already devoted to incompatible uses.” (Pub. Util. Code,

§ 21670, subd. (a)(2).) Each ALUC must include at least two aviation experts. (Pub.

Util. Code, §§ 21670, subd. (b)(3), 21670.1, subd. (b).) ALUC’s prepare and adopt plans,

have jurisdiction over the areas around civilian and military airports, and determine

whether a city’s general plan, specific plans, and amendments thereto, are consistent or

inconsistent with the applicable ALUC plan. (Pub. Util. Code, §§ 21674, 21675,

subds. (a), (b), and 21676, subds. (a), (b).) Thus, ALUC is the expert on its plan’s

requirements and compatible land uses around March ARB. As such, the facts and

opinions from this agency constitutes substantial evidence of a fair argument regarding

the Project’s potential significant safety hazards.

Notwithstanding the above, Appellants assert the alleged public safety impacts

from the Project are speculative and fail to constitute a reasonably foreseeable significant

impact on the environment. They argue that “any attempt to evaluate the potential

environmental impacts of the highly remote and speculative possibility that a plane might

crash on the Parking Lot would be meaningless.” They cite Santa Rita Union School

33 District v. City of Salinas (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 298, 332 (Santa Rita USD) and two

other cases that stand for the proposition that an EIR is not required to speculate on future

environmental consequences. Santa Rita USD held that “CEQA review is . . . not

triggered where there is not yet an identifiable impact as until that point, the review

process could not be meaningful in the sense that it allows consideration of alternatives

that could mitigate the impact.” (Id. at p. 332.) However, it also held “‘“[t]he fact that

precision may not be possible . . . does not mean that no analysis is required.”’” (Id. at

p. 331.) Rather, the “‘lead agency must use its “best efforts” to evaluate environmental

effects, including the use of reasonable forecasting.’” (Ibid.) Here, the identifiable

impact is a plane crashing into the vehicles and occupants at the Project site. Since the

Project is located in the Clear Zone and is subject to the easement, the City was remiss in

failing to undertake any analysis of the reasonably foreseeable significant and identified

public safety impact from a plane crash.

In short, the City violated CEQA by adopting an MND despite the substantial

evidence in the record to support a fair argument that the Project may have significant

effect on the environment.

34

III. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

McKINSTER J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ

P. J.

CODRINGTON

J.

35