DISCUSSION

Robert contends that he is an heir to Decedent’s estate because he is a biological nephew of Decedent. He relies upon section 6453, subdivision (b)(3). The law of intestate succession is purely a matter of statutory regulation. We wrote in Estate of Shellenbarger (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 894, 896, “One hundred years ago our Supreme Court warned that ‘ “[s]uccession to estates is purely a matter of statutory regulation, which cannot be changed by courts” ’ and that ‘ “[i]t is vain to argue against the injustice of the rule . . . .” ’ ” Our Legislature has determined that the state’s interest in providing for a just and orderly distribution of property at death requires a mechanism to discourage dubious paternity claims from being made after the father’s death solely for inheritance purposes. (Estate of Sanders (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 462, 475.) Intestacy rights in California are determined based on the natural parent/child relationship and not on biology. (Estate of Sanders, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th 462, 471.) Section 6453 sets forth the conditions for determining whether a natural parent/child relationship exists. Section 6453 provides in part: “For the purpose of determining whether a person is a ‘natural parent’ as that term is used in this chapter: [¶] (a) A natural parent and child relationship is established where that relationship is presumed and not rebutted pursuant to the Uniform Parentage Act . . . . [¶] (b) A natural parent and child relationship may be established pursuant to any other provisions of the Uniform Parentage Act, except that the relationship may not be established by an action under subdivision (c) of Section 7630 of the Family Code unless any of the following conditions exist: [¶] (1) A court order was entered during the parent’s lifetime

4 declaring parentage. [¶] (2) Parentage is established by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has openly held out the child as that parent’s own. [¶] (3) It was impossible for the parent to hold out the child as that parent’s own and parentage is established by clear and convincing evidence, which may include genetic DNA evidence acquired during the parent’s lifetime.” The statutory interpretation of section 6453, subdivision (b)(3) is a pure question of law subject to our de novo review. (Estate of Griswold (2001) 25 Cal.4th 904, 910-911; Estate of Sanders, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th 462, 470.) Here Robert has not shown that he established a natural parent/child relationship with Louis pursuant to section 6453, subdivisions (a) or (b). In particular, pursuant to subdivision (b)(3), Robert has not shown that it “was impossible” for Louis to hold him out as his own. At the time of Louis’s death, Robert was 12 years old. Robert’s mother could have brought a paternity action against Louis during Louis’s lifetime, but she did not. The plain language of section 6453, subdivision (b)(3) also requires proof of parentage by clear and convincing evidence which may include DNA evidence acquired during the parent’s lifetime. Robert has not shown that the DNA evidence he obtained was acquired during Louis’s lifetime. Moreover, permitting DNA evidence acquired after a parent’s lifetime would render the statutory condition surplusage, a construction that should be avoided. (Estate of Sanders, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th 462, 470.) The legislative intent is clear – to discourage paternity claims made after the father’s death for the sole purpose of inheritance. (Id. at p. 475.)

5 We need not decide the evidentiary value of the DNA evidence submitted by Robert because we have resolved the appeal on statutory grounds.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

GILBERT, P. J.

We concur:

YEGAN, J.

BALTODANO, J.

6 Roger L. Lund, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

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Staker/Johnson Law Corporation and Samantha W. Koopman for Objector and Appellant. Panitz & Kossoff and Kenneth W. Kossoff for Objectors and Respondents.