1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ROSITA M. STEWART, an individual; Case No. 2:25-cv-07153-SPG-MAA 11 and VERNE M. MANUELITO, an ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ 12 individual, MOTION TO REMAND 13 Plaintiffs, [ECF NO. 12]

14 v.

15 GENERAL MOTORS LLC, a Delaware 16 limited liability company; and DOES 1-10, 17 inclusive, Defendants. 18 19 20 Before the Court is the Motion to Remand (ECF No. 12 (“Motion”)) filed by 21 Plaintiffs Rosita M. Stewart and Verne M. Manuelito (“Plaintiffs”). The Court has read 22 and considered the Motion and concluded that it is suitable for decision without oral 23 argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. Having considered the parties’ 24 submissions, the relevant law, and the record in this case, the Court DENIES the Motion. 25 I. BACKGROUND 26 On or about January 25, 2023, Plaintiffs purchased a 2023 Chevrolet Silverado 2500, 27 manufactured and sold by Defendant General Motors LLC (“Defendant”). (ECF No. 1-1 28 (“Complaint”) ¶¶ 6, 9). When Plaintiffs purchased the vehicle, they received express 1 written warranties that provided that, in the event of a nonconformity during the warranty 2 period, Plaintiffs could deliver the vehicle to Defendant’s authorized service facilities for 3 repair. (Id. ¶ 11). During the warranty period, the vehicle developed transmission defects 4 that impaired the vehicle’s use, value, and safety. (Id. ¶ 12). Plaintiffs delivered the vehicle 5 to Defendant, which failed to repair the vehicle even after a reasonable number of 6 opportunities to do so. (Id. ¶¶ 13-14). Plaintiffs state that, in light of the nonconformities, 7 they justifiably revoked acceptance of the vehicle and exercised their right to cancel the 8 contract. (Id. ¶ 23). 9 Plaintiffs assert claims under California’s Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act 10 (“Song-Beverly Act”), Cal. Civ. Code § 1790 et seq., and the federal Magnuson Moss 11 Warranty Act (“MMWA”), 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq. (Id. at 3-7). As relief, Plaintiffs seek 12 actual damages, restitution, civil penalties, remedies authorized by California Commercial 13 Code §§ 2711-13, and attorney’s fees. (Id. at 8). 14 Plaintiffs initiated this action in Los Angeles County Superior Court on March 6, 15 2025. (Id. at 2). Defendant filed an answer on April 24, 2025. (ECF No. 1-2). On June 16 23, 2025, Plaintiffs produced a copy of the vehicle’s sales agreement, which identifies a 17 total sales price of $90,046.00. (ECF No. 12-1 (“Yang Declaration”) ¶ 7). Defendant 18 removed the action to this Court on August 1, 2025. (ECF No. 1). 19 Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion on August 22, 2025, arguing that Defendant’s 20 notice of removal was untimely filed. (Mot.). Defendant filed an opposition on September 21 10, 2025, (ECF No. 13 (“Opposition”)), and Plaintiffs replied in support of the Motion on 22 September 17, 2025, (ECF No. 16 (“Reply”)). 23 II. LEGAL STANDARD 24 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, having subject-matter jurisdiction 25 only over matters authorized by the Constitution and Congress. Kokkonen v. Guardian 26 Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A defendant may remove a civil action 27 filed in state court to federal court if the federal court would have had original jurisdiction 28 over the suit. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Federal courts have original jurisdiction where an 1 action arises under federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or where each plaintiff’s citizenship is 2 diverse from each defendant’s citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, 3 exclusive of interest and costs, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 4 Federal law sets forth two separate deadlines, which, if triggered, require a defendant 5 to initiate removal within thirty days: (1) following service of an initial pleading that 6 affirmatively reveals the basis for removal; or (2) if “the case stated by the initial pleading 7 is not removable,” following receipt of “an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper 8 from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become 9 removable.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1), (3). The first thirty-day deadline “only applies if the 10 case stated by the initial pleading is removable on its face,” as determined “through 11 examination of the four corners of the applicable pleadings, not through subjective 12 knowledge or a duty to make further inquiry.” Harris v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 13 689, 694 (9th Cir. 2005). The second deadline, meanwhile, is only triggered where “an 14 amended pleading, motion, order, or other paper . . . [makes] a ground for removal 15 unequivocally clear and certain.” Dietrich v. Boeing Co., 14 F.4th 1089, 1095 (9th Cir. 16 2021). A defendant may remove a case “outside the two thirty-day periods on the basis of 17 its own information, provided that it has not run afoul of either of the thirty-day deadlines.” 18 Roth v. CHA Hollywood Med. Ctr., L.P., 720 F.3d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 2013). 19 There is a “strong presumption” against removal jurisdiction, and “[f]ederal 20 jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first 21 instance.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). “The 22 removal statute is strictly construed, and any doubt about the right of removal requires 23 resolution in favor of remand.” Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 24 1244 (9th Cir. 2009). The removing party bears the burden of establishing federal subject- 25 matter jurisdiction. Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 1988). 26 III. DISCUSSION 27 Plaintiffs’ primary argument in favor of remand is that Defendant’s notice of 28 removal was untimely. (Mot. at 7). Plaintiffs argue that removability was clear on the face 1 of the Complaint and that disclosure of the purchase agreement resolved any doubt about 2 the amount in controversy. (Id. at 7-10). Defendant responds that while it could have 3 removed the case at any time, it was not required to do so because neither the Complaint 4 nor the sales agreement contained sufficient information to ascertain the amount in 5 controversy. (Opp.). The Court will consider whether either of the thirty-day deadlines in 6 § 1446(b) was triggered. 7 A. The Complaint 8 Plaintiffs first argue that removability was clear on the face of the Complaint because 9 the Complaint contained a claim under the MMWA, which is a federal cause of action. 10 (Mot. at 7). However, while the MMWA creates a federal cause of action, such claims 11 cannot serve as the basis for federal question jurisdiction unless the amount in controversy 12 equals or exceeds “the sum or value of $50,000 (exclusive of interests and costs) computed 13 on the basis of all claims to be determined” in the suit. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(3)(B); see 14 Shoner v. Carrier Corp., 30 F.4th 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2022) (“Although the MMWA is a 15 federal statute, federal courts do not have jurisdiction over an MMWA claim if the amount 16 in controversy is less than $50,000.”). Thus, Plaintiffs must still show that the amount in 17 controversy was evident from the face of the Complaint to trigger the thirty-day deadline. 18 Next, Plaintiffs argue that the Complaint contained sufficient allegations such that 19 Defendant could plausibly allege satisfaction of the amount in controversy requirement. 20 (Mot. at 8). Plaintiffs cite to Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 21 81 (2014), for the proposition that a notice of removal requires only plausible allegations 22 that the threshold requirements are met. However, Dart set out the standard for a 23 defendant’s notice of removal, not the standard to trigger either of the thirty-day deadlines 24 in § 1446(b). See Kuxhausen v. BMW Fin. Servs. NA LLC, 707 F.3d 1136, 1141 n.3 (9th 25 Cir. 2013) (“[W]hether a defendant can establish that federal jurisdiction exists and the 26 question of when the thirty-day time period begins are not two sides of the same coin.”). 27 As set forth above, the standard here is not whether the Complaint contains sufficient 28 1 allegations such that Defendant could plausibly allege federal jurisdiction, but whether “the 2 case stated by the initial pleading is removable on its face.” Harris, 425 F.3d at 694. 3 Finally, Plaintiffs argue that “Defendant had more than sufficient information at its 4 disposal to provide a plausible allegation regarding the satisfaction of the jurisdictional 5 threshold.” (Mot. at 9). Specifically, Plaintiffs point to allegations in the Complaint as to 6 the make, model, year, and VIN of the vehicle, which would allow Defendant “to ascertain 7 an approximation” of the vehicle’s market value. (Id.). Plaintiffs also argue that the 8 Complaint lays out the specific forms of statutory relief sought, such that Defendant could 9 calculate an approximate amount in controversy. (Id. at 10). 10 The Ninth Circuit has previously rejected such arguments. A defendant is required 11 to examine only “the four corners of the applicable pleadings” and need not rely on 12 “subjective knowledge or a duty to make further inquiry.” Harris, 425 F.3d at 694. Even 13 assuming Defendant had documents in its possession from which it could approximate the 14 amount in controversy, it was not required to “rely on pre-complaint documents to ascertain 15 whether a case stated by an indeterminate initial pleading is actually removable.” Carvalho 16 v. Equifax Inf. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 885-86 (9th Cir. 2010). Thus, absent any specific 17 allegations of the dollar value of the claims, bare allegations of the make and model of the 18 vehicle and claims for broad categories of damages are insufficient to trigger the removal 19 deadline. See, e.g., Alvarez-Munguia v. Ford Motor Co., No. 23-cv-02751-BLF, 2024 WL 20 69076, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2024) (concluding that complaint did not trigger thirty-day 21 removal deadline because it alleged only categories of relief and did not identify any 22 “specific measure of damages, nor [did] it allege the amount of attorneys’ fees and costs 23 incurred”); Pastrana v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., No. 8:24-cv-00515-FWS-ADS, 2024 WL 24 2817533, at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 3, 2024) (concluding that thirty-day deadline was not 25 triggered where “the Complaint does not list a dollar amount corresponding to the 26 damages”). Plaintiffs do not point to anywhere in the Complaint that affirmatively revealed 27 the amount in controversy. Accordingly, the first thirty-day deadline in § 1446(b) was not 28 triggered. 1 B. Service of Sales Agreement 2 Plaintiffs next argue that production of the vehicle’s sales agreement was sufficient 3 to resolve any ambiguity about the amount in controversy and trigger the thirty-day 4 deadline for removal. (Mot. at 10). Plaintiffs point out that the sales agreement identifies 5 a total sales price of $90,046.00, in excess of the MMWA’s amount in controversy 6 threshold. (Id.). Defendant responds that the sales agreement did not provide all the 7 information necessary to calculate the amount in controversy, such that it was not 8 “unequivocally clear and certain” that the amount in controversy requirement was met. 9 (Opp. at 20-21, 24-25). The Court agrees with Defendant. 10 Because the MMWA does not specify the appropriate measure and type of damages, 11 courts have turned to applicable state law to determine the available remedies. See Romo 12 v. FFG Ins. Co., 397 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1239 (C.D. Cal. 2005). The applicable state law 13 for Plaintiffs’ claims is the Song Beverly Act.1 See id. Under the Song Beverly Act, the 14 purchaser of a vehicle may obtain restitution equal to “the purchase price paid by the buyer, 15 less that amount directly attributable to use by the buyer.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.2(d)(1). 16 1 Defendant notes that some courts have found that California’s version of the UCC 17 provides an alternative basis for calculating MMWA damages to the Song Beverly Act. 18 (Opp. at 17); see Orichian v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 226 Cal. App. 4th 1322, 1332 (2014) (finding error in trial court’s conclusion that the only available remedies under the MMWA 19 were those available under the Song Beverly Act). While Plaintiffs make no argument to 20 this effect, the Complaint does seek remedies under California Commercial Code §§ 2711- 13 in addition to those under the Song Beverly Act. However, to the extent these remedies 21 provide an alternative measure of the amount in controversy under the MMWA, the sales 22 agreement still does not make it “unequivocally clear and certain” that the amount in 23 controversy requirement is met under these theories. As Defendant argues, the sales agreement lists only the purchase price but does not identify how much Plaintiffs have paid 24 on the leased vehicle, as required under § 2711(1). The sales agreement also provides no 25 information about the market value of the vehicle at the time of breach, as required to calculate the cost of cover under § 2712, or the difference between “the market price at the 26 time when the buyer learned of the breach and the contract price,” as required by § 2713. 27 Even under these alternative theories, then, production of the sales agreement does not 28 meet the Ninth Circuit’s “unequivocally clear and certain” standard to trigger the second thirty-day removal deadline. See Dietrich, 14 F.4th at 1095. 1 The usage offset is calculated by multiplying the purchase price by a fraction with a 2 denominator of 120,000 and a numerator of “the number of miles traveled by the new 3 motor vehicle prior to the time the buyer first delivered the vehicle to the manufacturer.” 4 Id. § 1793.2(d)(2)(C). In addition, under newly enacted California law, defendants in 5 actions seeking restitution for motor vehicles are entitled to offset from the purchase price 6 any negative equity, manufacturer’s rebate, third-party sold optional equipment, and 7 unpaid financing. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 871.27(b), (c), (d), (f).2 The Ninth Circuit has 8 explained that, because “an estimate of the amount in controversy must be reduced if ‘a 9 specific rule of law or measure of damages limits the amount of damages recoverable,’” 10 consideration of the Song Beverly Act’s offsets in calculating the amount in controversy is 11 “appropriate.” Schneider v. Ford Motor Co., 756 F. App’x 699, 701 n.3 (9th Cir. 2018) 12 (quoting Morris v. Hotel Riviera, Inc., 704 F.2d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1983)). 13 Taking into account these statutory offsets, the disclosure of the sales agreement did 14 not make it “unequivocally clear and certain” that the case was removable. See Dietrich, 15 14 F.4th at 1095. While Plaintiffs disclosed the purchase price of the vehicle, they did not 16 provide information about the vehicle’s “payoff history” or the number of miles driven. 17 See (Yang Decl. at 9; ECF No. 13-1 (“Wynsma Declaration”) ¶ 3). Defendant therefore 18 lacked information needed to calculate the available damages. See Lopez v. Gen. Motors, 19 LLC, No. CV 25-06549-MWF(MAAx), 2025 WL 2629545, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 20 2025) (denying motion to remand because “Defendant could not have calculated the unpaid 21 financing offset without the loan payment history”); see also Covarrubias v. Ford Motor 22 Co., No. 2:25-cv-00328-JLS-MAA, 2025 WL 907544, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2025) 23 (finding amount in controversy to be “indeterminate” where the complaint “fail[ed] to 24 provide information from which the vehicle’s mileage use offset can be determined” and 25 26

27 2 Section 871.27 was enacted as part of Assembly Bill 1755 and went into effect on January 28 1, 2025. See A.B. 1755, 2023-24 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2024). Because this action was initiated after January 1, 2025, these requirements apply here. 1 failed to provide “the total cash price paid for a purchased, or monthly payments made on 2 a leased, vehicle”). 3 While the inclusion of attorney’s fees and civil penalties, coupled with the disclosure 4 of the vehicle’s purchase price, may have made it likely that the amount in controversy 5 requirement was met, the Ninth Circuit has adopted a “bright-line approach” requiring that 6 removability be “unequivocally clear and certain” to trigger the removal deadline. 7 Dietrich, 14 F.4th at 1095; Harris, 425 F.3d at 697. Because actual damages were 8 uncertain, Defendant had no basis to calculate civil penalties. See Lopez, 2025 WL 9 2629545, at *4 (“Defendant could not have calculated civil penalties in this action until the 10 actual damages were certain.”); see also Crescencio v. Ford Motor Co., No. CV 24-10946- 11 MWF (BFMx), 2025 WL 1122096, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2025) (“Because the Complaint 12 does not include sufficient information from which [the defendant] could reliably calculate 13 actual damages, any estimate of civil penalties was equally uncertain.”). As to attorney’s 14 fees, Plaintiffs provided no information from which Defendant could calculate any such 15 award, let alone with unequivocal certainty. See Lopez, 2025 WL 2629545, at *4 (finding 16 it “implausible at this early stage of the action” that defendant could determine that 17 attorney’s fees would exceed the $50,000 threshold). 18 Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ disclosures did not trigger the second thirty-day deadline for 19 removal. Because neither of the thirty-day deadlines in § 1446(b) was triggered, and 20 because the case was removed within a year of its commencement, see 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1446(c)(1), Defendant’s removal was timely. 22 C. Amount in Controversy 23 In addition to the timely removal arguments discussed above, Plaintiffs argue in their 24 Reply brief that Defendant has failed to meet its burden to show by a preponderance of the 25 evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold. (Reply at 5). 26 As Plaintiffs argue, a removing defendant bears the burden to show that “it is more likely 27 than not that the amount in controversy exceeds” the jurisdictional threshold. Sanchez v. 28 1 Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 404 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks and 2 citation omitted). 3 As an initial matter, however, Plaintiffs have waived this argument by failing to raise 4 it in their initial brief. McKay v. Ingleson, 558 F.3d 888, 891 n.5 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating 5 that where an “argument was not raised clearly and distinctly in the opening brief, it has 6 been waived”). From the Court’s reading, the sole focus of Plaintiffs’ Motion was that the 7 removal was untimely. In the Reply, Plaintiffs point to several parts of the Motion to argue 8 otherwise. (Reply at 5). However, none of these passages contains any argument that the 9 amount in controversy requirement was not met. In a section entitled, “Defendant, as the 10 removing Party, has failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction,” Plaintiffs argued only 11 that “Defendant has failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that removal was proper in 12 any respect, as the removal was plainly untimely.” (Mot. at 12 (emphasis added)). In the 13 other two cited passages, Plaintiffs argued that the notice of removal did not cite to “any 14 ‘other paper’ which provided Defendant with new information amounting to its conclusion 15 that this Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1446.”3 (Id. at 10). Here 16 too, the focus of Plaintiffs’ argument was on timing. See (id. at 10-11 (“Nowhere in the 17 Notice of Removal, do Defendant [sic] identify any facts, documents, or evidence 18 purportedly uncovered through their investigation that would support an objectively 19 reasonable basis for seeking removal within the second 30-day window.”)). Because 20 “issues cannot be raised for the first time in a reply brief,” the Court need not consider this 21 argument. Gadda v. State Bar of Cal., 511 F.3d 933, 937 n.2 (9th Cir. 2007). 22 However, even setting aside this deficiency, Defendant has met its burden to show 23 that the amount in controversy requirement is met. In its notice of removal, Defendant 24 estimates that the purchase price for the vehicle was $90,046.00 and that, with deductions 25

26 3 To the extent Plaintiffs argue that Defendant could only remove during a thirty-day period 27 following service of one of the documents listed in § 1446(b)(3), the Ninth Circuit has 28 clearly rejected any such requirement. See Roth, 720 F.3d at 1125 (“[A] defendant [may] remove outside the two thirty-day periods on the basis of its own information.”). 1 for the “mileage offset, third-party service contracts, manufacturer’s rebate, and negative 2 equity,” the actual damages were approximately $61,249.29. (ECF No. 1 at 5). Further, 3 the notice of removal notes that Plaintiffs seek to recover civil penalties of up to two times 4 actual damages, as well as attorney’s fees. (Id.). Plaintiffs offer no reason to doubt these 5 figures. Taking into account both attorney’s fees and civil penalties,4 it is “more likely 6 than not” that the $50,000 jurisdictional threshold under the MMWA is met. See Sanchez, 7 102 F.3d at 404 (citation omitted). 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

16 4 The Ninth Circuit has made clear that attorney’s fees “may be included in the amount in controversy” under the MMWA where, as here, they are available under state law. Shoner, 17 30 F.4th at 1148; see Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(e)(1). While the Ninth Circuit has not 18 addressed whether civil penalties are included in this calculation, it has expressed 19 skepticism that the amount in controversy in MMWA cases should be assessed differently than in diversity cases, see id., and in diversity cases, “both actual and punitive 20 damages . . . must be considered to the extent claimed in determining jurisdictional 21 amount,” Bell v. Preferred Life Assurance Soc’y of Montgomery, Ala., 320 U.S. 238, 240 (1943). Applying similar logic, several district courts in this Circuit have concluded that 22 civil penalties are properly included in calculating the amount-in-controversy under the 23 MMWA. See Romo, 397 F. Supp. 2d at 1239 (“The Court finds that Plaintiff could recover significant civil penalties under the Magnuson-Moss Act, and that these sums can be 24 considered in the amount in controversy equation.”); Lazorosas v. Mercedes-Benz USA, 25 LLC, No. 8:24-cv-01161-JWH-DFM, 2025 WL 40483, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2025) 26 (“Courts routinely include civil penalties when calculating the amount-in-controversy for Magnuson-Moss purposes.”); see also Brady v. Mercedes–Benz USA, Inc., 243 F.Supp.2d 27 1004, 1009 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that Song–Beverly Act’s civil penalties should be 28 included in amount in controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction). 1 CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the Motion to Remand. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 5 ||DATED: October 7, 2025 fge 5 :

7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 8 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28