NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 21 2025

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KENNETH PAUL HOUGAS, No. 24-5650 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 3:23-cv-08572-JAT v. MEMORANDUM*

FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona James A. Teilborg, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 17, 2025** Phoenix, Arizona

Before: COLLINS, MENDOZA, and DESAI, Circuit Judges.

Kenneth Paul Hougas appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the

Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his application for disability benefits

and supplemental income. We review the district court’s decision de novo and “set

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). aside a denial of benefits only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is

based on legal error.” Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 494 (9th Cir. 2022)

(quoting Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir.

2009)). Substantial evidence is “‘more than a mere scintilla.’ . . . It means—and

means only—‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion.’” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019)

(quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1. Hougas states that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred in her

consideration of the medical opinions of two doctors, Dr. Valpiani and Dr. Meier,

who treated Hougas. For claims filed before March 27, 2017, an ALJ must

consider how much weight to assign medical opinions based on various factors,

including the consistency of the opinion with the record. 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1527(c), 416.927(c). An ALJ may reject treating and examining doctors’

opinions for “clear and convincing” reasons if uncontradicted and for “specific and

legitimate” reasons if contradicted. Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1154 (9th Cir.

2020).

Contrary to Hougas’s assertion, the ALJ properly considered Dr. Valpiani’s

opinion in the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) determination. The ALJ

weighed Dr. Valpiani’s note that Hougas “had a diagnosis of depressive disorder”

2 24-5650 against Dr. Valpiani’s own finding that any depressive disorder was “stable,”

Hougas’s denials that he was depressed, and contradictory evidence that “the

consultative examiner made no diagnosis as the claimant was neither depressed nor

anxious.” Elsewhere, the ALJ considered Dr. Valpiani’s opinion in finding that

further limitations beyond the RFC are unnecessary “as the claimant reported only

minor limitations in activity” and stated that Dr. Valpiani’s clinical findings were

“largely normal” and inconsistent with Hougas’s purported inability “to walk, sit,

or lift.”

With respect to Dr. Meier, we find that the ALJ properly evaluated Dr.

Meier’s opinion in the residual functional capacity determination. The ALJ

concluded that Dr. Meier’s opinion did not provide any functional limitations, was

contradicted in part by other record evidence, and that Dr. Meier’s physical

examination and proposed course of treatment were consistent with the ALJ’s

RFC. These are “clear and convincing” as well as “specific and legitimate”

reasons for giving Dr. Meier’s opinion little weight, and they are supported by

substantial evidence. See Ford, 950 F.3d at 1154.

2. Hougas states that the ALJ’s hypothetical question to a vocational expert

(“VE”) did not cover at least one of his most significant limitations, oxygen

dependency. See Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th

Cir. 2009) (“Hypothetical questions posed to a VE must ‘set out all the limitations

3 24-5650 and restrictions of the particular claimant.’” (quoting Russell v. Sullivan, 930 F.2d

1443, 1445 (9th Cir.1991))). But the ALJ’s hypothetical question properly

accounted for Hougas’s limitations, including those associated with his oxygen

dependency. When posing the hypothetical, the ALJ specifically instructed the VE

to consider certain limitations “due to the oxygen.” The ALJ also enumerated

what the ALJ considered to be Hougas’s oxygen-related limitations of “no work

near open flames,” “no extreme non-weather-related heat,” and no “flammable

chemicals.” Because “[t]he ALJ adequately accounted” for Hougas’s use of

oxygen “in [her] construction of [his] RFC and in the hypothetical [she] presented

to the VE,” the ALJ’s hypothetical properly “reflect[ed] all of the claimant’s

limitations.” Bray, 554 F.3d at 1228.

3. Hougas argues that the ALJ improperly discounted his subjective

complaints. The Social Security Act and regulations prohibit granting disability

benefits based solely on a claimant’s subjective complaints. 42 U.S.C. §

423(d)(5)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(a), 416.929(a). Rather, an ALJ must assess

the limiting effects of a claimant’s impairments by determining whether his

descriptions of his symptoms are consistent with evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1529(c), 416.929(c); SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304 (Oct. 25, 2017). An

ALJ may discount the claimant’s subjective complaints when they are inconsistent

with objective medical evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4); Smartt, 53 F.4th at

4 24-5650 498.

The ALJ identified several inconsistencies in Hougas’s subjective

complaints. Hougas offers an interpretation of the record evidence that supports

his subjective complaints—but does not undermine the ALJ’s rational alternative

interpretation of the record. We therefore uphold the ALJ’s conclusion. Ford, 950

F.3d at 1154 (9th Cir. 2020) (“If the evidence is susceptible to more than one

rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld.” (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted)).

AFFIRMED.

5 24-5650