INTRODUCTION

19 On March 19, 2025, Plaintiff Miguel H. Martinez (“Plaintiff”) filed a 20 complaint (the “Complaint”) alleging violations of California’s Song-Beverly 21 Consumer Warranty Act and the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act in the Los 22 Angeles County Superior Court against Defendant General Motors LLC 23 (“Defendant”). (Dkt. 1-1.) On March 24, 2025, Plaintiff effectuated service of the 24 Complaint on Defendant. (Dkt. 15-1 at 6.) On May 8, 2025, Defendant filed an 25 Answer in the Los Angeles County Superior Court. (Dkt. 1-2.) On August 5, 2025, 26 Defendant filed a Notice of Removal of the action to the U.S. District Court for the 27 28 Central District of California (the “Notice of Removal”). (Dkt. 1.) 1 Remand”) this action to the Los Angeles County Superior Court. (Dkt. 15.) On 2 September 24, 2025, Defendant filed an Opposition to the Motion to Remand (the 3 “Opposition”). (Dkt. 18.) On October 1, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Reply in Support of 4 the Motion to Remand (the “Reply”). (Dkt. 19.) On October 10, 2025, Defendant 5 filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority. (Dkt. 20.) Also on October 10, 2025, 6 Defendant filed a Notice of Errata Regarding the Opposition (the “Notice of 7 Errata”). (Dkt. 21.) 8 The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned U.S. 9 Magistrate Judge. (Dkt. 6.) For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES 10 Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand. (Dkt. 15.) Because the Court has determined that the 11 Motion to Remand must be denied, the Court will also issue a separate scheduling 12 order. (Dkt. 17.) 13

14 15 II. 16 LEGAL STANDARD 17 Removal of a case from state court to federal court is governed by 28 U.S.C. 18 § 1441, which provides in relevant part that “any civil action brought in a State court 19 of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be 20 removed . . . to the district court of the United States for the district and division 21 embracing the place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Federal 22 courts have original subject matter jurisdiction where an action presents either a 23 federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. 24 § 1332. Generally, a court has diversity jurisdiction only when there is complete 25 diversity of citizenship among adverse parties and the amount in controversy 26 exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Remand to state court may be ordered 27 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or any defect in the removal procedure. See 28 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 1 construed in favor of remand. See Harris v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 2 689, 698 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 3 684 (9th Cir. 2006) (“It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside the limited 4 jurisdiction of the federal courts and the burden of establishing the contrary rests 5 upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” (internal quotation marks and brackets 6 omitted)). If there is any doubt as to whether removal is proper, remand must be 7 ordered. Ethridge v. Harbor House Rest., 861 F.2d 1389, 1393 (9th Cir. 1988). 8 “The party seeking removal bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction.” 9 Id. 10

11

III.

12

RELEVANT ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT

13 Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges four causes of action under the Song-Beverly 14 15 Consumer Warranty Act, California Civil Code §§ 1791, et seq., and one cause of 16 action under the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act arising out of his November 17 13, 2020 purchase of a 2021 Chevrolet Silverado 1500 (the “Subject Vehicle”). 18 (Dkt. 1-1 at 11-15.)1 Specifically, Plaintiff alleges causes of action for violations of 19 California Civil Code §§ 1793.2(d), 1793.2(b), 1793.2(a)(3), breach of the implied 20 warranty of merchantability, and violation of the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty 21 Act. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he is a resident of the State of California. (Id. at 11.) 22 Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of 23 Delaware and registered to conduct business in California. (Id.) 24 Plaintiff alleges that during his ownership, “the Subject Vehicle manifested 25

26 1 The Court notes that Plaintiff’s Complaint, filed herein as an attachment to 27 Defendant’s Notice of Removal does not contain consecutive page numbers. (Dkt. 1-1.) Thus, the Court uses the CM/ECF page numbers when referencing specific 28 pages of the Complaint. 1 limited to, “infotainment and engine defects.” (Id. at 12.) Plaintiff further alleges 2 that he “delivered the Subject Vehicle to Defendant and/or authorized service and 3 repair facilities for diagnosis and repair of the defects. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that 4 “Defendant and/or its authorized service and repair facilities failed to service or 5 repair the Subject Vehicle to conform with the applicable express warranties after a 6 reasonable number of opportunities to do so.” (Id.) 7 Plaintiff seeks actual, equitable, statutory, incidental, and consequential 8 damages. (Id. at 16.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s conduct was willful and 9 therefore seeks civil penalties of up to two times the amount of actual damages. (Id. 10 at 12-14, 16.) Finally, Plaintiff seeks attorneys’ fees and costs, prejudgment 11 interest, and other relief as the Court may deem proper. (Id. at 16.) 12

13

IV.

14 15 DEFENDANT’S NOTICE OF REMOVAL 16 Defendant removed the action based on diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 17 § 1332 and 1446. (Dkt. 1 at 2.) Defendant points to the allegation in the Complaint 18 that Plaintiff is a resident of California. (Id. at 3.) Defendant then states that its 19 “preliminary investigation also concluded that Plaintiff resided in California when 20 he purchased the [S]ubject [V]ehicle, and on other occasions, establishing a 21 plausible basis for intent to remain in California thus providing a plausible basis for 22 citizenship.” (Id.) Defendant states that it is a Delaware corporation with its 23 principal place of business in Michigan, and therefore is a citizen of both Delaware 24 and Michigan for purposes of jurisdiction. (Id. at 3-4.) 25 With regard to the amount in controversy, Defendant points to the language in 26 the Complaint seeking recission of the contract, damages under the California 27 Commercial Code, civil penalties in the amount of two times Plaintiff’s actual 28 damages, consequential and incidental damages, attorneys’ fees, prejudgment 1 explains that under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, a plaintiff’s actual 2 damages for breach of warranty are an amount equal to the actual price paid or 3 payable by the buyer less applicable offsets. (Id. (citing Cal. Civ. Code §§ 4 1793.2(d)(2)(B), 1794(b)).) Defendant estimates the purchase price for the Subject 5 Vehicle to be $53,442.28. (Id. at 5.) Defendant further estimates $19,415.95 in 6 total deductions including estimates of mileage offset, third-party service contracts, 7 manufacturer’s rebate, and negative equity. (Id.) Thus, Defendant states that its 8 preliminary investigation “yield[ed] a plausible estimate of actual damages of 9 $34,026.33.” (Id.) 10 Defendant states that its “preliminary investigation into the vehicle repair 11 history and related case history revealed that Plaintiff is more likely than not to 12 actually seek civil penalties in this matter, and it would thus be reasonable to include 13 a meaningful amount for civil penalties, tied to the actual damages calculated.” (Id.) 14 15 Defendant further states that based on its “prior experience in similar matters, a 16 reasonable estimate of Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees accumulated up to this point in 17 litigation is $5,000.” (Id. at 6.) Additionally, Defendant’s “assessment is that this 18 case is not likely to resolve and conservatively including fees from work up for even 19 just 6 months post-removal, the amount in controversy more than exceeds the 20 jurisdictional threshold.” (Id.) “Considering the combination of actual damages, 21 civil penalties, past, and conservatively calculated future attorney fees,” Defendant 22 contends that “the amount in controversy meaningfully exceeds $75,000.” (Id.) 23 24 V. 25 DISCUSSION 26 Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s Notice of Removal was untimely because 27 the basis for removal was apparent on the face of the Complaint. (Dkt. 15 at 1.) 28 Additionally, Plaintiff contends that Defendant failed to carry its burden on removal 1 contends that neither diversity of citizenship nor the amount in controversy were 2 sufficiently clear from the face of the Complaint and therefore Defendant had no 3 duty to remove the action. (Dkt. 18 at 16-24.) Thus, the resolution of Plaintiff’s 4 Motion to Remand turns on whether the grounds for removal were sufficiently clear 5 from the face of the Complaint, and if not, whether Defendant carried its burden on 6 removal to establish subject matter jurisdiction. 7 For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that the grounds for 8 removal were not sufficiently clear from the face of the Complaint and the Notice of 9 Removal was therefore timely. The Court also concludes that Defendant met its 10 burden on removal of establishing subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, Plaintiff’s 11 Motion to Remand is DENIED. 12 A. The Grounds For Removal Were Not “Set Forth” On The Face Of 13 Plaintiff’s Complaint. 14 15 The Ninth Circuit has explained that there are three pathways for removal of 16 an action from state court. See Roth v. CHA Hollywood Med. Ctr., L.P., 720 F.3d 17 1121, 1124 (9th Cir. 2013). The first two pathways are contained in 28 U.S.C. § 18 1446(b) and impose 30-day deadlines for removal. See Dietrich v. Boeing Co., 14 19 F.4th 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 2021). The third pathway is based on reading 28 U.S.C. 20 § 1446 together with 28 U.S.C. § 1441 and permits removal up to one year from the 21 filing of the complaint, but this pathway only applies if the first two do not. See 22 Roth, 720 F.3d at 1125-26. 23 The first pathway is set forth by Section 1446(b)(1) and states that “[t]he 24 notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within 30 days after 25 the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial 26 pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is 27 based, or within 30 days after the service of summons upon the defendant if such 28 initial pleading has then been filed in court and is not required to be served on the 1 The second pathway is set forth by Section 1446(b)(3) and states in relevant part 2 that “if the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal 3 may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant, through service or 4 otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from 5 which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become 6 removable.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3) (emphasis added). 7 The third pathway is based on the interaction of Section 1446 with Section 8 1441. See Roth, 720 F.3d at 1125. Section 1441(a) states that “[e]xcept as 9 otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State 10 court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may 11 be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United 12 States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is 13 pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The Ninth Circuit has explained “that §§ 1441 and 14 15 1446, read together, permit a defendant to remove outside the two thirty-day periods 16 on the basis of its own information, provided that it has not run afoul of either of the 17 thirty-day deadlines.” Roth, 720 F.3d at 1125. Thus, “a defendant who has not lost 18 the right to remove because of a failure to timely file a notice of removal under § 19 1446(b)(1) or (b)(3) may remove to federal court when it discovers, based on its 20 own investigation, that a case is removable.” Id. at 1123. The only time limit on 21 removal under this third pathway is that a defendant must file the notice of removal 22 within one year of the filing of the complaint. Id. at 1126 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 23 1446(c)(1) for the one-year time limit). 24 Here, Defendant removed this action pursuant to the third pathway set forth 25 above after conducting “a preliminary investigation [which] determined that 26 Plaintiff’s citizenship and the reasonable, non-speculative estimation of the amount 27 in controversy placed at issue through Plaintiff’s allegations plausibly g[a]ve rise to 28 subject matter jurisdiction.” (Dkt. 1 at 2.) Defendant contends that it timely 1 triggered and it ultimately removed the action less than one year after the filing of 2 the Complaint. (Id. at 10.) By contrast, Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s removal 3 was untimely because service of the Complaint on March 19, 2025 triggered the 30- 4 day deadline to remove the action under the first pathway, 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). 5 (Dkt. 15 at 1-2.) Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the 30-day deadline to remove 6 was triggered under Section 1446(b)(1) because the Complaint alleges a Magnuson- 7 Moss Warranty Act claim, providing the Court federal question jurisdiction, and 8 because the threshold requirements for diversity jurisdiction were ascertainable from 9 the face of the Complaint. (Id. at 4-7.) As explained below, the Court concludes 10 that the grounds for removal were not set forth on the face of the Complaint. 11 1. Plaintiff’s Magnuson-Moss Warranty Claim Did Not 12 Independently Establish Federal Question Jurisdiction. 13 First, Plaintiff contends that the grounds for removal were set forth on the 14 15 face of the Complaint because it alleges an “independent claim under the Federal 16 Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, [which] formed the bases of federal question 17 jurisdiction when initially filed on March 19, 2025.” (Dkt. 15 at 4-5.) However, the 18 Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act states that “[n]o claim shall be cognizable . . . if the 19 amount in controversy is less than the sum or value of $50,000 (exclusive of 20 interests and costs) computed on the basis of all claims to be determined in this 21 suit.” 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(3)(B). Thus, “[i]n order [to] file a claim in district court 22 under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, the amount in controversy must be at least 23 $50,000.” Guerrero v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 2023 WL 4085975, at *1 (C.D. 24 Cal. June 20, 2023). “There is nothing in the text of the Magnuson-Moss Act that 25 would indicate that the amount in controversy for that statute is assessed any 26 differently than the diversity jurisdiction requirement found in 28 U.S.C. § 1332.” 27 Romo v. FFG Ins. Co., 397 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1240 (C.D. Cal. 2005). Thus, 28 Plaintiff’s Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claim did not independently provide 1 still needed to sufficiently allege an amount in controversy of $50,000. As 2 explained below, the Complaint is indeterminate as to the amount in controversy. 3 2. Plaintiff’s Complaint Is Indeterminate As To The Amount In 4 Controversy. 5 As set forth above, the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act requires an 6 amount in controversy of at least $50,000. See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(3)(B). And of 7 course, diversity jurisdiction requires an amount in controversy that exceeds 8 $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Plaintiff contends that even though the 9 Complaint does not allege an amount in controversy, Defendant should have been 10 able to determine the amount in controversy from the face of the Complaint because 11 “the make, model, year, and VIN[] were included within the factual bases alleged 12 within the Complaint.” (Dkt. 15 at 9.) 13 However, in Harris v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., the plaintiff argued that the 14 15 defendant “should have looked in its files within the first thirty days” to discover 16 that a named defendant whose presence in the suit frustrated complete diversity of 17 citizenship had died, and therefore should have recognized that the case was 18 immediately removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Harris, 425 F.3d at 696. The 19 Ninth Circuit rejected this argument in favor of “a bright-line approach” that relies 20 on “objective analysis of the pleadings” instead of asking “whether [a] defendant 21 had subjective knowledge, or whether [a] defendant conducted [a] sufficient 22 inquiry.” Id. at 697. Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that materials outside the 23 complaint, even in the defendant’s own files, did not trigger the 30-day deadline to 24 remove under the first pathway (28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1)). See id. 25 The Ninth Circuit reinforced the holding and rationale from Harris in 26 Kuxhausen v. BMW Fin. Servs. NA LLC, 707 F.3d 1136 (2013). In Kuxhausen, the 27 Ninth Circuit held that the amount in controversy for removal under the Class 28 Action Fairness Act was not sufficiently clear from the face of the complaint 1 other class members’ vehicle financing contracts, and instead, alleged only the value 2 of the named class representative’s vehicle financing contract. See Kuxhausen, 707 3 F.3d at 1140-41. The Ninth Circuit relied on Harris to specifically reject the 4 argument “that BMW should have consulted its business records to identify a 5 representative valuation.” Id. at 1141. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit explained “that 6 BMW was not obligated to supply information which Kuxhausen had omitted.” Id. 7 Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that because the complaint did not allege the 8 amount demanded by each of the putative class members, “it fell short of triggering 9 the removal clock under Section 1446(b).” Id. 10 The Court concludes that Harris and Kuxhausen are controlling here. 11 Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege the amount in controversy, even by 12 approximation. Instead, the Complaint simply identifies the make, model, year, and 13 VIN of the Subject Vehicle. (Dkt. 1-1 at 11.) The Ninth Circuit has clearly and 14 15 repeatedly held that this is insufficient to start the removal clock under Section 16 1446(b) and that Defendant was not required to research its internal files to 17 determine the value of the vehicle contract at issue. See Harris, 425 F.3d at 696-97; 18 Kuxhausen, 707 F.3d at 1140-41; Crystal Fortune v. Gen. Motors, LLC, et al., 2025 19 WL 2866659, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2025) (“In this case, Plaintiff’s Complaint 20 does not allege a specific amount in controversy, nor does it allege specific facts that 21 would allow Defendant to make simple calculations to ascertain the amount in 22 controversy issue (like the purchase price of the Vehicle). Under such circumstances 23 and in accordance with Harris and Kuxhausen (and numerous district court opinions 24 within the Ninth Circuit), the Court concludes that service of the summons and 25 complaint did not trigger Defendant’s 30-day time period for removal.”). 26 Plaintiff contends that the Complaint actually does allege the amount in 27 controversy because “both the caption page and accompanying Civil Case Cover 28 Sheet expressly indicated that the claim was being brought under the state court’s 1 However, the caption page and Civil Case Cover Sheet merely indicate that the 2 “Amount demanded exceeds $35,000.” (Dkt. 1-1 at 3, 10.) There is no indication 3 of whether the amount demanded is the total amount in controversy, in which case 4 the amount would be too low, or whether this is the amount demanded for actual 5 damages. See Longoria v. Ford Motor Co., 2022 WL 16961482, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 6 Nov. 16, 2022) (“Yet the Civil Cover Sheet for Plaintiff’s Complaint did not assert 7 that his ‘damages’ exceed $25,000: it stated only that the ‘amount demanded 8 exceeds $25,000,’ and did not specify what this amount includes.”). Thus, the Court 9 concludes that the caption page and Civil Case Cover Sheet were insufficient to 10 trigger Defendant’s 30-day deadline for removal.2 See, e.g., id.; accord Cuevas v. 11 Ford Motor Co., 2022 WL 1487178, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 11, 2022); Carillo v. FCA 12 USA, LLC, 546 F. Supp. 3d 995, 1000–01 (C.D. Cal. 2021). Accordingly, the 13 Court concludes that Defendant’s Notice of Removal was timely. 14 15 2. Plaintiff’s Complaint Is Also Indeterminate As to Citizenship. 16 Even if the Complaint had sufficiently alleged the amount in controversy, 17 which it did not, the Court would still conclude that Defendant’s 30-day deadline for 18 removal was not triggered under the first pathway because the Complaint is also 19 indeterminate as to Plaintiff’s citizenship. As set forth above, Plaintiff’s Complaint 20 only alleges that “Plaintiff is, and at all times relevant herein was, a resident of 21 Madera, California.” (Dkt. 1-1 at 11.) However, “the diversity jurisdiction statute, 22 28 U.S.C. § 1332, speaks of citizenship, not residency.” Kanter v. Warner-Lambert 23 24 2 To trigger the 30-day deadline, all that Plaintiff needed to do was allege the 25 approximate value of the sales contract and facts necessary to calculate the statutory use offset. See, e.g., Larios v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 2025 WL 2402250, at *4-6 26 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2025) (holding that plaintiff sufficiently alleged the amount in 27 controversy to trigger the 30-day deadline for removal because the complaint alleged the approximate value of the sales contract and facts necessary to calculate 28 the statutory use offset). 1 citizenship is . . . determined by [their] state of domicile, not [their] state of 2 residence.” Id. A person is domiciled in a state where they live and intend to 3 remain permanently. See id. “A person residing in a given state is not necessarily 4 domiciled there, and thus is not necessarily a citizen of that state.” Id.; see also 5 Weible v. United States, 244 F.2d 158, 163 (9th Cir.1957) (“Residence is physical, 6 whereas domicile is generally a compound of physical presence plus an intention to 7 make a certain definite place one’s permanent abode, though, to be sure, domicile 8 often hangs on the slender thread of intent alone, as for instance where one is a 9 wanderer over the earth. Residence is not an immutable condition of domicile.”). 10 Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s bare allegation of residency 11 was insufficient to trigger Defendant’s 30-day deadline for removal on the basis of 12 complete diversity under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.3 See, e.g., Crisp-Stoot v. Wal-Mart 13 Stores, Inc., 2019 WL 1307735, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2019) (“[A]n allegation 14 15 that an individual is a resident of a state is not enough to show that she is a citizen of 16 that state. And because the thirty-day removal clock does not start running until the 17 defendant receives a pleading or other paper that affirmatively reveals that the case 18 is removable, with no need for further investigation, this Court has previously held 19 that information in pleadings or other papers about residence alone is not enough to 20 start the clock.” (citations omitted)); accord Brady v. Kohl’s, Inc., 2022 WL 21 4104627, at *2-3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2022); Cioffi v. Solomon, 2014 WL 6679555, 22 at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2014); Tandoc v. U.S. Renal Care, Inc., 2025 WL 23 1397193, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 14, 2025); Brinkley v. Monterey Fin. Servs., Inc., 24 2016 WL 4886934, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2016). 25 In sum, the Court concludes that Defendant’s 30-day deadline for removal 26

27 3 Of course, Plaintiff could have easily put Defendant on notice of the existence 28 of complete diversity by simply alleging his citizenship. 1 to both the amount in controversy and Plaintiff’s citizenship. Thus, the Court 2 concludes that Defendant’s Notice of Removal was timely. Accordingly, the Court 3 now turns to the question of whether Defendant has met its burden on removal to 4 establish subject matter jurisdiction. 5 B. Defendant’s Notice Of Removal Plausibly Alleges Diversity Jurisdiction. 6 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a), a defendant’s notice of removal must be signed 7 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and include “a short and plain 8 statement of the grounds for removal, together with a copy of all process, pleadings, 9 and orders served upon such defendant.” The Supreme Court has explained that 10 where removal is based on diversity jurisdiction, “a defendant’s notice of removal 11 need include only a plausible allegation that the amount in controversy exceeds the 12 jurisdictional threshold.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC, v. Owens, 574 13 U.S. 81, 89 (2014). “Evidence establishing the amount is controversy is required by 14 15 §1446(c)(2)(B) only when the plaintiff contests, or the court questions, the 16 defendant’s allegation.” Id. 17 Plaintiff argues in his Motion to Remand that “Defendant’s Notice of 18 Removal is procedurally defective as it is untimely,” but never actually challenges 19 the accuracy of Defendant’s allegations in the Notice of Removal. (Dkt. 15 at 10.) 20 Indeed, under a heading in the Motion to Remand arguing that Defendant “Has 21 Failed To Establish Subject Matter Jurisdiction,” Plaintiff simply asserts that 22 “Defendant has failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that removal was proper 23 in any respect, as the removal was plainly untimely.” (Id. at 11.) This single- 24 sentence assertion constitutes the entire paragraph of argument without any further 25 explanation. (Id.) The only other reference to Defendant not meeting its burden is 26 in the Notice of Motion, where Plaintiff states that “Defendant failed to establish 27 removal is substantively proper.” (Id. at 2.) 28 Plaintiff argues in his Reply that Defendant was required to submit evidence 1 threshold because Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand contests the amount in controversy. 2 (Dkt. 19 at 5.) However, this argument was raised for the first time in the Reply and 3 is therefore waived. See, e.g., Bazuaye v. INS, 79 F.3d 118, 120 (9th Cir. 1996) 4 (“Issues raised for the first time in the reply brief are waived.”); Dytch v. Yoon, 5 2011 WL 839421, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2011) (collecting cases); Rosita M. 6 Stewart v. Gen. Motors LLC, 2025 WL 2848991, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2025) 7 (“Plaintiffs have waived this argument by failing to raise it in their initial brief.”); 8 accord Watanabe v. Gen. Motors LLC, 2025 WL 2848993, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 9 2025). Regardless, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand does not actually contest the 10 amount in controversy. 11 Plaintiff contends that he “explicitly raised the issue both in the Notice of 12 Motion and throughout the memorandum.” (Dkt. 19 at 5 (citing Dkt. 15 at 2:17; id. 13 at 8:4-9; id. at 9:22-10:8; id. at 10:12-11:7).) As set forth above, Plaintiff’s Notice 14 15 of Motion states, “Defendant failed to establish removal is substantively proper.” 16 (Dkt. 15 at 2:17.) However, it is unclear what Plaintiff means by the contention that 17 Defendant’s removal is not “substantively proper” because Plaintiff failed to support 18 this assertion with any argument or explanation in his brief.4 Plaintiff’s failure to 19 support this assertion with any argument or explanation violates Local Rule 7-5 and 20 constitutes waiver of the argument. See C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15 (“There shall be served 21 and filed with the notice of motion: . . . [a] brief but complete memorandum in 22 support thereof and the points and authorities upon which the moving party will 23 rely[.]”); Van Steenwyk v. Van Steenwyk, 2021 WL 4815212, at *16 (C.D. Cal. 24

25 4 As set forth above, the only argument in the Motion to Remand about Defendant’s burden to establish proper removal is the single-sentence assertion that 26 “Defendant has failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that removal was proper 27 in any respect, as the removal was plainly untimely.” (Dkt. 15 at 11.) This sentence identifies only untimeliness as a defect in the Notice of Removal and does not 28 contest the amount in controversy. (See id.) 1 this claim, they did not brief the issue in their motion. Dkt. 94 at 1. The ATA 2 defendants have waived the ground by failing to argue it.”); Foye v. Victor Valley 3 Medium Cmty. Corr. Facility, 119 F. App’x 871, 872 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The 4 remaining issues raised in Foye’s opening brief are waived because they are not 5 supported by specific, cogent argument.”). 6 The remaining portions of the Motion to Remand identified by Plaintiff as 7 contesting the amount in controversy simply do not contest the amount in 8 controversy. (Dkt. 15 at 8:4-9; id. at 9:22-10:8; id. at 10:12-11:7). To the contrary, 9 Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand repeatedly argues that the jurisdictional threshold for 10 the amount in controversy is met and was apparent from the facts alleged in the 11 Complaint. (Dkt. 15 at 9 (“Plaintiff emphasizes to the Court Defendant had more 12 than sufficient information at its disposal to provide a plausible allegation regarding 13 the satisfaction of the jurisdictional threshold.”); id. (“[I]t follows logically that the 14 15 restitution amount coupled with the demand for civil penalties and attorneys’ fees 16 under the Act, not to mention Defendant’s sophistication in the market valuation of 17 the vehicles it manufactures and sells, make it clear that the instant action was 18 removable since Defendant was served with a copy of the Complaint and 19 Summons.”).) 20 Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff did not challenge the accuracy 21 of Defendant’s allegations as to the amount in controversy and therefore Defendant 22 was not required to present evidence to establish that the amount in controversy met 23 the jurisdictional threshold. See Ehrman v. Cox Commc’ns, Inc., 932 F.3d 1223, 24 1228 (9th Cir. 2019) (“In short, Cox alleged the parties’ citizenships based on 25 information and belief in its notice of removal. And, because Ehrman asserted a 26 facial, rather than a factual or as-applied, challenge to the notice of removal, those 27 allegations were sufficient. No evidence was required.” (citation omitted)); 28 NewGen, LLC v. Safe Cig, LLC, 840 F.3d 606, 614 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Only upon a 1 allegations with proof.”). Instead, Defendant was only required to plausibly allege 2 diversity jurisdiction with a “a short and plain statement of the grounds for 3 removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a); see Ehrman, 932 F.3d at 1228. 4 The Court concludes that Defendant plausibly alleged the grounds for 5 diversity jurisdiction in the Notice of Removal. As set forth above, the Notice of 6 Removal points to Plaintiff’s allegation in the Complaint that he is a resident of 7 California. (Dkt. 1 at 3.) The Notice of Removal further states that Defendant’s 8 “preliminary investigation also concluded that Plaintiff resided in California when 9 he purchased the [S]ubject [V]ehicle, and on other occasions, establishing a 10 plausible basis for intent to remain in California thus providing a plausible basis for 11 citizenship.” (Id.) The Notice of Removal states that Defendant is a Delaware 12 corporation with its principal place of business in Michigan, and therefore is a 13 citizen of both Delaware and Michigan for purposes of jurisdiction. (Id. at 3-4.) 14 15 Thus, the Notice of Removal plausibly alleges complete diversity.5 16 With regard to the amount in controversy, the Notice of Removal states that 17 based on a preliminary investigation, Defendant estimates the purchase price for the 18 Subject Vehicle to be $53,422.28. (Id. at 5.) The Notice of Removal further states 19 that Defendant estimates $19,415.95 in total deductions including estimates of 20 mileage offset, third-party service contracts, manufacturer’s rebate, and negative 21 equity. (Id.) Thus, the Notice of Removal states that Defendant’s preliminary 22 investigation “yields a plausible estimate of actual damages of $34,026.33.” (Id.) 23 The Notice of Removal further alleges that it would be “reasonable to include a 24

25 5 Indeed, Plaintiff affirmatively argues that complete diversity exists and was apparent from the face of the Complaint. (Dkt. 15 at 5 (“Defendant incorrectly 26 contends that removal was not triggered by the Complaint because it purportedly 27 fails to establish the amount in controversy and Plaintiff’s state of citizenship. The Court should not be misled by Defendant’s arguments, which are on their face 28 misleading and unpersuasive.” (citation omitted)).) 1 The Notice of Removal states that based on Defendant’s “prior experience in similar 2 matters, a reasonable estimate of Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees accumulated up to this 3 point in litigation is $5,000.” (Id. at 6.) Finally, the Notice of Removal states that 4 “[c]onsidering the combination of actual damages, civil penalties, past, and 5 conservatively calculated future attorney’s fees, the amount in controversy 6 meaningfully exceeds $75,000.” (Id.) Thus, the Notice of Removal plausibly 7 alleges that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.6 8 In sum, the Court concludes that Plaintiff did not challenge the accuracy of 9 Defendant’s allegations as to the amount in controversy and therefore Defendant 10 was not required to present evidence to establish that the amount in controversy met 11 the jurisdictional threshold. The Court further concludes that the Notice of Removal 12 plausibly alleges the existence of subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity of 13 citizenship and an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000. 14 15 C. Plaintiff’s Request For Attorneys’ Fees And Costs Is Denied. 16 Plaintiff seeks an award of attorney’s fees and costs for having to bring the 17 Motion to Remand. (Dkt. 15 at 11-12.) However, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) only 18 authorizes an award of fees and costs where a court grants a motion to remand. See 19 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“An order remanding the case may require payment of just 20 costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the 21 removal.”). Here, the Court has determined that it must deny Plaintiff’s Motion to 22 Remand. Accordingly, no fees or costs are authorized. 23 24 6 Indeed, Plaintiff affirmatively argues that the jurisdictional threshold for the 25 amount in controversy is met and was apparent from the face of the Complaint. (Dkt. 15 at 5 (“[T]he record clearly reflects that Defendant had sufficient 26 information to plausibly allege satisfaction of the jurisdictional threshold . . . .”); id. 27 at 9 (“Plaintiff emphasizes to the Court Defendant had more than sufficient information at its disposal to provide a plausible allegation regarding the satisfaction 28 of the jurisdictional threshold.”).) 1 VI. 3 ORDER 3 Consistent with the foregoing, Plaintiff's Motion to Remand is DENIED. 4 (Dkt. 15.) The Court will also issue a separate scheduling order. (Dkt. 17.) 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 7 || DATED: October 15, 2025 Nek Palle g HONAA. JOEL RICHLIN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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